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
ARMY IN INDIA COMMITTEE, 1912.

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VOLUME V.

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DIGEST OF EVIDENCE.



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## DIGEST OF EVIDENCE.

### AFGHANISTAN.

#### BRITISH LINES OF ADVANCE—COMMUNICATIONS.

*General Staff Appreciation. Appendix I.*—Owing to state of communications, doubtful whether a force sufficient to protect Kabul against Russians could be maintained at that place. 12.

*Colonel Bingley.*—Peshawar-Kabul road is now a good road throughout. Amir's interest in motoring has resulted in improvement of roads in Afghanistan generally. 2.

People of Afghanistan rely, as heretofore, on camels and mules for their internal traffic. 18.

Amir's road making programme includes project for motor road from Kabul to Kandahar and round to Herat. Of this proposed road 183 miles were completed in 1911, and the remaining 128 miles to Kandahar should be finished during the summer of 1912. 22.

With exception of Amir's motor roads, the roads are considered to be unmetalled tracks, probably mostly in a bad condition. Amir stated that his subjects were opposed to the construction of railways. 26.

No steps have been taken to bridge rivers in Afghanistan except on the Amir's motor roads. 28.

Amir proposes to organize a parcel service with motor lorries between Kabul and Peshawar. 33.

A mile of railway a day is considered a not unreasonable rate of construction on the southern line of advance, but such a rate would be quite impossible on the northern line. 201.

Officially estimated that it would take three months to prolong railway from Chaman to Kandahar. Section of line compiled from field note books now in records of Railway Board. 203, 205.

Easier for Russians to get to foot of Hindu Kush than for us to get there. 207.

Broad gauge railway and bridging material stored at Chaman. 225.

*Mr. Hayden.*—Road over Lataband Kotal not now used; the road over Haft Kotal is the one now followed. 1526.

Road over Haft Kotal fit for motor traffic. 1528.

Road leading north from Kabul perfectly good but not metalled. The road up the Gorbund valley excellent for caravan traffic throughout its length. 1530, 1532.

The Amir has made an excellent caravan road over the Ak Robat Pass; this pass blocked throughout the winter. 1538.

The fields and gardens at the bottom of the valleys in the neighbourhood of the Hindu Kush provide excellent camping grounds. 1568.

Passes over Hindu Kush only open from about beginning of June to October. 1570.

Could get guns across Ak Robat Pass, but not over Shahdarrah Pass. 1576.

*General Dickie.*—A line of railway through the Khyber would interfere seriously with the use of the road. Sound policy to adopt, pending resumption of construction of the Kabul river railway, is to double the road through the Khyber. 1940.

Motor lorries could travel along the Khyber. 1948.



*General Aylmer.*—Regards southern line as more important and practicable than the northern or central line. 2525.

Does not think we can reach the Hindu Kush passes before the Russians. If Afghans cordially accept our assistance, and the tribes are friendly we might combine with them to drive Russians from Hindu Kush passes, and occupy Girishk-Ghazni-Kabul and the Hindu Kush passes. 2547.

If Afghan friendliness consisted of surly acceptance, extremely probable that we might have to confine our first advance to the Girishk-Ghazni-Jalalabad line till reinforcements arrived 2547.

*Sir H. McMahon.*—Roads over Hindu Kush undoubtedly difficult but considers that guns could be taken over them. 3371.

Amir doing his best to accustom his people to the idea of having railways. 3399.

No British-Indian troops should cross the Afghan boundary until the Afghan Government ask for armed assistance. Whoever attempts to stay in Kabul, whether as friend or foe, will probably soon have the people against him. A British force should never be sent to Kabul unless necessity absolutely demands it, and the less time it spends in the actual neighbourhood of Kabul the better. Preferable to make Kandahar the main line of advance. Unwise to suppose that the Russians could not get to the crest of the Hindu Kush in much less time and in greater numbers than we could. 3411.

Road fit for motors between Dakka and Kabul.

Road from Chaman to Kandahar in fairly good condition. 3457.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—Communications in Afghanistan the most difficult in the world. 3986.

Hesitates to accept the view that we can advance to Kabul and Kandahar with the rapidity that is assumed. 3990.

In a war with Russia, we would have six months to get to Kabul and Kandahar instead of the few weeks that Army Headquarters contemplate or assume. 3992.

In war with Russia would confine advance to Kandahar-Jalalabad plan, but if the people in Afghanistan were friendly and were afraid of Russia, it would be quite safe for us to go to Kabul but not otherwise. 4004.

Three lines of advance strategically unsound and strategical folly. 4008, 4104.

Kandahar line is the only one which would allow of any extensive use being made of cavalry across the frontier. 4046.

*Sir G. Roos-Koppel.*—Main road from Jamrud to Landi Kotal has been widened and well metalled. The difficult parts of a second road have been finished and metalled and could be completed at short notice. Road made through Mullagori country to Landi Kotal. Road from Torkham to Kabul has been improved. Road between Jalalabad and Kabul has been lightly metalled. It is possible to take motors to Jalalabad through the Khyber. 4742.

Light transport lorries would cut the roads in Afghanistan to pieces in a very short time. 4746.

Does not think the proposed motor service between Landi Kotal and Kabul will come to anything. 4750.

Considers that our line of communication to Kabul should be very strong as it would bear the brunt of the fighting, while a much smaller force than that suggested could deal with Kabul. 5042.

Kabul is Afghanistan, and the capture of Kandahar by itself could never end an Afghan war. Arguments in favour of a main advance on Kabul by Kandahar. 5044.

Balance of advantage rests with an advance by the Khyber road utilizing the Kurram as an auxiliary line of advance in the summer and autumn. 5044.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—Whether Russia has Afghanistan with her or not, we must occupy Kabul as soon as possible. To leave Kabul alone whilst the Russians consolidated their position in Afghan-Turkistan and made preparation

for crossing the Hindu Kush would mean that the Afghans might or might not go over to Russia but would in any case go dead against us. 5343.

The roads from Dakka to Kabul and from Kabul in various directions are good surface roads but would never stand heavy wheeled traffic. 5343.

Cannot conceive of any situation under which we could not be in Kabul before the Russians. 5345, 5349.

In the event of a war with Russia would not delay the advance on Kabul until we were asked to go there by the Afghans. 5351, 5353.

If the Afghans were friendly we might try to hold the mouths of the Hindu Kush passes but not otherwise. 5352.

If Russia did Afghanistan a really bad turn, and the Afghans remained friendly to us, would send some troops to assist Afghans on Hindu Kush, and also occupy Kabul-Ghazni-Kandahar line. 5361.

*General Birdwood.*—In a war with Russia we must occupy Kabul with the least possible delay as it is the key of Afghanistan.

Essential for us to extend our frontier railways to the foot of the Peiwar Kotal and to our frontier in the direction of Dakka. 7281.

*Sir T. Wynne.*—From Dakka to Kabul it would be impossible to advance the railway at the rate of a mile a day. 8896.

It would take three or four months, or about a third of a mile a day to construct a line from Dakka to Jalalabad, the trouble is not in laying the rails but in making the formation. 8926.

Rails could be laid down for the Chaman to Kandahar line in about three months. 8966.

A rope-way would help us in getting supplies over the Khyber, would probably have to work it with electricity. 9047.

*General Hamilton Gordon.*—It was always hoped that improvement to the roads within our own border leading up to Afghanistan would be proceeded with until they were at least equally as good as the roads to be found on the other side of the border. 13853.

The extension of railway communications has, it is understood, failed to receive sanction, but with the improvement of the roads the maintenance of the force mentioned for Kabul is thought to be possible, more particularly as in all probability motor transport could be made available to a considerable extent. 13853.

As regards the Amir's road making programme, were these roads to be used by ourselves, they would probably be more to our advantage than to that of the Afghans, though no doubt in many cases they would make it easier than before for the Amir to concentrate larger forces and to supply them. 13887.

The roads on our side of the frontier, from Jamrud onwards, compare unfavourably, according to reliable accounts, as regards number with those in Afghanistan. 13887.

Our road up the Khyber is better constructed than any road on the other side, but from reports of those witnesses who have recently travelled, the Afghan roads certainly show that remarkable improvements have taken place both in their numbers and construction as compared with what was the case before. 13887.

Recommendations made to the Government of India and the Secretary of State regarding the urgent necessity for improving communications through the Khyber so as to make them available for motor transport. 13887.

As regards the roads on the central and southern lines, the roads up to our frontier are probably superior to those beyond it, but we have information that a motor road between Kandahar and Kabul is likely to be completed in the near future. 13887.

*General Birdwood.*—In regard to the roads on the lines of advance being cut up by mechanical transport, the question of laying down metal and tar has been considered but the expense would be very great. 15663.

## AFGHANISTAN.

## MILITARY STRENGTH.

*General Staff Appreciation. Appendix I.*—Under the present Amir the armament of the people with modern rifles has been encouraged. Regular army improved and better armed, especially as regards artillery, but training and organization still very defective. Chief weakness lies on Russian frontier where the population is non-Afghan. 23.

*Notes on Military resources of Afghanistan 1912. Appendix II.*

Four military districts, Kabul, Kandahar, Herat and Afghan-Turkistan which are again divided into sub-districts. 1.

Highest unit is the brigade, composed usually of all three arms, and at present confined to the troops of Kabul District; this brigade organization is being gradually extended to the other districts. 1.

Statement showing in detail strength and distribution of the Afghan forces. 1.

A brigade at Kabul consists of 3 battalions infantry, 3 regiments cavalry, 3 field batteries and 3 mountain batteries.

Statement showing in detail strength and composition of the Kabul brigades. 1.

Brigades other than Kabul Brigades when fully organized will consist normally of :—2 battalions of infantry, 1 regiment of cavalry, and 1 mountain battery. 1.

Artillery has no brigade organization, batteries being allotted to mixed brigades. Batteries have normally six guns except heavy batteries which have four. 1.

A battalion of infantry has normally 600 men and a regiment of cavalry 400. 1.

None of the senior officers have proved their capacity as commanders and it is improbable that any of them are capable of handling a large force in the field. 2.

Inayatullah Khan, the Amir's eldest son, who is titular Commander-in-Chief, is zealous in his duties, and has received his military training from a Turkish Engineer officer, who is Principal of the Sirajiya Military School at Kabul. 2.

Strength and organization of the Afghan Army (a total authorized strength estimated at 95,200 men with 490 mobile guns, but the actual is probably less as units are not all up to strength). 3.

A reserve system exists by which each household is called on to provide a recruit if sufficient volunteers are not forthcoming. These would be utilized to meet deficiencies in regular units on mobilization, also to replace wastage and to meet a national emergency. 4.

The bulk of the adult males of Afghan tribes would no doubt take up arms to resist an invasion of their tribal limits and it is the avowed policy of the Amir to distribute rifles wholesale and thus facilitate the raising of a *levée en masse* should the necessity arise. 4.

Rates of pay and periods of service in the Afghan Army. 3, 6.

The fidelity of many regiments to the present dynasty may be doubted. The six Hazara regiments are notoriously disloyal while the Ghilzai regiments would probably welcome a change of government. 7.

Units are recruited generally on a territorial basis but their location is not necessarily territorial. Statement of recruiting areas and tribal composition of regiments. 8.

The older officers of the Afghan Army have had practically no military education and are incapable of reading a map. They cannot compare with our own Indian officers including those of the Imperial Service Troops. They may have some capacity for command but are ignorant and incapable of training their men. 9, 10.

The younger generation of officers are improving under Turkish instruction but a decade must elapse before the teaching of the military school can be expected to bear fruit. 10.

Except in the case of Kabul and possibly of the Herat garrisons, the training of the infantry is generally indifferent, and off the parade ground training is still in the elementary stage. Musketry training and field firing have been only recently introduced (1911) at Kabul and Herat and are, it is believed, not practised elsewhere. Entrenching, whether in attack or defence is rarely practised, nor is the use of obstacles understood. The usual attack formation appears to be successive lines in single rank at distance of about 100 yards. 11, 12.

Their lack of training renders the Afghan regular cavalry incapable of acting effectively against European or Indian cavalry. Their rôle is rather that of mounted infantry, scouts, and despatch riders. 11.

The drill and training of the artillery are poor. Until recently guns were seldom fired except for testing and ceremonial purposes. The Turkish instructors are gradually introducing more up-to-date methods but this improvement in the training is at present confined to the Kabul and Herat garrisons. 11.

At Kabul there are arsenals and factories capable of turning out all kinds of warlike stores from a fuze to a heavy gun, as well as saddlery, boots, equipment of all kinds, and woollen goods. The raw material for the above has mostly to be imported through India, and these are passed through the Indian Customs, duty free. The withdrawal of this privilege, though it would doubtless embarrass the Amir and bring work in the factories to a standstill, would probably drive him into the arms of Russia and force him to import his requirements through Russian and Persian territory. 13.

There are minor State workshops at Herat and gunpowder factories at Tatang, Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif and Bamian. 13.

Information concerning armament and distribution of the Afghan forces is necessarily vague and contradictory, but of one fact, however there is no doubt, and that is that there are more serviceable guns in Afghanistan than trained gunners to man them. The artillery suffers from a multiplicity of types. Details of the various types of guns. 14.

Of the imported guns, many of them, notably the 4" Krupp howitzer of 1902, were, at the date of importation, of the most modern type. 15.

Ammunition for these guns is imported, or manufactured in the Kabul arsenal after imported patterns. 16.

Smokeless powder of a sort has undoubtedly been manufactured in Kabul for some time past but only in small quantities. The cordite plant imported by the Amir through Indian ports in 1911 has not yet been brought into use. Reports are now awaited from the Ordnance Branch on a sample of an Afghan 3-pr. Q. F. mountain battery shell, and of Kabul-made smokeless powder and cartridges which have been sent to them for examination. 17.

Detail of machine guns. Afghans have no pom-poms. 18.

Troops at Kabul are armed with .303 magazine rifles, elsewhere with Martini-Henri rifles. Afghans estimated to have some 30,000 .203 rifles in all, including 12,000 now in possession of the troops: remaining rifles of the regular army are Martini either imported or Kabul-made. 19, 20.

The Amir is estimated to have approximately 1,000 rounds per rifle of .303 ammunition and sufficient Martini-Henri ammunition to meet all requirements. The Kabul arsenal is reported to be capable of turning out at least 15,000 rounds monthly. 21.

The Amir withheld from individuals permission to purchase arms from the State factory as they could purchase them elsewhere, *i.e.*, from the Afghan arms merchants, 22.

A large reserve of rifles is kept in the arsenals to be issued when required for a *levée en masse*. 22.

The tribesmen of the North-West Frontier and Afghanistan buy rifles in the open market at Kabul, Kandahar and Herat, from Ghilzais and other arms dealers. 22.

The time required to equip and despatch a punitive column against Khost does not give any reliable indication of how long the Afghan Army would require before it would be in a position to move against us. 25.

The Khassadars of the Kabul district are armed with Martini-Henri rifles; those stationed near the Khyber have Lee-Metfords. The Khassadars of other districts are armed with Martinis, Sniders, or muzzle-loading Enfield rifles. 27.

Khawanin sowars are armed with muzzle-loading Enfields and a few Sniders; as a fighting force they are almost a negligible quantity. 28.

There are a few forts in Afghanistan but these are considered incapable of resisting heavy and medium artillery and would not offer much protection against modern field and mountain howitzers. 29.

*Colonel Bingley.*—Amir has enough good guns to equip all his batteries. 54.

Organization of Afghan army is in brigades of all arms. 58.

Turkish instructors. 60, 64.

Afghan troops are of a certain military value and their efficiency is increasing. 70.

In future Afghans will have their irregular troops better armed and a backing of regular troops which they did not have before. 72.

Kabul brigades have Lee-Metfords, the rest of the regulars have Martinis. 79, 97.

Afghan officers in knowledge inferior to our Indian officers, in leading equal, and even better, in some cases. 85.

No really capable Afghan leaders. 87.

Turkish officer in Afghanistan experimenting with cordite manufacturing plant. 91.

Afghans can make excellent Martinis. 93, 95.

Amir has some machine guns. 101.

Amir has imported guns, rifles and small arms through British India on several occasions, and no objection has been raised. 111, 113, 115, 117.

Amir lately been importing mules; understand these are intended for mountain batteries. 139.

Understands the delay in suppressing the revolt in Khost was due to lack of transport. 139.

Amir has constructed defence works in northern Afghanistan, more especially at Kabul and Deh Dadi. These could not resist modern artillery and resemble fortified serais. 146.

*Sir M. Grover.*—Latest information shews Afghan army as having 490 mobile guns organized in 42 mountain, 36 field and 5 heavy batteries. 15,000 Kabul district troops could be concentrated against us within a fortnight, and later another 35,000. 483.

Recent instances in Khost cannot be regarded as giving us any idea at present of the efficiency and concentrating power of the Afghan troops. 483.

The armament of the Afghans has improved since 1878-80. 491, 493.

*Mr. Hayden.*—Afghans turning out small guns of 2-inch calibre from their factories. 1584, 1590.

Afghans do not yet know how to make smokeless powder. 1604.

The Afghan tribesmen, using guerilla tactics, would be much more formidable than the trained Afghan army which has deteriorated since Abdur Rahman's time. 1606.

Afghan forts are only fortified serais. 1614.

*General Aylmer.*—The military power of Afghanistan is steadily increasing, especially for purposes of defence. The Afghan regular army in itself not really formidable, but is rendered so by the strength of the Kabul line of defence, and the assistance it will receive from tribes. Afghan artillery not considered really formidable. 2549, 2551.

The Afghan Army has not shewn up at all well in connection with events in Khost. 2551.

*Sir H. McMahon.*—Afghanistan has increased in military strength since the accession of the present Amir. 3317.

Accepts statement shewing war strength of Afghanistan at 90,000 regular soldiers and a peace strength of about 50,000. 3325.

Afghan cavalry not much use for charging, but for rough work, getting over hills, and from point of view of mounted infantry, they are very hard to beat. They are beautifully mounted, their animals are strong, and they go everywhere and carry everything with them. Amir takes a great deal of interest in the artillery. 3333.

Afghans have many different patterns of guns, but the Afghan adapts himself very readily to conditions of that kind. 3335.

In a war with Afghanistan the irregular army of tribesmen would give more trouble than the regulars. 3337.

We cannot fairly judge the Afghan Army by the Khost affair because the Amir realized from the beginning what was the cause of the trouble in Khost. Does not think Amir was impressed by the danger of the rising and was slow to take action in the hope that he would be able to effect a settlement by less forceful means. 3343.

Amir very anxious to make cordite, but his experiments have not been very successful. Amir's smokeless powder also is not good. 3351.

We pass arms on to the Amir free of duty. 3353.

*Khassadars* very inefficient except as guerillas. 3365.

Irregular sowars fit only for irregular warfare and not very good at that. 3367.

Mud walls of forts in Afghanistan are of great thickness, perhaps howitzers would damage them. 3369.

Amir has a great many rifles stored at Kabul. 3373.

*Sir G. Roos-Koppel.*—The Amir has gigantic stores of ammunition (bulk Martini) in Kabul, which he has obtained from England, by the Gulf, and from his factories. 4856, 4858, 4904, 5018.

Amir empowered to import arms and ammunition duty free through British India, but we have the power to stop it at any time if deemed necessary. 4894, 4896.

The Amir has collected all sorts of stores, but has neglected the personnel to utilize them. 4906.

Afghan troops that he has seen in the provinces beneath contempt, not fit to face tribesmen, and far less to face our troops. Afghan army not really formidable, but were we to advance upon Kabul a great effort would be made to concentrate a sufficient force to fight a battle some few marches on this side of Kabul. 5018, 5024.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—The Afghan army, compared with European armies is a rabble; stiffened by the presence of British troops it might offer a good defence in the difficult passes and mountains north of Kabul but without such stiffening it would be swept away by Russia. 5361.

Afghan army is anything but formidable, a rapid mobilization and advance would cause panic in it. Its training and leading are merely nominal it could not concentrate in large numbers against us. 5363.

The Afghan guerillas, armed from the Amir's arsenals, would be the people who would give us trouble. 5365.

Does not think Afghan guerillas would give as much trouble as the tribesmen on the frontier. 5367.

The more the Amir organizes his army, the easier it will be to mop them up. 5369.

*General Hamilton Gordon.*—It is of course probable that the Amir's regular army is not as well trained and officered, and is not as formidable as a thoroughly efficient European regular army would be, but it is probably a far more formidable force than it was during the Afghan war of 1878-80. 13855.

Whether its organization and arrangements for supplies, transport, etc., are sufficient or not, there is no doubt that a definite attempt has been made to organize those services, and as compared with previous occasions the Afghan army ought to be far more efficient than before. 13855.

Not sure that all the Amir's guns are serviceable, but without being able to send a British officer to see them it is impossible to say. 13879, 13881.

We know that the Afghan troops are not as well trained and officered as they might be, but of the ammunition we have no information. 13883.

\* There can be no question that the Amir's policy of arming his people and the tribesmen and of maintaining a large reserve of arms and ammunition has made both of them far more formidable enemies than they were before. 13887.

## AFGHANISTAN.

## POLITICAL.

*General Staff Appreciation. Appendix I.*—Discharge of obligations to the Amir of Afghanistan might involve us in difficulties with Russia. 9.

Anglo-Russian Convention as regards Afghanistan has not yet received assent of Amir. This leaves loophole for future disagreement between the contracting parties. 10, 13, 22.

Chief weakness of Afghanistan lies on Russian frontier where the population is non-Afghan. 23.

Amir's difficulty in dealing with the more fanatical and ignorant of his subjects the chief danger of war. 24.

*Mr. Hayden.*—No anti-foreign feeling among the people, only among the officials. So long as the Afghans did not think we were going to take the country for ourselves, they would be extremely friendly. 1591.

*General Aylmer.*—Regards our co-operation in the field with Afghan troops with greater apprehension than he does the large Russian army. 2511.

Whoever took northern Afghanistan (not Afghan-Turkistan) would never cease to repent it. 2517.

*Sir H. McMahon.*—Nothing short of serious and active hostilities by the Afghan Government against ourselves should ever induce us to consider the question of invading or occupying any portion of Afghanistan, still less of effecting a partition of that country with Russia. Any attempt to impair or destroy the integrity of Afghanistan will be bitterly resented by Muhammadans throughout the world and more especially by those of India. 3197.

If we removed Afghanistan as a buffer State the Russians would not hear of any other arrangement except partition. 3201.

Would deprecate for every reason the partition of Afghanistan and would only consent to it in a case of absolute necessity. 3203.

We are only called upon to give the Amir assistance if he follows our advice. 3207, 3227.

The Amir has never consented to the Afghan clauses of the Anglo-Russian Convention and he will never probably do so. 3213, 3239, 3241.

Validity of Convention not at present affected by the Amir not having subscribed to it, but it is doubtless open to Russia in the future to question its validity on this ground. 3239.

The Agreement with the Amir has the very highest value. He is never likely to break the Agreement as long as we ourselves adhere to it. 3297.

People of Afghan-Turkistan are not Afghans and have little or no national spirit. They are very friendly towards the Russians largely owing to their trade with them. 3303.

If the Russians occupied Afghan-Turkistan they would come in for the richest portion of Afghanistan and be so much nearer the portions which are considered of vital importance to ourselves. 3307.

If we came to blows with Russia over Afghanistan we might count upon support from Afghanistan. 3315.

The whole of the Afghan people would follow the Amir with the exception, perhaps, of the Ghilzais. 3311.

A large faction of *mullahs* and conservative people would prefer Nasrulla Khan as Amir owing to his religious fanaticism and his dislike to Western improvements and innovations which the Amir favours, but Nasrulla Khan does not appear to lend himself to their designs. If he had had aims on the throne he could have seized it long ago. 3387.



Present Amir seems to have secured himself very firmly on the throne, and Afghanistan as a whole seems fairly contented at present. 3387.

Our obligations in respect of Afghanistan should be carried out to the letter. 3393.

Assuming eventual partition of Afghanistan and Persia, describes most desirable line of division. 3415.

As a whole, anti-foreign feeling has increased in Afghanistan during the last 30 years but in the case of south-west Afghanistan it is less than it was 30 years ago. 3425.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—In a war with Russia, Russians would content themselves in the first instance with the occupation of Badakshan, Turkistan, and the Herat Province; unless they were invited to Kabul as allies by the Afghans. 3984.

In a war with Russia would risk alliance with Afghanistan if we had a united people clamouring for our support. 4006.

Would preserve as far as possible the buffer State between Russian and British territory. 4010.

In the event of partition of Afghanistan would not go beyond Kandahar and Jalalabad Provinces if it could be avoided. 4018.

So long as present situation exists should like to maintain a "strong, friendly and united Afghanistan." 4024.

*Sir G. Roos-Keppel.*—The Amir keeps up regular pro-Afghan agencies amongst the tribes and subsidises them. Anybody who is notoriously anti-British receives an allowance from Kabul. 4782, 4790.

Should tribes have serious grievances, and their discontent tempt them to rise, their inclinations would doubtless be intensified by preachings and promises of support from Kabul. 4909.

Nasrulla Khan begs tribes always to keep in communication with each other. 4918.

In a tribal war the Afghan Government would disclaim any sympathy with the rebels, but would give covert assistance in the shape of food and ammunition and would wink at large numbers of Afghan subjects joining the tribesmen. 4944.

In minor troubles the Amir can always be brought to reason by closing the Khyber, but would not make use of this method too lightly or too frequently. 5053, 5057.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—In regard to Afghanistan, a nation so treacherous and barbarous keeps no agreements, and only acknowledges superior force. 5361.

In a war with Russia, supposing Afghanistan more or less friendly, would trust Afghans but would be on his guard. 5361.

As regards Afghan-Turkistan, what is the use of saying we could defend a place to which we cannot get our troops? 5379.

## AFGHANISTAN.

## RUSSIAN LINE OF ADVANCE—COMMUNICATIONS.

*General Staff Appreciation. Appendix I.*—Russian railway extension from Omsk through Vyerni to Aris a third line of advance to Afghan frontier. 11.

*Colonel Bingley.*—Easier for Russians to get to foot of Hindu Kush than for us to get there. 207.

Russians would have to occupy Afghan-Turkistan in any case and would then rush for Kabul because to occupy an enemy's capital is to strike a decisive blow at his power. 209.

Construction of railway to foot of Hindu Kush will enable Russians to feed their troops. 215.

Railway extension to Termez likely to be started soon because navigation of the Oxus is becoming more difficult. 217.

Known that Russia has collected material for the railway to the Oxus. 221.

Without the railway to Termez, Russians are in a relatively worse position than we are. 223.

*Mr. Hayden.*—The fields and gardens at the bottom of the valleys in the neighbourhood of the Hindu Kush provide excellent camping grounds. 1568.

Russians could not move troops with any degree of rapidity towards Kabul, and it is doubtful whether they could bring their guns across the passes. They would have to carry their own food by pack transport. 1576.

*General Aylmer.*—Russians in their first campaign would be content to advance as far as the Hindu Kush on the north. Roads from the Oxus are very difficult and the transport troubles would be enormous. They would not have much difficulty in seizing Herat and the Farah valley in a single campaign. 2531.

Does not think we can reach the Hindu Kush passes before the Russians. 2547.

*Sir H. McMahon*—Roads over Hindu Kush undoubtedly difficult, but considers that guns could be taken over them. 3371.

Sceptical about the rapidity with which it is assumed that the Russians will be able to move. Unwise to suppose that the Russians could not get to the crest of the Hindu Kush in much less time and greater numbers than we could. 3411.

Of opinion that the Russians would never dream of going to Kabul direct. They would advance slowly and consolidate their position in the north before they tried to cross the Hindu Kush. 3413.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—Russians would content themselves in the first instance with the occupation of Badakshan, Turkistan and the Herat Province, unless they were invited to Kabul as allies by the Afghans. 3984.

Contests alleged ability of the Russians to make a rapid advance on Kabul and Kandahar. 3985.

*Sir J. Villencks.*—Russians would of course occupy Afghan-Turkistan early, but unless the Afghans themselves desired it they could not reach Kabul for many months. 5343.

The period which must elapse between an outbreak of war with Russia and her actual occupation of anything more than Afghan-Turkistan would afford time for the arrival of reinforcements from England provided we had command of the sea. 5361.

*General Birdwood.*—Whether Russia would decide on attempting to cross the Hindu Kush and make a dash for Kabul would depend to a great extent on what she conceived to be our state of preparedness. 7281.

*General Hamilton Gordon.*—The construction of the Trans-Persian Railway, even if not completed, will add a third line of approach for Russia and one which, from its outflanking character, would be a greater source of anxiety to us than the other two. 13798,

## AFGHANISTAN.

## SUPPLIES.

*Notes on the Military resources of Afghanistan. Appendix II.*

According to regulations one year's supplies for men and animals should be kept up at all military stations, but from recent reports it would seem that owing to official laxity and peculations reserves are often allowed to run out. 23.

Afghanistan is ordinarily self-supporting in the matter of food and forage. There is however no surplus for export and in bad years it has been found necessary to supplement local stocks by importations. 23.

*Colonel Bingley.*—Afghans would find it difficult to supply any grain or fodder for the use of an army. 38.

British army advancing on Kabul would have to be fed on supplies from India. 44.

Big granaries at certain places in which grain is stored for issue to Afghan troops. No reliance placed on statement that the reserves in these granaries have to be maintained at a certain fixed scale. 144.

*Mr. Hayden.*—Ranges north of Kabul almost entirely devoid of vegetation. 1512.

Difficulty in getting fuel in Afghanistan. 1541, 1546, 1602.

Supplies of foodstuffs scanty on the Hindu Kush. 1518.

Good grazing on slopes of Hindu Kush. 1550, 1552.

Valleys in the vicinity of Kabul comparatively broad and rich, and a large force could be fed there. 1578.

*General Aylmer.*—Would be most difficult with present transport to feed the four divisions of the Field Army proposed for Kabul. 2549.

*Sir H. McMahon.*—Large surplus of supplies down in the south and in the north also, but there is not much in the neighbourhood of Kabul or Jalalabad. 3361, 3411.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—Sceptical as regards the possibility without railways to Parachinar and Dakka of feeding four divisions at Kabul. 4008.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—In the last Afghan war there was an immense lot of local food where we were, but we were not allowed to touch it. 5355.

You could not feed four divisions and two cavalry brigades in Kabul from local supplies for long, but sees no difficulty in doing so once our lines of communication are open and we have light railways to assist us in our task. 5363.

*General Birdwood.*—Except fuel and forage we could supply four divisions in Kabul by utilizing the northern and central lines. 7305, 7316.

## AFGHANISTAN.

## TRANSPORT.

*Notes on the Military resources of Afghanistan. Appendix II.*

Statement showing Afghan Government standing transport. 24.

In view of the large number of transport animals reported to be in the country, it is probable that, given time for collection and organization, sufficient transport could be secured to equip any force that the Amir could put in the field. 25.

The time required to equip and despatch a punitive column against Khost does not give any reliable indication of how long the Afghan Army would require before it would be in a position to move against us. 25.

Carts (both bullock, mule and pony) have recently been added to the standing transport. 26.

*Colonel Bingley.*—Amir does not maintain any organized transport except at Kabul, Kandahar and Herat. Afghans' transport system, or the lack of one, is their weak point. Understood delay in suppressing recent revolt in Khost due to this deficiency. Amir lately been importing mules for mountain batteries. He has also imported some bullocks for use with his carts. 139.

*Sir G. Roos-Koppel.*—Does not think we could use light lorries for transport in Afghanistan as they would cut the roads to pieces in a very short time. 4746.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—The transport of the Afghan army is very defective. 5363.

*General Hamilton Gordon.*—There is no doubt that a definite attempt has been made to organize the transport services in Afghanistan. 13855.

## AFGHANISTAN.

## WAR WITH AFGHANISTAN.

*General Staff Appreciation. Appendix I.*—Amir's difficulty in dealing with the more fanatical and ignorant of his subjects the chief danger of war. 24.

*Colonel Bingley.*—In war with Afghanistan with Russia neutral or friendly, it would be more than ever desirable to get to Kabul, or at any rate to Jalalabad. 229.

Kandahar is more accessible than Kabul. 231.

The occupation of Kandahar would probably cause less tribal irritation than the occupation of Kabul. 233.

In event of advance beyond Jalalabad, tribes would be placed in an awkward position, as in an advance to Kabul we would secure advantage of controlling them by getting in behind them. 235.

In a war with Afghanistan, in the event of the Amir preaching a *jihad*, the tribes would probably follow him as their spiritual leader. 237.

*Sir M. Grover.*—Fifteen thousand Kabul district troops would be concentrated against us within a fortnight, and later, another thirty-five thousand. The total force which the General Staff estimates for Afghanistan alone equals that which General Duff thought necessary for Afghanistan *plus* the tribes. 483.

We are in a better position for dealing with Afghanistan now than we were in 1878-80. 491.

*General Aylmer.*—In a war between ourselves and the Afghans, the frontier tribes are bound to go against us. Assuming the strict neutrality of the tribes, six divisions would be sufficient for a war with Afghanistan. In the event of war with Afghanistan and the frontier tribes combined, we shall want every man we have in India in an efficient state of organization. 2549.

Does not think General Duff's estimate of 120,000 men required to fight Afghanistan and the tribes far wrong. 2559.

*Sir H. McMahon.*—A larger force than has been used before would now be necessary in the event of war with Afghanistan, though does not think it would amount to six divisions. 3419.

The frontier tribes will be the first to come under the influence of the fanatical feeling which a war with Afghanistan will arouse. 3545.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—In war with Afghanistan strategically unsound to advance by three lines, as it involves three lines of communication.

(a) If we occupy the Kandahar Province including Seistan and act defensively elsewhere, we want six divisions and four cavalry brigades. (b) If we occupy the Kandahar and Jalalabad districts and act defensively elsewhere, we want six divisions and five cavalry brigades. (c) If we advance on Kabul and occupy Kandahar as well, we want seven divisions and six cavalry brigades.

Would adopt course (a) under present conditions. 4008.

Seven divisions would be sufficient for a war with Afghanistan *plus* the tribes. 4040.

Kandahar line is the only one which would allow of any extensive use being made of cavalry across the frontier. 4046.

Does not consider the estimate of men and arms of tribes reliable and considers estimates exaggerated. Ammunition of tribes would run out in a very short time. 4052, 4054.

*Sir G. Roos-Keppel.*—A war with Afghanistan would unsettle the tribes, but it would not necessarily make them rise in sympathy. In such a war the

Afridis are the most important tribe as they command Khyber throughout its length and road from Landi Kotal to Jalalabad. An early and decisive victory at Jalalabad or Gandamak would probably bring Afridis to our side. The other tribes from their situation could take little part in the war, but were it prolonged, they would probably become much excited and go in for extensive raiding. 4944.

Afghans would probably risk one battle between Kabul and Jalalabad. 5020.

Does not think we can count on any help in Afghanistan. 5038.

Not safe to base calculations regarding number of troops required for an Afghan war upon the assumption that frontier tribes would give but little trouble. 5042.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—If Russia were friendly or neutral, a war with Afghanistan could present but few difficulties. Provided that we are prepared to accept the fact that Russia must have her share, does not consider eight-and-a-quarter divisions necessary. Considers that in a war with Afghanistan we must reckon with the frontier tribesmen also. 5363.

We want more troops to hold Afghanistan than we should to take it. 5371.

Does not consider 120,000 men would be required to fight Afghanistan and the tribes combined. 5375.

*General Birdwood.*—Can hardly imagine a war with Afghanistan without the frontier tribes giving us a great deal of trouble. 7305.

*General Hamilton Gordon.*—The greatest external danger in existing circumstances with which the plans for which the General Staff are responsible are intended to deal, is a war with Afghanistan in combination with the frontier tribes. 13727.

Owing to the buffer State policy, the possibility of Russia joining in with us in a partition of the country is at present too remote a contingency for us to take into consideration. 13865.

In a war with Afghanistan it would not be better to wait and trust to external dissensions among the Afghans themselves, as they are not likely to suffer in that way, and we might have to wait an interminable time, while the effect behind would be disastrous if we did not advance at once. 13867.

Does not think it is to our advantage that the Afghans have started organizing their army, and does not consider that we shall defeat them more easily in future than if they had adhered to their old guerilla methods. 13873.

Considers that Sir Beauchamp Duff's belief that the Afghan forces could be swept away in a week was sanguine. 13885.

The only preparation for operations against Afghanistan prior to 1906 that can be traced appear to have taken the form of mobilization orders and timetables for the concentration of troops on general mobilization. 13933.

## ARMS TRAFFIC.

*Notes on the Military resources of Afghanistan. Appendix II.*

There is evidence that Nasrulla Khan is financially interested in the Arms Traffic, and he is believed to have some sort of business connexion with certain Kabuli arms dealers. 22.

Nasrulla Khan constantly makes presents of arms and ammunition to prominent men among the frontier tribes. 22.

The tribesmen of the North-West Frontier and Afghanistan buy rifles in the open market at Kabul, Kandahar and Herat, from Ghilzais and other arms dealers. 22.

*Colonel Bingley.*—Ammunition to the extent of 100 rounds is sent with each of the cheaper kinds of rifles imported into Afghanistan by way of the Persian Gulf. 103.

Rifles sold to frontier tribes realize Rs. 100—300 for a Martini and Rs. 500—1,000 for a Lee-Metford. 125.

Amir believed to have been selling some obsolete rifles such as Sniders to the frontier tribes. Caravans laden with rifles go up from the Mekran coast to Kabul and Amir must be aware these arms are there sold to the tribesmen. 129, 131.

Number of rifles imported from the Persian Gulf has diminished enormously during the past year. 133.

*Sir M. Grover.*—Tribes form syndicates for trading in rifles. 509.

*General Aylmer.*—For some of the more modern weapons tribes would have very little ammunition. 2573.

*Sir H. McMahon.*—We pass arms on to the Amir free of duty. 3353.

Amir has indirectly encouraged the armament of the North-West Frontier tribes. 3377.

The blockade in the Gulf has already begun to affect the supply of arms to frontier tribes. The quantity and quality of rifles made in the Kohat Pass is steadily increasing, but want of ammunition will minimize the evil of this; the courage of the tribes will diminish with their ammunition. 3501, 3511.

*Sir G. Roos-Keppel.*—Return of arms in the possession of tribes shows only arms of European manufacture. Every tribesman has a weapon of some sort. 4834.

The Amir has gigantic stores of ammunition (bulk Martini) in Kabul which he has obtained from England, the Gulf and from his factories. 4856, 4858, 4904, 5018.

Rifles made in tribal country shoot well up to 800 yards or so. 4868.

If we stopped the manufacture of rifles in the Kohat Pass it would only drive the trade further inland. 4874.

The effect of our operations in the Persian Gulf has been to reduce largely the supply of arms and ammunition. 4878.

Tribesmen visit Kabul and Jalalabad in considerable numbers each year, and bring back a few rifles and large quantities of ammunition. 4884.

Operations against the arms traffic in the Gulf should be continued until the trade is exterminated. 4890.

Amir empowered to import arms and ammunition duty free through British India, but we have the power to stop it at any time if deemed necessary. 4894, 4896.

The stoppage of the arms traffic would not have the effect of bringing some of the tribes on us. 4912.

The armament of the tribes is very much better than it was in 1897. 4932.



*Mr. Kennedy.*—There are many more arms than are covered by licenses. Has heard of revolvers being imported from France and Belgium in boxes with false bottoms. Forty-two revolvers were sent out in this way in connection with the Nasik conspiracy. Impossible to import revolvers through Goanese ports. 6944, 6946, 6952.

*Mr. Hughes-Buller.*—Automatic pistols believed to have come from Pondicherry to Chandernagore. 7900.

*General Hamilton Gordon.*—The increased armament of the tribes has undoubtedly been materially affected by our operations in the Persian Gulf; the check on importation is most satisfactory. 13929.

#### WRITTEN EVIDENCE.

*Mr. Francis.*—The worst point of the present rules under the Arms Act is the large number of exceptions they grant. 211.

*Mr. Carey.*—The working of the Arms Act in Burma is on the whole most satisfactory. 296.

*Mr. Leveson.*—So far as the regards the importation or possession of arms on a large scale, the working of the Arms Act in Burma is satisfactory, but on a small scale the results are not entirely satisfactory. 297.

*Colonel Parkin.*—The Arms Act is well worked in Burma with good results. 298.

*Mr. Law.*—The working of the Arms Act is satisfactory in Burma with the exception of smuggling of firearms (chiefly revolvers) into the seaport towns. The quartermasters and petty officers of the various steamers and ships visiting our seaports invariably bring with them firearms of this description for which they find a ready sale. 299.

## ARMY IN INDIA.

## ADMINISTRATION, ORGANIZATION, COMMANDS AND STAFF.

*Sir M. Grover.*—Does not agree with the proposal to include the Kohat, Bannu and Derajat Brigades in the Peshawar divisional area. 528, 532, 536.

Burma, even if reduced in garrison, should have a divisional General owing to the extent of the administrative area. 532.

Does not think divisional commanders refer matters to Army Headquarters which they could deal with themselves. 748.

*General Aylmer.*—There must be decentralization to divisions to ensure the smooth working of a large mobilization and the management of internal defence afterwards. 2455.

Commanders of frontier brigades and divisions should be men with frontier experience. Officers of the British service should have had considerable Indian experience before being given commands in this country. 2487.

Each division should have a Brigadier-General for Administration who would command the divisional area defence troops on the mobilization of the Field Army. 2491.

Seems essential that the Kohat Brigade should cease to exist as an independent unit when the advance by the central line is made. 2605.

Even if the garrison is reduced, Burma should still remain a divisional command. Many objections to including the independent frontier brigades in the Peshawar Division. 2632.

The opinions of divisional commanders should be obtained in matters relating to internal defence, but it seems imperative that the General Staff should finally fix the number of troops. 8703.

Army Commanders should not be given more administrative work. 8707.

Army Commanders are wanted for inspection and training. 8709.

Considers that it was necessary to appoint the six divisional artillery commanders. 8747.

Would be far better and more economical to have fewer and intact units for internal defence, and self-supporting forms of organization. 8803.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—Army Commanders never consulted officially in regard to army or war requirements. 3834, 4173.

The Field Army as organized by Lord Kitchener could have been provided without the complete re-casting of previous arrangements. 3838.

Our calculations do not allow for commanders of internal defence troops in time of war. 3923.

Does not approve of proposal to have a General attached to a division for administrative purposes in time of peace who would command internal defence troops on mobilization. 3925.

A certain proportion of Generals now in India should be retained for internal defence and administrative purposes, and deficiency now existing in the Field Army made up by selected colonels and lieutenant-colonels. 3929.

No objection to abolition of Colonels on the Staff. 3936, 3946, 3948.

Pay of brigade commanders insufficient. 3938, 3952.

Any experience or special knowledge Army Commanders may have is absolutely thrown away. 4173.

Even if reduced in garrison the extent and importance of the Burma area render it desirable to have an experienced senior officer in command. 4175.

Does not approve of merging any of the independent frontier brigades into the Peshawar Division in peace time. 4175, 4177, 4179.

Does not think we should adhere rigidly to a fixed proportion of General Officers by arms. 4505.

An advantage in having a proportion of junior officers in staff employment. 4507.

Does not think proposal (XIV) of the Johnson Committee *re* cavalry brigade commanders is workable, because a young cavalry brigadier on transfer to a mixed brigade cuts out a senior officer. 4509.

Does not approve of the system under which Army Commanders are not utilized in any way for administrative work. 4632.

As Army Commander could undertake a larger measure of administration without any additional staff. 4648.

*Sir G. Roos-Keppel.*—Would like to see the four militia corps merged into the regular army after the manner of the Punjab Irregular Frontier Force when it was directly under the Punjab Government. If militias were made part of the regular army, we should immediately have to start another force ahead of them. 5059, 5075.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—Reliefs should be gradual, one corps leaving a brigade at a time. 5303.

It is a very good thing to move troops by road occasionally and thus shew them to the people. 5425.

Army Commander practically not consulted by the Army Department or the General Staff on matters relating to the Field Army or internal defence though his opinion might occasionally be of some use. 5447, 5449.

If the Field Army were reduced to seven or eight divisions, it would be necessary to redistribute the divisional areas so as to render it easier to have each divisional area self-contained. 5451.

Would keep the independent frontier brigades separate. 5459.

Divisional Generals make full use of the financial and other powers conferred on them. Divisional Generals might be given more power in disciplinary matters. 5701.

An Army Commander has as much work as he can manage, and does not approve of proposal to saddle them with any additional duties. 5713, 5727.

Agrees generally with Sir B. Duff in regard to the chaos that would arise through the non-fulfilment of the self-contained divisional area scheme. 5739.

Not satisfied in regard to arrangements for the command of internal defence troops. 5773.

The Chief of the General Staff should know the most suitable men to appoint to the command of internal defence troops. 5779.

Does not concur in the proposal to give each divisional commander a Brigadier-General for administrative work, who would command the internal defence troops on mobilization of Field Army. 5858.

Does not consider that the six Brigadier-Generals of artillery were absolutely necessary, but at the same time they tend to greater efficiency. 5860.

Army Commander might be consulted by the General Staff on matters of organization, preparation for war and internal defence arrangements. 5864.

Thinks that the Adjutant-General's Branch does not give the Army Commander enough freedom in disciplinary cases. 5870, 5872.

*General Birdwood.*—Believes the principle of self-contained divisions to be essentially sound, and deprecates departures therefrom unless the necessity can be proved. Attaches great importance to continuity of policy in army administration. 7148.

The advantages of the decentralized system introduced by Lord Kitchener are most striking. 7184.

The arrangements previous to Lord Kitchener's regime were unscientific and represented a series of compromises. 7223.

The present system is better than the previous one. 7227.

As regards commanders for internal defence troops, the only way to get over the difficulty is by incurring extra expense on new appointments. Lord Kitchener did not think them necessary. 7277.

Believes it is the intention of the General Staff to allow an entirely free hand to the internal defence troops commanders. 7347.

Even if the Field Army is reduced to seven or eight divisions, it would not be in any way advisable to reduce the number of existing divisional areas. 7361.

Decentralization of supply and transport work has already been carried out as far as possible. 14947.

Does not know of any further administrative measures which could be delegated to divisions than are delegated at present, and from experience as Brigade Commander cannot remember cases arising in which he felt he was unduly restrained or had to refer cases to Army Headquarters which could have been dealt with locally. 14947, 14981.

*General Stuart.*—The Military Accounts establishment employed in checking requisitions passed by officers in charge of arsenals are a waste of money and might be done away with. 10066.

*Colonel Mead.*—From a regimental point of view should like to see the system of Assistant and Deputy Assistant Adjutant-Generals for Musketry visiting regiments during the year re-introduced. 12554.

*General Hamilton Gordon.*—Would like to have a Brigadier-General for administration in each division who would be the officer to command the internal defence area on the departure of the field division. 13677, 13613, 13705, 14037.

At present the senior officer of troops allotted for internal security within the area concerned would command the internal defence troops in the event of a general mobilization of the Field Army. 13677.

Would not be prepared to leave some of the Brigadier-Generals behind to look after internal defence and transfer colonels to the Field Army. 13709.

Divisional Commanders are consulted as regards internal defence schemes, in fact they prepare the schemes themselves. Army Commanders are not held responsible for these schemes. 13761.

As regards external operations, the principle followed is to consult only those who are likely to have command of the troops or those who are considered to have special knowledge which ought to be taken advantage of, and does not consider it would be beneficial to consult all General Officers on such subjects. 13761.

Divisional Generals were not consulted in regard to the proposed mobile brigades for internal defence, because the new proposals were modifications of the old proposals, based on conditions which applied to the whole of India. 13777.

*General Headlam.*—Would like to have a special officer appointed in peace to command internal defence troops on the mobilization of the Field Army. 14473.

The course of instruction at the Quetta Staff College is satisfactory and practical, but the College is handicapped by not having the proportion of Directing Staff to students, admitted to be necessary to give our staff officers the thorough training required to make them the equals of those of Continental armies. 14505.

*Colonel Williams.*—The powers of Supply and Transport Inspectors-General of Commands were not very much greater than those of divisional Generals now are, but the difference is in favour of the Command system, 14991, 14993, 14996.

## ARMY IN INDIA.

## ARMY HEADQUARTERS.

*Sir M. Grover.*—There ought to be an actuarial branch at Army Headquarters. 681.

Does not think there is any duplication of work at Army Headquarters. 776.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—Army Commanders never consulted officially in regard to army requirements. 3834, 4173.

Desirable to have an actuarial branch in the Government of India available for use by the Army Department. 4576.

There might be some reduction of officers in the General Staff Branch. 4657.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—Army Commanders not consulted by the Army Department or the General Staff on matters relating to the Field Army or internal defence, though their opinions might occasionally be of some use. 5447, 5449.

Army Commanders might be consulted by the General Staff on matters of organization, preparation for war and internal defence arrangements. 5864.

Thinks that the Adjutant-General's Branch does not give the Army Commander enough freedom in disciplinary cases. 5870, 5872.

*Mr. Brunyate.*—From a finance point of view, the present system of administration and co-ordination at Army Headquarters has worked exceedingly well and he would not propose anything in the shape of an essential modification of its original lines. The Advisory Council rarely meets, and is too large for practical work. Would suggest financial advice in the Branches at Army Headquarters and a more efficient Advisory Council. 6185.

Advisory Council should be reduced in numbers and meet oftener. 6201.

In matters which most closely concern finance, Quartermaster-General's and Adjutant-General's cases are ordinarily very fully and clearly stated. There seems to be less reasoning and more in the way of pronouncement in the General Staff notes than in those of other Branches. 6205.

Tendency at Army Headquarters is to hunt up too many references and precedents rather than too few. 6225.

The Army Department is necessarily doing again and very much from the same point of view work which has already been done or should have been done by the Branch concerned. 6226.

Be a good thing to have a financial adviser as an integral part of a Branch. 6229.

Not within his experience that the various Branches are constantly re-stating the whole case. 6252.

Proposals under consideration involving a modification of the present position of the Military Finance Secretary and of the relation of the Finance Department to the army authorities. 6254.

The existing system at Army Headquarters, so long as it works, and does not break down, gives the maximum power of financial control. 6268, 6270.

The work of the Military Works Branch is very sound indeed when they have been taken thoroughly into confidence, and they are working cordially with the Finance Department. 6375.

It is a question whether there should not be a re-examination of the duties transacted by the General Staff with a view to seeing whether some appointments cannot be abolished or re-sanctioned on a purely temporary basis.

The number of officers in the Adjutant-General's Branch for artillery work might be found capable of reduction.

In the Quartermaster-General's Branch if you have a Director of Supply and Transport with two senior officers as deputies cannot see necessity for two assistant deputies.

The sanitary officer in the Medical Branch might be dispensed with.

Question whether two officers at Headquarters would not suffice for the whole of the Judge Advocate General's work throughout the army. 6464.

The work of the Judge Advocate General's Department is well and carefully done. 6468.

Strong feeling that the work at Army Headquarters should be transacted by a smaller number of officers. 6472.

*General Aylmer.*—In favour of having an actuary. 8653.

The opinions of divisional commanders should be obtained in matters relating to internal defence, but it seems imperative that the General Staff should finally fix the number of troops. 8703.

No hesitation in saying that the Adjutant-General's Branch is undermanned as regards officers, and it would be relieved of a certain amount of the present strain if the administrative organization in divisions were strengthened financially and otherwise. 8729.

Does not think clerical establishments are excessive, certainly not as regards the Adjutant-General's Branch. 8745.

Does not think further decentralization would reduce clerical establishments. As regards administrative work throughout India, clerks are generally overworked. 8745.

*General Hamilton Gordon.*—In arriving at the functions of the General Staff as a whole in regard to preparation for war and the manner in which the line of demarcation is drawn in this respect between the duties of the General Staff and those of other Branches at Army Headquarters, the orders laid down in King's Regulations are followed. The War Office system is followed as closely as possible; details are given in the memorandum on the formation of the General Staff. 13316, 13318.

Generally, the General Staff are charged with the consideration of all questions affecting efficiency in war and preparation for war. The Adjutant-General is charged with discipline, mobilization, recruitment, etc. The Quartermaster-General deals with the maintenance of supplies, quarterings, movements, etc., and the Director General of Ordnance is charged with war material, equipment, ammunition, and the supply of material. 13328, 13330.

General Staff deal with the distribution of troops so far as it is governed by strategical conditions. 13332.

The General Staff submit their plans to the Commander-in-Chief who, with the concurrence of the Government of India, approves of them. 13342.

Some of the functions of the Mobilization Committee have been passed on to the General Staff. 13362.

The Defence Committee is in active operation now; it deals with defences, and papers are circulated amongst its members whenever there is an important question to be considered. 13367.

Mobilization is solely the work of the Adjutant-General now. 13369, 13369.

The General Staff in India is not a section of the Imperial General Staff, but they are guided by the same principles as the Imperial General Staff at Home. 13374.

It is not the function of the General Staff to see that the Field Army is properly equipped but it is their duty to keep themselves informed on the subject. 13382.

General Staff keep a general watch on the progress of preparation for war, and bring important defects to notice, and when sanction has been given by superior authority for the provision of necessary items, they ask the heads of the Branches concerned occasionally to inform them what steps have been taken so as to be in a position to inform the Commander-in-Chief how the question of the readiness for war stands. 13392.

When proposals are put forward financial considerations are borne in mind, and when the proposals get to a certain stage they are submitted by the Branches concerned to the Finance Department for its consideration. 13432.

The General Staff could, at any time, advise in general terms as to the state of the army in India for war, but are not in a position to state in detail the extent of the progress made. 13451, 13457, 13461, 13473, 13475, 13639, 13641.

Statement of system on which the existing General Staff plans for the external defence of India and the maintenance of internal security are drawn up and studied. 13731, 13741, 14013, 14029.

The General Staff consult outside authorities, but do not consult them all. 13913, 14029.

Plans of operations are sent to officers who would command a force. 14096, 14098.

Not prepared to say that all commanders have invariably been shown the schemes, but it is the intention that they should be in future. 14100.

Difficult to keep schemes up to date because of changes in the political situation. 14100, 14102.

*General Headlam.*—In regard to establishments of units, the General Staff lay down what war establishments are to be and what peace establishments are required for training; and then the Adjutant-General, on this, bases the peace establishment which is necessary to give that establishment for training. 14168.

Differences of opinion between heads of Branches at Army Headquarters are settled by the Commander-in-Chief. 14172.

Statement showing the numbers of the General Staff Branch at Simla when first constituted and at the present time, and statement showing how the duties were performed before the formation of a General Staff Branch. 14283.

The unpaid attachés in the General Staff Branch fluctuate. They are generally taken in the hot weather. Of opinion the number is considerably less now than formerly, and every effort is made to reduce the number. They are usually only got up for some special work or when there is stress of work. 14285, 14287, 14289.

Some of the new duties now carried out by the General Staff that were not carried out by the Chief of the Staff's Division are co-ordination of war manuals and war establishments, and the service of communication. 14291, 14295, 14297.

In regard to the number of officers employed in the Intelligence Section of the General Staff Branch, the countries and duties are divided up, and the officer in charge of each sub-section "devils" for the head of the section. 14307.

In his Directorate in the General Staff Branch, the decisions are arrived at after personal consultation, though of course a note is placed on the case giving the Chief of the General Staff's decision and the reasons for it, if necessary, but there is not a series of successive notes, beginning with those of clerks, as used to be the case. 14309, 14311, 14313, 14315, 14317.

The clerks in the General Staff Branch have plenty of work in looking up information, preparing and correcting proofs, and so on. 14323.

In the General Staff Branch there is an indexed file, weekly decisions are circulated, and points of permanent policy are taken out and put in a 'policy book.' 14325, 14329.

Associates himself with the idea that officers of the General Staff should all think alike; they should all loyally follow the accepted doctrine. 14331.

In the General Staff Branch the application of the accepted doctrine to ever-varying cases and circumstances affords ample scope for the work of the most capable officer. The clerks could not do the work the officers do. 14333.

In regard to the establishments of the Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General, it has always been understood that the present temporary changes could not continue indefinitely and that the Secretary of State must be addressed before they can be made permanent. 14340.

Statement showing the strength of the General Staff at the War Office. 14345.

The work of the Imperial General Staff is more a case of laying down general principles to guide the local Branches throughout the Empire. The General Staff in India have to do the detailed work. For instance, we have the whole question of internal security which is very complicated, besides the defence of India's 6,500 miles of land frontier. Then the strength of the forces which we have to train is greater than the whole of the British regular army, while the variations of race and organization and the vast extent of country with its great differences of climate and other conditions involve complications unknown at Home. 14350.

Considering the relative responsibilities, does not think the establishment of the General Staff Branch is too large when compared with the General Staff at Home. Perfectly clear that the responsibilities of the War Office are not three times as great as ours; our establishment leaves no reserve for leave. 14352.

In regard to the staff maintained in the Intelligence Section of the General Staff Branch, it is not unlikely that some reduction will eventually be possible but in view of the constantly changing conditions of the countries dealt with, their frequently changing development, the difficulty of procuring any information at all, and the scanty information that is at best available, it is probable that a considerable establishment will be required for several years to come. 14354, 14373.

When the General Staff was formed many records of "Intelligence" information were found to be seriously defective and have required and will continue to require constant attention to bring and keep them up to date. 14354.

Believes the General Staff in India get very specific information regarding Afghanistan, but the details are only known to the actual people responsible. 14358.

Believes the Adjutant-General's and Quartermaster-General's Branches to be very much undermanned. 14382.

Evident that the General Staff is not overstaffed for the work to be done. 14382.

The General Staff Branch is the only Branch definitely organized for the work it has to do in accordance with the principles adopted at the War Office as the result of the Esher Committee. In fact, the General Staff is organized on the lines recommended for all headquarter sections of the Imperial General Staff, and accepted by the Imperial Defence Conference. 14382.

All officers at Army Headquarters do fully as much work as is good for them. They constantly take work home, and have to work late at night or in the early morning. They also have to read a good deal out of office hours in order to do the office work properly. 14395.

No one who saw the actual work to be done would think there was any tendency to do work which was unnecessary; on the contrary, all are striving to reduce work at Headquarters and to avoid worrying people outside with constant circulars and so forth. 14397.

Statement showing the clerical establishment of the General Staff Branch together with their pay. No reduction in the establishment could be made at present without loss of efficiency, but if a Central Registry were established, some reduction might be possible. The whole of the clerical work of the Inspectors is done in the Branch. 14401, 14411.

The higher paid clerks are chiefly employed in superintending the work of the office. 14405.



The work done by the Inspectors of Cavalry and Horse and Field Artillery when on tour ought not to overlap the duties assigned to the army, divisional and brigade commanders, for the Inspectors are only the eyes and ears of the Commander-in-Chief for ensuring that the technical, as distinct from the general, training of their special arms and services is being correctly carried out. 14415, 14437.

In cases where there is a cavalry brigade commander, the Inspector of Cavalry is directed by regulations to confine his attention to the inspection of units higher than the regiment. 14415.

The necessity for the training of cavalry in cavalry divisions in peace is universally recognized and forms an important function of the Inspector of Cavalry in India. When a cavalry division is formed for training, the Inspector of Cavalry actually commands and trains it. 14425.

As a general rule the Inspector of Cavalry inspects the brigades, only inspecting single regiments when they are isolated. 14425.

Duties of the Inspector of Cavalry when in Simla. 14441.

A large civil force of the nature of the Volunteers may reasonably demand that there should be some officer at Army Headquarters specially qualified to represent their difficulties and needs. 14443.

Questions in connexion with the Volunteers brought to notice by the Inspector of Volunteers are sent to the Branch concerned for action. 14459, 14465.

There is no Central Registry for Army Headquarters, but each Branch has now its own Central Registry. The Central Registry was tried first as an experiment for six months, and a committee then assembled to consider the question, decided that the adoption of a Central Registry for the whole of Army Headquarters was inadvisable. 14475, 14483.

The Inspector, Royal Garrison Artillery, is the only permanent Royal Garrison Artillery officer at Army Headquarters to whom technical questions, etc., can be referred, and to act as adviser to the Commander-in-Chief or to heads of Branches. 14493.

*Colonel Hamilton.*—In regard to the transfers and appointments of officers in regiments now done by the Military Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief considers that if the Adjutant-General is responsible for personnel (as he is) he should be responsible for the individuals also. 14837.

*General Birdwood.*—The Quartermaster-General's Branch is composed of 14 officers and 82 clerks. Satisfied that the number of officers employed in the Branch is necessary, in fact, of opinion that the Branch is undermanned. 14947.

There are five officers in the Supply and Transport Directorate, and taking into consideration the necessity for the efficient and economical administration of the army so far as supply and transport is concerned, does not consider it would be desirable to reduce the number of staff officers employed in this Directorate. Present complement is only sufficient for the disposal of current work, and the officers in the Directorate have no time to study and deal with exterior questions such as those connected with mobilization. With the Commander-in-Chief's approval, has brought the inadequacy of officers to the notice of the Government of India. Submits comparative statement showing number of officers employed in the Supply and Transport Directorate and the number employed on similar duties at the War Office with their respective responsibilities.

In 1902 there were five officers with the late Military Department and thirteen at Command Headquarters and in Burma, whereas now there are only five officers at Army Headquarters.

Decentralization of supply and transport has already been carried out as far as possible.

A Committee, assembled in 1911, expressed the opinion that to enable the Movements and Quartering Directorate to provide efficient control it was

necessary to have two additional officers on its staff. Concurs in this opinion, and has represented the inadequacy of this Directorate staff to Government. At present compelled to obtain officers from regiments who carry on the duties of permanent staff officers without the staff pay attached to staff appointments. Moreover, it is doubtful how far such assistance would be available on mobilization and in any time of stress, the present shortage of permanent staff officers must inevitably lead to the neglect of administration unconnected with the work in hand, and to the consequent accumulation of arrears.

The Director of Veterinary Services has an assistant who, in addition to the duties pertaining to his appointment, has charge of Government and other animals at Jutogh and Simla.

The Director of Farms has no assistant; inconvenience is caused by this when he is on tour, but not at present prepared to recommend that he should be given an assistant.

The Director-General, Army Remount Department, has an assistant, and convinced of the necessity for his retention. 14947.

There is a staff captain in the concentration section of the Quartermaster-General's Branch under whom railway arrangements are worked out, and the Railway Board have an officer at Lahore who works out time-tables. 14951, 14953.

Under existing arrangements although the Commander-in-Chief does not as a rule express his opinion as such on the various questions requiring the sanction of Government, he sometimes informally sees the case and gives his views before the case is referred to the Army Department and the Finance Branch. 14971, 14973.

The two Deputy Assistant-Directors in the Supply and Transport Directorate get no extra pay; they only get their ordinary grade pay, and they are necessary. 15007.

The appointment of the Inspector of Cantonments has been abolished, but there is still constant work in connexion with Cantonments. 15009.

The present position with a Director as the head of the Supply and Transport Corps under the Quartermaster-General is satisfactory and necessary, and wants to keep the Director of Supply and Transport working under him in his office. In a corps like the Supply and Transport Corps which consists of distinct and partially separated Branches dealing with administrative services which are so diverse and yet so interdependent, the presence of a co-ordinating head is an asset which makes for efficiency. Moreover it is hardly to be expected that every officer appointed Quartermaster-General will have sufficient previous acquaintance with the details of supply and transport work as to be able to dispense with the assistance which a Director of Supply and Transport afford him.

The Director of Supply and Transport is already largely an inspecting officer and spends the greater part of the cold weather on inspection tours, and inspection by an administrative officer is a much more useful process than inspection by an officer whose duty ends when he has submitted his inspection report. The former has probably larger previous knowledge of the weak points in the administration which requires his attention, and is in a position himself to give effect to the reforms and to supply the remedies which his inspections convince him the situation demands.

Essential that any big corps like the Supply and Transport Corps should have one of its own officers whom all can look to as the head of the Corps and to whom they can apply when in any doubt or difficulty and to whom the Commander-in-Chief can look for advice regarding any details concerning the interests of the Corps.

The time of the Director of Supply and Transport is also fully occupied in dealing with innumerable questions regarding his Corps and supply and transport work generally; this would perhaps more especially be the case in times

of mobilization when his presence would be absolutely essential. 15031, 15035.

The delays which take place in dealing with proposals at Army Headquarters are responsible for a great loss of economy, and apart from the loss to Government, the withholding of sanction to schemes where an obvious saving can be anticipated cannot but fail to have the effect of diminishing the zeal of officers in putting forward similar proposals. 15641.

*Colonel Williams.*—We have no supply and transport establishments at Army Headquarters to deal with frontier expeditions; it has to be put in the hands of one or more divisional Generals. 14991.

## ARMY IN INDIA.

## ARTILLERY.

*Sir M. Grover.*—Not possible to reduce the peace strength of native artillery units. 614.

The reduction of three companies of garrison artillery now garrisoning inland defences is feasible. 699.

*General Aylmer.*—Amount of artillery in Field Army at present very small and cannot recommend any reduction. 2783, 2785.

Reserve of artillery horses is very small. 2792.

The scheme to reduce three companies of garrison artillery hardly seems desirable. 2796.

The reserves of men for Indian artillery might be increased to 140. 8456.

Considers that it was necessary to appoint the six divisional artillery commanders. 8747.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—Doubtful whether Ahmadnagar is a good place for mountain batteries. 4144.

Would prefer to see the mountain batteries for the 6th Division stationed at Deolali if accommodation can be provided without detriment to the distribution of the infantry. Would like to see British mountain batteries at or near Wellington to complete the 9th Division. 4144, 4160.

Might reduce horse artillery to enable us to have more mountain batteries and howitzers without extra expense. 4150.

The addition of seven horses to the strength of each field artillery brigade desirable. The best way to get out of the present difficulty in regard to horse and field artillery drivers on mobilization, is to increase the establishment of drivers in each higher establishment battery by four. 4350.

In case of emergency would utilize bullocks for internal defence batteries. 4352.

Does not think the number of artillery units assigned to the Field Army is excessive, but it is sufficient for warfare against Asiatics. 4362.

More mountain batteries would be of more use than heavy batteries across the frontier. 4368.

If we raise six Eurasian militia artillery companies we might dispense with one or even two Royal Garrison Artillery companies. 4372.

We must keep six Royal Garrison Artillery companies for the Quetta and Attock defences and for siege train. 4372.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—In the event of war would like to know what will happen as regards replacing casualties among horses in batteries. 5297, 5299.

Would like a larger reserve of artillery horses. 5301.

We could do with a much smaller proportion of artillery for putting down rebellion than for use in the field. 5565.

Our Field Army is already very low in artillery power, and it should not be depleted for any cause. 5565, 5567, 5569, 5571.

Improvised batteries with 2 guns would be strong enough as units in proportion to the enemy we should meet in internal defence. 5569.

Does not approve of proposal to reduce the number of garrison companies. 5573.

If reductions are going to be made, the number of heavy batteries might be reduced. 5573.

We might want a few heavy guns if we were going to besiege a big place, but very few would be enough. 5575.

Does not consider that the six Brigadier-Generals of artillery were absolutely necessary, but we want them for war and at the same time they tend to greater efficiency in training. 5860.

If desirable to increase the British artillery would advocate converting some of the heavy batteries. 5882.

*Mr. Brunyate.*—The number of officers in the Adjutant-General's Branch for artillery work might be found capable of reduction. 6464.

*General Birdwood.*—To horse the artillery of the Field Army on mobilization it would be necessary, even after utilizing the reserve, to withdraw 803 horses from internal defence units. 7007.

Does not personally approve of the proposed reorganization of artillery ammunition columns. 7062.

A reserve of at least 1,500 artillery horses should be maintained. 7068.

The reserve of artillery horses (500) as it at present stands is not sufficient, and on mobilization we should require 1,310 horses for the Field Army and 164 for internal defence or a total of 1,474 horses, therefore recommends that the artillery reserve of horses be fixed at from 1,500 to 1,700 provided that the ammunition columns remain as they are at present; if they are altered the question will require reconsideration. 15261.

Under the proposed reorganization of ammunition columns some 5,753 mules would be required for the ammunition columns of nine divisions, eight cavalry brigades and army troops. It is not the intention to maintain in peace time the mules required for these columns and it is hoped they can be obtained on mobilization from those registered in India. 15419.

If he had been Quartermaster-General when the proposals for the reorganization of ammunition columns were brought forward should have liked to have modified them, but it is possible that we could meet requirements if we could get our organized cadres expanded. But as things are at present, some of the leading divisions of the Field Army would probably have to go short of a certain amount of organized transport. 15437, 15462.

If the proposal for the reorganization of the ammunition columns is accepted would require about seven additional mule corps. 15661.

Statement showing the total number of mules and carts required under the existing and the proposed ammunition columns for nine divisions and eight cavalry brigades.

Under the reorganization if we get all our registered animals we shall have sufficient mules to complete the enhanced number required for the proposed ammunition columns, but this would reduce the large number required almost from the start to replace wastage.

For the new ammunition columns, will require 1,921 carts more than are at present arranged for which will be met from the existing surplus of 10,459 carts left over after supplying the nine divisions and eight cavalry brigades, the deficiency for supply purposes on the lines of communication being met by a corresponding increase in the number purchased from the country. 15663.

*General Hamilton Gordon.*—Artillery units for the Field Army could be properly equipped only by the serious depletion of internal defence units. This can only be remedied by an alteration in the establishment of men and an increase in the reserve of horses. 13645, 13647, 13717.

The artillery allotted to internal defence should certainly be kept in good condition. 13651.

Heavy batteries would still be of real use in a war with Afghanistan though not probably against the tribes. Against the latter it is not contemplated to use them. 13994.

Heavy batteries are now allotted to army troops so that they need only be used when there is advantage in using them. 13996.

The Commander-in-Chief has recommended that the new armament for heavy batteries should take the form of a howitzer, and that we should first obtain an experimental howitzer. This we have asked the Home authorities to design. 13998.

Considers the scheme sent to the Secretary of State regarding the reorganization of artillery ammunition columns a practical one. The Quartermaster-General at the time definitely stated that he was prepared to find the extra mules required. 14000.

*General Headlam.*—Looks upon the appointment of Brigadier-Generals of divisional artillery as the most important step taken during the time he has been Director of Military Training towards bringing the training and efficiency of the army in India up to modern standards. 14493, 14497, 14501.

The training of divisional artillery commanders in the utilization of the various powers of the different natures of guns comprised in the divisional artillery is a case in point. The combination or distribution of their fire in accordance with the general plan is a matter which requires the highest technical skill. Moreover the mere question of ensuring uniformity in technical training assumed special importance in India owing to the fact that there is no school of gunnery such as exists at Home where the instructors from the school attend the practice camps of the various divisions. The duties of the Inspector, Royal Garrison Artillery, are those of the same officer at Home, but more important owing to the absence of a school of gunnery, and even of Commanders of Royal Artillery at the defended ports, and also owing to the fact that the General Officers Commanding at the defended ports are not specially selected coast defence commanders as they are at Home. At gun practice his presence is absolutely necessary to criticise, bring to notice defects, and suggest improvements. 14493.

## ARMY IN INDIA.

BRITISH ARMY—MISCELLANEOUS.

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*Sir E. Barrow.*—Might reduce British cavalry and horse artillery to enable us to have more mountain batteries and howitzers without extra expense. The addition of 7 horses to the strength of each field artillery brigade desirable. 4150, 4350.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—Would not like to see the British cavalry reduced. 5886.

*Sir T. Wynne.*—Does not think the railways could spare many Royal Engineer officers for ordinary military works in the field, but could spare a few civil railway officers. 9039, 9041.

*General Stuart.*—British units, whether allotted to the Field Army or to internal defence, should always be in actual possession of 300 rounds per rifle. 10091.

Absolutely necessary that the British troops that go to the hills should take ammunition with them. 10093.

*Major Hill.*—In the cold weather British troops should take their share of fatigues and duties. 11219.

## ARMY IN INDIA.

BRITISH OFFICERS, INDIAN ARMY—ESTABLISHMENTS, PAY, PROMOTION,  
LEAVE AND FURLOUGH.

*Sir M. Grover.*—Establishment of 14 British officers per unit considered excessive. 626.

Quartermaster and transport officer both required on field service. 631.

Present system of recruiting officers more or less provides for annual wastage. 677.

Present system of promotion and pension in the Indian army not altogether satisfactory. 685, 687.

The number of Commanding Officers who have been given extensions in the tenure of their commands has aggravated the congestion in promotion. 689.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—Pay of brigade commanders insufficient. 3938, 3952.

Establishment of British officers per unit is now too high. 4426.

Would have an establishment of thirteen officers per unit in time of peace with a reserve equivalent to one officer.

As regards war establishment, generally accepts views and proposals of the General Staff.

Considers each internal defence battalion should have eight officers.

Cavalry regiments should have eleven officers on service. 4426.

One officer might discharge the duties of both quartermaster and transport officer with the aid of a native officer, but a native officer for this work must be added to the present establishment. 4434.

The term of command of native regiments might equitably be reduced to four years. 4446.

Regimental officers of cavalry holding post of second-in-command should vacate at 48, and commandants at 50. 4474, 4478.

In future officers entering the Indian army who have not been selected for the command of a regiment should not get a higher pension than £550 per annum. 4483.

Disapproves of incremental pension unless there is a great difference in the increments. 4485, 4487.

The ranks of captain and major should be attained after 10 and 19 years' service respectively, this would save money and not affect efficiency. 4491, 4497.

Would not increase term of service for lieutenant-colonel. 4493.

Does not think we should adhere rigidly to a fixed proportion of General Officers by arms. 4505.

An advantage in having a proportion of junior officers in staff employment. 4507.

University candidates are as a rule better than the men we get from Sandhurst, better educated and wider outlook. 4513.

Would like to recruit more university candidates. 4517.

Agrees to proposal that no officer should be permitted to exchange into the Indian army who is more than two years older or more than two years senior to the officer with whom he exchanges. 4519.

Junior officers selected for command of regiments should only be given temporary rank. 4545.



British officers granted leave most liberally; though this may affect an economy, not in favour of officers going on leave to such an extent. 4559, 4561.

Agrees to proposal to remove the present restrictions on combined leave. 4563.

Officers might be given facilities to attend courses of instruction whilst on leave at Home. 4567.

In regard to recruitment of officers, would be better to work on average requirements. 4571.

Would leave the system of promotion by the efflux of time alone. 4578.

System obtaining for appointment of officers to frontier militias most unsatisfactory. 4690.

*Sir G. Roos-Keppel*.—Not sure that a large number of British officers in a militia corps is an advantage. 5067.

*Sir J. Willcocks*.—Agrees with the proposals of General Staff to reduce the numbers of British officers with native cavalry and infantry units. 5643.

One British officer with the aid of a native officer could discharge the duties of both quartermaster and transport officer. 5651.

Much harm has been done by the amount of leave now given to British officers of the Indian army. 5659.

Would however be liberal with leave. 5665.

Approves of General Barrow's proposal to make lieutenant-colonels of cavalry retire at 50. 5783.

Approves of seconds-in-command of cavalry being made to retire at 48. 5785.

Would leave the system of officering the militia as it is. 5800.

*Mr. Brunyate*.—The increases to the number of officers of late years should have been more gradual.

So long as officers are protected by the time scale, and have a reasonable chance of rising to the command of a regiment, would not attempt any elaboration. 6427, 6431.

Would be against applying the normal standard of recruitment to officers of the Indian army. 6433.

Would not alter the periods for promotion to the various ranks from time to time in accordance with the average conditions prevailing in the British army. 6439.

You get the most economical pay rates if you give assured conditions. 6443.

Was quite unnecessary to shorten the periods of promotion in the Indian army with reference to the conditions existing in the British army as the result of the South African War. 6445.

Would await report of the Royal Commission before tinkering with military pensions. 6453.

Sees no objection to the military leave rules as applied to regimental officers. The furlough and combined leave rules are liberal in theory, but in practice there are few men who can take the maximum amount of leave the rules allow them. 6455.

Business of Commanding Officers to see that the leave rules are not abused. 6457.

As regards the leave rules, why tamper with a rule which is probably one of the great attractions of the service, and enables us to give low rates of pay etc. ? 6459.

*General Birdwood.*—If an average of fourteen officers were always serving with their units, their presence would tend to stifle the responsibilities of native officers and to limit their initiative. In practice, however, the number is never present, as officers are always away on leave, attending classes, etc. In fact, with our present establishments, regiments seem to be frequently short of British officers. In no circumstances should any reduction be made in the number of British officers, unless and until a real reserve of officers is actually in being. The wastage of British officers with native regiments is underestimated, as such officers from their colour alone, must always be conspicuous. 7421, 7427.

If a reserve of officers can be formed, the proposed reduction by the General Staff will be vindicated to some extent. 7423.

If an efficient reserve is formed, in favour of a small reduction of, say, one officer per regiment. 7425.

One British officer with the assistance of a native officer, might carry out the duties of both quartermaster and transport officer. 7429.

The present system of recruiting officers for the Indian army is based on average requirements of past years. 7453.

Sees no way of improving the present system. 7465.

Promotion of officers by efflux of time is considered advantageous in that it ensures a contented army. The cadres of the Indian army regiments are too small to admit of regimental promotion as it is understood in the British service. 7467.

The majority of officers look forward to the certainty of promotion in the Indian army as its greatest advantage. 7471.

The time system does not encourage mediocrity because brevet rank is given to deserving officers. 7473.

The system of giving an officer promotion by appointing him to the command of a regiment is a good system because selection comes in as well. 7475.

Concurs in suggestion that Commanding Officers of cavalry regiments should vacate at 50, seconds-in-command at 48, and in other units of the Indian army at 52 and 50. 7499.

There will be a block unless some of the recommendations of Sir Edmund Barrow's and Colonel Johnson's Committees are given effect to. 7501.

Present leave rules financially economical to the Government. Would abolish the eight months' restriction and permit the combination of privilege leave with ordinary furlough. Instead of laying down the number of officers who may be absent on leave from a regiment, would lay down those who should be present during the cold weather and the summer. 7504.

Would leave the responsibility for granting leave to the Commanding Officer and the Brigade Commander. 7516.

Would suggest that each of the three Governors' bodyguards in this country could quite efficiently carry on with one officer apiece. 15641.

*General Aylmer.*—A war establishment of ten officers per battalion or regiment in the field will be sufficient, provided this number can really be maintained by a proper system of reserves. Internal security units also require this number of officers. There should be two British officers at each dépôt of units both of the Field Army and internal defence. Thus require twelve British officers per battalion or regiment without taking into consideration the question of a reserve. Existing peace establishment of British officers is so high that it stifles the initiative of the Indian officers. Suggests a reduction in the peace establishment of 294 British officers but points out that a reserve of about 1,250 for fighting units alone will, at the same time, be required. 8579, 8595.

Possible, but most inadvisable for one officer to carry out the duties of both quartermaster and transport officer. 8593.

Owing to the increased number of British officers with native regiments, officers are granted leave most liberally. Present orders prevent an officer from taking leave to Europe too frequently. 8635.

Sees no reason why furlough should not be distributed over the whole year. 8641.

To his knowledge, Commanding Officers do not go on leave unduly often. 8647.

High officers do not take leave excessively. 8649.

Would recommend the regulation of recruitment by average requirements calculated on an actuarial basis tempered by common sense. 8651, 8657.

No one can find a better system than the time system for promotion. 8659.

Prefers the normal system to that of giving officers promotion out of their turn. 8663.

Would reduce tenure of command to four years. 8669.

Would also retire a Commanding Officer at 52 and a second-in-command at 50. 8671.

*Colonel Hoghton.*—Would rather see fewer British officers in peace time and more Indian officers both in peace and war. 10492.

Owing to the number of British officers, it is difficult for the native officers to retain and act up to the responsibilities of their positions in regard to the maintenance of discipline, training and administration, more especially in the training season. 10500, 10504.

In favour of allowing more British officers on leave during the training season. 10502.

Since the increase of British officers, native officers are less anxious to take responsibility and initiative, but their efficiency would increase if they were given more scope. 10512, 10516.

Would like to see a complement of eleven British officers in a regiment in time of peace, and the same number with a reserve of two in time of war. 10520, 10538.

In a big war, a native regiment would require more officers to lead it than a British regiment would. 10540.

The duties of quartermaster and transport officer in war can be efficiently performed by one British officer if he be aided by a native officer. Necessary to have a British officer with the regimental transport when marching with British troops. 10566.

Statement showing the amount of leave and furlough taken by each officer in his regiment during the last three years. In the junior ranks, leave to Europe should be restricted. 10574.

In regard to the restriction of leave, would prefer to see the power of a Commanding Officer bounded by regulations. 10582, 10590.

Leave rules are excessively indulgent. 10598.

As regards leave, the rules applicable to civil departments might be introduced, provided a certain amount of latitude was allowed to meet special cases. 10600, 10602, 10620.

It would be a good scheme if officers could take leave at any time of the year. 10604.

Statement showing average number of officers on the rolls of the regiment, the number absent on leave, furlough, etc., and the number actually present at regimental duty for the past three years. 10624.

Would like to have a minimum of six officers always with the regiment. 10626.

Advisable to give every officer the two months' privilege leave every year to which he is entitled. 10630, 10632.

For regiments not serving on the frontier, suggests a strength of eleven British officers and 738 Indian ranks. Regiments on the frontier should have the present strength of officers and men. 10671, 10707.

The majority of the senior officers have a sufficient knowledge of the subjects, and a sufficient command of the vernacular to keep in close touch with the native ranks. Amongst the juniors it is not so common although there are exceptions. The study of their men's classes and characteristics by junior officers should be made compulsory, and should form one of the subjects for the examination for retention in the Indian army. 10898.

*Major Hill.*—In peace time there is always sufficient employment for the present number of British officers in barracks and on manoeuvres. It does occasionally happen that there is a superfluity of British officers, but never known that state of affairs to last for long. In the case of a minor campaign from a regimental point of view, the present number of British officers is sufficient, but in the event of the whole army being mobilized, doubts whether there would be a sufficient number of British regimental officers. 11064.

At the commencement of a campaign a large number of British officers is necessary to furnish leaders even for minor enterprises, but as the campaign continued the necessity for a large number of British officers would probably grow less as the Indian ranks found their feet. Casualties among British officers could be met to some extent by the Indian officers. 11036, 11074.

Would not be in favour of any change in the present establishment of British officers. 11076.

On service it is absolutely necessary to have a separate British officer for each of the duties of quartermaster and transport officer. 11088.

In a war with Afghanistan or the tribes, the casualties amongst British officers would be heavier than they were in previous campaigns, as the Afghans and tribesmen are better armed than they were. 11094.

Present leave rules for officers too liberal and strongly opposed to them. 11100, 11104.

Would suggest a maximum of three officers per battalion being allowed to go on twelve months' combined leave, the first three months being on full Indian pay and allowances. 11100, 11116.

A Commanding Officer should be given a free hand as to the number of officers he thinks should be permitted to be absent on leave. 11114.

Would not apply the condition that an officer may not take leave unless he has put in a certain amount of service. 11116.

Statement showing for last three years the number of officers on roll of regiment, the number absent on leave or furlough or on duty, and the number actually present at regimental duty. 11121.

The vernacular is much better spoken by British officers who entered the service within the last fifteen years than by their predecessors. 11306.

Does not think there is quite the same intimate relation with the men that there used to be, but thinks this is caused by the increase of work and training. 11306.

Does not think it expedient to bring in a colonel from one battalion to command another battalion in the link over the head of another officer, unless there is considerable difference in their seniority. 11310, 11316.

*Colonel Dunsterville.*—Present establishment of officers as satisfactory as possible. Sometimes an excess of British officers in peace time, but not often. When the number of British officers is greater than that required for ordinary routine, it is easy to find work for the surplus officers in the shape of special classes for scouts, etc. 11418.

In case of war, casualties among British officers would be very heavy and it would therefore be dangerous to reduce the peace strength, and further it would be more necessary than ever to have a reserve of officers to fall back upon. 11418.

The present number of British officers by no means necessitates undue interference with native officers in the thorough command of their units. 11422.

Would like to have 14 officers for each battalion in time of peace and 17 officers (including two for depôt, and one medical officer) in time of war. 11440, 11442.

British officers are primarily instructors in peace and leaders in war, and in both peace and war, impartial judges of men's grievances. 11440.

Could do with very few British officers if it were absolutely necessary. 11448, 11450.

The duties of quartermaster and transport officer in war can be efficiently performed by one British officer if assisted by a native officer, but would like to start with a separate British officer for each duty. 11458.

Statement of leave taken by officers in his regiment during last three years. Present leave rules are good—certainly liberal. Tendency on part of young officers to run Home too frequently. Combined leave out of India to be granted only at such a rate as would ensure officers being at Home not more frequently than once every five years. 11460, 11484.

No restriction on combined leave in India other than those at present in force. 11460, 11468.

Proposes no alteration in the rules for privilege leave out of India. 11468.

Established strength of officers in his regiment, the number absent on leave or furlough or on duty and the number actually present and at regimental duty during last three years. 11462.

Would be difficult to make a rule fixing the minimum strength of officers with a regiment at all times. 11484.

Does not think any advantage would be gained by introducing the civil leave rules into the army. 11486.

It would not be a good thing to lay down a hard and fast rule regarding the grant of leave. 11488, 11490.

British officers have a sufficient knowledge of the subjects and a sufficient command of the vernacular to keep in close touch with the native ranks. 11730.

Junior officers can speak the vernacular quite well. 11732.

The language examinations for officers are appallingly difficult, but at the same time quite unpractical in character. 11734, 11736.

*Colonel Creagh.*—Present establishment of British officers satisfactory. 11858.

Arguments against reduction of number of British officers with native regiments. 11858.

Not necessarily the case that owing to the number of British officers it is difficult for native officers to retain and act up to the responsibilities of their position, though this tendency has to be carefully guarded against. 11859.

Would like to have 14 British officers per regiment in time of peace and 13 British officers actually with the regiment in time of war. 11867, 11869, 11871.

Duties of British officers. 11867.

Duties of quartermaster and transport officer in war can, as a rule, be efficiently performed by one British officer, if he be aided by one native officer. 11893.

Officers should not ordinarily be allowed to go Home on leave until they have had five years' service. 11895, 12127.

A year's leave should then be given them and a free passage one way at any rate, though it would be better if it were given both ways. 11895.

Reasons which call for great liberality in the matter of leave to military officers and more especially regimental officers. 11895.

In the interest of the State, as well as of the officer, that leave should be more liberally granted as the officer's service increases. 11895.

If thought necessary to put a limit on leave Home, it could not be thought unreasonable from the point of view of the State to fix the limit of leave at 8 years during the period of an officer's service. 11895.

Statement showing number of British officers on rolls of his regiment, the number absent on leave or furlough, or from other causes, and the number actually present and at regimental duty. 11916.

Would not be in favour of accompanying leave conditions by a general rule as to the minimum number of officers who should be present at one time. 11920, 11922.

It is better that native soldiers should keep their own British officers provided they liked them. 12105.

British officers have as a rule a sufficient knowledge of the subjects and a sufficient command of the vernacular to keep in close touch with the native ranks, though of course, there is always room for improvement. 12119.

Language examination tests should be as colloquial as possible. 12123.

Garrison courses for British officers might be reintroduced in a modified form. 12175.

*Colonel Mead.*—The establishment of British officers is unnecessarily high for the performance of duties in peace, and approximately correct for the performance of duties in war. 12211.

When the Commanding Officer's regimental system regards the British officers as a staff advising, assisting in, supervising and inspecting the training of the companies and the battalion, there is not too much interference with the native officers, but where the system regards the double-company as the tactical and administrative unit the case is different. 12213.

Would like to have ten British officers in peace time and ten with a regiment in the field, with a reserve of two officers to meet casualties. 12237, 12265, 12269.

The duties of British officers to consist in initiating programmes of training, supervising the training and inspecting and checking the company accounts, etc. 12237.

Doubtful if a British officer aided by a native officer could efficiently perform the duties of quartermaster and transport officer in time of war, but if the quartermaster is taken out of the list of wing officers, and the native officer who assists him is mounted, it might be possible. 12296.

Leave rules are too lenient; if an officer could get Home for one year or eight months after every three years spent in the country, it would be sufficient. 12298.

Statement showing the amount of leave or furlough taken by each officer in his regiment during the last three years. 12298.

Would restrict leave Home as much as possible to the hot weather, but would be liberal regarding leave taken in the country for shooting purposes, etc. 12300.

Statement showing the number of officers on the rolls of his regiment, the number absent on leave, furlough or duty, and the number actually present and at regimental duty for the last three years. 12312.

The present very high standard insisted on for the Urdu Higher Standard means a long time of hard work and by the time a young officer comes to tackle Marathi, he is very tired of languages, and finds he has a new character to learn, and a book with no relation to military conversation to read. Conversation is the end to be aimed at as a result of the examination, and it should be the real test in examination. A much better practical test would be obtained if the matter was put into the hands of the Commanding Officer to whose interest it is that his officers should speak fluently. At present there is too much book work. 12490, 12496.

Generally speaking, the knowledge of Marathi of the officers in his regiment is not satisfactory. 12494.

*Colonel Graham.*—Present establishments of officers fairly satisfactory, 12 British officers and 17 Indian officers (including Indian adjutant) should be the absolute minimum in peace time. 12615, 12621.

Only ten officers in his regiment excluding the medical officer. 12617.

In Madras regiments it is not the case that owing to the number of British officers it is difficult for native officers to act up to the responsibilities of their positions in regard to discipline, administration and training. 12619.

For war, would suggest the proposed peace establishment of officers with two or three additional double-company officers attached from other non-mobilized regiments. 12621.

British officers maintain the general efficiency of the corps as a whole and seek to increase it and keep it abreast of the times by applying new ideas and methods as they come out. 12621.

For war, the establishment should be more than 12. 12623.

In case of casualties among the British officers native officers would be able to take command to a certain extent. 12625.

The duties of quartermaster and of transport officer in war can be efficiently performed by one British officer if he be aided by a native officer. 12637.

Cannot suggest any amendment to the existing leave rules which appear to be satisfactory. The maximum number of officers on combined leave should not exceed four. 12639, 12655.

Nine of the proposed thirteen officers should be present during the training season. 12641.

Statement showing the number of British officers on the rolls of his regiment, the numbers absent on leave or duty, and the number actually present and at regimental duty for the past three years. 12659.

Most officers have a fair knowledge of the subjects which however have not very much interest for Madras sepoy. Majority of officers have a sufficient knowledge of Hindustani (hardly any of Tamil) to converse with the native ranks to a certain extent but there ought to be an improvement even in Hindustani. 12864.

Fluent conversation and ability to deliver a short lecture on some subject should be a *sine qua non* in the Hindustani qualifying examination for the Indian army; nothing else matters much. 12864.

Essential also that there should be an examination in the traditions, castes, customs, etc., of the men of his regiment before a probationer is finally admitted into the Indian army. 12864.

Agrees that present language examination tests are unduly difficult in some ways and they do not lay stress on the necessary things. 12866.

The knowledge of Tamil of the officers in his regiment is somewhat superficial. 12868.

*Colonel Cole.*—We might have one squadron officer less for peace and war without any harm, provided we have a workable reserve. 12975, 12979.

Twelve officers required in the drill season and six in the hot weather. 12997, 12999, 13046.

Certainly not the case that owing to the number of British officers it is difficult for the native officers to retain and act up to the responsibilities of their positions in regard to the maintenance of discipline, training and administration. 13001.

Administration is done entirely by British officers. 13001.

Plenty of work for British officers on higher training without being constantly occupied with elementary instruction. 13005, 13012.

Would like to have 13 British officers in time of peace and 14 British officers (including 2 for the depôt) in time of war. 13012.

Generally speaking, British officers are required to command, guide and direct. 13012.

Present leave rules call for amendment, they are hard and fast and not adaptable to the numerous individual cases constantly occurring. 13042.

The eight months' leave should be abolished and privilege leave given with all leave out of India. 13042.

Preferable to lay down that so many officers must be present with the regiment in the drill season, and so many in the hot weather, and leave the rest to Commanding Officers and General Officers Commanding. 13042.

Adjutant-General should intimate that as a rule young officers should not be allowed any leave out of India until they had done four years in the country, and after that, three years for a further period of leave. 13042.

A young officer at present gets too much leave Home which has the tendency to lessen his interests in this country. 13042.

Statement showing number of officers on rolls of regiment, the numbers absent on leave or furlough or owing to other causes, and the number actually present and at regimental duty for the past three years. 13050.

It would be sound for purposes of efficiency to retire a Commanding Officer at 50, and a second-in-command at 48, and if you could offer them an increased pension, it would be all right from the officer's point of view as well. 13098, 13100.

A junior officer selected for command of a regiment should be given the permanent rank of lieutenant-colonel, but such promotion should not carry any claim to accelerated promotion to colonel. 13106.

The language test examinations lay too much stress on the written examinations and not enough on colloquial, and a good deal of valuable time is wasted by officers in trying to pass these examinations which give no good result. 13193.

A good idea to start regular classes with competent instructors, in suitable centres, to teach officers the language properly and quickly. 13193.



## ARMY IN INDIA.

## BRITISH OFFICERS, INDIAN ARMY—FORMATION OF A RESERVE.

*Sir M. Grover.*—To form a reserve, would suggest giving officers reserve pay and then letting them retire. 645.

Entirely against proposal to provide for special war requirements by employing British non-commissioned officers acquainted with native ways and languages as officers with Indian troops. 647, 650.

In case of necessity, officers would be obtained from non-mobilized British regiments. 652.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—The estimate *re* the reserve requirements of officers prepared by the General Staff may be accepted. 4436.

Does not altogether agree with proposals regarding transfers to Special Reserve. For a reserve of officers we want young officers. 4525, 4547.

Planters and other outsiders if appointed to the reserve should only be given commissions as lieutenants. 4547, 4549.

In a serious national emergency two non-commissioned officers might be promoted to commissions in each British regiment, and two subalterns acquainted with Hindustani transferred to the Indian army. 4555, 4569.

Officers might be spared from the Forest or the Public Works Department. 4557.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—Doubts as to the quality of the reserve officers we could get from the merchant and other classes; should be understood that if they draw the pay they must learn the work. 5653.

Would induce a certain number of officers to join the reserve from the regular army. 5655.

Thinks proposal to obtain a war reserve by promoting non-commissioned officers to commissions in British regiments and transferring British officers to native units would work well to a limited extent. 5669.

*General Birdwood.*—Under no circumstances should any reduction be made in the number of British officers unless and until a real reserve of officers is actually in being. 7421.

If a reserve of officers can be formed, the proposed reduction by the General Staff will be vindicated to some extent. 7423.

If an efficient reserve is formed, in favour of a small reduction of, say, one officer per regiment. 7425.

For a reserve of officers for the Indian army would suggest attaching officers from British cavalry and infantry units, and from the Militia, Yeomanry, and Colonial troops to units of the Indian army. Their names should then be kept on a list until they attain a certain age. 7431.

The difficulty of getting officers in India is accentuated by the impossibility of getting men who know the native. 7439.

We could only get a very small number of officers from planters, etc. 7443.

Officers of the Indian army will only leave to join a reserve if they are given sufficient inducement to do so. 7449.

Considers proposal to obtain a reserve by the grant of commissions to British non-commissioned officers well worthy of consideration. 7451.

Is against the employment of non-commissioned officers of British regiments as officers in the Indian army. 14899.

*General Aylmer.*—Suggests a reduction in the peace establishment of 294 British officers but points out that a reserve of about 1,250 for fighting units alone will, at the same time be required. 8579, 8595.

In addition to the reserve required for fighting units, nearly 1,300 officers will be required for the departmental services.

To help in meeting requirements in officers would suggest :—

(1) Fighting units and departments :—

(a) Offering civilians inducements to join a reserve.

(b) Promoting non-commissioned officers in British units to commissioned rank.

(2) (a) Obtaining a reserve of officers for the establishments of the Indian army by the offer of special pensions, gratuities, or furlough, and by adding those who joined the Indian army after 1893, who are liable to be recalled for service after they have retired.

(b) Supply and Transport Corps :—In addition to (1) and (2) (a) above, giving a retaining fee to retired warrant officers of the Corps ; some such system also for warrant officers of the Ordnance Department.

Officers of the Public Works Department might be used for internal defence, and this should be made a condition of their service.

Endeavouring to form an Indian section of the Special Reserve. 8597.

In case of war, some non-commissioned officers in British regiments with a knowledge of Hindustani to be offered permanent transfer to the Indian army. Subalterns of British units who have passed their lower standard in Hindustani to be offered permanent transfer to Indian army. 8618.

The number of British officers with native combatant units can be reduced contingent on a proper reserve of officers being maintained. 8803.

*General Lean.*—A certain proportion of Volunteer officers could be utilized as a reserve of officers for the Indian army. 9332, 9334.

For officers for the Indian army would prefer a Volunteer officer to a serjeant from a British regiment as the former would command a native better. 9338.

*Colonel Dunsterville.*—In case of war, casualties among British officers would be very heavy, and it would therefore be dangerous to reduce the peace strength, and further it would be more necessary than ever to have a reserve of officers to fall back upon. Qualified Volunteer officers might be available for a reserve. 11418.

## ARMY IN INDIA.

## BUDGET PROVISION, CONTROL OF EXPENDITURE, DELEGATION OF FINANCIAL POWERS, ETC.

*Sir M. Grover.*—Divisional commanders have the same financial powers as Lieutenant-Generals of commands used to have. 748.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—Considers that divisional Generals make adequate use of the financial and other powers conferred upon them, and sees no necessity for further decentralization. 4628.

Does not consider any reduction of expenditure on the army feasible. 4726.

Could suggest economies in one direction but these would be counter-balanced by increased expenditure in another. 4726.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—Divisional Generals make full use of the financial and other powers conferred on them. 5701.

Divisional Generals might be given more financial powers. Would also extend the financial powers of Brigadier-Generals. 5701, 5703, 5707, 5709.

*Mr. Brunyate.*—The ten crores initial and two crores recurring were simply rough forecasts in lump of the possible ultimate total cost of Lord Kitchener's Redistribution and Reorganization Schemes as a whole, and were not estimates which had been subjected to departmental examination. 5890, 5892, 5894.

A thorough examination of the estimates for the Reorganization and Redistribution Schemes would have involved very great delay. 5897.

The system of obtaining financial advice by the Commander-in-Chief now in force, introduced by Lord Kitchener, is superior to the system previously in force. 5897.

The Budget provision for the current year is £3·89 millions in excess of that for 1912-13, and there is likely to be a further increase by about £300,000 a year. 5900.

The cost of the complete Redistribution Scheme is now estimated at £2,900,000 but the scheme estimated at this figure is not identical with the scheme originally put forward. 5905.

The Redistribution Scheme estimates received credit for barracks that would either have to be abandoned or rebuilt in any case. 5913.

The Redistribution Scheme must, in the end, involve some permanent recurring expenditure. 5920.

It was a great mistake to provide funds for the Reorganization and Redistribution Schemes before the process of examination had been well advanced; there can be little doubt that money would have been saved to some extent had this been done. 5931.

It does not seem probable that the Reorganization and Redistribution Schemes could have been fully carried out in five years. 5940.

There has been a growth in non-effective charges owing to the transfer of certain services from the Civil to the Military. 5954.

There has been increased expenditure owing to the measures in connexion with British troops in which the Indian authorities had to follow the lead of the Home Government. 5956.

Powers of reappropriation do not apply to Home provision. When very large lapses are involved, it is difficult to find means of expending them at short notice. Money is sometimes put in the Budget though the Finance Department does not consider it likely that it will be possible to spend it. 5962.

The Government of India, in pursuance of their own policy of carrying out Lord Kitchener's scheme in 5 years, provided from year to year more money than could be spent. 5964.

Does not think that any loss of economy or increased friction in every day work has resulted from the abolition of the Special Grant. 5970.

Does not think it is sound to have a fixed grant for Schedule covering the whole of the Schedule items, because the sums involved fluctuate so enormously. 5970.

The utter absence of any systematic method of fixing the Schedule might at any moment lead to acute trouble. 5974.

Contract system would be suitable for minor Schedule items. Total grants for big measures should be and are fixed by Council. 5976.

The store expenditure is passed with an absence of check which is absurd when compared with the scrutiny exercised over other military expenditure. The store expenditure might well be included under any contract system. 5978.

Would like to see the provision for horses, mules, etc., brought under any contract system which may be proposed. 5978.

The quasi-contract grants for reliefs, training, hutting, etc., might be included in contract grants. 5978.

Military Works Service are of opinion that financial pressure on their ordinary grant has been too strong and that other military claims have led to their being left in the lurch. 5978.

Utterly disbelieves in a system of accumulating money for military expenditure. The accumulation of lapses would not lead to economy but to slackness. 5984.

Would not include recurring charges, due to previous measures, in the contract amount. 5990.

Recent tendency has been to fix the Army Budget as a whole in the first instance and the Schedule figure tends to become merely a derived or secondary figure, but the Schedule is not left absolutely out of account. 5992.

Agrees with view that there ought to be some means of regulating the Schedule. 5992.

For Army Budget would suggest :—

(a) Provision each year for the very large schemes on the basis of the periods in which Council have already determined to complete them.

(b) Contract for minor Schedule measures, ordinary stores, animals, certain minor grants, and ordinary military works.

(c) All the rest by a process of expert estimating. 5994.

Lapses in ordinary expenditure cannot be applied to Schedule measures except with sanction of Secretary of State, but it is often advisable that such sanction be freely given. 5996, 5998.

With the enormous mass of military demands always awaiting execution it is very desirable to spend every penny you take in your Budget. 6000.

In actual practice, the system of re-granting lapses is already followed to a large extent in cases such as stores, where for some reason the money is not spent in a year. 6020.

When prevention of lapses is merely a matter of careful watching and administration, better not to encourage slackness by giving a free hand in the re-granting of lapses. 6020.

In matters which are within our own control, and when we have full powers, the lapses are very small indeed. At Home the Secretary of State controls the grant himself, therefore we cannot control it. 6022.

The main lapses in Home expenditure take place under Schedule expenditure and Government stores. If lapses are not to occur, the Schedule must not be too large. A more rigid attitude ought to be adopted regarding the provision of funds before schemes have been fully worked out. Heads of departments should be more continuously in touch with the Director General of Stores. There ought to be a complete understanding between the Secretary of State and the Government of India that every effort should be made to expend the money voted in the military Budget. 6024.

Financial advisers in technical departments should be a partial remedy regarding lapses in stores expenditure. Fullest use should be made of advance purchases as a means of avoiding lapses. Does not agree with proposal to place orders for stores with producing agencies at Home instead of with the India Office. 6024, 6026, 6036.

To prevent lapses, the grant of advances to firms, or anything which is fairly analogous to ordinary business should be done by the India Office. 6028.

In practice we do not receive much advance information from the India Office in regard to such matters as store purchases. 6030.

The Military Finance Secretary could also perhaps be in closer touch with the India Office. 6036.

Sceptical about the general policy of incurring heavier capital outlay now with a view to diminishing recurring charges in the future. 6042.

There has been considerable economy lately in sending invalids to the hills instead of sending them to England. 6058.

The scheme for making the Deputy Controller of a division the financial adviser of the General Officer Commanding has been a decided improvement on the old system, but it has not attained the success that was hoped for it. Under the new scheme for the reorganization of the Military Accounts Department the financial adviser to the General Officer Commanding will be independent. 6150.

At present no reappropriation can be effected without the approval of the Controller; this is a remnant of the old system and requires correction. With better arrangements for military financial advice, it will be possible for a General Officer Commanding to delegate his financial powers. Cases are not numerous in which General Officers Commanding do not make full use of the financial powers granted to them. These powers could be enlarged in regard to personal cases, such as trivial questions about detention allowance, pensions, etc., and questions about followers and menials; and General Officers Commanding should be encouraged to use their supposed powers about "unauthorized but otherwise regular charges" more freely. 6165.

The question of classing menials such as sweepers, etc., under 'office contingencies' might be taken up. 6169.

Opposed to the suggestion that Army Commanders should exercise administrative functions in matters of expenditure. 6173.

It may be possible a few years hence to take up the questions of giving Generals larger powers and of simplifying the Regulations. 6177.

The existing system for the control of expenditure, so long as it works and does not break down, gives the maximum power of financial control. 6268, 6270.

The proposed system for the control of military expenditure is not likely to be as strong as the existing system. 6272.

The powers of General Officers Commanding in regard to military accounts expenditure are still very small, but it would not be desirable to decentralize in this matter. 6377, 6379.

Redistribution measures have not secured any extraordinary degree of precedence. 6482.

*General Aylmer.*—Divisional Generals in the majority of cases make adequate use of the financial and other powers conferred on them. They might be given full powers over the administration of all funds placed at their disposal in the divisional Budget. Given a financial adviser and a good administrative organization in divisions, the more financial powers that can reasonably be decentralized the better. 8713.

*General Lean.*—If the Government training grant were increased to Rs. 1,40,000 it would enable nearly all Volunteer corps to go to camp each year. 9251, 9253, 9364.

If the Government are anxious to attract a greater number of the right stamp of men, more money should be expended on the Volunteer force so as to make it more attractive and at the same time lessen the expense of the

individual. The capitation grant and the outfit allowance for officers might be increased with advantage. Would like Rs. 5 more per head for the capitation grant. 9364, 9374.

*General Stuart.*—Existing regulations in regard to supplies to units are sufficient to prevent undue waste and no economy would result from the proposed contract system which in practice would be impossible to work. 9928.

To obviate the highly undesirable delays that now occur in placing the orders and in supplying the stores, the Government should say definitely at the time of sanction to an important Schedule measure what funds will be forthcoming during each of the years of the period which it is decided should be occupied in its completion, and that the Secretary of State should be asked to agree to any Schedule provision made in one year and not expended in that year being funded. 10034.

Quite impossible to place the Budget for Ordnance stores on a contract basis. 10048.

We want more check of stores than we have at present. 10050.

The provision of an expert financial branch in the office of the Director-General of Ordnance would effect an immense diminution in the correspondence and delay which at present occur in arriving at decisions at a cost that would be more than compensated for by the advantages to be obtained. 10075.

*General Birdwood.*—In practice has found that some individual Generals are not too willing to take such financial powers as they possess and refer to Army Headquarters unnecessarily, but this is possibly due to their not yet having really proper financial advice at their disposal, but it is hoped to remedy this shortly by a reorganization of the Military Accounts Department. 14947.

Considers that questions involving general principles or recurring expenditure must be referred to a central authority. 14947.

## ARMY IN INDIA.

## DISTRIBUTION OF THE ARMY—GENERAL.

*General Staff Appreciation. Appendix I.*—So long as railways can be kept open, the exact location of troops makes little difference in the time taken to concentrate them wherever required except in Burma. 133.

*Colonel Bingley.*—Dislike of down-country troops for frontier or upcountry stations is now an exploded idea. 184.

Command of troops in war by the Generals who commanded them in peace can be carried out, at any rate in the case of divisions and infantry brigades: 192.

Cannot say that there has been any special massing of troops on the frontier. The 1st and 4th Divisions have been partially completed with some of their troops, but so have several others. 197.

Every frontier has a greater density of troops. 199.

*Sir M. Grover.*—We are still working on the idea of making each divisional area self-contained. 381, 383

Seems desirable to work up to Lord Kitchener's scheme of divisional areas. 396.

Proposed cantonment at Torsappar an unsound proposition. 470.

Had the money spent on redistribution been utilized in improving the armament of units of the Field Army we would still be in much the same position as we are now, as armaments are always changing and units are at times in the Field Army and at times detailed for internal defence. 472, 476, 478.

Does not agree with proposal to include the Kohat, Bannu and Derajat Brigades in the Peshawar divisional area. 528, 532, 536.

Burma, even if reduced in garrison, should have a divisional General, owing to the extent of the administrative area. 532.

*Sir C. Cleveland.*—Evil effects are likely to result from stationing a native regiment within its recruiting area. 1292.

Does not consider that the number of troops allotted to the internal defence of the Punjab is adequate. 1294.

*Mr. Fenton.*—Would keep Sikh regiments away from Amritsar, Lahore and Ferozepore; they are too near Sikh agitators at these places. 1716.

*General Aylmer.*—Many other requirements for the army which should take precedence of the further development of the Redistribution Scheme. 2329, 2449, 2467, 2523.

Better to have units for war trained together. 2333.

When barracks are falling down, they should, if required, be rebuilt at places indicated under the Redistribution Scheme. 2357.

Circumstances have developed since the Redistribution Scheme was brought forward; it does not now sufficiently provide for internal security. 2359.

Adherence to Lord Kitchener's scheme of divisional areas highly expedient. Is of opinion that in view of the conditions existing at the time, Lord Kitchener was perfectly correct in putting redistribution in the forefront of the 1904 scheme. 2523.

Divisional areas should eventually be self-contained as far as possible. 2622.

No complaints have been made about the present system under which units are often stationed long distances from their recruiting area. 2814.

Not safe to have a Sikh battalion at Amritsar, and does not think the Sikh troops like it. 2818.

Considers the proportion of British troops in the hills and of officers on leave during the hot weather satisfactory. 8563.

As regards the North-West Frontier, in no case would the number of men required for the minimum strength of the moveable columns be allowed to be reduced by men going on furlough or leave. 8573.

Keeping a unit very long at a station means stagnation as long stays are not generally popular. Policy of localizing Indian units in or near recruiting areas would be a bad thing and would not be popular. On grounds of policy advisable to march instead of railing troops on relief to a greater extent than has been done of late years. Relief grant cannot be advantageously curtailed. 8677.

Present garrison for Chitral is sufficient, and another battalion would certainly be excessive. 8687.

The policy of posting regiments to provinces distant from their recruiting areas has apparently had no prejudicial effect on recruiting and is on the whole popular with the native soldier. From point of view of unrest the system is a success, but in some cases has been somewhat overdone. It often does a unit an immense amount of good to give it a tour of frontier service. The system, however, costs the Government a considerable amount extra. 8697.

*Mr. Lovett.*—Does not think it advisable to quarter regiments in the areas from which they are recruited. 3041.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—Does not consider that such great expenditure on redistribution was necessary. 3765.

It is not necessary to have all the troops located in peace within the divisional area. 3769.

Other things much more essential than the Redistribution Scheme. 3771.

Many of the rearrangements under the Redistribution Scheme were sound and desirable though others were both futile and extravagant. 3838.

That troops should be commanded in peace by those who will command them in war is obviously the correct principle, but its complete application is quite impossible in any but a localized army like that of Germany. 3907.

There was a deplorable waste of money in the Redistribution Scheme. 3964.

Doubtful whether Ahmadnagar is a good place for mountain batteries. 4144.

Would prefer to see the mountain batteries for the 6th Division stationed at Deolali if accommodation can be provided without detriment to the distribution of the infantry. Would like to see British mountain batteries at or near Wellington to complete the 9th Division. 4144, 4160.

Under a proper and suitable organization there would be no difficulty in the calling up of reservists by reason of battalions serving far away from their recruiting grounds. 4402.

Great political objection to keeping units for long period at the same stations. 4604.

Regarding posting of regiments far from their recruiting areas, as a general policy would hesitate to give an opinion, but in particular cases it is advantageous. To place up-country regiments at Secunderabad and Bangalore is not a satisfactory arrangement. 4620.

Would prefer a system of large groups or regiments, one battalion on frontier, one in its own area, and the other at a reasonable distance. 4624.

Aden requires another battalion of Indian infantry. 4708.

Not necessary to have the British battalion at Aden completed to full strength. 4710.



*Sir G. Roos-Keppel.*—Sees no great advantage in increasing the proportion of British troops in the North-West Frontier Province. 5163.

Torsappar is a place well-suited for a brigade, but now that the Loi-Shilman railway has been abandoned, there is no advantage in having the cantonment. 5227, 5229.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—If money were not the chief consideration, would certainly carry out the Kitchener scheme in full; but in view of the cost and the many needs of the army, does not think it possible to work out the scheme in its entirety. 5257.

For purposes of war training nothing can be more important than that each divisional area be self-contained. 5257, 5265.

Convinced that the Redistribution Scheme was the best thing that could have done, and was a right good move. 5275.

Reliefs should be gradual, one corps leaving a brigade at a time. 5303.

It is a very good thing to move troops by road occasionally and thus show them to the people. 5125.

Considers localized troops the most efficient but more influenced by local feeling. 5685, 5687, 5689.

The policy of posting regiments to provinces distant from their recruiting areas is politically a good thing, and sees no ill effects from such postings. 5711.

Agrees generally with Sir B. Duff in regard to the chaos that would arise through the non-fulfilment of the self-contained divisional area. 5739.

*Mr. Brunyate.*—It does not seem probable that the Reorganization and Redistribution Schemes could have been fully carried out in five years. 5940.

*Mr. Kennedy.*—From a military point of view considers that the present system which distributes regiments all over India, regardless of their recruiting area, is a sound one. 6624.

*General Birdwood.*—Believes the principle of self-contained divisions to be essentially sound, and deprecates departures therefrom unless the necessity can be proved. Attaches great importance to continuity of policy in army administration. 7143.

At present there are some more important projects than the Redistribution Scheme. The Peshawar Division should, however, be completed with the least possible delay. 7148.

Lord Kitchener's scheme for making each divisional area self-contained should certainly not be abandoned and should be carried out in its entirety when money is available. 7148, 7158, 7184.

Does not think Lord Kitchener laid any great stress upon a brigade being quartered within a ringed fence, but he wanted units to be within a reasonable distance of each other. 7243.

Nowshera has improved enormously since the construction of the canal and is much more popular than it formerly was. 7251.

Even if the Field Army is reduced to seven or eight divisions, it would not be in any way advisable to reduce the number of existing divisional areas. 7361.

Expenditure on reliefs cannot be curtailed to any appreciable extent. 7569.

It is cheaper to move British infantry by rail than by road. 7578.

Artillery march in relief whenever possible. 7580.

*Colonel Haghton.*—Advantages of having a native unit stationed near its recruiting area are :—

Men are near their homes and therefore more contented.

An impetus is given to recruiting by the presence of the regiment in the midst of the people.

Men can take advantage of short leave to a far greater extent.

Disadvantages are :—

Relatives apt to sponge on men and efficiency suffers in consequence.

In case of spread of sedition or disaffection men are much more liable to evil influences.

In case of riots or disorder, men's loyalty would be tried very highly if called upon to act in aid of the civil power. 10874.

The advantages and disadvantages of stationing a native unit near its recruiting area really counterbalance each other. 10876.

No objection to increasing the period of stay of regiments at particular places. 10882, 10884.

*Major Hill.*—When a regiment is stationed in its recruiting area, there are no recruiting difficulties, but the sepoys' relatives batten on them. 11262, 11264.

Moving from one station to another is popular among Indian troops. 11268.

Frontier should not be closed to anyone—would make the period of stay there two years, so as to give as many as possible a chance of serving there. 11272.

At present about three-fourths of the regiments on the frontier belong to the old Punjab Frontier Force. 11274.

Nowshera a very good training ground. 11276.

Native would like to stay in one place for ever. 11278, 11282, 11284.

It would be better not to have a battalion of Sikhs at Amritsar. 11350.

You could have one Sikh battalion and one of another class at Ferozepore. 11352.

*Colonel Dunsterville.*—The troops like Jhelum; very conveniently placed for their homes. 11650.

Advantages of stationing a regiment near its recruiting area are :—

In his opinion :—General contentment of men, recruiting facilities.

In the men's opinion :—Less expensive railway fares home, constant short leave.

Disadvantages :—

In his opinion :—Too great a tendency to ask for short leave; loss of experience which serving away gives to the men; and not so useful for purposes of internal defence.

In the men's opinion :—No disadvantage except that (especially in case of Pathans), relatives have a tendency to eat them out of house and home. 11686.

Complete Indian brigades at a station with no British unit are inadvisable except perhaps on the frontier. 11794.

Good for sepoys and British soldiers to learn to know each other in peace time, and there are political objections to unmixed native brigades. 11794.

*Colonel Creagh.*—Native ranks like being near their homes. 12071.

Each class should have its turn at being stationed near its recruiting centre. 12071, 12089.

Too long a stay in a station would not be advantageous. 12081.

The further regiments were from their recruiting grounds, the harder as a rule it would be to draw recruits. 12085.

Regiment would like to have one station as a home to which it might periodically return. 12175.

*Colonel Mehd.*—From a Commanding Officer's point of view, the advantages of stationing a native unit near its recruiting area are :—

Increased opportunities for British officers to know their own recruiting area and to get into touch with their men and closer touch with recruiting.

From the native point of view :—

More frequent opportunities of getting home and less expense in taking short leave. 12458.

The invariable stationing of a unit within its recruiting area would have a deadening effect on it, but service outside the area should not if possible exceed from 3 to 5 years. The spirit of emulation engendered by serving with regiments of other classes has a decided effect in improving the training of regiments. 12458.

Marathas do not mind serving outside their recruiting area. 12464.

Not good for a Maratha regiment to be stationed in Bombay city. 12466.

Five years in one station should be the rule. 12470.

*Colonel Cole.*—Advantage of being near recruiting area is that a larger pick of recruits is obtained, but if kept too long in one area regiments get localized. All regiments are improved by a change of locality, and especially by service on the frontier. 13175.

As regards native ranks, it is all a matter of leave ; men like to get home quickly and cheaply, but the disadvantage of being near a recruiting centre is that sometimes relations wish to come and stay, and overstay their welcome. 13175.

A move down south would not be popular so far as his regiment is concerned. 13181.

*General Hamilton Gordon.*—There is a danger that the interruption of railway communication might cause serious delay in the recall of British troops from their hot weather stations in the hills, but it is not so great as to outweigh the advantages of locating as many troops as possible in the hills. 14053.

#### WRITTEN EVIDENCE.

*Sir H. Stuart.*—Would not station Moplahs in Malabar at present. 145.

## ARMY IN INDIA.

## DISTRIBUTION OF ARMY—NEW PROPOSALS.

*Sir M. Grover.*—Sapper corps are being distributed to divisional areas. Pioneer battalion being brought into 1st Division. 385, 394.

Proposal to move British cavalry from Rawalpindi to Risalpur still holds good, but personally not in favour of the proposal. 387, 389.

There ought to be British troops at Jhelum. 526.

Does not agree with the proposals for Kohat, and considers that the garrison proposed is dangerously low. 534.

*Mr. Fenton.*—In the event of dissatisfaction in the native army it might be unsafe to have no British troops at Jhelum. 1808.

*General Aylmer.*—Would like to see a whole cavalry brigade and an infantry division in and around Quetta. 2525.

Does not approve of proposal to reduce the Indian cavalry regiment at Kohat by 2 squadrons, and to post at Thal a battalion of Indian infantry and 2 squadrons of Indian cavalry.

No objection to proposal to station an additional half-squadron and a detachment of Indian garrison artillery on the Samana in addition to present garrison.

Agrees to posting a battalion of Indian infantry and a regiment of Indian cavalry at Tank.

Strongly opposed to a withdrawal from Wana and the Upper Tochi. 2648.

Necessary that the Zhob Levy post on the Baluchistan—Afghan frontier west of Domandi should be maintained. But probably the present line of posts could be drawn back a good deal so as only to include the Kunar valley. 2668.

*Sir H. McMahon.*—Would not be in favour of removing the regiment from Baroda. 3722.

Zhob Levy post on Afghan frontier should not be withdrawn. 3750.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—No reason for retaining the garrison at Bellary as it is not altogether a desirable station. 3867.

Torsappar is an impossible place; Landi Kotal and Suffolk Hill would have been preferable. Assuming that it is necessary to have a third brigade in the Peshawar divisional area it should be located on the Maira covering the Loi-Shilman extension near the Shahgai police post. 3972.

Absolutely opposed to proposed reduction of Kohat garrison. 4104.

So long as there are troops available at Bangalore and Madras for reinforcements one battalion at Trichinopoly is sufficient for the needs of southern India. States Governor thinks that in war time we should have a battalion in Malabar and another half-battalion on east coast at, say, Vizianagram, but he himself does not agree with these views. 4130.

Thinks Calicut and Cannanore could do without their British detachments.

So long as there are troops available at Madras and Bangalore for reinforcements, one battalion at Trichinopoly is sufficient for the needs of southern India. 4130, 4679.

Agrees to the withdrawal of a mountain battery from the Burma peace garrison, but does not approve of proposed reduction in Indian infantry in the Burma peace garrison. 4140.

Disagrees with the proposed reduction of Burma garrison. 4140, 4142, 4669.

Doubtful whether Ahmadnagar is a good place for mountain batteries. Would prefer to see the mountain batteries for the 6th Division stationed at Deolali if accommodation can be provided without detriment to the distribution of the infantry. Would like to see British mountain batteries at or near Wellington to complete 9th Division. 4144, 4160.

A weak detachment of British troops at Jhelum would be a mistake in the presence of a very strong brigade of Indian troops, and does not think it would be advisable to have one there even on account of the bridge. 4257.

As regards the proportion of British to Indian troops would have no qualms about putting another Indian regiment at Peshawar, as a good many of the men are in a foreign country. 4259.

Would like a Carnatic battalion at Dera Ismail Khan to get experience in frontier work. Or a Carnatic battalion might be on foreign service at colonial stations, or in Burma or at Aden. 4622.

In event of withdrawal of British troops from Calicut and Cannanore would suggest following distribution of British infantry in the Southern Brigade :—

Wellington	...	...	...	...	1 battalion.
Fort St. George	...	...	...	...	4 companies.
The Mount	...	...	..	...	1 company.
Mallapuram	...	...	...	...	1 company.
Bellary ...	...	...	...	...	2 companies.

4684.

In the event of the withdrawal of the regular troops from Fort Sandeman would send another regiment to Chaman. No more reason for keeping a regiment at Fort Sandeman than for keeping one at Landi Kotal. 4704.

Should like to see Zhob Levy Corps so increased as to dispense altogether with the regular regiment at Fort Sandeman. 4704.

*Sir G. Roos-Keppel.*—Thinks if we are going to keep an isolated garrison in Chitral it must be increased to two battalions. 5143.

Agrees with contention that the Derajat Brigade should be located at Tank. 5173, 5179, 5183.

If increase to Peshawar garrison is to enable it to hold the outposts of Abazai, Shabkadr and possibly Bara, should strongly advocate it. 5185.

Understands that under the defence scheme the garrisons of Abazai and Shabkadr will be withdrawn, but convinced this could not be done with safety. 5185.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—Would complete the 1st Division area by bringing in those units of which it is now deficient. Bringing in the Abbottabad Brigade is one solution of how to complete the Peshawar Division though does not say it is the best. 5259, 5261, 5263, 5271.

Would bring the fourth battalion into Peshawar, the Pioneer battalion into Nowshera, the cavalry and artillery into Risalpur, and also bring up a sapper company. 5263.

Strategically, Torsappar is a very good site, but as a spot for a cantonment it is impossible. 5337.

The alternative site to the right of the railway leading to Jamrud near Chahgai is quite a good place for a cantonment. 5339.

Under conditions stated, sees no harm in reducing the Kohat area by one battery and 2 battalions of infantry. 5427.

Would like to see the Derajat Brigade moved from Dera Ismail Khan to Tank. 5461, 5463.

A place like Jhelum should never be without a British regiment. 5511.

In favour of posting a battalion of infantry at Thal. The whole garrison at Dera Ismail Khan would be better placed at Tank, and in any case one battalion of infantry and one cavalry regiment should go there. Against any withdrawal from Wana and the Upper Tochi. 5794.

Peshawar should have another battalion. 5812, 5822.

Heavy battery might be turned out of Peshawar where it is perfectly useless. 5816.

There should certainly be troops at Shabkadr, Jamrud and Abazai in time of war. These stations might be taken over by the Khyber Rifles. 5820.

Does not consider two battalions necessary for Chitral. 5826.

*General Birdwood.*—At present there are some more important projects than the Redistribution Scheme. The Peshawar Division should, however, be completed with the least possible delay. 7148.

Agrees to the proposed withdrawal of certain troops from the Kohat Brigade on mobilization. 7347.

Would transfer the Abbottabad Brigade to the Peshawar Division as it would complete the area and tend to smooth working on mobilization. Would not include any of the three independent brigades in the Peshawar Division. 7361, 7371, 7373.

Most necessary to move the Derajat Brigade from Dera Ismail Khan to Tank. Politically and strategically Tank has every advantage over Dera Ismail Khan. 7397, 7399.

*Colonel Dunsterville.*—Very unsound to have no British troops at Jhelum, and would certainly like to have a British regiment there. 11776, 11778.

Would like to see a larger proportion of British troops on the frontier. 11796.

*General Hamilton Gordon.*—There is no probability that the situation at present existing in the North-East Frontier is likely to require the presence of additional troops near that frontier in time of peace, but it is impossible to say what direction the present unrest in the frontier provinces of China may take, and additional troops on our Assamese and Burmese frontiers may possibly prove necessary. The future policy of China may also affect the question. 14006.

May safely reduce the Burma peace garrison by one battalion of British infantry, three battalions of Indian infantry and one mountain battery. 14011.

#### WRITTEN EVIDENCE.

*Lieutenant-Colonel Stratton.*—Would be wise to add at least two companies of British infantry to the garrison proposed for the Nasirabad area. 82.

*Sir H. Stuart.*—Would like to see some troops stationed in the Godavari or Kistna district. 137.

Rajahmundry would be a more useful military station than Bellary. 137.

Not necessary to retain the detachments of British infantry at Calicut and Cannanore. 137.

*Mr. Carey.*—If British troops are withdrawn from Mandalay and Shwebo, the whole population of Upper Burma will believe that we are unable to hold the country and the administration will be reduced to something bordering on lawlessness if not actual anarchy. 265, 291.

*Mr. Leveson.*—Should not apprehend any immediate danger if an additional battalion of Indian infantry were withdrawn temporarily from Burma, but should consider a permanent reduction of the peace garrison of the Province as a dangerous step. 266.

*Colonel Parkin.*—It would not be safe to denude the present peace garrison of Burma as regards regular troops by more than one mountain battery and one Indian infantry battalion. 267.

*Mr. Law.*—It would not be safe to denude the present peace garrison of Burma as regards regular troops by more than one mountain battery and one Indian infantry battalion. 268.

## ARMY IN INDIA.

## EURASIAN UNITS.

*Mr. Lovett.*—Eurasian members of the Volunteers would only be useful for holding defensive positions. 2973.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—Eurasian battalions of infantry not desirable. The employment of Eurasian infantry either as regulars or militia would not adequately fill either the requirements of the Field Army or of internal defence, but strongly in favour of employing Eurasians in companies of Eurasian artillery militia on a local basis. 4231.

Eurasians might do all right as signallers. 4237.

If we raise 6 Eurasian militia artillery companies, we might dispense with 2 Royal Garrison Artillery companies. 4372.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—Does not think Eurasian infantry or cavalry would be of much use, and they would not serve under ordinary conditions, but they might be tried as a signalling company and would do that work very well; none but specially selected and approved men should be enlisted. 5489.

Inclined to think they would do well in coast defence batteries if the very best men can be got to enlist, but does not place much reliance on their physique or steadiness in the field. 5489.

Utilization of Eurasians for internal defence. 5489.

Agrees with General Barrow's proposal for the formation of a Eurasian artillery militia. 5483.

*Sir F. Halliday.*—Eurasians are not at all equivalent in fighting value to the British soldier, nor for purposes of internal security is the moral effect of their presence the same. 7751.

*General Aylmer.*—A committee have recommended the formation of a Eurasian signalling unit. 8807.

*Sir T. Wynn.*—The Eurasians in the Volunteers work willingly and improve very much in condition at the end of a week's camp of exercise. 9095, 9101.

To form a Eurasian regiment you must get the better class of Eurasian, and that class will not enlist. 9097, 9105, 9123, 9125.

To form Eurasian artillery militia as suggested by Sir E. Barrow would cost a good deal of money if you took them for a month, as you would have to make up their pay to them. 9109.

Does not think much of the plan to form a Eurasian signalling unit. 9111.

*General Lean.*—There are now 22,203 Europeans and 18,428 Eurasians in the Volunteer force. 9179.

Generally speaking, Eurasians of satisfactory character and race composition, but in some parts of India, particularly in the south, the dividing line between the Eurasian and native is thin. 9179, 9181.

Against Eurasian units being enlisted and working in brigades with native and European regiments. 9185.

Average native dislikes the Eurasian very much, and the British soldier holds him in contempt. 9185.

Eurasians might be usefully employed in police battalions. 9185.

As regards formation of Eurasian artillery militia, thinks it is feasible, but ill-feeling might be caused through the difficulty of deciding what a Eurasian really is. 9187.

The Eurasians most suitable for military purposes get better openings in civil life than they would get in the army. 9189.

Sees no way of utilizing Eurasians except in police battalions in the various Presidency towns. 9191.

## ARMY IN INDIA.

## IMPERIAL SERVICE TROOPS.

*Sir M. Grover.*—It would be impossible to reverse the policy of allowing Native States to maintain Imperial Service Troops now. 426.

Imperial Service Troops, as for instance those of the Phulkian States, might be dangerous, but not in ordinary times. 428.

*Major Molyneux.*—Number, efficiency and composition. 1331, 1341, 1343, 1345, 1357.

Many requests made by States to have their artillery placed on an Imperial Service footing, but sanction has so far been withheld. 1333.

In training, men of Jodhpur, Patiala and possibly Alwar, may be considered as absolutely equal to our own Indian troops. Disadvantage of not having British officers. 1339.

Pay and pensions of Imperial Service Troops not quite equal to the pay and pensions given by the Government of India to the Indian army. 1347.

In some instances the States draw recruits from the same source as Government of India does. 1347.

Only one man in the whole of the Imperial Service Troops who could be put down as a really good man for high command—General Bakshish Singh of Patiala. 1365.

If it is desired to increase the efficiency of the Imperial Service Troops greater facilities ought to be given them for training with our own troops. 1339, 1488.

Whilst going to, coming from, and at manœuvres the States would not mind paying the expenses so long as they are not asked to do it too often. 1371, 1373.

Nothing would improve the efficiency of the Imperial Service Troops more than the thought or knowledge that Government would take them on service. 1377.

The advice of Inspecting Officers is very necessary in order to ensure that the best men are promoted. 1381, 1385, 1389, 1391.

With exception of one or two States, believes Imperial Service Troops thoroughly loyal to their States and to the Supreme Government. 1397, 1502.

If the Ruler were known to be acting in open opposition to the Government of India he would not have the support of his troops. 1399.

Imperial Service Troops not a greater potential danger than the Indian army itself. 1413.

With exception of Gwalior not much in common between Imperial Service Troops and the local State forces. Interchange of officers between Imperial Service Troops and the local State forces in Gwalior. 1421, 1423.

Practically no reserves for Imperial Service Troops. 1435.

Chiefs would not on the whole be averse to the entire removal of their Imperial Service Troops on mobilization. 1437, 1439, 1454, 1476.

Orders controlling supply of arms and ammunition to Imperial Service Troops adhered to absolutely. 1441.

Imperial Service Troops armed with 303 rifle. 1443.

Chiefs cannot increase their Imperial Service Troops without the sanction of the Government of India, and sanction has been withheld in many cases. 1445.

In the event of a serious war on the frontier all Imperial Service Troops who are sufficiently efficient to place in the fighting line should be moved up. 1451.



The Inspecting Officer would be practically in command of an Imperial Service unit on service as regards movements in the field. 1466.

The troop and company officers of Imperial Service Troops not as a rule better than those of the native army, either by birth or education. 1508.

*General Aylmer.*—Does not consider Imperial Service Troops comparable with regular British or Indian battalions. The absence of British officers, other things apart, must always keep them inferior, and the miscellaneous nature of their organizations and want of uniformity in strength, etc., will always render them somewhat hard to deal with. 2633.

*Mr. Lovett.*—In time of trouble the Nawab of Rampur would have some difficulty in maintaining order should the Imperial Service Troops be withdrawn. 2894.

*Mr. Waterfield.*—Imperial Service Troops of Native States in Central India fairly efficient, the other troops not so. 3153.

*Sir H. McMahon.*—In some respects Imperial Service Troops are no more a potential source of danger than our Indian army, but in some respects more so. Unwise to discourage their maintenance in cases where willingness to maintain them is expressed and known to be felt. No hindrance should be placed in the way of reduction in cases where Chiefs shew a desire for it. 3631.

The principle that each State's Imperial Service Troops should be drawn from the State itself is sometimes disregarded in practice. 3643.

In the event of war on the frontier would take the opportunity of removing the Imperial Service Troops from some States. 3647.

List of Imperial Service Troops who have taken part in manœuvres with regular units. 3649.

Without the British Inspecting Officers, Imperial Service Troops would at once lose all efficiency. 3655.

On service, Imperial Service Troops would be very sorry to be left without the support and assistance of their British officers. 3658.

Imperial Service Troops armed in a similar manner to our own troops. 3666.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—Efficient as regards equitation, musketry, drill, etc., but not comparable with our own troops. 4181.

Without British officers they are necessarily deficient in leading. 4181.

Imperial Service Troops decidedly better than the local armies of Native States. 4187.

Would use Imperial Service Troops of Hyderabad and Gwalior for their declared purpose whenever there was war. 4189.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—Efficient, but in no way comparable with similar corps of our Indian army. 5465.

*General Hamilton Gordon.*—The reasons for including only half the Imperial Service Troops in the Field Army are in general terms:—

Considerable difference between peace and war establishments. Units badly reported on are not detailed for service with the Field Army.

Certain Indian Princes have from time to time raised objections to all their Imperial Service Troops being taken away from their command.

The question of the utilization of Imperial Service Troops for field service is not a very simple one and is still under discussion. 13625, 13627.

#### WRITTEN EVIDENCE.

*Lieutenant-Colonel Stratton.*—Subject to the special conditions of the moment, would be a good move to send the Jodhpur Imperial Service Troops to the front in time of war. At worst they would be useful as hostages with our army and under favourable circumstances they might well form a leaven of enthusiasm which would extend over Rajputana and bring many fine recruits to our standard. 72.

## ARMY IN INDIA.

## MEDICAL.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—Necessary to have organized bearer corps for the Field Army. 3810.

If troops are to be moved, advocate more accommodation being provided in the hills, especially in the 1st and 4th Divisions. 3964.

Desirable that a proportion of British troops should go to the hills during the hot season, the gain in health, physique, and moral is enormous, and in any case we can soon bring them down. 4241.

Does not think it desirable to reduce the number of British troops who go to the hills or the period they stay there. 4255.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—The army is absolutely without ambulance transport—would rather do without a brigade than without ambulance transport. 5289.

From a health point of view it is desirable that a large proportion of British soldiers should be in the hills during the hot weather. This however has been overdone of late years. 5497, 5503.

Sees no reason why corps should not be kept in healthy stations for longer periods, though from relaxing stations reliefs must be more frequent. 5685, 5695.

*Mr. Brunyate.*—Possibility of reducing the number of Royal Army Medical Corps officers. 6038.

In the long run we are wasting money by not facing the question of building for troops in the hills. 6042.

There has been considerable economy lately in sending invalids to the hills instead of sending them to England. 6048.

*General Birdwood.*—Desirable to build huts in the hill stations and other places where they will be occupied. 7253.

The more one can in reason move British troops to the hills in the summer, the better. 7546.

It is from the hot Punjab plains stations that we specially wish to send men to the hills in the summer. 7558.

Would say that Government dairies had something to do with the health of the Army being improved. 15171.

*General Aylmer.*—Considers the proportion of British troops in the hills and of officers on leave during the hot weather satisfactory. 8563.

Extra efficiency and possibly considerable economy would eventually result from making the medical arrangements for the native army similar to those of the Royal Army Medical Corps. 8803.

*General Stuart.*—A large eventual economy would result if British troops accommodated in tents in the hills were provided with permanent barracks. 10066.

*Surgeon-General Sloggett.*—If the emergency occurs we cannot nearly supply the Field Army with medical personnel. There is a total deficiency of 381 medical officers, 158 assistant surgeons, 22 sub-assistant surgeons, 467 ward orderlies, 632 ward servants, and 18,750 bearers. 10175.

Have sufficient medical personnel for four divisions together with internal defence requirements, except as regards Army Bearer Corps men of whom only 91 would be available for the Field Army after meeting internal security equipments. 10179.

Medical personnel for internal defence units reduced to a minimum on the supposition that it would eventually be supplemented by non-official practitioners. 10181.

The deficiency in medical officers will have to be met from England and if there is peace in Europe, and sea passage is open, we might obtain 381 civil surgeons from England in six months. We should have to enlist and train men in order to make up the deficiency in ward orderlies and ward servants, and to impress men from the bazars to make up the deficiency in bearers. 10191, 10345.

Assuming that there is no fighting elsewhere, we could make up the deficiency in medical personnel in India. 10199.

Able to meet the requirements of an army in the field for six weeks as regards medical officers. 10214.

Except as regards Army Bearer Corps men, six divisions and four cavalry brigades could be adequately equipped with medical personnel and appliances within three months. 10216.

Statement showing for what periods and from what stations in each division British troops and families are sent to the hills. Not many more men are sent up to the hills now, than were sent say, ten years ago, but far more women and children are sent now than formerly. 10226.

In the Northern Army about 28,000 British troops out of a total of 45,000 are accommodated annually in the Himalayas. 10228.

The period that troops are in the hills is generally from the middle of March to about the 1st November. 10230.

In northern India nearly all regiments go up to the hills as a matter of routine. 10236.

Would like to send every man to the hills. 10241, 10257.

In southern and western India, the British troops remain largely in the plains. 10247.

The move to the hills has a marked beneficial effect on the health of the troops. 10269, 10273.

Statement showing total accommodation in convalescent depôts, and authorized standing camps in Himalayan hill stations. It most certainly conduces to the health of men and families to be quartered in the hills even in tents during the rains, but they undoubtedly experience considerable discomfort. 10271.

The present system of sending men to the hills instead of invaliding them to England has had a very marked effect—the death rate has fallen from 8.18 to 4.8 per 1,000. Although the total number of men sent to the hills has not materially increased, a large number of sick and convalescents who previously would have been sent to England are now given a change to the hills, thus effecting a great saving. 10299, 10303.

Have saved some £30,000 a year over this decrease in invaliding Home. 10305.

Of the total number of convalescents and young soldiers sent to the hills, 25 per cent. are unfit for duty on the plains, and the remaining 75 per cent. are transferred to the hills simply for reasons of health. 10310.

Desirable that all European women and children for whom accommodation can be provided, should be sent to the hills annually. 10318.

Statements showing from a health point of view, the worst and the best military stations on the plains. 10320.

The reason for the reduction of the Army Bearer Corps was evidently financial. 10335.

We have a reserve of 1,500 bearers but in the event of the mobilization of the whole of the Field Army, we should want 20,000. 10337.

Most inadvisable to reduce the number of Royal Army Medical Corps officers employed in peace.

The present establishment of Royal Army Medical Corps officers only just meets our peace requirements. The Royal Army Medical Corps officer has twice as much work now as he had a few years ago. 10357.

The appointment of medical officers to the charge of medical mobilization stores has enabled an economical turnover of these stores to be effected. 10380.

There will be a medical mobilization store officer for each division, but none for the Burma Division or the Independent Brigades. 13382, 10384.

If the recommendations of the Field Hospital Equipment Committee are carried out to, a saving of Rs. 3,38,347, will be effected. It is proposed to abolish 6½ British and 26½ Indian field ambulances and 5 British and 2 Indian general hospitals. 10396.

The reorganization of field hospital equipment as advised by Committee would effect an economy. 10396, 10466.

Proposed simplification of equipment of new field ambulances, clearing, stationary, and general hospitals. 10396.

The increase in the number of administrative medical officers at Army Headquarters since 1898 is necessary and it is a retrograde step to abolish the appointment of sanitary officer at Army Headquarters, as is at present contemplated. 10430.

If compelled to shed one officer, would shed the sanitary officer in preference to the Deputy Director. 10438.

Proposals at present under consideration for introducing a station hospital system for Indian troops. 10442.

Would not reduce Indian Medical Service officers, we are badly off as it is. 10446.

We want a civil Indian Medical Service and a military Indian Medical Service. 10452.

Having four instead of two classes of cantonment hospitals would effect an economy. Cantonment hospitals at Aden, Dharmasala, Kalabagh and Abbottabad might be closed. Local purchase instead of keeping up a reserve of alcohol would result in economy. The employment of assistant surgeons as dentists instead of employing civilian dentists. There might be economy in bedding and clothing. The waste at present is enormous, due to bad laundry arrangements, cheap and shoddy material and slipshod tailoring. A military pharmacopœia to be drawn up assimilating drugs in use in the field, and in station hospitals, and thus facilitating turnover would effect an economy. The provision of a large steam sterilizer in all hospitals would save itself over and over again. The universal issue of mosquito nets as a preventive of malaria would save wastage by invaliding. 10466.

Suggests the employment of non-commissioned officers and men of the Royal Army Medical Corps in India in place of the present British nursing orderlies. 10482.

*General Hamilton Gordon.*—It is not the duty of the General Staff to provide the numbers required for the Army Bearer Corps but, being aware of its absolute inadequacy, the General Staff have several times drawn the attention of the Advisory Council, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Government of India to the unsatisfactory state of affairs. In the circumstances, the only action which can apparently be taken should war break out is to endeavour to carry out the proposals of the Director of Medical Services to engage the men at once. 13574, 13582.

There is a danger that the interruption of railway communication might cause serious delay in the recall of British troops from their hot weather stations in the hills, but it is not so great as to outweigh the advantages of locating as many troops as possible in the hills. 14053.

## ARMY IN INDIA.

## MILITIA, LEVIES AND MILITARY POLICE.

*Mr. Wheeler.*—Undesirable to place military police in Bengal, Assam and Burma under the Commander-in-Chief. 2189.

*General Aylmer.*—Reliability of tribal militia corps varies greatly. Would not place great reliance on Khyber Rifles in the event of a *jihad* or a war against Afridis. Kurram Militia may be relied on under nearly all contingencies. Northern and Southern Waziristan Militias and Zhob Levies reliable except possibly in the case of a *jihad*. 2644.

No objection to the proposed reorganization of the Border Military Police, except that force will probably become too regularized. 2648.

Proposal to place military police in Bengal, Assam and Burma and frontier militias in North-West Frontier Province and in Baluchistan under the Commander-in-Chief an admirable and most sensible suggestion. 2650.

*Mr. Waterfield.*—There are 616 military police in Central India Agency. Recruited solely from Bhils. 3061, 3063.

Bhil police staunch and keen. 3065, 3075, 3077.

*Sir H. McMahon.*—Strongly against proposal to place border militias under the Commander-in-Chief. 3471.

Our irregular forces will, as in the past, be loyal to us even when used against their own kith and kin. 3479.

Not possible or desirable to reduce the strength of the border militia under present conditions on the frontier; but would like to see them slightly increased. 3563, 3575.

Not desirable to merge the frontier militia into the regular Indian army for many reasons. 3563.

Actual people employed across the border should be irregulars. 3563, 3565.

*Sir E. Barron.*—Some of the frontier corps more efficient than others and their loyalty varies greatly in degree. The Kurram Militia can be trusted absolutely to fight against the tribes around them. The same reliance cannot be put on some of the other corps more especially in case of a disturbance of a religious nature. 4195.

In the event of war in Afghanistan, if doubtful about Afridis on line of communication, would send them up to the forefront of the battle where they would be out of temptation. 4197.

Entirely disagrees with the proposal to place the tribal militias under the Commander-in-Chief. 4688.

System obtaining for appointment of officers to militias most unsatisfactory. 4690.

Present Lieutenant Governor of Burma looks on large body of military police scattered about the country as a danger. 4700.

Should like to see Zhob Levy Corps so increased as to dispense altogether with the regular regiment at Fort Sandeman. 4704.

*Sir G. Ross-Keppel.*—Khyber Rifles, Kurram and Waziristan Militias well trained, organized and disciplined. 4756.

The officers of the frontier militias are very good indeed—they are taken from the regular army and seconded. 4760.

Khyber Rifles would fight against anybody. 4958.

Highest possible opinion of the value and utility of the frontier militias. 5059.

Would like to see the four militia corps merged into the regular army after the manner of the Punjab Irregular Frontier Force when it was directly

under the Punjab Government. Any attempt to regularize the militias to the standard of technical efficiency of the Indian army would deprive them of their elasticity and impair their efficiency. To place the militia under the control of the Commander-in-Chief in time of peace impossible at present. 5059.

Not sure that a large number of British officers in a militia corps is an advantage. 5067.

If militias were made part of the regular army should immediately have to start raising another force ahead of them. 5075.

Considers any reduction in the number of the Khyber Rifles impossible. 5085.

The pay of frontier militias compares very badly with that of the regular army. 5087.

An efficient force of border police is absolutely essential if we are to guard the border villages against raids. Present border police are inefficient, badly paid, overworked, without hope, and have lost all *esprit de corps*. Adheres to recommendations of last year's Border Police Committee. 5097.

The tribal militia system for the garrisoning of Chitral would not be a very satisfactory arrangement. 5149.

The attitude of the frontier militia in the event of hostilities with their fellow-tribesmen, with Afghanistan, or with Turkey, depends almost entirely on the personal influence of their officers. 5193.

With their present officers the tribal militia can be relied on in every case. 5195.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—Khyber Rifles and Kurram Militia good fighting units and would take them on any frontier expedition. Believes they would be staunch and fight against their own people. Great thing is to give them the offer of fighting or leaving before operations commence, and secondly to give them officers whom they know and understand and will follow. Mistake to move militia away from the frontier on the outbreak of hostilities; back them up and trust them fully and believe they will do well. 5471.

The Border Military Police on the North-West Frontier Province as it stands at present is useless. 5794.

Does not approve of the proposal to place the frontier militia or the frontier or Assam military police under the Commander-in-Chief. 5796.

Would leave the system of officering the militia as it is. 5800.

Sees no danger in holding Chitral as at present. Tribal levies would not be suitable for garrisoning Chitral. 5826, 5830.

*General Birdwood.*—Kurram Militia thoroughly efficient for their purpose as a local militia, and a most valuable asset.

Khyber Rifles could be relied on to guard the Khyber.

If we were at war with Afghanistan, we had better take time by the forelock and send the Khyber Rifles to the front to fight.

The Northern and Southern Waziristan Militias would be no more affected by trouble on the border than their co-tribesmen in regiments in the Indian army. 7379.

Khyber Rifles would fight against the Afghans cheerfully. 7389.

An enormous amount depends on the British officers who exercise great influence over the militias. 7391.

*Mr. Hughes-Buller.*—In the event of disaffection amongst the native troops, the civil police, but not the military police, in Bengal would most certainly join them. 7676.

As regards the military police in Bengal would be better to have the men concentrated at Dacca with a flying column. 7763.

*Colonel Dunsterville.*—Khyber Rifles would fight against their own people. 11726.

## WRITTEN EVIDENCE.

*Lieutenant-Colonel Stratton.*—The military police in Rajputana supply guards for the Agent to the Governor General, Rajputana, and the Resident and Assistant Resident in Mewar, and preserve order in the Mewar hill tracts. The military police headquarters in Rajputana are at Kherwara and detachments are at Kotra, Abu, Wadaipur and Mewar. 74.

*Mr. Carey.*—If disorders break out in Burma the military police could not restore order without considerable assistance in the shape of mounted infantry and infantry drawn from the Indian army. 225.

In the event of dacoity reviving, no appreciable bodies of military police could be formed into columns to proceed to any particular sphere of operations. 225.

Present Burma military police not comparable with the police battalions of past days. Strongly doubts whether Kachins, Shans and Chins will serve in the plains, and uncertain whether they will fight against their own races. Karens will fight but not yet proved that they will stand heavy casualties or prolonged guerilla warfare. 225.

Believes sedition-mongers have made no systematic attempt to seduce the police in Burma from their loyalty. 230.

Provided the army remains loyal, the Burma Military Police can also be trusted to do so. Present system of police recruiting is dangerous and suggests an examination of the races and castes in Burma Military Police. 235.

Increasingly difficult to recruit for the military police. 240.

The military police will undoubtedly follow the lead of their fellow classmen in the regular army. 245.

The general attitude of the Burman towards the military police is one of tolerant dislike. 255.

*Mr. Leveson.*—No evidence that sedition-mongers have tried to seduce the military police from their loyalty. 231.

Provided the army remained loyal, the military police could generally be trusted to do so also. 236.

Disaffection in particular classes of the native army would probably spread to military policemen drawn from like classes. 246.

*Colonel Parkin.*—Strength of Burma military police is :—

11,882 Upper Burma, 4431 Lower Burma.

Of these Karens, Kachins, Shans and Chins, of whom there are altogether some 1,100 are recruited locally. Indians are recruited mainly in India. 215.

Military police in battalions of which there are 11 in Upper Burma and 2 in Lower Burma. In Upper Burma men are under the control of the Commandant of the battalion both at battalion headquarters and at the posts in districts. In Lower Burma the men at posts in districts are under the control of the District Superintendent of Police for drill, discipline and duties. An Adjutant is in command of each of the two Lower Burma battalions. In Salween District and Arakan Hill Tracts, small separate bodies of the military police maintained under control of district superintendent of police. 215.

Scheme for reduction of strength of military police in Upper Burma by 748 men under consideration of Government. 217.

Considers that the Burma Military Police are efficient in every respect but that to attract recruits of the best stamp it is now necessary to improve the conditions of service, and proposals to this effect have been submitted to Government. 219.

Little prospect of further extensive reduction of Upper Burma Military Police unless the troops undertake to garrison the frontiers of the Province. 219.

Officers of the Burma Military Police are in every respect as efficient as ever, and does not advocate any change in the system of appointing officers to the command of battalions. 221, 223.

Not understood why it might be considered advisable to place the Burma Military Police under the Commander-in-Chief. 223.

In times of internal disturbance Burma Military Police could do much to maintain internal order, but troops would also be required. A network of police posts throughout districts would become necessary and for this about 5,000 more military police would be required. 227.

No evidence that sedition-mongers have tried to seduce the military police from their loyalty. 232.

Provided the army remains loyal, the Burma Military Police can also be trusted to do so. 237.

Recruits generally obtainable, but the quality not so good as could be desired. As regards Sikh recruits, both quality and quantity are in defect. 242.

Disaffection in particular classes of the native army might spread to military policemen drawn from like class especially in the case of Sikhs. 247.

*Mr. Law.*—Does not think Burma Military Police could ensure internal order in the country to any extent except in the immediate vicinity of any large body of that force. 228.

Believes sedition-mongers have made no systematic attempt in Burma to seduce the police from their loyalty. 233.

Provided army remained loyal, the Burma Military Police would follow suit. 238.

No very great difficulty in recruiting for the Burma Military Police, but the class of recruit is not now of the same good stamp it was years ago. 243.

Disaffection in particular classes of the native army would spread to military policemen drawn from like classes. 248.

*Lieutenant-Governor in Council, Bihar and Orissa.*—Military police in Bihar and Orissa consists of 2 subadars, 2 jemadars, 8 havildars, 8 naiks, 8 lance-naiks, and 194 sepoy, armed with 196 Martini-Henri rifles. 305.



## ARMY IN INDIA.

## MISCELLANEOUS.

*General Dickie.*—System of Government building quarters and charging rent for them very popular with officers, and not very expensive. 1870, 1872, 1880.

Electric installations. 1882.

Electric schemes to be held up until funds can be made available for providing additional installations. 1888.

Improvements made and further measures under consideration in the matter of water-supply for British troops. 1890.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—A great advantage from the point of view of efficiency in making every unit liable in its turn for active service. 3921.

Pay of brigade commanders insufficient. 3938, 3952.

*Sir J. Willcocks*—If a small reduction is going to be made under any circumstances, would advocate the reduction of such troops as are not fit to fight at the front. 5403.

It is a very good thing to move troops by road occasionally and thus show them to the people. 5425.

*Mr. Brunyate.*—Suggests reduction of number of horses in British cavalry regiments in peace time. 6038.

Clothing allowance for British troops might be reduced. 6038.

*General Aylmer.*—If you want to effect economy, one way would be to reduce the number of Indian regiments. 8362.

If thorough war efficiency is required in the army for the present Budget allotment or for something less, the only possible method is to cut down the strength, and this reduction must not touch British troops. 8803.

No grant of land should be made without a stringent condition of military service of a nature economical to the Government. 8803.

*General Stuart.*—The 45 maxim guns in India might be converted to 303 calibre and there would then be no wastage on account of ammunition for these guns which at present is about Rs. 30,000 annually. 10066.

Essential to efficiency and economy that once commenced, a rearmament should be carried through and completed within three years. 10075.

The reserve of ammunition that would remain in the country for internal defence troops is reasonably adequate if it can be maintained. 10091.

*Surgeon-General Sloggett.*—The use of Royal Indian Marine ships for home trooping instead of hired transports would result in economy. 10466.

*General Hamilton Gordon.*—In regard to the deficiency in the number of rifles required for the army, the General Staff drew the attention of the Commander-in-Chief to the state of affairs as soon as they learned from the Ordnance Branch that the estimates upon which manufacture and the orders for the supply of the new rifle had been based, had been found to have been seriously miscalculated. 13593, 13597, 13599, 13601.

The General Staff Memorandum of July 1911 on the duties and requirements of the army in India as a whole represents his personal views also, and he has had no occasion to change them in any material particular. 13721.

Should like to see the army in India increased by one-and-a-half divisions. 13843.

*General Birdwood.*—As a possible minor measure of economy would suggest that each of the three Governor's bodyguards in this country could quite efficiently carry on with one British officer. 15641.

The existing arrangements whereby it is left to Commanding Officers to train men in shoemaking or not and to employ soldiers or native labour as they may see fit are unsatisfactory from the point of view of efficiency for service. It is therefore proposed to make paragraph 1207 King's Regulations applicable to India with a view to ensuring that battalions going on service will have at least four men per company instructed in the rudiments of shoemaking by a recognized and qualified instructor. To this end it is also proposed to appoint a serjeant-master-shoemaker to each British infantry battalion in India. No extra expense would be involved as this non-commissioned officer would count as a duty serjeant in the establishment of the corps, his place being filled by the appointment of an extra unpaid lance-serjeant. At present there is nothing to show that the knowledge men acquire in going through a course of shoemaking at the Army Boot Factory is put to good use afterwards as, out of a possible total of 90, only 36 availed themselves of the opportunity during the last three years. 15745.

## ARMY IN INDIA.

## NATIVE ARMY—CARNATIC BATTALIONS.

*Sir M. Grover.*—Considers all units should be of uniform strength. Would prefer to see the eight Carnatic battalions converted into six battalions with a higher establishment. 560.

Madras battalions are more expensive than others when stationed outside their own country. 566, 570.

*Major Ottley.*—Would not say Madras people are deficient in fighting characteristics. Marawars are superior as soldiers to anything obtainable in Madras with the exception of the Moplahs. 1323.

*General Aylmer.*—Would keep the existing number of Carnatic regiments and raise their peace establishment to what is necessary for sufficient training. Would give them the same number of reservists as other regiments. 2775.

Madras not so good a fighting man as men of northern races, but his fighting characteristics have been unnecessarily run down. Not enthusiastic about Moplahs; some companies of them might be tried again, but not whole battalions. 2777.

Physique of Moplahs poor. 2779.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—Would propose that all the Carnatic battalions be brought up to an 800 strength. Would like to raise a ninth Carnatic battalion. 4138, 4312.

Madras sepoy has not been given a fair chance. Moplahs were most unfairly and stupidly treated so also were the Telugus and Coorgs. 4328.

Introduction of Moplahs would be a good thing, but depot must be in a place where there would be no difficulty in recruiting them. 4338.

The question of the recruitment of Moplahs would have to be taken up very tactfully. 4344.

Would like to see a Carnatic battalion at Dera Ismail Khan to get experience in frontier work; or a Carnatic battalion might be on foreign service at a Colonial station, or in Burma or at Aden. 4622.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—Considers that the Carnatic regiments and a few others are not worth maintaining. 5429, 5431, 5433, 5435.

Does not think the Moplahs would make good soldiers. 5437.

*Colonel Graham.*—Would like to have 17 Indian officers in a regiment in peace time. 12615, 12621.

Indian officers have plenty of scope for acting up to the responsibilities of their position, and for executive command. 12619.

Indian officers' duties are of a more executive nature than those of British officers and comprise the carrying out and application of the higher training supplied by British officers which they themselves from lack of superior military education could neither introduce nor properly appreciate nor apply without the British officers. 12621.

In case of casualties among the British officers, native officers would be able to take command to a certain extent. 12625.

Has never found any men suitable for direct commission officers and does not think the system would in any case be popular and it would cause some heart-burning to bring in anybody. 12631.

Nearly all commissioned officers can speak a little English and also read a little; and many are very well educated. 12635.

The native officer detailed to assist the quartermaster and transport officer on service should be surplus to the fixed establishment, and be permanently the assistant of the British officer whilst on service. 12637.

The link system is not adhered to in the matter of transfers of officers so far as his regiment is concerned, and thinks this is the case with all Carnatic regiments. 12645, 12647.

Service with Carnatic battalions is unpopular and officers try to get away. 12653.

There are undoubtedly good men among the Pariah caste who enlist chiefly in the Madras Sappers and Miners and Pioneers. 12667.

Would not hesitate to use Madras soldiers against men of their own religion if those of another religion were not at hand. 12667.

The best class composition for Carnatic regiments would be to have some regiments composed of four companies Muhammadans and four companies Tamils and some of four companies Muhammadans and four companies Telugus—selected classes of each. 12667.

Doubts if Pariahs can ever turn out good Indian officers with authority and influence. 12667.

No better composition can be arranged than that each regiment should be composed of two classes of four companies each, as far as possible. 12667.

Class composition of 80th Carnatic Infantry. 12667.

A double-company composed partly of Pariahs and partly Christians with the other six companies of other castes is not a success. 12667.

If decided to continue recruiting Pariahs, would have four companies of Pariahs in one regiment, the other four being Muhammadans, and would alter name 'Pariah' to 'Paraiyan.' 12667.

It is said that no better soldiers can be found than some Paraiyans but that has not been his experience especially in the higher grades. 12671.

A Paraiyan native officer would be inclined to salute a high caste Tamil havildar or naik. 12671.

If you get the best Telugu he is about as good as the Tamil. 12675, 12677.

The class company system was a move for good. 12693.

Difficult to get the best Tamils to enlist. 12679.

Carnatic regiments recruit all over the Madras area, have one recruiting officer between them, and this is a more satisfactory arrangement than allowing each regiment to have its own recruiting ground. 12681, 12683.

The so-called 'line-boy system' has been abolished. 12699.

Statement showing normal strength and composition of his regiment, the numbers actually available for duty at certain periods during the last three years, and the proportion absent on leave or furlough during the hot weather. 12709.

In the Carnatic battalions training suffers from the very small establishments. 12721.

Present reserve establishment of 52 per regiment totally inadequate. 12734.

If you had no furlough, men would not enlist. 12776.

Statement showing establishment and strength of his regiment and numbers absent on leave or from other causes, the number under special training, employed, and number present on parade for the last three years. 12780.

No great difficulty in obtaining the requisite number of recruits but, if conditions were improved, a far larger number of really suitable men would come forward, and in this case would anticipate no difficulty whatever in obtaining recruits in time of war. 12813.

Strongly advocates enlistment being thrown open to following classes of Telugus:—Boyas and Bedars, Kapurs and Paiks. 12813.

Would get better class of men with better pecuniary conditions. 12834.

Madras regiments should not be stationed too long out of their own Presidency. 12837.

Giving Madras regiments their turn on the frontier would be popular, does not think climate would affect them. 12839, 12843, 12945.

As there are so few Carnatic regiments they might be all linked together and Secunderabad selected as a centre. Present links exist only in name. 12843, 12845.

Would prefer six battalions of 800 to the scheme proposed by Sir E. Barrow, although the effect of disbanding two more battalions would be very bad indeed. 12858.

Under Lord Kitchener's orders Madras regiments were reduced to a complement of 600, which has made it practically impossible to train and prepare them for field service as they should be. 12912.

Disagrees with conclusion that appears to have been arrived at regarding deterioration in the material of the Carnatic regiments. 12920.

Constant source of wonder to him that Madras regiments are in such an efficient state considering the many discouragements they have had during last 25 years. 12920.

Convinced that good fighting blood exists among many of the castes of southern India, though it can only be proved by trial. 12920.

The Madras troops employed in the Burmese War had for nearly thirty years been stagnating in cantonments employed on one monotonous round of garrison duty. The regiments were filled with elderly men and elderly officers having no experience of active service, and the recruits had been drawn from any caste or class regardless of its suitability. Further, a Madras regiment he joined about that time had a very large percentage of men of between 20 and 32 years' service, and of really young soldiers there were hardly any. 12920.

In a Madras regiment difficult to make headway even with good material with British officers fewer in number than in up-country regiments and of those few a certain number who are casters from up-country regiments. 12920.

His own regiment employed in the Tochi valley where it earned considerable praise. 12924.

Does not see why the Madrasi should not be equal in efficiency to the Gurkha, Sikh or Pathan of today, but you cannot tell till you try him. 12930.

To make Carnatic regiments in all respects fit for active service in any country in which the Indian army is likely to be employed would suggest:—

- (i) Increase strength from 600 to 850.
- (ii) Drop word 'Carnatic' and call regiments '—th Infantry.'
- (iii) Very careful selection of recruiting officer is perhaps the crux of the situation.
- (iv) Present practice of utilizing Carnatic regiments as a dumping ground for indifferent British officers should be abandoned.
- (v) Double-company of Pariahs and Christians abolished.
- (vi) Vernacular regulation books in Urdu, Tamil and Telugu should be liberally supplied gratis to units.
- (vii) Regiments to be more frequently stationed at big military stations.
- (viii) Reforms suggested given effect to, and early opportunity taken of sending one or more Madras regiments on service.
- (ix) Everything done to try and remove stigma that has long been attached to Madras regiments, and these regiments treated without partiality or prejudice.
- (x) Fewer transfers of officers from one Carnatic battalion to another. 12932.

As regards discipline, loyalty, obedience, intelligence, education, musketry, training, marching powers, signalling, turnout, general behaviour in cantonments, adaptability and readiness to follow good British officers anywhere, Madras regiments are second to no other Indian regiment. 12932.

If the Carnatic battalions were raised to an 850 strength, would like to have about 300 reservists. 12941.

#### WRITTEN EVIDENCE.

*Sir H. Stuart.*—Individually, the Madrasi is inferior in fighting characteristics to the Punjabi, Gurkha and Afridi, but a regiment of Madrasis would not be markedly inferior to a regiment of the other classes.

The failure of the Madras regiments may be largely ascribed to their insufficient employment on active service, and to the feeling that they are regarded with contempt.

Given fair treatment, and if the officers would learn Tamil, excellent regiments would be obtained from some of the Tamil castes. 141.

The Pariah, whether Hindu or Christian, can be made into a good soldier. 141.

The Moplah regiment did not get a proper chance. 141.

The Moplah would make a good sepoy. 141, 145.

Would not station Moplahs in Malabar at present. 145.

Does not think the Telugu will make a good soldier. 148.

*Mr. Francis.*—The failure of the 77th Moplahs was due to the wrong class being recruited and to the indifference of their officers. 146.

*Mr. Horne.*—Confident the Telugu will not make a good soldier. 149.

## ARMY IN INDIA.

## NATIVE ARMY—GURKHA SOLDIERS.

*Sir M. Grover.*—If the peace strength of infantry battalions is to be reduced, it will be necessary to maintain a larger peace strength in Gurkha battalions than in others. 602.

*General Aylmer.*—Does not think Gurkhas can be implicitly relied on. 2737.

Highly advisable to give all battalions the same establishment though an exception may perhaps have to be made in the case of Gurkhas and the Hazara Pioneers. 8208, 8374, 8452.

The number of reservists is totally inadequate. Possible that on an emergency some 2,000 Gurkhas could be drafted from the Burma Military Police to Gurkha battalions. 8385.

*Sir H. McMahon.*—Disagrees with view that Gurkhas cannot be relied on. 3609.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—Gurkhas can be relied on for the present except in the case of a Nepalese war. 4278.

Anticipates difficulties with Nepal Darbar in connexion with Gurkha reserves. 4396.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—Does not think we have soldiers in our native army as loyal as Gurkhas. Even when mixed with other races, Gurkhas do well. 5525.

Gurkha reservists would like some time to join, but believes a certain number of reservists would not turn up. 5611.

*Colonel Dunsterville.*—Gurkhas are last people would think of touching in regard to the class composition of the regiments. 11512.

## ARMY IN INDIA.

## NATIVE ARMY—LOYALTY.

*General Staff Appreciation. Appendix I.*—Arya Samaj has tried to seduce soldiers from their allegiance. 65.

Revolt of population of northern India might easily spread to the troops. 131.

So long as the Indian army remains loyal we may regard the internal position of India with comparative equanimity. 139.

To keep the Indian army loyal amid all the efforts that will be made by clever agitators may tax our capacity for government to the utmost. Indian army considers it is not appreciated by the Government of India to the extent it ought to be. 139.

*Colonel Bingley.*—India is going through a period of change and this affects the army. Army is drawn from the agricultural classes, and the grievances of the latter affect the troops. Agitators who 'get at' the agricultural population indirectly 'get at' the troops. 249.

Taken as a whole, no section of the Indian community is more attached to Government than the army which is thoroughly loyal. 249.

At the time of the rejected Punjab Canal Colonization Act of 1907 several regiments were tainted with sedition. 253.

At time of Punjab Canal Colonization Act efforts of agitators directed towards tampering with the army with some measure of success. 253.

Spread of education among fighting classes in India has had the effect of lowering status of military service. 255.

Army not subject to many of the influences which tend to make other people disloyal. 267.

Commanding officers are now kept informed of what is going on. 269, 284.

Quotes Punjab leaflet comparing lot of British and Indian soldiers and asking native soldiers how they could allow themselves to be slaves to the alien. 305.

*Major Jackson.*—Abundant evidence to shew that the Arya Samaj, Tat Khalsa, the Chitpavan Brahmans and other agencies have made attempts to tamper with the loyalty of the troops. 365.

*Sir M. Grover.*—No danger anticipated from any particular class of the native army under normal conditions. 414.

*Sir C. Cleveland.*—Members of the Arya Samaj stirred up unrest in the 10th Jats. 898, 900.

Members of Arya Samaj have made persistent efforts to seduce soldiers from their allegiance. 904, 906.

Tilak and the Chitpavans have made distinct efforts on the army; so has Mr. Gokhale through his underlings. 1039.

There is abundant evidence of attempts having been made to tamper with the troops. 1087.

Attempts to tamper with the Indian army have been chiefly made through the medium of newspaper articles, pamphlets, etc. 1095.

The agitators in 1907 expected the army to get excited and to take sides with them, or at any rate to refuse to act against them. 1197, 1199.

*General Dickie.*—Improved housing arrangements should promote contentment and good feeling. 1864.

*General Aylmer.*—Indian soldiers our principle danger unless they are kept in a state of contentment which will make it worth their while to remain faithful: if money not forthcoming to do this, our position would be strengthened by their reduction. 2585.



Indian army under the impression that it is not sufficiently well paid. 2595.

Sikhs, Jats and Rajputs have been a good deal mixed up with sedition. 2743.

If a regiment is severely tainted it should be instantly disbanded. 2759.

Possibility of combination between Muhammadan and Hindu troops very small at present. 2763.

Unless we keep our Indian troops really contented and make it worth their while to serve us faithfully, there is danger of their allegiance being tampered with. 2769.

If native troops are untrue to the salt they have eaten they should be summarily dismissed. 8773.

*Mr. Lovett.*—It is certain that persistent efforts were being made to get at the army in the United Provinces. An Arya Samaj missionary was found preaching to soldiers what came near to sedition. 3025.

Never met with any troublesome combination among Rajputs. 3049.

*Mr. Waterfield.*—Aware of 3 cases where attempts were made to tamper with the native troops in Central India. 3177.

*Sir H. McMahon.*—In a war with Afghanistan Pathan troops could generally be relied on to fight for us. 3547.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—We may have trouble from Sikhs or Jats as it is their areas in which the agitator has been most busy and where the Arya Samaj is most powerful. 4280.

In the event of a war brought about by a Pan-Islamic revival, or a *jihad* preached from Constantinople or Kabul, does not think we could rely on our Pathans as a body, or on Punjabi Muhammadans, against the enemy. 4286.

Efforts are constantly being made to seduce the troops from their loyalty especially amongst the Sikhs and Jats. 4302.

So long as the native officers are loyal and contented, we may rely on the men. 4722.

*Sir G. Roos-Keppel.*—In war against the tribes Pathan reservists would probably join in with their fellow tribesmen if at home at the time. 5209.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—Personally, should have no hesitation in disbanding a disloyal element. 5529.

Believes there was a certain amount of disaffection in class regiments in 1907-08. 5531.

With a *jihad* preached from Kabul, the Pathans would be excited. Does not believe Punjabi Muhammadans would go against us if we had sufficient British and other troops ready and took action at once. 5543.

A good deal goes on which aims at causing disaffection in the native army, but it is the class regiments it chiefly affects. 5563.

In the event of unrest altogether doubtful whether the reservist will come when you call him up. If you have him with his regiment he is on the spot. 5585, 5587.

Would disband any corps which showed united or open discontent. In special cases, doubtful corps might be sent to the base of operations, and if they did well, might be allowed to join the Field Army. 5808, 5810.

There is discontent in the native army. The first step to remove it is to improve the status and pension of Indian officers. 5844.

*Mr. Curtis.*—Does not believe that Tilak and the other agitators have made distinct efforts to seduce the army from its allegiance, but the undermining of the loyalty of the army must be their principal aim. 6816, 6818.

*Mr. Kennedy.*—Has never been able to discover any particular case of sedition in native regiments in the Bombay Presidency. 6638.

Preachers have from time to time been found in the regimental lines and have been turned out, but can recall no real attempt at undermining the loyalty of the troops. 6644.

The method of some agitators in using the temperance movement as a cloak for spreading sedition among the sepoys has not had any effect on the troops. 6646.

*Mr. Hughes-Buller.*—Deliberate and organized attempts were made in Calcutta to contaminate the 10th Jats. 8092.

*Sir F. Halliday.*—The disaffection in the 10th Jats was entirely due to local prompting, the sepoys being first approached through Arya Samaj ideas. 8093.

*Colonel Houghton.*—The inadequacy of the present scale of pensions, especially of sepoys and jemadars, is being somewhat keenly felt and generally commented upon. Should not say that the contentment of the Indian soldier has so far been much affected by these considerations, but it may be so before long. Knows of no other cause of discontent. Grants of land on a more liberal scale would assist to a very large extent in keeping the Indian ranks contented. 10823.

Punjabi Muhammadans would fight readily against brother Muhammadans in the tribal areas. 10866.

Advantages of having a native unit stationed near its recruiting area are :—

Men are near their homes and therefore are more contented. An impetus is given to recruiting by the presence of the regiment in the midst of the people.

Men can take advantage of short leave to a far greater extent.

Disadvantages are :—

Relatives apt to sponge on men and efficiency suffers in consequence. In case of spread of sedition or disaffection men are much more liable to evil influences.

In case of riots or disorder, men's loyalty would be tried very highly if called upon to act in aid of the civil power. 10874.

Cannot say that native officers of their own accord allude to such topics as the Muhammadan feeling in regard to the Turco-Italian War, the Pan-Islamic movement or to the Tat Khalsa, etc. Arya Samaj frequently alluded to by the Sikhs who are fully alive to its advances, and are hostile to its members as a rule. 10890, 10894.

Not aware of attempts being made in cantonments (since 1907) to arouse feelings of discontent in the native ranks. Never yet been able to elicit any reliable evidence to show that attempts were made to arouse feelings of discontent in the native ranks whilst on leave. 10902.

Relies on the Indian officers to keep him informed of efforts to tamper with native troops, or of movements which may tend to affect their contentment and loyalty. Has also one or two agents amongst the non-commissioned officers. 10912.

Advisable to speak freely with the native officers on subjects which are open to suspicion of being seditious. They have so much to lose by being even suspected of seditious leanings, that one can trust them as a rule to keep clear of such things, and to assist their British officers in this respect. 10920.

Schoolmasters and salaried religious teachers can if so disposed, and they are not hindered, exercise great powers for evil, and they should therefore be kept under due observation and control—most Commanding Officers realize this. 10938.

Would not hesitate to call on Indian soldiers to act against men of their own religion. 10950, 10952.

Does not notice any appreciable change in the demeanour of any particular class compared with what it was in 1907. 10954.

The feelings of so-called unrest which existed, more or less, throughout the native army in 1907-08 have entirely disappeared except amongst the Sikhs, who have been spoilt to a large extent by over-recruitment and have thus got wind in their heads, especially Jat Sikhs. 10960, 10970.

In the event of disaffection on the part of one religious section of his regiment, the other sections could be trusted to disclose it and act against it. 11012.

*Major Hill.*—So far as he can judge, the Indian soldier is contented. 11219.

Some of the better educated Indian officers interest themselves and talk about the Tat Khalsa and Arya Samaj, but has never heard any of his Sikh officers refer to anything regarding Muhammadans. 11296.

It may be said that the Tat Khalsaist is a seditious man. 11298.

Native soldiers do not bother their heads about the Tat Khalsa. 11300.

Never personally came across a case where efforts were made either in cantonments or on leave to arouse feelings of discontent in the native ranks. 11318, 11320.

Been informed that there are men who travel in 3rd class carriages up and down the railway with the sole object of talking to soldiers with a view to arousing feelings of discontent. 11318.

Everything as regards discontent, etc., depends on the character of the native officer. 11324.

Can absolutely trust the majority of the Indian officers in his regiment to tell him of a feeling of discontent. 11332.

The selection of a schoolmaster is a very difficult one, and unless a Commanding Officer gets help from his Indian officers, the schoolmaster can be, and often is, a source of danger. 11340.

Would not hesitate to call on Indian soldiers to act against men of their own religion, but would prefer not to have to do it. 11348.

It would be better not to have a battalion of Sikhs at Amritsar. 11350.

You could have one Sikh battalion and one of another class at Ferozepore. 11352.

*Colonel Dunsterville.*—There are no very serious or genuine causes of discontent. Seditious orators lay stress on the disparity of pay between British and native soldiers; this does not affect the fact that the native soldier is well paid. The direct commission has not been a success in the infantry and has been a source of disappointment to promising non-commissioned officers. 11652.

Sikhs and Dogras are naturally secretive and seldom speak of the Tat Khalsa or Arya Samaj, but they are willing enough to talk if the subject is introduced. 11708.

Matter of common knowledge that, especially in Sikh districts, men on leave have been obliged to listen to seditious teachers. Native officers admit in a general way that efforts are made to arouse feelings of discontent in men while on leave, but always refer to others and not to themselves. 11738.

Seditious subjects must be openly discussed with the native ranks. 11752.

If reliable information is received to the effect that a native officer or non-commissioned officer had been lending himself to sedition, but had no definite proof, would tell him to go. 11754, 11756.

Regimental schoolmasters at present discontented, and should be more highly paid. 11758.

In the case of a class company regiment, would certainly not hesitate in case of riots to call upon Indian soldiers to act against men of their own religion. If in command of a class regiment, would try it, but feel doubtful of the issue. 11764.

Sees no difference in the demeanour of the native soldiers in his regiment now, as compared with what it was in 1904 or 1907. 11766.

Should say the feeling of so-called 'unrest' which existed more or less throughout the native army in 1907-08 had disappeared, but while he knew of its existence, and kept his eyes open, never saw any signs of it personally. 11772.

Unless the circumstances were very special, such as those which preceded the Mutiny in 1857, any class would act without hesitation against any other in the event of open disaffection. As to disclosing such a state of affairs, feels less certain, but convinced that speaking for his own regiment, either section would disclose the facts concerning the other in nine cases out of ten. 11804.

*Colonel Creagh.*—Does not know of any causes existing which affect the contentment of the Indian soldiers with regard to their service as soldiers. 12049.

Advantage is often taken of soldiers by their neighbours to seize or damage their property or institute law suits against them during their absence. 12049.

Muhammadan feeling regarding the Turco-Italian War and the Pan-Islamic movement, and the feeling regarding the Tat Khalsa are not mentioned by the native ranks of their own accord. 12107.

No information has reached him of any concrete case of attempts being made to tamper with the native troops in cantonments or on leave. 12129.

Has however no doubt that attempts are made to tamper with troops whilst on leave. 12131.

Native officers thoroughly understand that they must look out for and keep their double-company commanders and Commanding Officer informed of any movements which may tend to affect the contentment or loyalty of the troops. 12135.

Men not allowed to attend an Arya Samaj meeting without permission of company and double-company commander, and has arranged for the subadar-major to attend any meeting of the Arya Samaj. 12135.

Better to speak freely on subjects open to suspicion of being 'seditious' to the senior native officers, and not to make a mystery of the matter with the junior ones. 12139.

Until Government is in a position holdly to suppress injurious societies and punish their ringleaders, it is better that British officers should not speak freely to the rank and file, as the attitude one must maintain with the regiment is that the British Raj is all powerful and does what it likes.

Also all ranks in the native army liable to intrigue against each other, and there is danger that private malice, class hostility, or desire to gain credit for zeal may find its opportunity in starting mare's nests. 12139.

In case of riots would not hesitate to call upon Indian soldiers to act against men of their own religion. 12147.

It is essential that the schoolmaster, as well as being a good and capable teacher, should be a loyal and contented man with pay and prospects which make the post a really attractive. Good and contented *Maulvis* and *Granthis* foster adherence to religion and to strict observance to religious customs, and show that an interest is taken in the men by the Government, thus promoting loyalty and contentment. 12145.

The visit of the King-Emperor to Delhi has removed any wrong feeling that may have previously existed in the army among all those who saw him last year at Delhi. 12163.

No feeling of unrest exists in his regiment. 12165.

*Colonel Mead.*—Native officers do not of their own accord allude to such subjects as the Turco-Italian War or the Pan-Islamic movement, but does not think this arises from any distrust of British action in regard to these. They speak freely enough when the subject is brought up. 12484.

No love lost between men of his regiment and the Chitpavan Brahmans. 12484.

The anti-cow-killing movement affects the Hindus in his regiment, but has not had any trouble with them as a result. 12488.

Has not found any trace of efforts made either in cantonments or while the men are on leave to arouse feeling of discontent in the native ranks, but it is possible that the regiment owes it immunity to the fact that it was out of India from 1905 to 1907. 12498.

The adjutant and himself every now and then see the postbag and note if any pamphlets, etc., are being received, and what newspapers come to the regiment. 12500.

The duty of every native officer in his regiment when anything occurs, or if he hears of anything which has any bearing on the contentment of the men or of attempts to make unrest, is to report it to the subadar-major or, if he has any doubts of it coming to the Commanding Officer's ears, to report direct to the Commanding Officer. 12500.

Only advisable in the case of senior officers of discretion, and then only rarely, to speak on subjects which are open to suspicion of being 'seditious.' Any harping on the subject would do more harm than good. 12510.

If he suspected, say, a jemadar of not being loyal, should try to find out the extent of his desloyalty without arousing suspicion, and if it was proved, bring him up for trial, but if he had strong suspicion and no definite proof, should recommend his discharge. 12514, 12516.

Regimental schoolmasters and salaried religious teachers do very little to keep the native ranks in his regiment contented and loyal. 12518.

Government would be well advised to keep a good class of religious teacher in the regimental lines, and for this it is necessary that he should be paid a decent wage. Should also like to see a better educated man for schoolmaster—this would also involve a higher wage. 12518.

The *Maulvi* in his regiment began to talk sedition and had to be turned out, and they have not succeeded in getting another one yet. 12520.

In his regiment religious instructors are paid by the men themselves. 12518, 12526.

In the case of riots, would not hesitate, so far as his regiment is concerned, to call upon his Indian soldiers to act against men of their own religion. 12534.

Has not observed any appreciable change in the demeanour of the men from what it was in 1904 and 1907. 12538.

Thinks he can say with certainty that no feeling of unrest exists at present in his regiment. 12542.

*Colonel Graham.*—Only grievances he can discover in the regiment are nearly all concerned with pecuniary conditions. 12786.

Has not been within his experience that native officers of their own accord allude to such topics as the Muhammadan feeling in regard to the Turco-Italian War, to the Pan-Islamic movement, or to the Tat Khalsa and the Arya Samaj. 12860.

So far as he knows, what is going on in the Muhammadan world outside India does not interest the Muhammadans in his regiment a bit. 12862.

Not aware of efforts being made either in cantonments or when the men are on leave to arouse feelings of discontent in the native ranks. 12874.

No sympathy between the agitators in Bengal and his regiment. 12878.

Has a really reliable and trustworthy subadar-major, and feels sure there could be little tampering with the contentment and loyalty of his native ranks without the subadar-major knowing it and bringing it to notice. 12880.

In Madras regiments there is so little seditious feeling that he thinks it does more harm than good to call attention to the matter. 12886.

Does not think schoolmasters or religious teachers are an influential factor in Madras regiments as regards contentment and loyalty or the reverse. Contentment of men depends on how they are treated, and their loyalty on the

influence of British officers, and partly because it is their natural disposition. 12888.

In case of riots would not hesitate for an instant to call on Indian soldiers to act against men of their own religion. 12900.

Demeanour of men always appeared to be thoroughly loyal and amenable. 10902.

Does not believe that the so-called feeling of 'unrest' existed in Carnatic regiments, except possibly to an infinitesimal extent. 12904.

*Colonel Cole.*—In 1907, when he was with 26th Light Cavalry, had men telling him spontaneously and heard that they told other officers, how men were going from village to village preaching sedition and in his own regiment had been told how a man came and put an anti-cow-killing paper into the narrator's hands. 13187.

Has not of late heard of efforts made either in cantonments or on leave to arouse feelings of discontent in the native ranks. 13199, 13201, 13203.

In addition to information sent periodically by Army Headquarters relies implicitly on his native officers to keep him informed of efforts made to tamper with the loyalty of the native troops or of movements which may tend to affect their contentment and loyalty. 13207.

Great mistake continually to call attention to subjects open to suspicion of being "seditious," but if they crop up in ordinary conversation, well and good. 13211, 13213.

Regimental schoolmasters and religious teachers are always doubtful people. Schoolmasters who are discontented are liable to pass it on to those they come in contact with. Salaried religious teachers can do a great deal to keep men contented and loyal when supported by the native officers. 13215.

In ordinary circumstances one would not hesitate to use men in case of riots to act against men of their own religion except in the immediate vicinity of their own homes, when one would rather use someone else. 13221.

Does not think it would be right to take Afridis into Tirah, and should leave them behind. 13223.

Has noticed no difference in the demeanour of the men in his regiment or in the 26th Cavalry as compared with what it was in 1904 and 1907. 13225.

The events of 1907, the sedition-monger, the length of the war in South Africa, the Japanese war, education and religious activity in India, have all tended to awaken thoughts which did not exist before and which cannot be suppressed or smothered. Thoughts that the native soldier is equal to or better than the British soldier, that the educated native is equal to the white man are spreading through the country. 13235.

*General Headlam.*—There is less chance of agitators getting at the soldier while he is serving with his unit because the soldier is under discipline and is protected from these outside influences to a great extent. 14115, 14117.

#### WRITTEN EVIDENCE.

*Lieutenant-Colonel Stratton.*—It is believed that a good number of the camp followers and some of the native troops at Nasirabad belong to the Arya Samaj. 86.

## ARMY IN INDIA.

## NATIVE ARMY—MISCELLANEOUS.

*Sir M. Grover.*—For reasons, generally political, decided not to interfere with the system of compensaion for dearness of food and forage. 733, 737.

Inexpedient to do anything in connexion with reducing the expenditure on free rations in Baluchistan. 741.

*Mr. Fenton.*—In colonization schemes steps taken to set apart land for native officers and soldiers. About 10 per cent. of the total area has been allotted to military settlers. Ex-soldiers constitute an element of loyalty in the colony, but adverse reports have been received regarding them as agriculturists. 1626.

No better way of disposing of land than by allotting it to old soldiers. 1628.

Military settlers now hold land in the colonies on exactly the same terms as anybody else. 1648.

Ex-soldier settlers have an influence for good on the Canal population; this influence disappears however in the next generation. 1652.

A foundation of the right type is laid for a district by the introduction of military pensioners as colonists. 1660.

*General Dickie.*—The hutting of native troops is being improved. 1848.

Improved housing arrangements should promote contentment and good feeling. 1864.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—The cutting down of furlough in native regiments would cause great dissatisfaction. 4618.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—Leave rules of the rank and file are liberal, but not too liberal. 5697.

Would like a definite ruling in regard to the position of the Subadar as regards the Tahsildar. 5850.

*Mr. Brunyate.*—For native lines and hutting, five lakhs were given in 1909-10, and 13 lakhs in each succeeding year; the latter is becoming a stereotyped figure likely to be maintained. For political and other reasons this expenditure on hutting is considered necessary. 6385.

Considerable improvement in the system of fixing compensation for the dearness of food and forage in the Indian army of late years. 6413.

Decided to take no immediate action in regard to the curtailing of the supply of free rations, etc., to troops serving in Baluchistan and Burma, but of opinion that every opportunity of withdrawing or modifying such concessions should be taken. 6421.

*General Birdwood.*—The fact of a regiment having a good name for 'granting leave liberally goes a very long way towards good men coming forward to enlist in it. 7528.

Leave rules for native troops can hardly be too liberal and would feel inclined to give officers commanding regiments a free hand in this respect. 7528.

It is impossible to go back on the leave rules now, and any restrictions in this way would cause great discontent. 7534.

The question of compensation for dearness of food has been exhaustively examined for years past, and many Committees have been assembled with a view to arriving at a satisfactory solution, but none so far has been found. The present arrangements are not entirely satisfactory and economical because

the rates on which compensation is based, and which are quoted by the civil authorities, are not always reliable, but the Assistant Director of Supplies of each division checks all the prices of items of the standard ration at all stations in his division, whilst the prices at all the principal stations are closely watched at Army Headquarters and suspicious rates are at once queried. Further, Mr. Brunyate expressed the belief that food supply charges (of which compensation is an important item) have not risen to the extent which might have been anticipated in view of the rise of prices since 1898. 15594.

*General Aylmer*—The horses of men returning from furlough are not as a rule in bad condition. 8471.

A sepoy after 21 years' service is unable to bear the strain of active service in the great majority of cases. 8501.

Should be sorry to see the present attractions of the Indian army reduced in any way. 8523.

When grants of land are being made, native officers do not get preference over native soldiers as each of these classes gets a different kind of grant. 8787.

When reservists or pensioners have been known to have been fighting against us, the payment of their pay or pension had been suspended, and in some cases withdrawn altogether. 8791.

The present is not an opportune moment for interfering with the special concessions to troops in Baluchistan, etc. 8795.

No grant of land should be made without a stringent condition of military service of a nature economical to the Government. 8803.

*General Stuart*.—Present policy of limiting the amount of ammunition in possession of native units to 20 rounds per rifle, *plus* 50 boxes as a maximum for practice ammunition, is sound and should be adhered to. 10091.

*Colonel Hoghton*.—Of the native ranks in his regiment, 12 per cent. are allowed to be absent on furlough and 10 per cent. on leave, but regulations permit of a maximum of 40 per cent. being absent. The minimum number to be present in a regiment is 550 rifles, including non-commissioned officers. 10653, 10655, 10663, 10665.

If a sepoy enlists at 19, he is, as a rule, worn out after 18 years' service; but many non-commissioned officers serve on for 25 or 26 years. 10737.

A man on the frontier gets on an average only three-and-a-half or four nights in bed which wears him out. 10741.

A large proportion of the men with over 18 years' service, who would not be much good in time of war, would be of use for internal defence. 10746.

Of the men enlisted, about 12 to 14 per cent. are rejected as unfit in the first year or two of their service; discharges chiefly due to men being stupid. 10789, 10791.

Grants of land on a more liberal scale would assist to a very large extent in keeping the Indian ranks contented. 10823.

It would be an excellent thing if Commanding Officers had more power in getting rid of undesirable sepoys. 10926.

The *Fauji Akbar* is much read in his unit, all ranks unanimous in their approval of its style and appropriateness. Considers it fulfils the purpose it is intended for very well. 10964.

Great inducement in present circumstances to units to practise economy in regard to stores and equipment issued departmentally.

The present system in regard to the supply of such stores, works well.

The only alternative system is one of a fixed annual allowance of stores and equipment, but such a system would not work so well in the interests of the State as that now in vogue. 10982.



Periods of service before promotion in his regiment—to lance naik 9 years; naik 10 to 11 years, and havildar 12 to 14 years. 11014.

*Major Hill.*—An Indian regiment require more leading than a British regiment. 11084, 11086.

In the Nowshera Brigade, furlough and leave are open the whole year round except for a period of six weeks, but each regiment has always to have 400 rifles present and ready to move out at a moment's notice. Statement showing number of men present, employed, and fit for duty in his regiment for the last three years. 11159, 11163, 11169.

Recommendations in regard to law suits against soldiers. The rules for exempting soldiers from *bega i* are not fully carried out. This applies especially in Native States. 11219.

Much unnecessary trouble is experienced by sepoy on railways which could be prevented by the appointment of more retired Indian officers as platform inspectors. It would be an advantage if the provision that a man receiving land should take his pension at once could be abolished. An impression that the civil authorities did not give the native soldiers a fair share of the land distributed some years ago. The status of the Indian soldier in his village could be improved especially in the Native States. The *izzat* of pensioned Indian officers might be increased. Considers the Indian soldier contented; his pay is sufficient. 11219.

*Fauji Akbar* a most excellent paper, and if it continues to improve it will provide a long felt want with the Indian army. 11364.

No doubt every unit is more prepared for war than it was 15 years ago. 11374.

As regards to stores and equipment issued departmentally, would suggest introduction of a modified silladar system. 11378.

Gets boots for his regiment from Cooper, Allen, but though the sepoy is satisfied, he is not, as for a little more could get a much better boot from England. 11388, 11390.

Periods of service before promotion in his regiment:—

Lance-naik 10 years, naik 13½ years, havildar 15½ years; last jemadar was promoted after 20 years' service. 11400.

*Colonel Dunsterville.*—The sepoy is an old man at 35. 11666.

A sepoy will do more for an officer of average ability whom he knows, than for an officer of high ability whom he does not know. 11706.

Religious teachers are much appreciated as an outward and visible sign of the Government's tolerance in religious matters. 11758.

The *Fauji Akbar* is much appreciated, and to a certain extent fulfils the purpose for which it was introduced. 11780.

Boots for regiment supplied by Pocock and Co. of Northampton. 11818.

No special inducement to units to practise economy in regard to stores and equipment, but Commanding Officers are very conscientious in these matters, and they are well watched and controlled. 11800.

Stores and equipment deteriorate with greater or less rapidity according chiefly to the zeal with which training is carried out, and any premium on economy might lead to slackness in training. 11800.

Statistics would show that the Indian army is very careful in its use of stores and equipment. 11800.

Does not agree with suggestion that sepoy should get an allowance for the up-keep of his rifle. 11802.

Would be able to keep up supply of shoes in the field. 11826.

If it were decided to fit the regiment with boots, thinks Pocock and Co. could supply them. 11828.

Pocock and Company gives a nicer looking boot and better quality for the money than the other firms. 11828, 11830.

Anticipates no difficulty in obtaining fresh clothing supplies for his battalion on service. 11840.

*Colonel Creagh.*—With regard to canal land allotments, the soldier might be given a preference over the ordinary civilian. Concessions with regard to revenue might be given to those who have land. 12049.

*Fauji Akbar* much read in his unit and thinks it fulfils its purpose. 12169.

The present system in regard to stores and equipment issued departmentally, cannot be improved on. 12177.

Gets his regiment's boots from Pocock and Co. of London. 12187.

Pocock has promised that they will always have enough boots ready to keep them with a constant supply. 12195.

Pocock's boots better than boots out here. 12197.

Satisfied that he can meet requirements as regards clothing for his battalion on mobilization. 12199.

*Colonel Mead.*—Maratha regiments complain that of late years they have been given very few opportunities of active service. 12420.

A decidedly good thing to have a wholesome paper like the *Fauji Akbar* in which the news is reliable. The native officers read it and discuss it and pass it on to the non-commissioned officers. 12546.

Generally speaking, economy is duly practised as regards the quantity of stores issued departmentally, and does not see what satisfactory system could be devised other than the personal responsibility of the Commanding Officer with regard to condemnation and replacement of stores. As regards fixed allowances, though they might with advantage be revised in some cases, the system seems the only practicable way to deal with these small items, 12587.

Gets the boots for his regiment from Cooper, Allen and Co., who keep 700 pairs for him on mobilization—tried Pocock for a year or two but the fitting was not good. 12591, 12593, 12597.

Trying the Army Clothing Factory for khaki with the object of getting supplies from them for field service. 12609.

*Colonel Graham.*—A sepoy's physical condition appears to deteriorate rapidly when he leaves the colours, through want of good feeding and active exercise. 12748.

The period of leave might be cut down and given oftener. 12776.

Thinks the *Fauji Akbar* fulfils its purpose to a great extent but only half the regiment can read it. 12910.

The departmental issues do not allow of anything but economy being practised, and many things have to be supplied from regimental funds which should be issued to regiments gratis. 12918.

Gets the boots for his regiment from Pocock of London. Cooper, Allen and Co., were discarded after a great deal of worrying in the matter. 12955, 12957.

Always has a number of boots on hand in the regiment. 12959.

*Colonel Cole.*—Forty per cent. of the men are absent on leave and furlough between the 15th March and 15th October. 13066.

It would not be good to curtail the leave of the men. 13074.

Civil authorities should treat old soldiers and native officers better. In the distribution of land the civilian comes off much better than the soldier. 13132.

Silladar soldier is disgracefully housed. If you go into villages you find the most excellent houses and if you are going to enlist men from decent residences and put them into hovels it will very soon *badnam* the Government. 13132, 13147.

Does not think that at present the *Fauji Akbar* does much good, but would be sorry to see it stopped. 13243.

*General Hamilton Gordon*.—The *Fauji Akbar* is a distinct success: circulation risen to about 6,000; paper financed by Government; avoids giving opinions in the paper in regard to political questions. 14070, 14072, 14078.

*General Heddle*.—Can only justify the leave and furlough rules of the native army by the necessities of recruiting. Since it is desirable to obtain the best of the agricultural community it is essential that they should be allowed to get away for the harvesting and sowing seasons. Moreover in many stations the climate renders much training impossible during the hot weather and men on furlough or leave are nearly in every case (except Gurkhas and Hazaras) available for recall at short notice. 14109.

## ARMY IN INDIA.

## NATIVE ARMY—NATIVE OFFICERS.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—There is discontent in the native army, the first step to remove it is to improve the status and pension of Indian officers. 5844.

*Colonel Hoghton.*—Owing to the number of British officers, it is difficult for the native officers to retain and act up to the responsibilities of their positions in regard to the maintenance of discipline, training and administration, more especially in the training season. 10500, 10504.

Since the increase of British officers, native officers are less anxious to take responsibility and initiative, but their efficiency would increase if they were given more scope. 10512, 10516.

As there are always more candidates than there are vacancies, there will always be a certain number men on hand for appointment as native officers. 10558.

A native officer promoted from the ranks, takes about six months to learn the duties of his appointment. 10560.

A direct commission native officer would require at least twelve months before he could take his place in the field. 10562.

In his regiment the native officers given direct commissions compare favourably with those promoted from the ranks. 11020.

As a class, men with direct commissions are better than the other Indian officers, but we also get excellent men from the ranks. 11030.

Would continue present system of 25 per cent. direct commissions but must have a large percentage promoted from the ranks in order to ensure contentment. 11034.

In favour of having a school of training for native officers and a similar school for havildars. 11036.

*Major Hill.*—The present establishment of Indian officers would be improved by the addition of a jemadar adjutant. 11064.

At the commencement of a campaign a large number of British officers is necessary to furnish leaders even for minor enterprises but as the campaign continued, the necessity for a large number of British officers would probably grow less as the Indian ranks found their feet. Casualties among British officers would be met to some extent by the Indian officers. 11066, 11074.

Cannot see anything in the present establishment of British officers and Indian officers which would prevent the latter acting up to their responsibilities in peace time, provided that a proper system prevails in the regiment. 11066, 11072.

Not in favour of any change in the present establishment of Indian officers. 11076.

Does not propose to take any direct commissioned native officers in his regiment. 11328.

The native officer promoted from the ranks is more of a soldier; the direct commissioned man is inclined to be a babu. 11330.

*Colonel Dunsterville.*—The native adjutant should be additional to the sixteen company officers. 11418, 11420.

The present number of British officers by no means necessitates undue interference with native officers in the thorough command of their units. 11422.

Never have and never would put native officers in temporary charge of double-companies. 11432.

The type of native officers he has got are rather uneducated. 11436, 11438.

Native officers can be trusted with most duties that require merely intelligence and not integrity. 11440.

In time of war would only put native officers in charge of double-companies as a temporary measure pending arrival of European officers. 11452.

Native officers after distinguished careers sink into insignificance, in their village life after retirement; they enjoy nothing like the *izzat* of the junior civil official. 11652.

The direct commission has not been a success in the infantry and has been a source of disappointment to promising non-commissioned officers. 11652, 11660.

*Colonel Creagh.*—Suggests addition of one jemadar to the peace establishment so as to provide for the jemadar adjutant without depriving a company of one of its officers. 11853, 11857.

In favour of the old system of two grades of jemadar and two of subadar being introduced. 11853, 12175.

Not necessarily the case that owing to the number of British officers it is difficult for native officers to retain and act up to the responsibilities of their position, though this tendency has to be carefully guarded against. 11859.

One allows the native officers to do as much as they are capable of doing. 11861.

Would like to have 14 British officers and 17 native officers in time of peace and 13 British officers (excluding depôt) and 17 native officers per regiment in time of war. 11867, 11869.

It is better to have a native officer of good family and local influence in his own country, of good character, tactful, trustworthy and reliable and with power of command, than a more brilliant man who is lacking in these qualities. 11867.

The native officer is seldom sufficiently well educated to do all the accounts and clerical work of his company. 11867.

The native officer should know all the undercurrents of thought and speech that may be going on in his company and keep his double-company commander and Commanding Officer informed. 11867.

The native officer is as a rule well up in his duties on the parade ground and capable of instructing his men in them, but few of them could be trusted to be scrupulously fair on the rifle range if left to themselves and if there was anything at stake. 11867.

In the manoeuvre attack native officers are not as a rule good at exercising their imagination as to what would be the effect of hostile fire on their men. 11867.

In the event of a regiment sustaining heavy casualties in the field among the British officers, the native officers would have to command double-companies and would generally rise to the occasion. 11873.

In favour of direct commissioned native officers in the case of Pathans. 11877.

Too many direct commissions discourage the non-commissioned officers and men in the regiment who may have been having hopes of promotion. 11881.

Native officers thoroughly understand that they must look out for and keep their double-company commanders and Commanding Officer informed of any movements which may tend to affect the contentment or loyalty of the troops. 12135.

*Colonel Mead.*—The number of native officers is insufficient for both peace and war, and the appointments of both subadar-major and native adjutant should be held by two native officers additional to the sixteen required for company commanders and company officers. 12211.

When the Commanding Officer's regimental system regards the British officers as a staff advising, assisting in, and supervising and inspecting the training of the companies and the battalion, there is not too much interference with the native officers, but where the system regards the double-company as the tactical and administrative unit, the case is different. 12213.

Native officers are capable of administration and looking after the interior economy of a double-company if carefully supervised. 12215.

In his regiment, the native officers who rise from the ranks are the least intelligent. 12219.

Would be prepared to take direct commission officers up to one fourth of the total if he could get suitable men. 12229.

Makes promotions from the ranks usually by selection. 12233.

Would like to have a complement of 18 native officers in both peace and war. 12237.

Native officers, subject to the supervision and inspection of British officers and the instructions emanating as a result of such inspections would command their companies as a captain in the British service commands his, with the one exception that they would be relieved of the duty of initiating schemes of training. 12237, 12249.

Native officers could keep company accounts if properly supervised, they can be trusted for making recommendations for promotion and for supervising musketry practices. 12275, 12277, 12279.

A native officer could lead a double-company in time of war for a while. 12288.

The system of promotion by classes to the rank of native officer causes some heartburning, and if some system of ante-dating a commission obtained after long service so as to date its recipient senior to the native officers of other classes who had the luck to be promoted after comparatively short service could be arranged, it would be agreeable to the native officer. 12420.

*Colonel Graham.*—In Madras regiments it is not the case that owing to the number of British officers it is difficult for native officers to act up to the responsibilities of their positions in regard to discipline, administration and training. 12619.

The duties of British and Indian officers may be broadly differentiated by saying that British officers maintain the general efficiency of the corps as a whole, and seek to increase and keep it abreast of the times by applying new ideas and methods as they come out. Indian officers' duties are more of an executive nature and comprise the carrying out and application of the higher training supplied by British officers which they themselves from lack of superior military education could neither introduce nor properly appreciate nor apply without the British officers' supervision. 12621.

*Colonel Cole.*—Present establishment of native officers too small—would like to see an increase of two jemadars and use one as signalling officer and the other as intelligence officer. 12975.

The maintenance of discipline in the lines is entirely in the hands of native officers. In training the native officer has his definite unit of a troop or half-squadron to train. 13001.

Certainly not the case that owing to the number of British officers it is difficult for the native officers to retain and act up to the responsibilities of their positions in regard to the maintenance of discipline, training and administration. 13001.

Would like to have 19 native officers in time of peace and 21 native officers (including two for the dépôt) in time of war. 13012.

Native officers are wanting in initiative and administrative powers and are prone to favouritism. 13012.

Duties such as signalling, intelligence and transport, could well be done by an educated native officer and would be quite ready to see an educated native officer as quartermaster. 13012.

Direct commission native officers differ very much—those he has got now are exceptionally good, but very often a man is got who is no use at all. 13030.

Much rather take a man who has served in the regiment a certain time—they are all the better trained and come on better. 13032, 13034, 13036.

Relies implicitly on his native officers to keep him informed of efforts to tamper with the native troops or of movements which may tend to affect their contentment and loyalty. 13207.

*General Birdwood.*—It would be impossible for Indian officers to command silladar camel corps. 15377.

# ARMY IN INDIA.

## NATIVE ARMY—PATHANS AND OTHER MUHAMMADAN SOLDIERS.

*General Staff Appreciation. Appendix I.*—General rising of frontier tribes which had the support of the Amir forming part of Pan-Islamic movement might affect loyalty of Muhammadans recruited in the North-West Frontier Province. 47.

Hostility towards Government caused by belief of Muhammadan soldiers that Great Britain, in common with other Christian Powers, aims at downfall of Islam. 57.

*Colonel Bingley.*—Sympathy with Muhammadans in Turco-Italian War spreading to Muhammadans in the Indian army. 343.

*General Aylmer.*—Pathans and Punjabi Muhammadans would remain faithful to us in the event of war with Afghanistan or the tribes with a *jihad* preached from Kabul, provided we keep them well contented and make our service really popular. 2763.

Possibility of combination between Muhammadan and Hindu troops very small at present. 2765.

*Sir H. McMahon.*—In a war with Afghanistan Pathan troops could generally be relied on to fight for us. 3547.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—Would not trust Muhammadan regiments to fight against their co-religionists, but would give them garrison duties. 4102.

In the event of a war brought about by a Pan-Islamic revival, or a *jihad* preached from Constantinople or Kabul, does not think we could rely on our Pathans as a body, or on Punjabi Muhammadans. 4286.

*Sir G. Roos-Keppel.*—We have too few Pathans in the Indian army. 5095, 5205.

The attitude of the Pathan troops in the event of hostilities with their fellow-tribesmen, with Afghanistan, or with Turkey, depends almost entirely on the personal influence of their officers. 5193.

Regiments in which Pathans are enlisted should contain not less than 2 double-companies of Pathans, and these should be homogeneous. 5205, 5223.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—Pathans are much better than other classes. 5415.

With a *jihad* preached from Kabul the Pathans would be excited. Does not believe Punjabi Muhammadans would go against us if we had sufficient British and other troops ready and took action at once. 5543.

*General Birdwood.*—We might get some more Pathans in the native army. 7590.

*Colonel Hoghton.*—The Punjabi Muhammadan is the best all-round man. 10864.

Punjabi Muhammadans would fight readily against brother Muhammadans in the tribal areas. 10866.

In his regiment, relations between the Muhammadans and non-Muhammadan elements are quite friendly and a healthy sense of rivalry exists, no very deep-seated sympathy is however to be found between them. 11012.

*Major Hill.*—Would mix Pathans and would have, say, one company Afridis and one company Khattaks. 11153, 11157.

*Colonel Dunsterville.*—His Muhammadan native officers do not take much interest in the Turco-Italian War, but they occasionally ask about it. Expects the Pan-Islamic feeling is strong, but they never refer to it. 11708.

Pathans quite unmoved by the Turco-Italian War, but when the *mullas* on the frontier take it up, they may have something to say. 11712.



Anticipates no difficulty with the Pathans from Afghanistan in his regiment in the event of war with Amir. 11722.

In the event of trouble with the tribes, would send Pathans to fight against them with pleasure. 11728.

Sikhs and Muhammadans in his regiment do not quarrel among themselves and are very happy. 11770.

Class of Pathans enlisted in the 20th Punjabis. 11814.

If called upon to act against their own particular tribe there might be some trouble, but Afridis of one tribe would gladly serve against another Afridi tribe. Reserve men of the trans-frontier tribes immediately affected by the war would place their highly trained services at the disposal of the enemy, but they would be very half-hearted enemies. 11814.

*Colonel Creagh.*—Would not hesitate to take his Pathans against the frontier tribes in case of war there. 12155.

Thinks the Yusufzais in his regiment would turn out against their own tribe. 12157.

His Pathans would not mind a war with Afghanistan and they would have no compunction in moving against the Amir. 12159, 12191.

*Colonel Graham.*—So far as he knows, Muhammadans in his regiment do not interest themselves about what is going on in the Muslim world outside India one bit. 12862.

## ARMY IN INDIA.

## NATIVE ARMY—PAY AND PENSIONS.

*Sir M. Grover.*—Present rate of reserve pay considered sufficient as regards infantry. 590.

*General Aylmer.*—Pension rules of Indian army are bad. 2595.

Indian army under the impression that it is not sufficiently well paid. 2595.

Pensioning reservists after 21 instead of 25 years would raise their cost by Rs. 10 per head. 8501.

To raise reserve to 100,000 pay of reservists must be raised to at least Rs. 3 and maintain pension in proportion it now stands to that of the men serving with the colours. 8505.

Considers that pensions of native ranks should be raised. 8534, 8533.

Agrees that the pay of the sepoy is adequate. 8555.

Native soldier's pay is quite sufficient provided he gets an increased pension. 8557.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—The present terms of service are good enough except as regards the native officers whose pay and pension should be increased. 4722.

*Sir G. Roos-Keppel.*—Thinks present pensions given to Indian officers are too small. 5205.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—The pay of the native soldier is now sufficient but the native officer is not well pensioned. 5629.

There is discontent in the native army; the first step to remove it is to improve the status and pension of Indian officers. 5844.

The pension of the native officer is the first thing that should be righted. 5846.

*Mr. Brunyate.*—From a political more than from a strictly economic point of view, we might at any time be called upon to improve the native officers' pay and pension. 6399.

*Mr. Kennedy.*—Informed that the men are not altogether satisfied in respect of their pensions. They compare the military pensions of the native army with the pensions earned by men of similar standing in civil employ, to the detriment of the former. 6955.

*Colonel Houghton.*—Rs. 3 per mensem recommended for reservists. Would suggest 21 years for pension—25 years is too long; men are generally worn out long before that. 10711.

Would suggest Rs. 3 per mensem pension after 21 years, and Rs. 2 invalid pension after 18 years' service if declared physically unfit. 10711.

Could work up to a reserve of 500 with increased pay and pension. 10719.

The inadequacy of the present scale of pensions, especially of sepoys and jemadars, is being somewhat keenly felt and generally commented upon. 10823.

The inadequacy of the present scale of pensions, especially of sepoys and jemadars, is being somewhat keenly felt and commented upon. 10823.

Would suggest the following pensions:—Sepoy Rs. 5-0-0 per mensem; jemadar Rs. 20, Rs. 30; Subadar Rs. 35, Rs. 45, Rs. 55. 10823, 10835.

No immediate necessity to increase the sepoy's pension, but within ten years it will become necessary. 10841.

A jemadar's pension is too small, but it is not so essential to raise the pension of subadars. 10843.

*Major Hill.*—Would suggest the reserve being divided into two classes :—

“ A ” active, with Rs. 4 per mensem pay, and “ B ” for depôts with Rs. 2 per mensem pay.

“ A ” class up to 15 years’ service and to train every year, “ B ” up to 21 years’ service and to train biennially. Class “ A ” to be trained one month the first year, and two months the second year along with class “ B. ”

Pensions of reservists to be as at present, but at the end of 21 years’ service. 11189, 11201.

The pensions of Indian officers are not sufficient to enable them to keep up their position as commissioned officers. 11219.

Considers the Indian soldier contented—his pay is sufficient. 11219.

The Indian officers’ and non-commissioned officers’ pay might be improved. 11224.

A jemadar should start with Rs. 20 more than he now gets; that would entail a rise for the subadar of Rs 20 also. 11226.

For sepoy’s pension would say Rs. 5 after 18 years, and Rs. 6 after 21 years. 11228.

Would be a good suggestion to let the sepoy go after 18 years on Rs. 4, but if he remained on as a reservist for 7 years, and would come up when called upon, to give him Rs. 5 at the end of that time. Would put such men in class ‘ B ’ and call them up every year. 11232.

*Colonel Dunsterville.*—The 25 years’ service required of reservists to qualify for pension is too long and might with advantage be reduced to 21. 11577.

Thinks reservists are satisfied with their present pay and pension, but some increase will be necessary later on, especially in pension. 11577.

The reserve is quite popular, but reserve pay of Rs. 2-0-0 a month is not enough.

To send the sepoy away on pension of Rs. 4 per mensem after 18 years’ service, and give him Rs. 5 pension after 7 years’ service in the reserve would be a good plan, but such men would only be of use in depôts, and for internal defence. 11583, 11591.

The free allowance of wood gives much trouble. It would be a great advantage to substitute a fixed cash payment. 11652.

Minimum pensions should be after 15 years’ service; this applies to sepoys only; not to non-commissioned officers. 11652.

The lowest rate of pension, Rs. 4 per mensem, is too low and should be increased. 11652, 11664.

The pension is always the most important thing; the pay is quite secondary. 11672.

Regimental schoolmasters at present discontented, and should be more highly paid. 11758.

*Colonel Creagh.*—In the event of a falling off in the popularity of the reserve, the reserve pay of the active reserve might be put at Rs. 3 with two months training every year and that of the garrison reserve at Rs. 2 a month with training every second year. 11975.

In the event of establishment of reservists being increased, in favour of an active reserve up to 18 years total service with reserve pay Rs. 3 and a pension of Rs. 3 on completion of 18 years’ service, garrison reserve from 18 to 25 years with a pension of Rs. 4. 11975.

Would be glad of any advance of pay or pension to the sepoy, but has not yet found reason for altering the pension. 12017.

A system whereby sepoy going away with 18 years' service on Rs. 4 might be given the alternative of doing seven more years on the reserve without regular training, but be liable to be called up on emergency by which he would earn Rs. 5 pension, might be tried. 12019.

It is essential that the schoolmaster, as well as being a good and capable teacher, should be a loyal and contented man with pay and prospects which make the post a really attractive one. 12145.

*Colonel Mead.*—Pay of reservists is insufficient. Rs. 4 per mensem seems the smallest amount on which the men could be expected to keep themselves fed so as to preserve physical efficiency. 12394.

Does not think any alteration is necessary in the case of pensions of reservists. 12398.

There is a feeling that pensions should be increased for all ranks, any native officer irrespective of length of service as an officer should receive not less than Rs. 15 per mensem. 12420.

Sepoys' pensions should be increased to Rs. 5 per mensem at least. 12434.

The system of letting sepoy go to pension after 18 years' service, but to offer them Rs. 5 per mensem pension for seven years' more service as reservists would work very well, but would not give any man the option of getting it unless he was physically fit for the next seven years. 12438.

Government would be well advised to keep a good class of religious teacher in the regimental lines, and for this it is necessary that he should be paid a decent wage. Should also like to see a better educated man for schoolmaster—this would also involve a higher wage. 12518.

In his regiment religious instructors are paid by the men themselves. 12518, 12526.

*Colonel Graham.*—Pay and pension of reservists might be increased. 12748.

There is a very general feeling that the pay is too small compared with what men can earn in civil life with a much less strenuous existence. 12786.

Three different rates of rice compensation. Men enlisting after 1902 do not get King's birthday 'batta.' Staff allowances vary in different regiments, e.g., pay havildars in some regiments receive Rs. 5; in Madras regiments they receive nothing. 12786.

Indian officers consider that their highest pension should be given after 25 years' service instead of 32 and the other pension correspondingly increased. 12786.

All ranks consider that the present pensions including family pension are totally inadequate, and that no pensions should be taxable. 12786.

Madras native soldiers have at least one legitimate grievance and that is the pension. 12802.

*Colonel Cole.*—The rates of pension in the lower ranks urgently demand attention; those for sowars, duffadars and jemadars are extremely low and quite inadequate in view of the high rates of living which now obtain. 13132.

The pay of the native cavalry grass cutter is ridiculous and the sowars have to augment it. 13132, 13138.

The only modification of the present reserve regulations which he advocates is that pensions should be granted after 21 years. 13268.

## ARMY IN INDIA.

## NATIVE ARMY—RECRUITING AND CLASS COMPOSITION.

*General Staff Appreciation. Appendix I.*—Punjab furnishes large number of soldiers for the Indian army. 56.

Oudh, after the Punjab and Nepal, our best recruiting ground. 79.

Rajputana as a recruiting ground. 104.

Internal situation demands that the admixture and distribution of the different classes composing the Indian army should be more carefully attended to. 139.

*Colonel Bingley.*—At present the supply of Sikh recruits is not equal to the demand, and later on the number of Sikh lads fit for enlistment will be insufficient for our requirements. 355, 357.

In regard to reduction of the number of Sikhs in the army, would suggest beginning with class regiments. 361.

The number of Rajputs in the army might be raised. Number of Brahmans could also be increased, but they would do better in class regiments as they have a baneful influence on other companies in class company regiments. 379.

*Sir M. Grover.*—Danger in policy of reducing the recruitment of the army from inferior classes and adding to the strength of the martial races 418.

Moplahs would be no use for counterbalancing other classes, but the Rajput might be considered as counterbalancing the Sikh as a fighting man. 420.

There has always been a falling off in recruiting for the native army during war. 616, 618.

*Sir C. Cleveland.*—Considers it questionable whether there are not too many Sikhs in the army, police, military police, etc. 1005, 1007.

*Major Ottley.*—A regiment of Moplahs with carefully selected officers would be as good as any other regiment in India. Inadvisable to mix up Moplahs with any Carnatics, but they would not get on any worse with the other races in India than the Sikhs or Muhammadans do. 1316, 1320.

*Mr. Fenton.*—Reason for suspecting that there are too many Sikhs in the army. 1710.

Twenty per cent. should be a safe proportion of any particular class to enlist in native army. 1714.

*General Aylmer.*—Risk in the policy of recruiting the Indian army mainly from a few sources. Class regiments are wrong in principle. 2731.

The establishment of Sikhs in the Indian army is excessive. List of classes that could be more fully enlisted. 2751.

Wishes to improve quality and diminish quantity of Jat Sikhs. 2753.

Madras not as good a fighting man as men of northern races, but his fighting characteristics have been unnecessarily run down. Not enthusiastic about Moplahs, some companies of them might be tried again, but not whole battalions. 2777.

In the event of war there would be a difficulty in getting recruits. 2808.

During war the recruiting falls off. 8276.

A scheme is now being considered wherein it is proposed that each reservist should bring in a recruit. 8411.

The policy of posting regiments to provinces distant from their recruiting areas has apparently had no prejudicial effect on recruiting and is on the whole popular with the native soldier. From the point of view of unrest the system is a success, but in some cases has been somewhat overdone. 8697.

*Mr. Lovett.*—More Rajputs could be enlisted in Oudh and there would be no political objection. 3029, 3031.

Thinks it is better not to have too many Brahmans. 3033.

All Brahmans in a regiment should not be from precisely the same part of the country. 3035.

Should say it would be better to have class companies than class regiments. 3035.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—The greatest possible danger in the policy adopted of late years of recruiting the native army mainly from a few sources. 4274.

Sikh recruitment has been overdone. Notices a great deterioration in the Sikh regiments and Sikh companies. 4282.

We might have more trans-frontier Pathans and Oudh men. 4282.

The political aspect of recruiting should be carefully considered. 4284.

In favour of class regiments, being a system which enables us to segregate doubtful troops. 4286.

Madras sepoy has not been given a fair chance. 4328.

Moplahs were most unfairly and stupidly treated, so also were the Telugus and Coorgs. 4328.

Introduction of Moplahs would be a good thing, but depôt must be in a place where there would be no difficulty of recruiting them. 4338.

The question of the recruitment of Moplahs would have to be taken up very tactfully. 4344.

Army should be recruited more evenly from diverse areas. 4626.

*Sir G. Roos-Keppel.*—Considering their numbers and fighting qualities, Pathans are very much under-enlisted. 5095, 5205.

Cis-Border Pathans such as Yusafzais, Khattaks and Mohmands over-recruited and gradually losing their fighting qualities. 5205.

Regiments in which Pathans are enlisted should contain not less than two double-companies of Pathans, and these should be homogeneous. 5205, 5223.

The very large number of Sikhs in the Indian army and their organization in class regiments, a serious danger. 5215.

Regiments where Sikhs and Muhammadans are mixed are all right because you know what is going on. 5215.

Is not in favour of class regiments. 5219.

With a regiment half Sikh and half Pathan you will be perfectly safe anywhere. 5221.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—The trouble lies so far as the army is concerned, in the class regiments. 5409, 5417.

Has not much confidence in the class regiments of Jats, Sikhs, and Oudh Rajputs. 5415.

Pathans are much better than other classes. 5415.

Does not think the Moplahs would make good soldiers. 5437.

Danger in having too many native soldiers of one caste. 5439.

Risk in recruiting mainly from a few classes, but such risk would be reduced to a minimum if class regiments were abolished and regiments were recruited from several classes. 5523.

Never found trouble in mixed corps, always in class units. 5523.

Regiments composed entirely of Sikhs, Jats, Rajputs, and even Punjabi Musalmans, will one day give trouble. 5523.

With mixed double-companies, any trouble that may be brewing, will be given away to the British officers by one or the other class. 5523.

Does not think we have another lot of soldiers in our native army as loyal as Gurkhas. 5525.

Gurkhas even when mixed with other races do well. 5525.

Would prefer to see one rather than two double-companies of Pathans in a regiment. 5527.

Believes there was a certain amount of disaffection in class regiments in 1907-08. 5531.

There are too many Sikhs in the army. 5533.

The following classes might be tried :—Jharwas, Nagas, Eastern Nepalese who live towards Sikkim, various classes of Punjabi Muhammadans who have recently begun to be enlisted ; inhabitants of Rajputana. 5533.

Prefers the Rajput of Rajputana to the Rajput from Oudh. 5535, 5537, 5539.

Assuming that we have too many Sikhs, would bring in men of other classes. 5541.

A good deal goes on which aims at causing disaffection in the native army, but it is the class regiments it chiefly affects. 5563.

Recruits will always be forthcoming for ordinary campaigns, and so long as we are victorious, assuming there is no internal trouble. If serious reverses come, recruits will not come forward. If internal trouble has to be grappled with, recruits will fall off to a lesser or greater degree, according to the quarters from which trouble comes. 5627.

If we were at war with Afghanistan, thinks we would get recruits. 5635.

*General Birdwood.*—Believes there are too many Sikhs in the Indian army. 7584.

Should not be sorry to see the Sikh class regiments changed into class company regiments. 7586.

Should like to see two double-companies only of Sikhs in class company regiments. 7586.

If such a thing were done, would like to see it begin in the more recently raised Sikh regiments. 7586.

Becoming difficult to recruit Sikhs. 7588.

We might get some more Pathans in the native army. 7590.

A number of Rajputs from Rajputana should still be available for recruitment. 7592.

*Colonel Houghton.*—Advantages and disadvantages of the class regiment. 10635.

The class company regiment is the best and safest organization. 10635.

In a class company regiment advancement must go in proportion to class and the best man therefore sometimes gets left behind. 10635.

In a class company regiment there is not quite the same cohesion throughout the unit as one should find in a class regiment. 10635.

Very few advantages in a mixed regiment, except that the best men perhaps come more easily to the front, and trouble or crime is less easily concealed. 10635.

Doubtful if one would get a good class of man to enlist in a mixed regiment. 10635.

Considers the composition of the 69th Punjabis an ideal composition. 10637.

From the point of view of all-round efficiency, class company regiments are more efficient than class regiments. 10641.

Taking the point of view of possible sedition, prefers also class company regiments. 10643.

Generally speaking, satisfied with the men the recruiting officer sends to him. 10797.

Except in the case of Jat Sikhs, knows of no difficulty in obtaining suitable recruits. 10860.

In the case of ordinary frontier expeditions, anticipates no difficulty in obtaining recruits. In the case of war in China or the Far East, recruits would be plentiful. Service in Afghanistan or Persia would not be so popular, but should not anticipate difficulty in recruiting until the war had been prolonged, say, six months. In the case of Egypt or Europe, if operations were much prolonged, recruiting might suffer once the novelty had worn off. Should, however, matters not go well with us from the start, recruiting would be a great difficulty.

Following classes might be enlisted :—

Musalman Jats of the Punjab, Karrals of the Abhottabad district and Sials (Punjabi Muhammadans from Jhang and the left bank of the Chenab).

Following classes might be enlisted more than they are at present :—

Saini and Maiton Sikhs, Brahmans of the Rawalpindi and Jhelum districts, and Gujars of the Punjab and North-West Frontier. 10860.

The Punjabi Muhammadan is the best all-round man. 10864.

Punjabi Brahmans are most adaptable people, have no prejudices, and make excellent soldiers. 10868.

Advantages of having a native unit stationed near its recruiting area :—

Men are near their homes and therefore more contented.

An impetus is given to recruiting by the presence of the regiment in the midst of the people.

Men can take advantage of short leave to a far greater extent.

Disadvantages :—Relatives apt to sponge on men and efficiency suffers in consequence. In case of spread of sedition or disaffection men are much more liable to evil influences. In case of riots or disorder, men's loyalty would be tried very highly if called on to act in aid of civil power. 10874.

Saini Sikhs still have a large supply for recruitment and are most anxious for military service. 11008.

In his regiment relations between the Muhammadan and non-Muhammadan elements are quite friendly and a healthy sense of rivalry exists, no very deep seated sympathy is however to be found between them. 11012.

*Major Hill.*—Class regiments are a mistake and a danger to India. 11123.

Advantages of class regiments are :—

Greater *esprit de corps* ; British officers soon get to know all the idiosyncrasies of the men they serve with. Arrangements for food and water easier ; enlistment easier and better class of men obtainable. 11123.

Disadvantages of class regiments are :—

Intrigue ; British officers apt to become narrow-minded and to think the class they serve with are the only fighting men in India. Absolute ignorance on the part of British officers of any other class but their own. 11123.

Advantages of class company regiments :—

Afford British officers a chance of gaining knowledge of at least four of the fighting classes of India.

Stimulate competition between companies, and double-companies, less chance of regimental intrigue. 11123.

Disadvantages of class company regiments :—

Less *esprit de corps*.

Food and water arrangements more difficult.

Enlistment not so easy as in a class regiment.

Promotion apt to be slow in one class and more rapid in another. 11123.



Disaffection in the case of a class regiment would be far more dangerous. 11125.

The Sikh would prefer to go into a class regiment than to a class company regiment. 11127.

Sikhs are already over-enlisted. 11131, 11242, 11408.

Some of the class regiments of Sikhs might be converted into class company, etc. 11137.

Best combination would be two companies of Sikhs, two of Dogras, two of Punjabi Muhammadans and two of Pathans. 11149.

Prefers 4 classes to 2 or 3, and would divide these up again by taking them from different districts. 11151, 11157.

Would mix Pathans, and would have, say, one company Afridis and one company Khattaks. 11153, 11155.

To curtail leave would materially affect enlistment. 11163.

Of late years had great difficulty in getting a good stamp of Sikh recruits, but they would come forward in large numbers if they saw a chance of service. 11234.

The Dogras could be called upon to a far greater extent than at present. 11234, 11246, 11248.

There is plague and also the great profit of agriculture in certain places which militate against Sikh recruiting. 11238.

Does not agree that we enlist more Sikhs than is politically safe. 11244, 11246.

When a regiment is stationed in its recruiting area, there are no recruiting difficulties, but the sepoys' relatives batten on them. 11262, 11264.

Would suggest doing away with one company of Sikhs from each of the six regiments which at present have three companies of Sikhs. 11408.

Would suggest doing away with half a squadron of Sikhs from the six regiments of cavalry which have one-and-a-half squadrons of Sikhs. 11408.

*Colonel Dunsterville.*—Advantages of class regiments :—

Easier to recruit ; men happier ; promotion simpler ; smarter appearance ; facility of transferring large bodies of men to other districts in case of disaffection. 11498.

Disadvantages of class regiments :—

No check on intrigue ; British officers spend their lives in knowing only one class of native ; enhancement of class prejudice ; lack of emulation ; men acquire a tendency to think too much of themselves politically. 11498.

Class regiments a great source of political danger. 11498.

Advantages of class company regiments :—

Check on intrigues ; safety of treasure ; checkmate to active disloyalty ; keen rivalry and emulation between companies while strictly retaining all essentials of caste ; knocking off unessential and troublesome corners ; British officers acquire a sound and practical knowledge of at least three races whereby their value is much enhanced. 11498.

Disadvantages of class company regiments :—

Not so easy to recruit men ; not quite so contented ; promotion rather complicated ; not so smart in appearance. 11498.

The system of mixed regiments was tried in the old days, and if it had been sound, would probably have survived. 11498.

Class regiments and mixed regiments the two extremes, and the balance of advantages undoubtedly lies in the mean, the class company regiment. 11498.

Class composition of 20th Punjabis would be hard to improve on ; 2 companies Sikhs, 2 companies Dogras, 4 companies Pathans. 11498, 11516.

Ideal composition would be class company regiments with the component elements mixed up among double-companies. 11510.

Gurkhas are last people he would think of touching in regard to the class composition of the regiments. 11512.

If the leave rules were interfered with the recruiting would fall off 11512.

In war time, once the casualty lists become known, parents would prevent their sons from enlisting, and the sources of recruiting would dry up almost entirely. When reservists were called up, each man should be told to bring two recruits with him, and be given a bonus of Rs. 5 for each recruit and certain boons as regards conditions of service. Knows of no fresh recruiting sources that might be tapped. 11674.

Two things affecting recruiting are the nature of the country where the campaign is carried on, and the number of casualties in that country. 11678.

It might be possible to get native gentry to raise a certain number of troops, but the feudal system is getting rather weak now. 11682.

To supplement regular army, might be feasible to raise bodies of yeomanry officered by local gentry. 11684.

Advantages of stationing a regiment near its recruiting area:—

Facilitates recruiting. 11686.

In the case of a class company regiment, would certainly not hesitate in case of riots to call upon Indian soldiers to act against men of their own religion. If in command of a class regiment would try it, but feels doubtful of the issue. 11763, 11764.

Sikhs and Muhammadans in his regiment do not quarrel among themselves and are very happy. 11770.

Sikhs, Dogras and Pathans get on very well together in all matters concerning the honour and welfare of the regiment; being mixed in double-companies, they vastly improve each other. But the *camaraderie* so engendered goes no further than the parade ground. In all except purely routine matters they remain as far apart as the poles, and each class loves to disparage the other when at a private interview with the Commanding Officer. 11804.

*Colonel Creagh.*—Class regiments should be easier to run as only one class of man has to be studied. In class regiments promotions to native officer and non-commissioned officer are simplified as the Commanding Officer has the whole regiment to choose from. In a class regiment the provision of food, drink and sanitary arrangements are simplified. In a class regiment mutiny or sedition has more chance of being undetected, and there is a lack of healthy class rivalry.

Advantages of class company regiments are:—

Less chance of mutiny and sedition as one class would probably give away the other; wholesome class rivalry between companies, and a large field for recruiting.

Disadvantages of class company regiments:—

More difficult to command as four or more classes have to be studied and controlled; more difficulty in the appointment of double-company and acting double-company commanders; promotions having to go by classes, a senior and better man may be passed over by a junior and inferior man; separate arrangements for food, drink and conservancy have to be made, and a tendency on the part of one class (especially Pathans) to pretend not to understand what a non-commissioned officer of another class may say to them, has to be guarded against.

The advantages of a class company regiment outweigh the disadvantages and are worth the extra trouble.

Mixed regiments would probably make mutiny or sedition still more difficult and selections for promotion more easy, but thinks that the men would take less pride in themselves; it would be difficult to get a good class of recruit.

Class composition of 128th Pioneers. 11924.

Would like to have four classes in all in a regiment. 11938, 11940.

A reduction of leave would be liable to affect recruiting, and the heart the sepoys put into their work when present. 11956.

No difficulty at present in obtaining the requisite number of suitable recruits. In time of serious war there might be difficulty in getting a sufficient number of good recruits quickly, as there might be political influences at work.

It should be possible to raise a regiment of Parwaris, but it would be better not to mix them with others. 12037.

As regards recruiting during war time, does not think there would be any reluctance, provided there was no political influence at work. 12069.

The further a regiment were from its recruiting area, the harder as a rule it would be to draw recruits. 12085.

Deccani Marathas are sufficiently enlisted already.

Would not advocate the enlistment of more Rajputana Muhammadans. 12185.

*Colonel Mead.*—Objections to class company regiments :—

Difficulty British officers would have in getting in touch with their men; for war there would be less mutual help and backing up than in a class regiment; British officers would be liable to prefer one class to another.

Only argument in favour of a class company regiment is that the mutual jealousy of the different classes would tend to prevent any unrest remaining hidden. 12316.

Only disadvantage of class regiments is that the men are more likely to work together and make it difficult for the officers to find out what is going on. 12328.

Class composition of 116th Marathas. 12316, 12318, 12320, 12322, 12324, 12326, 12330.

Has no difficulty in getting Deccani Maratha and Konkani Maratha recruits but is experiencing difficulty with Muhammadans. The town Muhammadan is no good and the country Muhammadan is a little difficult to get. 12440.

Would suggest Parwaris as suitable men for Pioneers, preferably for a class regiment of Parwaris commanded by Maratha native officers. 12440.

Would suggest the enlistment of more Deccani Marathas for Indian cavalry. 12440.

The recruiting of Hetkani Bhandaris might again be tried; they furnished a good stamp of men who have always received considerably more promotion than their relatively small numbers would warrant. 12440.

Satisfied with all his recruits except the Muhammadans. 12452.

*Colonel Graham.*—Advantages of class regiments :—

Only one language spoken, only one roll for promotion, avoidance of the passing over of men by juniors of another caste.

Disadvantages of class regiments :—

Discontent or disloyalty existing in the ranks more easily concealed and a full understanding of grievances more difficult to arrive at. In case of class or caste riots inadvisable to utilize the services of the nearest regiment if composed wholly of that class; race hatred more easily fostered. 12667.

Advantages of class company regiments :—

More difficult to keep any discontent or disloyalty concealed. Men of another class available in case of riots; a little rivalry among companies of different classes very beneficial in matters of musketry, training, and games of all kinds.

Disadvantages of class company regiments:—

More than one language spoken, promotions more irregular, men being superseded by juniors of another caste, but this would be brought to a minimum if there were exactly four companies of each class. 12667.

Advantages of mixed regiments:—

More difficult to keep any disloyalty or discontent concealed. Men of another class available in case of riots.

Disadvantages of mixed regiments:—

More languages spoken, absence of inter-company competition by castes, difficulties of messing, difficulties of maintaining impartiality in the mixed interests, Indian officers and section commanders having various castes and languages to deal with. 12667.

*Colonel Cole.*—Must be extremely difficult to ascertain what is going on in a class regiment, and if there is any inclination to disaffection it is more likely to spread. Further, officers are inclined to think that the people they serve with are the only class worth consideration. 13062.

In a class company regiment you have so many compartments, *esprit de corps* is not affected, and at the same time there is not so much love between the squadrons that iniquity is screened. 13062.

A good class of man would not enlist in a mixed regiment although he would go to it if promoted into it. Also it must be very uncomfortable at times and supply and administration must be difficult. 13062.

Class composition of 11th Lancers which he considers the ideal distribution. 13064.

Recruits are not obtainable in the abundance they were twenty years ago, nor is the quality up to what it was. Sikhs are exceedingly well off and are not inclined now to serve long in the ranks. Pathan recruits are more plentiful whilst Dogras and Punjabi Muhammadans are plentiful always, especially the former. 13157.

Does not anticipate any difficulty in obtaining recruits during war, in fact thinks it would be an extra inducement to serve. 13157.

Whilst in southern India the Deccani Muhammadan struck him as being an excellent man. 13157.

His recruits are all enlisted at regimental headquarters. 13173.

Advantage of being near recruiting area is that a larger pick of recruits is obtained, but if kept too long in one area regiments get localized. All regiments are improved by a change of locality, and especially by service on the frontier. 13175.

Personally entirely against class regiments. 13262.

#### WRITTEN EVIDENCE.

*Lieutenant-Colonel Stratton.*—The recruitment of the Jat of the Bikaner State has reached its extreme limit. 66.

It is also hard to obtain sufficient Rajputs, both Hindu and Muhammadan, in Rajputana, of good stamp and physique, though undersized specimens abound. 66.

The classes enlisted in Rajputana still maintain their former characteristics, the material is excellent and cannot be beaten. 66.

Meos, Gujars, Eastern Rajputana Jats and Minas, could easily furnish more men. 66.

Rajputs cannot be increased sufficiently to fulfil the object of acting as a counterpoise to the Sikh element. If the Meos, Gujars, Eastern Rajputana Jats and Minas were drawn upon, an excellent counterpoise to the Sikh element would exist. 66.

## ARMY IN INDIA.

## NATIVE ARMY—RESERVES AND RESERVISTS' TRAINING AND MOBILIZATION.

*General Aylmer.*—Indian army reserves should be organized in two categories. One category to be composed of men lately transferred from the colours and the other of older men. 2759.

Would have 750 reservists for each infantry battalion to meet deficiencies on mobilization and wastage for a year. 8203, 8355, 8371.

Would reduce the term of service of the Indian reservist to 21 years; 25 being considered excessive. 8223, 8497.

Does not think that a system allowing men to serve a certain number of years with the colours and a certain number of years in the reserve would work in the Indian army. 8245, 8249.

Suggests three different methods for the training of reservists. 8292.

In fixing the period of the year when reservists are to come up for training, regard must be had to the men's agricultural pursuits. 8301, 8305, 8341.

If you add the reservists to the present peace establishment, there are not enough men to cover wastage in war. 8353.

The number of Gurkha reservists is totally inadequate. Possible that on an emergency some 2,000 Gurkhas could be drafted from the Burma Military Police to Gurkha battalions. 8385.

There will be no difficulty in obtaining the necessary number of Pathan reservists, but it is possible that these may refuse to join the depôts on mobilization if the proposed campaign is unpopular with them. 8385.

The reserves of men for Indian cavalry regiments should be increased to about 320. 8456.

The reserves for Indian artillery might be increased to 140. 8456.

The peace establishment of sappers in a sapper company might be reduced by 25 men provided a suitable reserve were maintained. 8460.

Reserves for expansion of railway companies. 8469.

Does not think that the majority of the reservists and men returning from furlough can be considered unfit for immediate service, and considers 75 per cent. would be fit. 8471, 8473.

As a rule, officers commanding work up to their full powers in regard to weeding out unfit reservists. 8489.

Pensioning reservists after 21 instead of 25 years' would raise their cost by Rs. 10 per head. 8501.

The reason for the delay in bringing the number of reservists up to the establishment of 50,000 contemplated by Lord Kitchener, has been to a great extent financial. Under present conditions doubts whether we will be able to work up to 50,000 reservists. To raise reserve to 100,000, pay of reservist must be raised to at least Rs. 3 and maintain pension in proportion it now stands to that of the men serving with the colours. 8505.

An economical organization of the army can be ensured for a similar war strength by reducing the peace establishment of native units and increasing the reserves. 8803.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—Scattered reserves without arms and without cohesion must obviously be less of a danger than armed sepoys in regiments. 4380.

Utterly opposed to reducing the number of units. If we must have reductions in favour of lower peace establishments with increased reserves.

Suggests battalions being linked as battalions of a regiment with following strengths:—

Trans-Indus, foreign service, Pioneers, and two-battalion units such as Gurkhas	...	...	...	900
Battalions allotted to Field Army serving Cis-Indus	...	...	...	800
Battalions allotted to internal defence	...	...	...	700
with 1000 or 1200 reservists.	4380.			

Anticipates difficulties with Nepal Darbar in connexion with Gurkha reserves. 4396.

Feasible but inadvisable to reduce the peace establishments of Indian cavalry and Indian artillery units, but would like to see larger reserves. 4406.

The peace establishments of the 19 service companies of sappers and miners could not be reduced without loss of efficiency, but would increase their reserves. 4410, 4412.

Minimum number of reservists 300 per battalion. 4716.

*Sir G. Roos-Keppel*.—In war against the tribes Pathan reservists would probably join with their fellow tribesmen if at home at the time. 5209.

*Sir J. Willcocks*.—Against making up numbers on mobilization by having larger reserves. 5581.

Reservists, do what you will, rapidly deteriorate, and with larger reserves a number of men would enlist merely because they wished to go as soon as possible to the reserve. 5581.

In the event of unrest, altogether doubtful whether the reservist will come when you call him up. If you have him with his regiment he is on the spot. 5585, 5587.

Would not go over 50,000 reservists. 5589.

When reservists come up for training, they are not as a rule physically fit for active service. 5593.

Disagrees with proposal to have a certain number of weak battalions to be expanded by reserves. 5603.

Gurkha reservists would take some time to join, but believes a certain number of reservists would not turn up. 5611.

Very large reserves, especially of cavalry, are a danger. 5623.

*Mr. Brunyate*.—A lower strength of Indian units with larger reserves would be an economic measure to look into. 6038.

*General Birdwood*.—Peace strength of regiments on the 912 establishment might be reduced to 832, provided reserve is proportionately increased. 7401, 7413.

It is, however, only possible to employ reservists properly to replace wastage in the field, as not more than 50 per cent. would, when called up, be physically fit to go immediately on service. 7401, 7403, 7409.

*Colonel Hoghton*.—It might be feasible in the interests of economy to reduce the peace establishment of native units with a corresponding strengthening of reserves, but this would be at the cost of efficiency. 10707.

In the event of establishment of reservists being increased, would suggest it being divided into two classes:—1st class, 3 to 12 years, 2nd class, 12 to 21 years' service. 1st class reservists to have 28 working days training per annum, and 2nd class reservists 56 days biennially. 10711.

Would suggest Rs. 3 per mensem pension after 21 years' service and Rs. 2 invalid pension after 18 years' service if declared physically unfit. 1st class reservists to be utilized to fill up ranks of units to war strength (if establishments are reduced). 2nd class to follow suit when 1st class is exhausted, meanwhile to be formed into reserve battalions. 10711.

Could work up to a reserve of 500, with increased pay and pension. 10719.

There would not be a large percentage of men of over 18 years' service worth putting into the reserve. 10735.

Does not think there would be any difficulty in the Punjab at any rate in recalling reservists if required at short notice on emergency. There is now considerable difficulty in getting Dogras to join the reserve. Sikhs do not join the reserve as readily as they used to. Punjabi Muhammadans join the reserve readily still. 10748.

Reservists go for training to the reserve centre nearest to their homes. 10756.

In time of war when reservists would be required to join colours, they would go first to the reserve centres for equipment, and thence they would go to the depôts of their regiments. 10774.

Except in the case of Pathans, from 15 to 20 per cent. when called up for training would be physically unfit from underfeeding to take the field. In other respects at least one month's training would be necessary to render them fit, supposing they had gone through biennial training within the year, otherwise two months. 10799.

Does not think the sepoys would object to a reserve on the system of a certain period with the colours, say, 10 years, and after that in the reserve to qualify for pension, but there should be a certain amount of latitude allowed for special cases. 11044, 11046.

*Major Hill.*—Does not think it would be feasible to reduce the peace establishment of Indian units and to make a corresponding increase in the reserve. 11179.

It would add to the efficiency of the reserves most enormously if they were trained by their own regiments. 11189.

Would suggest the reserve being divided into two classes :—

'A' active, with Rs. 4 per mensem pay, and 'B' for depôts with Rs. 2 per mensem pay. 'A' class up to 15 years' service and to train every year, 'B' up to 21 years' service and to train biennially. Class 'A' to be trained one month the first year, and two months the second year along with class 'B.'

Pensions of reservists to be as at present, but at the end of 21 years' service. 11189, 11201.

A system under which men served for a certain number of years with the colours, after which they would go to the reserve until they had put in 21 years would not break down, but we should not get so many men to enlist. 11203.

Does not anticipate any difficulty in British territory if reservists are required to join at short notice on emergency, but the Native States might present difficulty as the postal arrangements there are so bad. 11205.

No difficulty in getting Sikhs to join the reserve. 11191, 11205.

Sends one British officer, three Indian officers, and twenty non-commissioned officers to look after reservists when they are up for training. 11209.

When he last saw Sikh reservists about 70 per cent. were fit to take their place in the field, and 10 per cent. more would have been fit in a fortnight. 11211, 11215.

Would be a good suggestion to let a sepoy go after 18 years on Rs. 4, but if he remained on as a reservist for 18 years, and would come up when called upon, to give him Rs. 5 at the end of that time. Would put such men in class 'B' and call them up every year. 11232.

*Colonel Dunsterville.*—The 25 years' service required of reservists to qualify for pension is too long and might with advantage be reduced to 21. 11577.

Reservists of between 21 and 25 years' service would not be of much use in the ranks. 11577.

A 10 per cent. increase in the strength of reserves would not necessitate any alteration in the present arrangements. 11577.

Thinks reservists are satisfied with their present pay and pension but some increase will be necessary later on, especially in pension. 11577.

The reserve is quite popular, but reserve pay of Rs. 2-0-0 a month is not enough. 11583.

To send sepoy away on a pension of Rs. 4 per mensem after 18 years' service, and then Rs. 5 pension, after 7 years' service in the reserve would be a good plan, but such men would only be of use in depôts and for internal defence. 11589, 11591.

There would be considerable difficulty in calling up reservists at short notice on emergency. 11593.

We are more sure of getting Pathan reservists than others when wanted. 11597.

Would not be safe to calculate on more than 50 per cent. of the reservists turning up punctually on emergency. 11593, 11605.

Reservists would require a month or more training before they would be fit to take their place in the ranks. 11609, 11611.

If care is taken during the training period to weed out all shaky men, the reservists would, with few exceptions, be physically fit to take the field the day they were called up. 11609, 11613.

Trains reservists at centre in one big battalion and the division helps as regards officers. 11623.

Training subject to disadvantage that it is conducted by officers unknown to the reservists. 11627.

A good idea to dismiss reservists who are old men on pension, and to fill up their ranks with young men. 11810, 11812.

*Colonel Creagh.*—In the interests of economy, it might be feasible to make a reduction in the peace establishment of units by a corresponding strengthening of the reserves, but such would not be in the interests of efficiency. 11950.

It might be feasible if the peace establishment were reduced, to expand it every training season by calling up a certain number of reservists, but the men would get less systematic training than under the present system. 11962, 11964, 11966.

Would suggest for present reserve, 21 years' total service in active reserve and 21 to 25 years' in garrison reserve. 11975.

In the event of a falling off in the popularity of the reserve, the pay of the active reserve might be put at Rs. 3 with two months' training every year, and that of the garrison reserve at Rs. 2 a month with training every second year. 11975.

In event of establishment of reservists being increased, in favour of an active reserve up to 18 years' total service, with reserve pay Rs. 3 and a pension of Rs. 3 on completion of 18 years' service garrison reserve from 18 to 25 years' with a pension of Rs. 4. 11975.

Proposes scheme for amalgamating control of reservists and recruits for keeping the various regiments in touch with their past, present and future sepoy and their people. 11975.

Pension of reservists might be Rs. 3 a month after 25 years' service. 11975.

Whether reservists would turn up or not at short notice in time of emergency would depend a good deal on the internal political atmosphere and whether the postmasters did their work well or failed to deliver the envelopes through slackness or disloyalty. 12001.

So far has found no difficulty in filling up his reserve. 12001, 12007.



Could fill a larger reserve if it were required. 12009.

A system whereby sepoys going away with 18 years' on Rs. 4 might be given the alternative of doing seven more years on the reserve without regular training, but be liable to be called up on emergency by which he would earn Rs. 5 pension might be tried. 12019.

When called out for training reservists would not as a rule be physically fit for active service. 12021.

After two months, about 80 per cent. of the reservists would be able physically and otherwise to take their places in the ranks. 12023.

*Colonel Mead.*—The reserves as they exist at present would not be fit to take their places in the ranks. 12354.

On the supposition that the reserves were sufficiently trained and paid sufficient to secure physical fitness when called, the number of native ranks in one battalion out of the three battalions in the link might be reduced to 652 Indian ranks. 12354, 12356.

Konkani Marathas will not go willingly to the reserve—he does not think the pay good enough. Same difficulty not experienced in the case of the Deccani Marathas or the Deccani Musalmans. 12366, 12370.

With a diminished peace strength, would require about 250 reservists. 12378.

Majority of the reservists of his regiment trained at Poona, and the regiment sends the necessary officers and non-commissioned officers there to train them. 12382.

Has more applicants than vacancies for Deccani Marathas and Muhamadans, and would suggest that more elasticity be allowed in transferring men of these classes to the reserve in place of a portion of Konkani Marathas. 12394.

Pay of reservists insufficient—native officers say Konkani Marathas would go sometimes to the reserve if they got Rs. 4 per mensem. 12394, 12406, 12554.

The period of service of reservists is too long—18 years' service should be the limit. 12394, 12402.

Would prefer yearly training of at least a month to two months biennially. 12395, 12554.

If a reservist is not fit he should be turned out. 12398.

When called out reservists would not, as a rule, be fit for active service. On the whole they are only just fit both physically and in other respects at the conclusion of their two months' training. 12408.

The system of letting sepoys go to pension after 18 years' service, but to offer them Rs. 5 per mensem pension for seven years' more service as reservists would work very well, but would not give any man the option of getting it unless he was physically fit for the next seven years. 12438.

*Colonel Graham.*—The present reserve establishment in Carnatic regiments of 52 per regiment totally inadequate. 12734.

Training of reservists should be annual instead of biennial with an increase of pay and pension. 12748.

Would not specify any particular period of service for reservists but during each annual training all men should be discharged who are not in all respects fit for active service. 12748.

Training of Carnatic reservists. 12752, 12754, 12756.

If reservists are required at short notice on emergency, the majority of them could be collected in a comparatively short time at any season. 12758.

Difficulty in getting men to join the reserve though present establishment of 52 can generally be maintained. With better pay and pension there would be no difficulty. 12758, 12762.

Of the reservists when called up at least thirty per cent. would be found altogether unfit for active service, of the remainder a large number would be in poor physical condition and require about three months' feeding up and physical training before being fit to take the field. In other respects they might be fit to take their place in the ranks in a month or less. An annual training would greatly improve matters. 12766.

*Colonel Cole.*—A native cavalry reservist would not take his place in the ranks as easily as an infantry reservist would. 13108.

A native cavalry reservist practically never gets on a horse from the time he leaves his regiment until he comes up for training. 13108.

It should be possible now on these canal colonies to work up a reserve of men keeping up their horses, the man being given land on condition that either he or his son serves so many years in a regiment after which he is transferred to the reserve and required to produce himself and his horse whenever required. 13112, 13118, 13122, 13278.

Not in favour of increasing the reserve. 13268.

The only modification of the present reserve regulations which he advocates is that pensions should be granted after 21 years. 13268.

Reservists when up for training are mounted on the horses of men on furlough, but no arrangements are made for mounting them on mobilization. 13272.

*General Headlam.*—The Indian Army reserve intended for maintenance not for mobilization. 14109, 14141.

It is a very general experience of training centres that the Indian reservist on being called up is physically incapable of doing the strenuous work of a soldier until he has been fed up into working condition again. 14109, 14129.

An increase in the number of reservists would constitute a political danger.

The Indian reservist as at present trained is not fit to take his place in the ranks for war immediately on being called up, and moreover the Home reserve consists of men below 30 years of age while the age of Indian reservists may be up to 40. 14109.

As regards the physical condition of the reservists on being called up, it makes a great difference where the men come from. The Punjab man is probably much better than the reservist who comes from the United Provinces or Bengal, and there are a good many reservists in the United Provinces. 14127, 14129.

In the event of the reserve scheme being altered, with a larger reserve as a result, there would be no necessity to work it up at once. 14139.

The objects of the revised system in regard to the training and calling up of reservists are:—

(i) To do away with the system of "foreign" reservists being trained at centres other than their own.

(ii) To avoid the move of depôts, with all the baggage of the battalion, for which accommodation has to be found.

(iii) To amalgamate the reservists with the depôt, on which will devolve the duty of furnishing drafts, thus avoiding the necessity for forming reserve battalions. 14212.

Reservists are trained at the regimental centre of their corps if their homes are situated within the geographical limits of the same Army Command in which such regimental centre is situated, otherwise, or in any case of doubt,

at the centre nearest their homes. The course lasts for two months, and each reservist has to go through it biennially; it consists of infantry work and musketry. A party for the purpose is sent from each battalion. 14241.

The reserve centres of Carnatic regiments were placed at Secunderabad when these regiments were composed of Telugus, and this has not been altered with the change of class composition of those regiments. 14241.

Much the best thing of all would be that reservists should train with their own battalions, but imagines the expense would be prohibitive, and does not know whether it would be popular with the reservists. 14249.

Under the new system reservists will join and be armed and equipped at their reserve centre to which they have been accustomed to come up for training. They will then as opportunity offers be moved to the depôt of their battalion which remains at the last peace station. Reservists are required to maintain and not to mobilize their battalions and they must go somewhere to be trained until required to be sent in drafts to their battalions in the field to replace wastage. It seems better they should be moved to the depôts of their battalions, than that the latter should be moved to the reserve centre. Reservists will be brought into much closer touch with their battalions under the new system than was the case under the old system, when the reservists of three battalions were lumped together to form one reserve battalion. 14255.

The experience is that there is much more interest taken in the training of reservists when this is carried out in the depôts of their own battalions than when they are trained in masses. 14265.

Considers the new system for the training and disposal of reservists on mobilization simpler than, and superior to, the old one. 14275, 14281.

*Colonel Hamilton.*—System under which reservists of the Indian army are trained in time of peace. 14515, 14517, 14519, 14523, 14589, 14591, 14593, 14599, 14625, 14627, 14631, 14633.

Last training four per cent. of the Gurkha reservists failed to turn up. 14523.

When called up on mobilization all reservists except those of cavalry and artillery go to their training centres. 14561.

Medical inspection is carried out at every training. 14675.

A free issue of clothing is made to men on joining the reserve. Renewals are granted free of cost when the clothing is condemned, but no free renewals are granted within three years of the first issue. During the non-training period the reservists' clothing is kept in charge of the officer commanding reservists at the regimental centre. 14675.

Training is carried out for two calendar months biennially and is of a practical nature, including a musketry course, judging distance practice and attack practice. 14675.

The staffs for training are detailed from regiments to which the reservists belong except in case of 'foreign' reservists who are trained by a staff detailed from regiments to which they are attached for training. The strength of the staff depends on the number to be trained. An Indian officer is detailed as native adjutant by the regiment which supplies the officer commanding reservists. 14675.

On mobilization, reserves are called out by order of the Government of India. They are summoned as in peace except in the case of Gurkhas whose calling up notices are sent to the Resident in Nepal in bulk by regiments. In the case of trans-frontier reservists the aid of the political agent will be asked to deliver the notices. 'Foreign' reservists on being equipped at their peace training stations are sent to their regimental centres. 14685.

It is proposed to abolish the term 'regimental centre' and to substitute 'reserve centre.' On mobilization the reservists will assemble, be armed and

equipped at their reserve centres and then proceed to the depôts of their battalions which will remain at the last peace stations of the battalions instead of moving to the reserve centres. 14685, 14706.

Not contemplated according to present orders that any reservists be absorbed into the battalions on mobilization. 14693.

The arms of reservists are stored in the arsenal on which the regimental centre is dependent. Those of 'foreign' reservists in the arsenal nearest the centre to which they are attached for training. Accoutrements are stored at the regimental or training centre, but if suitable accommodation does not exist they are stored at the nearest arsenal. The practice ammunition (50 rounds per man) of reservists is drawn from arsenals by the officer commanding reservists at the commencement of training and kept in the magazine of the regiment at the centre. On mobilization the officer commanding the reserve battalion would draw on indent from the arsenal the pouch ammunition (20 rounds per man) of the reservists. Reservists proceeding to the front would take this with them and complete their service requirements at the base. 14839, 14845, 14849.

Under the new scheme the reservists would draw no ammunition at the reserve centre, but on their joining the depôt the officer commanding the depôt would draw ammunition for them on a scale which has not yet been fixed, and the arms and equipment will be kept at the reserve centres. 14839, 14841, 14847.

There are thirty-four separate geographical centres for the training of reservists. 14716.

In the revised scheme for the training of reservists which has been sanctioned by Government but has not yet been promulgated the main principle is that all the men belonging to any particular battalion shall train together. 14724.

## ARMY IN INDIA.

## NATIVE ARMY—SIKH SOLDIERS.

*General Staff Appreciation. Appendix I.*—Sikhs have to some extent succumbed to influence of political agitators and can no longer be implicitly relied on. 59.

Sikhs have taken up questions of education and social reform and joined in general outcry for greater local autonomy. Tat Khalsaists aspire to a revival of Sikhism as it existed in the days of Ranjit Singh. 60.

First move in revolt among Sikhs would probably be an attack on Ferozepore arsenal. 61.

Sikhs can no longer be implicitly relied on. 59.

*Colonel Bingley.*—There are movements among the Sikhs which are weakening their loyalty to the British Raj. Development of a national policy which aims at 'The Punjab for the Sikhs' and restoration of Sikh nationality as it was in the days of Ranjit Singh. From military point of view Sikhs are suffering from 'swelled head.' 353.

Number of Sikhs enlisted could and should be restricted without offending their susceptibilities. At present the supply of Sikh recruits is not equal to the demand, and later on the number of Sikh lads fit for enlistment will be insufficient for our requirements. 355, 357.

In regard to reduction of the number of Sikhs in the army, would suggest beginning with class regiments. 361.

*Sir M. Grover.*—If Sikhs are left alone without work they are liable to intrigue. 414.

The Sikhs are the class which would give the most anxiety. 548.

Sikhs are over-recruited. 574.

*Sir Charles Cleveland.*—The Sikhs are, for many reasons, of special interest to everybody engaged in maintaining British rule in India. 1001.

Does not imagine the Sikhs could combine for long with either Arya Samajists or Muhammadans. 1003.

Questions whether we have not got too many Sikhs in the army, police, military police, etc. 1005, 1007.

Sikhs are suffering from 'swollen head.' 1260.

*Mr. Fenton.*—Reason for suspecting that there are too many Sikhs in the army. 1710.

Very undesirable that Patiala should become the leader of the Sikhs and our efforts should be directed against such an idea. 1750.

*General Aylmer.*—Establishment of Sikhs excessive on both political and recruiting grounds. 2751.

Wishes to improve quality and diminish quantity of Jat Sikhs. 2753.

Not convinced of the supposed innate superiority of Sikhs. 4274.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—We may have trouble from Sikhs or Jats as it is their areas in which the agitator has been most busy, and where the Arya Samaj is most powerful. 4280.

Sikh recruitment has been overdone. Notices a great deterioration in the Sikh regiments and Sikh companies of class company regiments. 4282.

Efforts are constantly being made to seduce the troops from their loyalty, especially amongst the Sikhs and Jats. 4302.

In reducing strengths of regiments, preferable to reduce Sikh regiments. 4318.

*Sir G. Roos-Keppel.*—The very large number of Sikhs in the Indian army and their organization in class regiments a serious danger. 5215.

The Sikh is an intriguing person, with, at the present moment, great grievances in regard to Canada. 5217.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—There are too many Sikhs in the army; they have lost their heads and think they are the salt of the earth. 5533.

Assuming that we have too many Sikhs, would bring in men of other classes. 5541.

*General Birdwood.*—Believes we have too many Sikhs in the native army. 7584.

Should not be sorry to see Sikh class regiments changed into class company regiments. 7586.

Should like to see two double-companies only of Sikhs in class company regiments. 7586.

If such a thing were done, would like to see it begin in the more recently raised Sikh regiments. 7586.

Becoming difficult to recruit Sikhs. 7588.

*Colonel Houghton.*—Except in the case of Jat Sikhs, knows of no difficulty in obtaining suitable recruits. 10860.

Arya Samaj frequently alluded to by the Sikhs who are fully alive to its advances, and are hostile to its members as a rule. 10890, 10894.

Would not hesitate to call upon Sikh soldiers to act against men of their own religion. 10952.

The feeling of so-called unrest which existed more or less throughout the native army in 1907-08 has entirely disappeared except amongst the Sikhs, who have been spoilt to a large extent by over-recruitment, and have thus got wind in their heads, especially Jat Sikhs. Does not think Saini Sikhs are affected. 10960.

Saini Sikhs have still a large field for recruitment and are most anxious for military service. 11008.

*Major Hill.*—The Sikh would prefer to go into a class regiment than into a class company regiment. 11127.

Sikhs are already over-enlisted. 11131, 11242, 11408.

Some of the class regiments of Sikhs might be converted into class company, etc. 11137.

Does not think the Sikh *ryot* has ever been affected or has taken the slightest interest in political agitation. 11141.

No difficulty in getting Sikhs to go to the reserve. 11191.

Of late years had great difficulty in getting a good stamp of Sikh recruits, but they would come forward in large numbers if they saw a chance of service. 11234.

Does not agree that we enlist more Sikhs than is politically safe. 11244, 11246.

It would be better not to have a battalion of Sikhs at Amritsar. 11350.

One Sikh battalion and one of another class might be stationed at Ferozepore. 11352.

Sees no change in the demeanour of the Sikhs; the Sikh is just as good a soldier in the lines as ever he was. 11354.

Would suggest doing away with one company of Sikhs from each of the six regiments which at present have three companies of Sikhs. 11408.

Would suggest doing away with half a squadron of Sikhs from the six regiments of cavalry which have one-and-a-half squadrons of Sikhs. 11408.

*Colonel Dunsterville.*—Sikhs and Dogras are naturally secretive, and seldom speak of the Tat Khalsa or Arya Samaj, but they are willing enough to talk if the subject is introduced. 11708.

*Colonel Cole.*—Sikhs are over-enlisted and they are not up to the standard they used to be. 13256.

## ARMY IN INDIA.

## NATIVE ARMY—STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION OF UNITS.

*Sir M. Gwyer.*—In favour of lower peace establishment with a larger reserve. 542.

If the peace strength of infantry battalions is to be reduced, it will be necessary to maintain a larger peace strength in Gurkha battalions than in others. 602.

Opposed to proposal to reduce the peace strength of Indian cavalry regiments and maintain a larger reserve. 608.

Against proposal to reduce peace strength of the 19 service companies of Sappers and Miners. 612.

Not possible to reduce the peace strength of Indian artillery units. 614.

*General Aylmer.*—Considers the system of having a lower peace establishment and a larger reserve for the Indian army one of the least objectionable methods of reducing expenditure. Would not be dangerous as an experiment to reduce Indian infantry battalions to a peace establishment of 832. 2802.

Approves of the proposed abolition of the Deoli and Erinpura squadrons. 8197.

The war establishment of an Indian infantry battalion should be the same as that of a British battalion in India. An enormous advantage in efficiency if the war establishment of Indian infantry battalions were raised to 832 including Indian officers. It would be running a great risk to reduce the peace establishment of battalions below 832. We could not work down to a 712 establishment without the greatest risk. 8203, 8209.

Highly advisable to give all battalions the same establishment though an exception may perhaps have to be made in the case of Gurkhas and the Hazara Pioneers. 8203, 8374, 8482.

Suggests three different methods for the training of reservists. 8292.

In fixing the period of the year when reservists are to come up for training, regard must be had to the men's agricultural pursuits. 8301, 8305, 8341.

If it is desired to effect economy, one way would be to reduce the number of Indian regiments. 8362.

Would rather reduce the number of regiments than have organizations for regiments which would leave them inefficient for war. 8364.

In the event of sudden trouble, Indian battalions could be sent on service at a strength below the fixed war establishment—an extra battalion could be sent if a fixed number of men were necessary. 8374.

The linked battalion system fails as a working principle in India as regards reliefs, etc. 8452.

The present peace establishment of men in Indian cavalry regiments cannot be reduced. Opposed to any change in the peace establishments of Indian artillery units. 8456.

The peace establishment of sappers in a sapper company might be reduced by 25 men, provided a suitable reserve were maintained.

Would like to see the war establishment of a sapper and miner company raised to 200 sappers. 8460.

Would rather have fewer sapper and miner companies and have them a little stronger. 8465.

If thorough war efficiency is required for the army for the present Budget allotment or for something less, the only possible method is to cut down the strength, and this reduction must not touch British troops. 8803.

Would do away with six regiments of native cavalry before beginning any reduction of the other arms. Further reductions should be made from all arms

roughly in proportion to the numbers. Except in the case of the Deoli and Erinpura squadrons, does not recommend any reduction in total number of men, but suggests fewer units with higher strengths. An economical organization of the army can be ensured for a similar war strength by reducing the peace establishment of native units and increasing the reserves. 8803.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—Approves of the proposed abolition of the Erinpura and Deoli squadrons. 4116.

Would reduce native battalions to 900 and 800. 4316.

In reducing strengths of regiments preferable to reduce Sikh regiments. 4318.

Utterly opposed to reducing the number of units. If we must have reductions, in favour of lower peace establishments with increased reserves.

Suggests battalions being linked as battalions of a regiment with following strengths :—

Trans-Indus and foreign service, Pioneers, and two-battalion units such as Gurkhas	...	...	...	900
Battalions allotted to Field Army serving Cis-Indus	...		...	800
Battalions allotted to internal defence	...		...	700
with 1000 or 1200 reservists. 4380.				

Feasible but inadvisable to reduce the peace establishments of Indian cavalry and Indian artillery units, but would like to see larger reserves. 4406.

The peace establishments of the 19 service companies of sappers and miners could not be reduced without loss of efficiency, but would increase their reserves. 4410, 4412.

Eight hundred is the minimum establishment at which a regiment can be kept having regard to its training in peace and employment in war. 4712.

Content with present war strength of 750 for an Indian infantry battalion. 4720.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—Against making up of numbers on mobilization by having larger reserves. 5581.

Reduction of the peace establishment of battalions is a mistake for you do not then get proper war training. Reservists, do what you will, rapidly deteriorate and with larger reserves a number of men would enlist merely because they wished to go as soon as possible to the reserve. 5581.

Would reduce no battalion below what it could train with for war. 5601.

Disagrees with proposal to have a certain number of weak battalions to be expanded by reserves. 5603.

No regiment should be at too low a peace strength and if it comes to sending a battalion suddenly, say, into the Khyber, whatever the system adopted, it should go at full war strength. 5607.

Sees no advantage in the linked battalion system we have at present. 5621.

Decidedly inadvisable to reduce peace establishment of native cavalry and artillery. 5623.

The peace strength of the service companies of sappers and miners could be reduced, but it will mean less efficient companies. 5625.

*Mr. Brunyate.*—A lower strength of Indian units with larger reserves would be an economic measure to look into. 6033.

*General Birdwood.*—Peace strength of regiments on the 912 establishment might be reduced to 832, provided reserve is proportionately increased. 7401, 7413.



It is, however, only possible to employ reservists properly to replace wastage in the field, as not more than 50 per cent. would, when called up, be physically fit to go immediately on service. 7401, 7403, 7409.

Would give another native officer to infantry regiments. 7429.

Silladar cavalry regiments are able to mobilize with their own horses. 15281, 15283.

*Captain Birney*—If we had more railway companies of sappers and miners, they would perhaps save time, but does not think that from a peace point of view, any increase is justified. 9033, 9035.

*Sir T. Wynne*—Does not think the railway companies of sappers and miners are of much use, but if the railway are allowed to keep them, they might become very useful. 9029.

*Colonel Houghton*—In favour of increasing the number of native officers in regiments both in peace and in war. 10192, 10498.

Would like to have 26 native officers in each regiment in peace and in war. 10520, 10526, 10530, 10532.

Would like to see establishment of Indian ranks for purposes of mobilization increased so that each company could start out 100 strong. 10520.

For regiments not serving on the frontier, suggests a strength of 11 British officers and 738 Indian ranks. 10671, 10707.

For regiments serving on the frontier considers that a strength of 912 Indian ranks is necessary. 10671, 10707.

With a peace establishment of 712, a regiment serving on the frontier could have its leave curtailed, but does not know if this would be advisable. 10677, 10679.

It might be feasible in the interests of economy to reduce the peace establishment of native units with a corresponding strengthening of reserves, but this would be at the cost of efficiency. 10707.

In the native army a man is just beginning to feel his feet after four years and is at his best from six to seven years' service. 10743.

Statement showing establishment and strength of his regiment and the number on parade, otherwise employed, sick, on leave, or absent for other reasons during the last three years. 10815.

It would be advantageous to make the system of linked battalions more real in so far as battalions which enlist the same classes are concerned. Where differences exist in the matter of tribe or class, does not think free transfer from one battalion to another in peace time would be popular, but during war there would be no difficulties. If this system were introduced, the standardization of the equipment, at any rate of the linked battalions, would be necessary. 10886.

The changes introduced by Lord Kitchener in connexion with the training, preparation and mobilization of units of the native army for field service have generally proved satisfactory. 10972.

*Major Hill*—The present establishment of Indian officers would be improved by the addition of a jemadar adjutant. 11064.

Cannot see anything in the present establishment of British officers and Indian officers which would prevent the latter acting up to their responsibilities in peace time, provided that a proper system prevails in the regiment. 11066, 11072.

Not in favour of any change in the present establishment of Indian officers. 11076.

The present strength is correct with the exception that the system of non-commissioned officers in vogue in the British service should be adopted. 11175.

Does not think it would be feasible to reduce the peace establishment of Indian units and to make a corresponding increase in the reserve. 11179.

Statement showing establishment and strength of his regiment for the last three years; the numbers absent on duty, leave, furlough or from other causes, and sick; also the number present on parade. 11217.

Would be a good suggestion to let a sepoy go after 18 years on Rs. 4 but if he remained on as a reservist for 18 years, and would come up when called upon, to give him Rs. 5 at the end of that time. Would put such men in class 'B' and call them up every year. 11232.

The existing linked battalion system is not satisfactory. If the system in vogue in the British army and Gurkha regiments were adopted, the matter of transfers from one battalion to another would be very easy. 11283.

The establishment of a linked system by which a battalion in time of war might draw on its linked battalion could be easily attained, but the men would go only in the full knowledge that they would return to their own unit. 11290.

*Colonel Dunsterville.*—Statement showing numbers available for duty in his regiment during last three years. 11516, 11522, 11528.

Present establishment for peace is a sound one, and would not like to see it reduced. 11530, 11534.

Training would lose half its value if the strength of battalions were seriously reduced. 11530, 11534, 11538.

Present leave privileges for sepoys absolutely essential; the army could not work without them. The fundamental consideration in the Indian army has always been liberal leave and furlough. 11540, 11544, 11548.

Any reduction of the present strength would have a most prejudicial effect on the winter training. 11550.

If economy is essential and a reduction is determined on, it would most certainly be better to reduce the strength of each unit's establishment than to reduce the number of units. 11550, 11556.

Maximum reduction might be taken at 10 per cent. of the sepoys. 11550.

Reduction of non-commissioned officers most inadvisable. 11550

If the peace strength were reduced, should be glad to have additional men for winter training from the reserve or elsewhere. 11554.

Would prefer to have 3 strong double-companies to 4 weak ones. 11571.

To send sepoys away on a pension of Rs. 4 per mensem after 18 years' service and give than Rs. 5 pension, after 7 years' service in the reserve would be a good plan, but such men would only be used in depôts and for internal defence. 11589, 11591.

Statement showing establishment, strength, number absent on duty, leave or from other causes, numbers employed, sick, and number present on parade in his regiment for last three years. 11644.

Does not think it would be advantageous to make the linked battalion system more real. 11698.

Does not think the native ranks would ever interest themselves in the three-battalion system, and does not see that much is to be gained by enforcing it. 11698.

As matters stand at present, quite easy to transfer a section, half company, or company to a linked battalion. 11698.

*Colonel Creagh.*—Suggests addition of one jemadar to the peace establishment so as to provide for the jemadar adjutant without depriving a company of one of its officers. 11853, 11857.

Would like to have 14 British officers and 17 native officers in time of peace and 13 British officers (excluding depôt) and 17 native officers per regiment in time of war. 11867, 11869, 11871.

Forty per cent. of the men are absent on leave or furlough from the 15th March to 15th October. 11942.

Statement showing actual numbers available for duty in January and July for last three years. 11942.

Would like to see establishment of rank and file raised to 896, and to be allowed 12 recruit boys on Rs. 3-8 per mensem pay. 11948, 11950.

In the interests of economy it might be feasible to make a reduction in the peace establishment of units by a corresponding strengthening of the reserves, but such would not be in the interests of efficiency. 11950.

A peace establishment of 770 rank and file (which makes no allowance for furlough or leave) is actually necessary to carry on the work in a Pioneer regiment. 11950.

Pioneer regiments require more training than others, have to take up railway and other contracts (leaving depôts behind) they should therefore have larger establishments than others. 11950.

After six or seven months' absence from his regiment, a sepoy requires a full month's training to put him back in his place as an efficient soldier. 11950.

A reduction of leave would be likely to affect recruiting and the heart the sepoys put into their work when present. 11956.

It might be feasible, if the peace establishment were reduced, to expand it every training season by calling up a certain number of reservists but the men would get less systematic training than under the present system. 11962, 11964, 11966.

Four double-companies with the reservists put into them would be more serviceable than 3 double-companies of men with the colours and one double-company of reservists. 11969.

Proposes scheme for amalgamating control of reservists and recruits for keeping the various regiments in touch with their past, present and future sepoys and their people. 11975.

When called out for training, reservists would not as a rule be physically fit for active service. 12021.

Statement showing establishment, strength, and numbers employed, absent on leave or owing to other causes, sick, and the number actually present on parade for last three years. 12045.

The power of transfer from one battalion to another is as free now as is desirable. 12091.

In time of war there would be no difficulty in making transfers from linked battalions to battalions going into the field provided the men came back. 12093.

It is better that native soldiers should keep their own British officers provided they like them. 12105.

Commanding Officers might be given more power in regard to getting rid of undesirable sepoys. 12039, 12043.

*Colonel Mead.*—Considers that the old wing system is better than the double-company system. 12239, 12257, 12261, 12294, 12554.

Statement showing strength and composition of his regiment and the actual numbers available for duty in January and July during each of the last three years and the proportion of men absent on leave or furlough. 12336.

The minimum establishment at which a regiment of infantry should be maintained having regard to training and duties in peace is 10 British officers and 828 Indian ranks. 12352.

On the supposition that the reserves were sufficiently trained and paid sufficient to secure physical fitness when called out, the number of native ranks in one battalion out of the three battalions in the link might be reduced to 652 Indian ranks. 12354, 12356.

Statement showing establishment and strength of his regiment, the number employed or under special training, the numbers absent on furlough or leave or from other causes, the numbers sick and the number present on parade. 12414.

The system of letting sepoy go to pension after 18 years service, but to offer them Rs. 5 per mensem pension for seven years more service as reservists would work very well, but would not give any man the option of getting it unless he was physically fit for the next seven years. 12438.

For ordinary purposes of exchanging individuals the present system seems satisfactory but if one unit of the link were on a lower establishment than others, it would be desirable that each should take its turn at the higher establishment. 12472, 12554.

Amendments suggested to proposed organization. 12554.

*Colonel Graham*—A minimum strength of 850 Indian ranks required to carry out the training and duties of a regiment efficiently in time of peace. 12719, 12734, 12744.

*Colonel Cole*.—Statement showing actual numbers available for duty in his regiment in January and July during the last three years, and the proportion absent on leave or furlough during the hot weather. 13066.

Forty per cent. absent on leave and furlough between the 15th March and the 15th October. 13066.

It would be fatal to attempt any reduction of the war strength, and if the present war strength is maintained then it is impossible to reduce the peace establishment. 13086.

It might be feasible in the interests of economy to reduce the peace establishment of native units with a corresponding strengthening of reserves, provided the cadres are not reduced; does not, however, advocate any reduction of strength as a native cavalry reservist would not take his place in the ranks as easily as an infantry reservist would. 13108.

Statement showing establishment and strength of his regiment, the numbers employed and under special training, the number sick, absent on leave or furlough, or from other causes, and the number present on parade. 13126.

The only amendment called for is the order regarding horses for machine gun detachments. Horses cannot be found for machine guns as now directed. 13249.

Indian cavalry regiments for internal defence could train horses for regiments at the front provided there was internal peace. 13294.

*General Headlam*.—Reasons against reduction of peace establishment of Indian units:—

- (i) A certain peace establishment is necessary for efficient training.
- (ii) Battalions would not be able to mobilize without calling on the reserve or on other units, and the latter method is universally condemned as being wrong in principle.
- (iii) An increase in the number of reservists would constitute a political danger. 14109.

Low peace establishments, depending on a reserve for mobilization, are unsuitable to the Indian army. 14109, 14111, 14121.

For efficient battalion training we require 614 native ranks, to this should be added men employed on various garrison duties; recruits, recruit instructors, and so forth, which average about 247, making a minimum peace establishment of 861. 14145, 14151.

In comparing the establishments required for the training of native troops with that required for British troops at Home, there is a great difference. The non-commissioned officer at Home is an extraordinarily intelligent well-read man who studies his profession and does not think that can fairly be said of the native non-commissioned officer. Similarly, at Home the officer is a Sandhurst man while the Indian officers are risen from the ranks; it is these leaders who are so important. 14210.

In detailing native units for the Field Army no provision is made for leaving one battalion of a link behind, and the linked system is disregarded in this respect. 14233, 14239.

*Colonel Hamilton.*—The linked battalion system was introduced to give a stronger war organization and to enable the battalion or battalions of a group when sent on service to be fed by the remaining battalion. The system still fulfils this object provided one battalion of the link is not mobilized. 14816.

Each group of battalions of Indian infantry has a regimental centre. 14541, 14543.

The idea of raising strong battalions of infantry by transfers from links for field service has been abandoned. 14553.

Statement shewing linked battalions and grouping, their present stations, regimental centres, centres at which reservists are trained, and the centres under the new system at which reservists of each class are armed and equipped on mobilization before joining regimental depôt. 14575, 14801.

Intend to keep up the system of linked battalions. 14710.

Instead of the old regimental centres which are being abolished a number of reserve centres are being substituted. 14712.

Unless a man belongs to a link it is illegal to transfer him to a battalion in that link unless he volunteers. 14734.

#### WRITTEN EVIDENCE.

*Lieutenant-Colonel Stratton.*—From a purely military efficiency point of view, there is little doubt that Government is not getting the best they could for the amount they spend on the upkeep of the Deoli and Erinpura squadrons. 98.

Inexpedient to disband these two squadrons unless it is decided to provide a sufficient force of cavalry in the area under the control of the Rajputana Agency, 98.

## ARMY IN INDIA.

## PROPORTION OF BRITISH TO NATIVE TROOPS.

*General Staff Appreciation. Appendix I.*—Ground for consideration whether the question of the balance between races might not be most satisfactorily dealt with by an increase in the number of British soldiers. (139-d). 275.

*Colonel Bingley.*—The sepoy has a great respect for the British soldier. 275.

*Sir M. Grover.*—Considers a British soldier may still be reckoned as equal to  $2\frac{1}{2}$  native soldiers. 432.

Volunteers are counted as British troops on their paper value. 440.

*General Aylmer.*—Would prefer to see the present proportion of British to Indian troops in the Field Army higher. 2431, 2435.

In no circumstances should our armed Indian forces be increased. 2585.

For purposes of internal security a British soldier is still equivalent to  $2\frac{1}{2}$  Indian soldiers, provided units are up to strength, not otherwise. 2700.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—The theory that one British soldier is equal to  $2\frac{1}{2}$  Indian soldiers is still valid. 4239.

As regards the proportion of British to Indian troops, would have no qualms about putting another Indian regiment at Peshawar, as a good many of the men are in a foreign country there. 4259.

*Sir G. Ross-Keppel.*—Sees no great advantage in increasing the proportion of British troops in the North-West Frontier Province 5163.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—For purposes of internal security, believes one British soldier is worth  $2\frac{1}{2}$  and more native soldiers. 5495.

*Colonel Cole.*—Thoughts that the native soldier is equal to or better than the British soldier are spreading through the country. 13235, 13237, 13-39.

*General Headlam.*—In regard to training, does not think native troops compare favourably with British troops now since there has been such a great improvement in the training of the latter. 14201.

In making comparisons between British and native troops there is a great difference. The British non-commissioned officer is an extraordinarily intelligent well-read man who studies his profession and that cannot fairly be said of the native non-commissioned officer. Similarly, officers of British troops are Sandhurst men while the Indian officers are risen from the ranks. It is just these leaders who are so important. 14210.

## ARMY IN INDIA.

## TRAINING.

*Colonel Bingley.*—One advantage of having troops on the frontier is that these troops are trained under local conditions, and get accustomed to the climate and the people. 186.

*General Aylmer.*—By having troops for a war division and internal defence troops in one divisional area, advantages of decentralization, better training, and more rapid concentration are secured. 2331.

Better to have units for war trained together. 2333.

A great advantage that troops in peace should be under the divisional General who is going to command them in war. 2341, 2343.

Suggests three different methods for the training of reservists. 8292.

In fixing the period of the year when reservists are to come up for training regard must be had to the men's agricultural pursuits. 8301, 8305, 8341.

Army Commanders are wanted for inspection and training. 8709.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—That troops should be commanded in peace by those who will command them in war is obviously the correct principle, but its complete application is quite impossible in any but a localized army like that of Germany. 3907.

Instead of spending money on bricks and mortar, we should spend it on the concentration of brigades at manœuvres, on the augmentation of the transport and medical services, and in improved communications. 3964.

Attaches great importance to winter manœuvres. 3978.

No inter-divisional manœuvres during the period he was in command of the Southern Army. 3982.

Eight hundred is the minimum establishment at which a regiment can be kept having regard to its training in peace and employment in war. 4712.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—For purposes of war training nothing can be more important than that each divisional area be self-contained. 5257, 5265.

The training of troops for war by those who will lead them into the field is essential and eventually economical. 5303.

The training of homogeneous infantry and cavalry brigades of more importance for India than training in mixed brigades, especially as troops do combined training under present conditions. 5321, 5325.

Would prefer the present organization instead of letting each brigade have a certain proportion of each arm. 5331.

It is a very good thing to move troops by road occasionally, and thus show them to the people. 5425.

Reduction of the peace establishment of battalions is a mistake for you do not then get proper war training. 5581.

Would reduce no battalion below what it could train with for war. 5601.

Attaches importance to that part of training of British troops which will enable them to fight side by side with their comrades at Home when they leave India. 5886.

*General Birdwood.*—The Field Army brigades trained under their own Generals should go on service. 7164.

It is quite essential and possible to carry out in practice the proposition that troops ought to be trained and commanded in peace by those who will lead them in war. 7229.

*General Lean.*—Actual training of Volunteers is in hands of the brigade commander. 9269.

*Colonel Hoghton.*—The abolition of certain of the smaller stations with garrisons of all three arms and concentration of single arms in other stations has tended to prejudice combined training to a certain extent. 10972, 10974.

The changes introduced by Lord Kitchener in connexion with the training, preparation and mobilization of units of the native army for field service have generally proved satisfactory. 10972.

Training carried out in the stations before the days of homogeneous brigades was more instructive. 10974.

*Major Hill.*—Training has been overdone so far as brigade training and divisional training are concerned; double-company and battalion training have suffered in consequence. 11374.

*Colonel Dunsterville.*—Training would lose half its value if the strength were seriously reduced. 11530, 11534, 11538.

Any reduction of the present strength would have a most prejudicial effect on the winter training. 11550.

If the peace strength were reduced, should be glad to have additional men for winter training from the reserve or elsewhere. 11554.

Approves of the changes introduced by Lord Kitchener in connexion with the training, the preparation, and the mobilization of units of the Indian army for field service, and would not suggest modifying or amending any of the changes made. 11794.

*Colonel Creagh.*—After six or seven months' absence from his regiment, a sepoy requires a full month's training to put him back in his place as an efficient soldier. 11950.

Pioneer regiments require more training than others, have to take up railway and other contracts (leaving depôts behind); they should therefore have larger establishments than others. 11950.

*Colonel Mead.*—The various changes in connexion with the training, the preparation and the mobilization of units of the native army for field service have generally proved satisfactory, but would suggest the re-introduction of the Kitchener test for inspection purposes. 12554, 12556.

*Colonel Graham.*—In the Carnatic battalions training suffers from the very small establishments. 12721.

Under Lord Kitchener's orders, Madras regiments were reduced to a complement of 600 which has made it practically impossible to train and prepare them for field service as they should be, otherwise the orders generally have tended to bring about more thorough training and preparation for war; has no suggestions to offer. 12912.

*Colonel Cole.*—No hesitation in saying that an enormous increase in efficiency for war has developed in the last ten years and we are much better prepared for mobilization than we were. 13249.

*General Headlam.*—In many stations the climate renders much training impossible during the hot weather. 14109.

The training of a battalion as a unit is under the General Staff. 14158.

The training season ordinarily lasts for five months. 14187.

With regard to training does not think native troops compare favourably with British troops, since there has been such a great improvement in the training of the latter. 14201.

The training and interior economy of units of the Volunteer force are matters for which divisional and brigade commanders are directly responsible. 14413.

The necessity for the training of cavalry in cavalry divisions is universally recognized, and forms an important function of the Inspector of Cavalry. When therefore a cavalry division is formed for training, the Inspector of Cavalry actually commands and trains it. 14415.



The training of senior officers of cavalry by means of staff tours, and by employing them in various capacities is also undertaken by the Inspector. It is by the help of this higher training that it is hoped to teach the cavalry leaders of the future, and it is important that this training should, as far as possible, be in the hands of the officer selected as Inspector of his arm. 14415.

High training could not be maintained without inspection. The advantage is that instead of having to confine himself to regiments, the Inspector is now free to devote his time to seeing that brigades are all right. 14423.

As a rule, the Inspector of Cavalry inspects the brigades, only inspecting single regiments when they are isolated. 14425.

There will be inter-divisional manoeuvres this winter but not more than two or three brigades of cavalry will take part. 14429.

Considers the British infantry are as well trained at Home as in India. 14256.

## ARMY IN INDIA.

## URGENT REQUIREMENTS.

*Sir M. Grover.*—Considers the following in their order of urgency the more important needs of the army :—

- (i) Armament, equipment and other modern needs.
- (ii) Improvements in distribution and organization.
- (iii) Improvements in communications.
- (iv) Training. 770.

*General Aylmer.*—The following are some of the most important needs of the army :—

- (i) Measures to ensure contentment of the native army.
- (ii) Re-armament, rifles and guns.
- (iii) Mobilization efficiency of artillery.
- (iv) Reserve of officers.
- (v) Aviation corps.
- (vi) Staff for command of internal defence areas. 2329.

Most important future needs of the army in order of urgency :—

- (1) Increased pensions for native army.
- (2) Establishment of an organization which will remain for internal defence when the Field Army is withdrawn.
- (3) Infantry rearmament.
- (4) Artillery rearmament.
- (5) Provision of a proper reserve for the Indian army (including British officers).
- (6) Provision of an Army Bearer Corps.
- (7) Increase in the establishment of artillery units.
- (8) Aviation Corps.
- (9) Completion of signalling companies.
- (10) Improvement in communications.
- (11) Provision of motor transport.
- (12) Improvement in distribution.
- (13) Increase of pay to captains and lieutenants of the British army.

8805.

*Sir E. Borrow.*—Instead of spending money on bricks and mortar we should spend it on the concentration of brigades at manœuvres, in the augmentation of the transport and medical services and improved communications. 3964.

Any hard and fast programme or classification in regard to the more important future needs of the army is inexpedient and unwise as sometimes one and sometimes the other is the more pressing need. List of important needs :—

- (1) Increase of British mountain artillery by four batteries.
- (2) An additional brigade of howitzers.
- (3) Improvement in the pay and pensions of native officers.
- (4) Increase in the establishment of the Army Bearer Corps, and improvement in the conditions of service.
- (5) Increase in transport and improvement in pay and status of transport followers.
- (6) The initiation of a donkey breeding scheme with a view to the substitution of donkeys for mules for the transport of compact loads such as ammunition.
- (7) Completion of the Kacha Garhi Base Scheme.

- (8) Completion of 2' 6" line from Thal to Parachinar.
- (9) Addition of one squadron to the Guides Cavalry.
- (10) Increase in the establishment of Indian army reserves, and division of them into two classes.
- (11) Improvement in the pay and status of sub-assistant surgeons.
- (12) More signal companies.
- (13) Field troops of sappers for use with cavalry brigades.
- (14) Introduction of the Station Hospital system for native troops and improvement in hospital equipment, etc.
- (15) Addition of eight battalions to the Indian army, *viz.* :—
  - 1 Brahman battalion.
  - 1 Jat battalion.
  - 1 Rajput battalion.
  - 1 Bengal Pioneer battalion.
  - 1 Baluchistan battalion.
  - 1 Carnatic battalion.
  - 1 Second battalion to Guides.
  - 1 Second battalion to Hazara Pioneers.
- (16) Further extension of principle of class regiments.
- (17) Delocalization of Burma regiments.
- (18) Provision of travelling field-kitchens of the Russian or other improved pattern for British regiments, and of travelling boilers for native regiments.
- (19) Formation of a small Aviation Corps.
- (20) Provision of mounted sections (25 men) for all British infantry battalions delegated to internal defence.
- (21) Improvement of lines of native troops.
- (22) Extension of Khyber Railway from Warsak to mile 300.
- (23) Improvement of pay and status of silladar-syces. 4665.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—If money were not the chief consideration, would certainly carry out the Kitchener Scheme in full; but in view of the cost and the many needs of the army, does not think it possible to work out the scheme in its entirety. 5257.

Contents that the first necessity is the Field Army complete and ready and that nothing should be allowed to interfere with that. 5429.

- (1) Better prospects and pensions for native officers.
- (2) Formation of Army Bearer Corps for service across frontier.
- (3) Completing Peshawar Division.
- (4) Provision of Manoeuvre Act in the vicinity of cantonments and reservation of land for training troops.
- (5) Improving accommodation for Indian army.
- (6) Formation of base sidings, etc., at Kacha Garhi.
- (7) Rearmament of artillery and completion of arming of all infantry with latest model rifles.
- (8) Improving communications to Parachinar and through Khyber.
- (9) Better provision for syces of Silladar Cavalry.
- (10) Making every division self-contained. 5731.

*General Birdwood.*—At present there are some more important projects than the Redistribution Scheme. 7148.

Would put the completion of the Loh-Shilman and Parachinar railways among the very early requirements of the army in India. 7334.

*General Hamilton Gordon.*—Would consider the expansion of the Intelligence Corps as urgent as any of the items shown in Appendix XVII of the General Staff Memorandum of July 1911 which he considers are all equally urgent. 14082, 14084, 14086.

## ARMY IN INDIA.

## VOLUNTEERS.

*Sir M. Grover.*—Volunteers are counted as British troops on their paper value. 440.

*Mr. Wheeler.*—Bihar Light Horse would be useful in putting down trouble. 2313, 2315.

*General Aylmer.*—Value and efficiency of Volunteers. 2678.

Value of Volunteers in an emergency. 2684.

*Mr. Lovett.*—Over 5,000 Volunteers in the United Provinces. 2965.

One great defect in respect of the Volunteer force in the United Provinces is that many of them are very badly armed. 2961 (Annexure).

Eurasian members of the Volunteers would only be useful for holding defensive positions. 2973.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—Does not consider Volunteers an efficient force, but thinks a few months of danger and disturbance would rapidly make them so for local defence. Doubts whether they have increased much in efficiency of late years. 4203, 4675.

Would like to have two Inspectors of Volunteers, one for the Northern and one for the Southern Army. 4205.

Would not trust defence of forts at Delhi and Agra to Volunteers without a nucleus of regulars. 4219, 4221.

*Sir G. Roos-Keppel.*—Volunteers in North-West Frontier Province are a negligible quantity. 5111.

*Sir J. Willecocks.*—Volunteers have improved in their ordinary duties of late years. They vary much in quality, but some corps such as Assam Valley Light Horse, would be invaluable in time of trouble. 5473.

Speaking generally, Volunteers could not do much more than hold places in which they lived. 5475.

Would not be in favour of a larger recruitment of natives for the Volunteers; does not think they would be of any use. 5479.

As a rule the rifles of Volunteers are adequately guarded. 5483.

*Mr. Curtis.*—The Volunteers in his division of the Bombay Presidency, with the exception of one or two Parsi companies at Poona, are small squads of scattered Europeans. More maxim guns are wanted. 6654.

In his division efforts have been made to convert all the European civilians into Volunteers, but the question of where to store their arms is a difficult one. 6699.

The state of efficiency of Volunteers in the Bombay Presidency is not very great outside Bombay city except in the railway corps. Thinks every civilian should be compelled to be a Volunteer. 6711.

It is difficult for civil officials to do much volunteering because they travel so much, but it would be a good thing to give district officers a dormant commission so that they could take military command of any available armed bodies other than regular troops, in case of a rebellion or other serious disturbance. 6713, 6715, 6717.

In the Bombay Presidency there are one or two Parsi officers, but there are no other natives of India as officers. 6719.

The Volunteers could not be utilized to any great extent in localities distant from their homes, though given emergency conditions, they would probably go wherever they were wanted. 6721, 6723.

Railway employés would be fully employed on their own lines. 6731.

In the Bombay Presidency, besides the Parsis, there are one or two Musalmans and a few Jews, also some Armenians in the Volunteers, but the latter are reckoned as Europeans. 6733.

Parsis are absolutely loyal, but their enlistment in the Volunteer force is objectionable from the point of view of privileges under the Arms Act and so on. The introduction of Parsis has rather thrown out the European element. They are good shots and we could get as many as we wanted but should not be in favour of allowing their enlistment if the question were to come up again. 6737.

The Volunteer artillery at Poona have 15-pounder guns. 6743.

*Mr. Kennedy.*—In the Bombay Presidency the arms of district Volunteers are stored in the police armouries, except where there are regular armouries. 6701.

*General Birdwood.*—Does not think Volunteers are wanted to defend other than their own areas. 7213.

*Sir F. Halliday.*—Does not think Volunteers would be readily available much beyond the vicinity of the places in which they live. 8139.

*Sir T. Wynne.*—If you want a Railway Volunteer Corps to march across country for days and days, it would not be of much use. For defending their own lines, big workshops, etc., Volunteers would do uncommonly well. 9085.

The Eurasians in the Volunteers work willingly and improve very much in condition at the end of a week's camp of exercise. 9095, 9101.

*General Lean.*—Conditions with which recruits and trained Volunteers have to comply before being classed efficient. 9131.

An active Volunteer or reservist who has been a non-efficient for two years is struck off the roll. 9133, 9135.

The 37,600 efficient Volunteers include only the efficient trained men. 9137, 9139.

Within the last two years, the musketry course has been made much more practical, but quite as many pass the new course as passed the old one. 9151.

As regards musketry, Volunteers compare very favourably with some of the regular troops. 9153.

On the whole, the Calcutta Volunteer corps are as good as any in India 9155.

Calcutta Light Horse is well trained and drilled, but their horses are not properly trained for steady work. 9157.

Qualifications for extra efficient. 9159.

Of the 43,059 Volunteers, 6,874 are cadets, of whom 889 are under fourteen years of age. About 20 per cent. of the cadets are of little present value. 9161, 9171.

Has always impressed on corps that they should not take cadets under fourteen years of age. 9167.

Cadets are armed with carbines, but most of the carbines are old and worn out. 9169, 9352.

In the event of a big disturbance where Volunteers were employed, about 50 or 60 per cent. of the cadets could be counted on. 9173.

There are now 22,203 Europeans and 18,428 Eurasians in the Volunteer force. 9179.

Generally speaking, Eurasians are of satisfactory character and race composition, but in some parts of India, particularly in the south, the dividing line between the Eurasian and native is thin. 9179, 9181.

An objection to having too many native Christians in the Volunteers as Europeans object very much to standing in the ranks side by side with natives. 9183, 9201, 9209, 9213.

Although the Boy Scout movement will at first diminish the number of cadets, it will not eventually have any diminishing effect. 9225.

There has been a great increase in general efficiency, musketry training and discipline throughout the force in the last few years. 9227.

Extra efficient are worth more than efficient in an emergency because they have done more drills and have had more shooting practice. 9231.

The efficiency and work of adjutants have improved very much. 9241.

Would not put the fighting capacity of a Volunteer unit as quite equal to that of a good regular Indian unit. 9245.

Volunteers are encouraged as much as possible to train with regular troops and a great many corps do so. 9247.

If the Government training grant were increased to Rs. 1,40,000 it would enable nearly all corps to go to camp each year. 9251, 9253, 9364.

A very good idea to have Volunteers accompanying expeditions; it would help to bring in more Volunteers. 9259, 9261.

List of corps above and below the average. 9263.

Bihar Light Horse are very good indeed. 9265.

Actual training of Volunteers is in the hands of the Brigade Commander. 9269.

The majority of the rifles and carbines in possession of Volunteers are not in good condition. It is hoped to give the Volunteers better rifles by the end of 1912. 9277, 9279, 9281, 9283.

Some of the larger corps have maxim guns and some of the railway corps have guns for which they themselves have paid. 9291.

In favour of extending the supply of maxims to Volunteers. 9293.

Arrangements for storing the arms of Volunteers. 9300, 9302.

Volunteer sergeant-instructors come from British regiments, get posted to the Unattached List, and remain so long as they are satisfactory; favours continuance of this system. 9306, 9308.

Volunteer instructors go through a refresher course with regular regiments. 9312.

The Volunteer officer, as a whole, considering the opportunities and time he has for training, is quite efficient. In the training of Volunteers, barrack square drill is practically disregarded; they are taught such things as would be useful in time of trouble. 9314.

In the Calcutta Light Horse, Volunteer officers are practically of the same social position as the ordinary army officer, but in some corps, they are not quite *sahibs*. 9322.

Would like to see every Indian Civil Service official hold a commission in the Volunteers. 9326.

Indian Civil Service officers display aloofness and reserve towards Anglo-Indian and Eurasian Volunteers, and the more this is got over, the better for the Volunteer force. 9328, 9330.

A certain proportion of Volunteer officers could be used as a reserve for the native army. 9332, 9334.

Many Volunteer units have a reserve company. 9342.

Volunteer reserve consists of men who are not fully efficient as Volunteers and of retired Volunteers. 9356.

Until disturbance is of so serious a nature that all railway traffic is stopped, railway Volunteers will not be available for internal defence as they will be required for their ordinary railway duties. 9358.

Mounted Volunteers in planting districts might be available for moveable columns, but the average Volunteer is not likely to be available for such work. 9362.

If the Government are anxious to attract a greater number of the right stamp of men, more money should be expended on the Volunteer force so as to make it more attractive and at the same time lessen the expense of the individual. The capitation grant and the outfit allowance for officers might be increased with advantage. Would like Rs. 5 more per head for the capitation grant. 9364, 9374.

For artillery Volunteers employed in coast defences, the ammunition is kept in the fort and the reserve in ordnance charge. No ammunition for the 15-pounder moveable armament is kept by Volunteer corps themselves. 9376, 9380.

The shooting of the Volunteer Field Artillery, so far as he has seen, is quite good. 9382.

The Volunteer field guns have no horses for moving them, and in time of emergency could not be used much outside their stations, except so far as they might be dragged by bullocks. 9384, 9387.

*General Stuart.*—Generally speaking, the arms in the hands of the Volunteers are in a very worn condition and are obsolete in the sense that they are not suitable for '303 ammunition as now issued. 9718, 9724, 9720.

*General Headlam.*—Undoubtedly there was a tendency in the past for the duties of the Inspector of Volunteers to overlap those of divisional and brigade commanders but this has been specially guarded against in the new regulations which lay down that the Inspector of Volunteers will confine his inspections to obtaining a general view of the Volunteer force as a whole and of its conditions and special requirements. He will watch the development of the force, and in his annual report suggest measures calculated to increase such developments, bringing to notice any points affecting the administration, efficiency and general welfare of the force. The training and interior economy of units of the force are matters for which brigade and divisional commanders are directly responsible. Of the greatest value to divisional and brigade commanders, who in many cases have had no opportunity of even seeing Volunteers before their appointment, that they should be able to consult during his annual visit an officer who is an expert in the special requirements of the Volunteers, and finding out from him the methods which have proved successful in other commands; the Inspector of Volunteers can help the Volunteers in the same way. Moreover a large civil force of the nature of the Volunteers may reasonably demand that there should be some officer at Army Headquarters specially qualified to represent their difficulties and needs. The appointment of a special Director for the Territorial Force at Home is a case in point, and the variety of the conditions obtaining in different parts of India render it all the more necessary here. 14443.

This year the Commander-in-Chief has specially pointed out that he hopes to provide the Volunteers with better weapons. 14461.

#### WRITTEN EVIDENCE.

*Sir B. Robertson.*—Nagpur Volunteer Rifles above the average of Volunteer battalions in India in drill, fieldwork, musketry, and fire discipline. 28.

*Sir H. Stuart.*—Has impression that the Volunteer corps in the Madras Presidency are in a satisfactory state of efficiency.

Volunteers could be relied on to serve away from their homes if they had reasonable assurance of the safety of their families during their absence.

Would experience some difficulty in sparing the services of Volunteers holding civil posts of the higher ranks.

Madras Artillery Volunteers are an efficient body, but would be more useful if they were converted into field artillery. 164.

*Lieutenant-Governor in Council, Bihar and Orissa.*—Unless the emergency was so great as to render it necessary to sacrifice the civil administration of a number of districts and to concentrate the Europeans at a few main centres, very few of the Volunteers in Bihar and Orissa would be able to leave their districts to serve elsewhere. 345, 347.



## DEPARTMENTS.

## ARMY CLOTHING DEPARTMENT.

*Sir M. Grover.*—A civil officer might be employed as Director of Army Clothing. 670.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—No objection to the Army Clothing Department being made largely civil in character. 4594.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—Army Clothing Department should be largely civil in character. 5677.

*Mr. Brunyate.*—The heavy overstocking some years ago was due to the clothing allowance schemes, the decision to maintain reserves of clothing, and in some cases to over-estimating requirements. 6112.

Does not know that there would be much direct saving by appointing civilians, but their employment might result in economy in the general management of the Department. You would get men with a more intimate knowledge of the technicalities of the work if you employed civilians. 6280.

*General Birdwood.*—With a few exceptions the reserves of clothing maintained by the Army Clothing Department are adequate to meet requirements. 7007.

Theoretically, supposes the Army Clothing Department might be run by civilian agency, but does not see where any advantages would come in. An advantage in appointing military officer is that if found unsuitable for the particular work he can be reverted to regimental duty any time during the first ten years of his departmental duty, whereas civilians once appointed by the Secretary of State can only be got rid of with difficulty and only for hopeless inefficiency. 15045, 15033, 15069.

Civilian administration would presumably not be any more economical, as a civilian director would demand more pay than the military officer, while civilian subordinates would undoubtedly have to be paid greatly enhanced salaries in comparison with those received by military men. Badly paid civilian subordinates would be an absolute danger and we should have no hold over them.

Does not know that such civilian agency as has existed and does exist in clothing matters is altogether a great success.

We deal with a civilian Director of Stores at the India Office and not always successfully. 15045.

The surplus stock in the Army Clothing Factory is being disposed of with little or no loss. 15089.

Indian troops should be required to get their boots from the Army Clothing Department, and we should maintain for mobilization purposes as large a stock as we can turn over without loss in peace. 15705.

The clothing allowance of the British soldier is less than it costs the soldier, and less than it used to cost Government. 15584.

*Colonel Williams.*—It would be unfair to the British soldier to reduce his clothing allowance. His allowance is already less than his clothing costs him, and less than it used to cost the Government. 15580, 15582.

## DEPARTMENTS.

## ARMY REMOUNT DEPARTMENT.

*Sir M. Grover.*—Satisfied that departmental horse-breeding and rearing is economical. 717.

*Mr. Brunyate.*—The balance of advantage lies in employing army men in the Army Remount Department. 6301.

It is more economical to make large purchases in one place where you can have officers staying for some considerable time than it is to go to one country one year and another country another year, and this is the procedure followed by the Army Remount Department. 6305, 6307.

*Colonel Cole.*—In time of war, except in minor operations, the Remount Department would have to take over remounting entirely from Silladar cavalry regiments. 13153, 13294.

*General Birdwood.*—Requirements in horses for all the artillery and cavalry units of the Field Army, for the first year of a campaign calculated at 8,509. 15227 15231, 15235, 15259.

Towards these requirements could always rely on getting 2,400 fit horses, and at a favourable time of the year some 3,500 horses from Remount Depôts, and to supplement these the following action would be taken on mobilization taking place or appearing to be imminent:—

- (1) The Impressment Act will be put in force in any localities in which it appears necessary, and under the powers conferred by this Act, the civil authorities will be requisitioned to produce at local centres all horses of specified kinds, belonging to private individuals (with certain exceptions) for purchase by the Government. In this way it is estimated 1,500 British cavalry horses and 1,000 artillery horses will be obtained, whilst some 3,230 horses can be obtained without applying the provisions of this Act from Native States and from brood mares in the canal colonies.
- (2) The Director General, Army Remount Department will issue cables to the Australian shippers who undertake in the terms of their commissions to supply with the least possible delay the number commissioned the previous year. This ensures a first supply of, roughly, some 2,400 horses. Orders for further supplies will issue as required. 15227.

If our reserves are sufficient, hoped not to have to draw on internal defence units for horses. 15233.

In remount depôts artillery remounts are broken to ride and draught. They are hard and muscled up on issue, and train almost immediately in a battery. Cavalry remounts are broken to ride as far as ordinary double rides and simple turns. They require from three to five months' extra training in units. All the above have been about a year in a depôt and are thoroughly acclimatized. 15235.

To meet wastage during the second or subsequent year of a campaign calculate on obtaining annually:—

					Artillery horses.	Cavalry horses.
From Australia	...	...	...	...	4,000	5,000
From Arabia and Persia	...	...	...	...	...	1,000
*From North America	...	...	...	...	1,000	2,000
*From Argentine	...	...	...	...	500	2,000
*From Hungary	...	...	...	...	500	1,500
Total					6,000	11,500

\*Through agency of the War Office if a European war was not on at the same time.

South Africa as a source of supply has not yet been considered. 15235, 15239, 15243.

Arab horses are used to a less extent than formerly because the market is shewing signs of falling off. The silladar cavalry are mounted on country-breds and 'bounders' the non-silladar on walers, the horses of artillery are entirely Australian, and of our nine British cavalry regiments the two regiments stationed in southern India will be mounted on walers and the whole of the balance it is hoped to mount on horses from our canal colonies. 15245, 15247, 15249, 15251.

The Remount Department reckons that an artillery remount can be trained in about two months, a cavalry remount in about five months, but acclimatization is a different matter and a horse cannot be called acclimatized that has been less than ten months in the country.

Statement shewing the average number of cavalry and artillery horses in remount depôts at the beginning of each quarter and the percentage fit for immediate issue.

The reserve of artillery horses (500) as it at present stands is not sufficient, and on mobilization we should require 1,310 horses for the Field Army and 164 for internal defence or a total of 1,474 horses, and therefore recommends that the artillery reserve of horses be fixed at from 1,500 to 1,700 provided that the ammunition columns remain as they are at present. If they are altered the question will require reconsideration. 15261.

Recommends that the reserve of horses for cavalry and of ordnance mules for mountain artillery be increased as follows:—

	Present.	Proposed.	
British Cavalry	500	600	<i>viz.</i> a year's turn to
Non-silladar Cavalry	Nil	200	over <i>from data</i>
Ordnance mules	200	350	<i>Do</i>

To meet wastage in silladar cavalry regiments during war, calculates on 3,230 horses being available in India, whereas at 30 per cent. the year's field wastage will be about 3,500. To meet the balance and the further wastage, remounts will be ordered from Australia, etc., in fact the horses for silladar cavalry will come out of the general 'pool' in time of mobilization. 15281.

The remount depôts are able to grow their fodder requirements at an annual saving to the Government of roughly five-and-a-half lakhs.

Farming operations in the Remount Department are conducted mainly for the production of fodder, which is hard to procure in large quantities in any part of India. Green grass has to be cultivated. The old system of purchasing green grass from contractors or cultivators proved a most expensive method and laid us constantly open to the ravages of contagious diseases.

In the young stock rearing depôts it is essential that large quantities of different fodder crops should be available for the growing young stock and in these districts such fodders are mostly unobtainable. 15285.

Specimen-balance sheet of a remount depôt farm. 15287, 15291.

The remount farms can very seldom grow enough fodder for their own requirements, but if they ever had a surplus they would at once inform the Director of Farms who would utilize it for the army generally. 15301.

Extract from note by Sir Denzil Ibbetson:—

"When the Civil Veterinary Department was first constituted it was on the express condition that we carried on the horse-breeding arrangements on their then footing. This we did under the supervision of the Military Department, which was the department really concerned. The position was never satisfactory as we were little more than the channel by which the policy of the Military Department was conveyed to the officers of the Civil Veterinary Department."

Complaints were frequent as to the results of these horse-breeding operations.

The Horse and Mule Breeding Commission, 1900-01, recommended the abolition of the dual control, and the unification of the Remount Department with horse-breeding under the control of the Revenue and Agriculture Department. At a conference which sat on the Committee's recommendation, with, among others, the Hon. Members for Revenue and Agriculture and Military Departments, it was decided that as the Commission had laid such stress on the failure of horse-breeding under civil officers, and the absolute necessity, if success were to be ensured, of the employment of military officers, the chief control must be with the Military Department.

Results obtained since the control of horse-breeding in selected districts was taken over by the Army Remount Department :—

In 1899-1900 the number of country-bred remounts issued to the service was 29; in 1911-12, 428.

Foaling results compare as follows :—

In 1899-1900 in all India ...	...	...	...	4,756
In 1911-12 in selected districts controlled by the Army Remount Department ...	...	...	...	9,861

Country-bred young stock considered fit for the British service purchased each year :—

				Rs.
In 1899-1900, 122 at an average price of	...	...	...	277 each.
In 1911-12, 594 at an average price of	...	...	...	120 „

Result of the Ahmadnagar stud has been to resuscitate two valuable breeds of Kathiawari and Marwari and to render us practically independent of the Arab market as we turn out nearly enough Arab stallions for our annual requirements, and by this means have reduced number of stallions required for annual replacements to be imported and purchased in India from 50 in 1906 (before the stud had any output) to an average of 13 in the last 3 years, thereby effecting a saving of one-and-a-half lakhs per annum. 15318.

The Unmool stud at Mona has not been a success and proposals for its abandonment have been submitted to Government. 15318, 15320.

The donkey stud at Mona has done good work, and with the output of the stud *plus* the number of colts bought as weanlings and reared in the stud we can now supply our own requirements in donkey stallions, besides supplying to Native States, on sale, who are taking up mule-breeding keenly. We have not imported a single donkey stallion since 1908, prior to which the average number imported was 25, at a cost landed in India of Cyprian about £45 and American £108. 15318.

The present system of covering mares in the canal colonies by our stallions and getting the pick of the results, which are bought young and sent to our own depôts to mature, is so much a success that we are asking Government to continue the system on the Lower Bari Doab Canal, and if the Punjab Government support the scheme the result will be most satisfactory. 15322, 15324, 15328.

Practicable and financially expedient to breed mules for military purposes in India in place of importing them, and every effort is being made to further mule-breeding in India. 15474.

The mules from China cost Rs. 325. In India we buy them at about Rs. 85, but we have to keep the latter for some time, so that there is not much difference eventually between the price of the imported mules and those of this country. 15488.

In regard to the substitution of donkeys for mules in respect to the conveyance of such loads as ammunition, provided the donkeys are of a suitable size they should do, but the small donkey of the country would be

unsuitable. A considerable improvement has, however, taken place in the donkey especially in the Punjab in the last nine years. 15498, 15502.

As regards the impressment of horses in the country, a Bill is already drafted and approved and will be passed in Council on emergency requiring it to be brought into operation. 15559.

Mules are obtained by the Army Remount Department partly by purchase in India and partly by importation. It was decided in 1907 that 1,000 mules should be bought annually in India and the balance imported (8 per cent. of the total scale), the age at purchase being from four to seven years. The two rearing depôts supply some 550 transport mules per annum from mules bought young (8 to 14 months) and reared at those depôts. 15673, 15685.

China is our principal stand-by for imported mules, the best being got there. Persia has good mules, but owing to the disturbed state of the country we have only been able to get a very small number in the last three years. Indian mules are obtained principally in the Punjab and at Kalimpong where we get some 300 Tibetan mules annually. Price of Indian mules is averaged at Rs. 225 and of the imported at Rs. 325 (including all deputation expenses). 15673.

## DEPARTMENTS.

## ARMY VETERINARY DEPARTMENT.

*General Birdwood.*—The establishment of veterinary officers in India is insufficient to meet war requirements. The establishment in India is 54 (excluding 10 lent to the Army Remount Department) whilst the requirements on mobilization of 9 divisions and 8 cavalry brigades is 128; a further 34 would be required for internal defence units making a total requirement of 162, or a shortage of 108 officers. 15608, 15621.

We have practically no resources in India in the way of trained veterinary officers to meet this deficiency. In case of great emergency we could possibly get:—

10 officers employed with the Indian Civil Veterinary Department.

2 retired veterinary officers.

6 civil veterinary surgeons in Calcutta and Bombay, utilizing 1 at Calcutta and 1 at Bombay for duty at the port of disembarkation,

and we might obtain 120 veterinary assistants (*salutris*) from the Indian Civil Veterinary Department and a few veterinary officers from Home, but in regard to the latter it is doubtful whether, in the event of a general mobilization, this is a source of supply we can rely on. 15608.

An additional 9 officers could be economically and usefully employed in peace to look after the Government animals at certain stations in India. 15608.

Under the existing orders of the Secretary of State officers of the Army Veterinary Corps can only be placed in charge of the animals of British mounted troops and non-silladar cavalry. 15608.

We have no veterinary officers in charge of our silladar cavalry regiments, mountain batteries, mule or camel corps, etc., or of the large number of animals with Government dairies. It would be judicious and pay the Government to have a certain number of officers in charge of these units. Treatment would be more up to date, greater efficiency would result, contagious disease would be reduced to a minimum, and a further reserve for war would actually exist in India. Thirty-two officers could be economically employed with such units. This with the addition recommended above would give us a total addition of 41 officers, thus reducing the deficiency on mobilization to 67. 15608.

Statement shewing approximate number of animals of British and Indian units, etc., located at stations unprovided with veterinary attendance locally. 15608.

Statement shewing the approximate number of animals in stations where the duties of the present veterinary charge are too heavy for one veterinary officer. 15608.

Statement shewing the detail of Government animals proposed to be placed in the veterinary charge of Army Veterinary Corps officers if the proposed increase to the cadre is sanctioned. 15608.

There is a proposal to raise a veterinary corps of *salutris* in the country now before Government and if it is sanctioned it will go far to obviate the necessity of drawing soldiers from non-mobilized cavalry units. The *salutris* would take the place of farriers. 15627, 15629, 15639.

## DEPARTMENTS.

## BARRACK DEPARTMENT.

*General Dickie.*—Does not think that pensioners would be suitable for employment in the Barrack Department. Such an arrangement would result in a good deal of waste and extravagance. 1838, 1840.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—Pensioners could be substituted for effective soldiers in the Barrack Department, but they would be more liable to come under corrupt influences. 4602.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—Would give pensioners a trial in the Barrack Department. 5683.

## DEPARTMENTS.

CANTONMENT MAGISTRATES' DEPARTMENT.

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*Sir M. Grover.*—The present system of placing cantonment magistrates under the Army Department is an advantage as they assist generally in the administration of cantonments. 701.



## DEPARTMENTS.

## MILITARY ACCOUNTS DEPARTMENT.

*Mr. Brunyate.*—The proposed reorganization of the Military Accounts Department may lead to a large economy. 6038.

Statement of lines on which it is proposed to reorganize the Military Accounts Department. 6068.

Proposed to audit only about 50 per cent. of the pay bills of units. 6070, 6072.

The divisional disbursing system is working very satisfactorily. 6090.

The reorganization of the Military Accounts Department now proposed will fit in well with war requirements. 6096, 6100.

The accounts arrangements for the internal defence troops not yet fully worked out and have to be taken up. 6102, 6104.

Would advocate the question of stock inspection on behalf of the Accounts Department being taken up again. 6106.

Although it is desirable to diminish concentration in ordinary accounts and audit work, it is also a good thing to centralize the technical accounts work relating to the Ordnance and other departments. 6122.

The military accounts officers have a narrower view of their duties than civil accounts officers. 6124.

A reduction of clerks in the Military Accounts Department must be preceded by an improvement in the personnel. 6124.

A great deal of unnecessary correspondence takes place owing to the idea which some officers have that by arguing with the accounts officer they will probably get him to withdraw his objection. 6138.

Favourably impressed with the new civilian officers who are promising men and have a variety of useful personal qualifications. 6142.

In the Military Accounts Department civil officers cost less than military officers. 6148.

*General Aylmer.*—Accounts Department is overmanned and might be reduced. 8603.

*General Stuart.*—The Military Accounts establishment employed in checking requisitions passed by officers in charge of arsenals is a waste of money and might be done away with. 10066.

*General Birdwood.*—The general impression throughout the army in India is that the greatest waste of public money is caused by the large pay and the establishments which are maintained in the Army Pay and Military Works Departments. Such establishments are possibly necessary owing to the intricacies of our Indian Army Regulations, which are framed to prevent the possibility of a single anna being spent that is not covered by rule, but this elaborate system of check often leads to lengthy correspondence and the taking up of much valuable time without corresponding advantages. 15641.

## DEPARTMENTS.

## MILITARY FARMS DEPARTMENT.

*Sir M. Grover.*—Satisfied that the present policy of supplying dairy produce and fodder departmentally by dairy and grass farms is economical 717.

*Mr. Brunyate.*—For consideration whether an organization similar to that of the dairy farms might be tried for the grass farms. 6038, 6299, 6401, 6405.

Satisfied that the present policy of supplying dairy produce and fodder departmentally by dairy and grass farms is economical, but questions whether a grass farm officer is required in every division. 6401.

*General Birdwood.*—Supply of fodder to the army is, and should be, a military concern. 15091, 15095, 15099, 15125.

The work of the dairy farms is of a highly technical character and can best be supervised by trained officers in charge of a group of dairies working directly under the Quartermaster-General in India as is now done.

Desirable to bring out periodically from Home a certain number of civilian dairymen who would enable us to keep abreast of the times and would have a wider experience of the subject than the trained military men. 15091.

Among the military men there are a considerable number who have, under the training of the dairy expert brought out from Home, acquired sufficient knowledge to manage dairy farms successfully.

As these military men have the great advantage over the civilians in their experience of Indian conditions and in knowing how to deal with troops, advisable that recruitment for dairies should still be made largely from the army, and the men after proving themselves suitable for employment in dairies allowed to resign their military rank. 15091.

The grass farming operations in the majority of stations are of a simple character and do not require any knowledge of farming in the ordinary sense of the word, and the accounts are free from complication. An efficient knowledge of the grass farms work is well within the capacity of British officers and men. By giving sufficient scales of pay, intelligent men of good character in the army have come forward for employment and have proved themselves to be thoroughly capable of undertaking the duties required of them, are doing good work, and can be trusted. 15091, 15161.

The nature of the duties of grass farm employes requires them to be in direct contact with the military authorities and, being soldiers themselves, this conduces to harmonious working.

Grass farms in many instances form cantonment lands and innumerable questions arise with the cantonment authorities, and as cantonments are controlled by military authorities, desirable that grass farms should also be under military control.

Military farms now arrange for all war fodder reserves, and in the event of general mobilization a portion of personnel would be required to assist in the supply of the Field Army. It is therefore desirable from every point of view that there should be a military organization.

Not prepared to say that the work could not be carried out by a staff of civilian subordinates working under military officers but can see no appreciable advantage to be gained.

Extract from note by Agricultural Adviser to Government "No reason to believe the civilian of the stamp which would be required would require less pay and pension than the military man. On the contrary, I rather think he would require more pay. At any rate it could not be less than is given by the

Agricultural Service \* \* \* \*. I have little hesitation in advising both from the point of view of efficiency and economy that the military grass farms should be run with a military personnel." 15091.

An organization similar to that of the dairy farms could not be introduced for the grass farms because the men have to come into contact with the military element so frequently, and would give a direct negative to such a suggestion. 15091, 15095, 15123.

Dairy farms are not strictly on the same commercial footing as the grass farms. 15097.

Does not know why the civilian should be better than the non-commissioned officer; the non-commissioned officer has been brought up to it—daily work with horses and the issue of fodder while with his unit. 15103.

Would not be conducive to efficiency to remove control of grass farms from General Officers Commanding. 15125.

The local farms officer advises the General Officer Commanding on all local work, and anything outside the power of the General Officer Commanding is put up to the Quartermaster-General by the divisional farms officer through his divisional General. 15137.

A man can be remanded to his regiment at any time, but if he is a good man he stays for the rest of his active life in the Farms Department. 15152.

Junior men are put in charge of the smaller farms and the seniors into the more responsible charges—transfers avoided as much as possible. 15159.

As regard dairies it is not a question of supplying an article more cheaply than in the open market but of providing a better one, and as such it must necessarily cost more. 15165.

There would be no necessity for Government dairies if a reliable supply from private sources were forthcoming, but the conditions in India are such that there is no hope of this.

The supply for the Darbar was opened to private enterprise but no one would come forward.

Whenever private enterprise is in a position to step in and take up the supply of dairy produce of undoubtedly good quality it will be time to close Government dairies.

Dairies at present run by native management cannot be relied upon, and no European managed concern can sell at Government prices, and is not likely to be able to do so until legislation with its resultant expenses of inspecting staff, etc., is introduced in India. 15165.

Although the military dairies have not been able to pay their way in the past this was due to a variety of causes which were the results of inexperience and defects in details of organization, but there is every reason to believe that now these defects have been removed the majority of the dairies will become self-supporting. And even if they do not do so entirely, the loss will be so small as to be negligible particularly seeing that by the retention of these institutions a supply of pure produce is made available for the army, which must be a direct means of reducing mortality in the ranks, an asset which, though not capable of being recorded in money, is after all the ideal to be aimed at.

At the Darbar alone a saving of nearly two lakhs of rupees was effected over the lowest offer received from a contractor. 15165.

Apart from its unquestionable advantage in economy, the system of departmental fodder supply admits of a far superior article being issued. 15165.

Production of fodder by grass farms undoubtedly economical. Since the question of the fodder supply has been seriously taken up, very large savings have resulted as compared with the contract system previously in force. 15165.

Would say that Government dairies had something to do with the health of the army being improved. 15171.

Proposed to increase the European subordinate establishment by 10 men, and if dairy farm operations are to be continued on the present scale the increase asked for is the least that will suffice. The additional men are required to control the rapidly increasing business, the receipts from which it is anticipated will cover the cost involved. In 1901-02, 420 tons of milk and 64 tons of butter were sold. In 1911-12, 3221 tons of milk and 638 tons of butter were sold. 15195.

Proposed to increase the European subordinate establishment of the grass farms by 14 men. If grass farm operations are to be continued on the present scale, the increase asked for is the least that will suffice. Still greater economies could be effected if additional establishments were forthcoming to enable the farming operations to be sufficiently extended to meet the whole supply in India. This is not a proposal for increased expenditure as the cost of the extra establishment will be far more than recouped by the saving in the rates now paid.

In 1901-02, 54,000 tons of fodder were produced, in 1911-12 154,924 tons were produced.

Enormous sums spent in buying grass for the mountain battery mules at Dehra Dun, and if we could only put in a grass farm agency it could be done at half the price.

Fremantle-Henderson Committee perfectly convinced as to the economy of the work of grass and dairy farms. 15165, 15207.

Does not think we could consider any general rise in the price of dairy produce sold to the soldier. 15221.

At the present moment we are spending large sums in making contracts for fodder in places, where, if only a little extra establishment were allowed, lands could be leased and fodder could be collected at a far smaller cost. 15641.

The building up of a reserve of fodder when there is a good harvest is in every way economical, and if the Military Farms Department were provided with funds to take advantage of such opportunities a great saving would result to Government. It would be well if the Finance would trust the grass expert authorities to some extent in such matters. 15641, 15649.

## DEPARTMENTS.

## MILITARY WORKS SERVICES.

*Sir M. Grover.*—Undesirable to have civilian subordinates employed in the Military Works Services. 739.

*General Dickie.*—Opposed to the substitution of native civilian for British military subordinates in the Military Works Services. 1816, 1828.

Military subordinates are cheaper and better educated than civilians. 1842.

New lines for Indian troops are now built by the Military Works Services. 1848.

Such lines of Indian troops as are considered good enough to bring on the books are now maintained by the Military Works Services. 1856.

There are occasional changes between officers of the Military Works Services and sapper and miner units, which is advantageous, but frequent interchange would militate against efficiency. 1922.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—Might be possible but not always advisable to substitute civil for military subordinates. 4598.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—Possible in a large measure to substitute civil for military subordinates, but if this is not to result in economy would leave things as they are. 5679.

*Mr. Brunyate.*—Whenever it is possible to get quarters for officers built by private enterprise would prefer that agency. 6046.

The tendency of the Military Works administration is in the direction of economy and careful control.

Military Works constantly under strong pressure to improve existing types of buildings.

In 1909 or 1910, Military Works Services were being loaded with an excessive proportion of senior officers, the apparent cost of buildings being thus inflated. 6369.

It should be one of the functions of the Director General, Military Works, to criticize fully any proposals which may appear intrinsically extravagant; this is not so at present. 6371.

The work of the Military Works Branch is very sound indeed when they have been taken thoroughly into confidence, and they are working cordially with the Finance Department. 6375.

The powers of General Officers Commanding in regard to military works expenditure are very small but it would not be desirable to decentralize in this matter. 6377, 6379.

Never gone statistically into the question but is of opinion that the Military Works are quite as economical as the Public Works Department. 6383.

Native troops' hutting now carried out by the Military Works Services. 6385.

## DEPARTMENTS.

## ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT—GENERAL.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—Thinks the Ordnance Department should be largely civil in character 5677.

*Mr. Brunyate.*—Arsenal establishments should be military as they are in direct contact with the troops. 6280.

In the case of the factories there does seem to be some case for employing civilians. 6280.

The system of fixing the cost of Ordnance products until recently in force not considered even approximately correct. 6343.

A new system of accounts has been introduced under technical supervision which it is believed will give far truer results. 6343.

Petty manufactures, such as pawlins, etc., might, with advantage, be handed over to civil agency. Might be worth while to contract with units for petty items like soap, grease, rifle flannelette, etc. 6357.

As regards other departments obtaining stores from the Ordnance, this should be practically compulsory and would lead to some economy. 6359.

Considers the appointment of Director of Ordnance Factories a necessary post. 6363.

Does not consider the Ordnance Department is too expensively manned at the top. 6367.

*General Aylmer.*—The quantity of ammunition maintained in reserve, should be increased by about 50 per cent. all round. 8749.

*General Stuart.*—Gross and net expenditure on the Ordnance Department in 1898-99, 1904-05 and 1911-12 respectively, with explanations of variations. 9391.

Current year's estimate Rs. 159. 62,480. 9331.

Does not receive any information from Home regarding the expenditure on Ordnance stores during any particular year. Annual expenditure on Ordnance stores imported from England during the last ten years. 9407.

Cannot form any conclusion as to how far the development of local supplies has curtailed the importation of stores from England as new equipments are, generally speaking, much more expensive than those they replace. 9413, 9415.

Outturn from factories started:—Gun and shell factory, about 1901; cordite factory, 1905-06; gun carriage factory, 1906-07; rifle factory 1908-09. Initial cost of starting cordite factory was Rs. 49,63,461. 9417.

Difference between present actual value of factories and the amount spent on them from the time they were first started to date not available, but a record for recent years of amounts spent is being kept. 9435

Method of valuation of stores in stock in Ordnance factories at end of a financial year. 9439.

Very difficult to compare prices of articles produced in India with the prices quoted for similar articles in England because so many stores in India are of special pattern. 9445.

In rating articles only shewn in Vocabulary,  $17\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. is added to the Vocabulary rates. 9451.

War Office obtains one-third of stores from Government factory and two-thirds from the trade and the Vocabulary rate is the mean of the two. 9451, 9560.

The Home Government Ordnance factories in calculating cost of stores do not charge interest on capital but they do charge on machinery at a rate which no private firm does. 9453.

In India in regard to anything that is sold at a loss, the difference between the price realized and the cost is debited against outturn. 9455.

The factory statement does not allow for such deterioration as may have occurred. 9457.

The forty lakhs shewn as representing the total cost of establishments employed in factories during 1910-11, do not include the salaries of the Director of Ordnance Factories and his office or that of the Central Accounts Office, which for the year in question amounted to 2·39 lakhs. The corresponding cost in 1900-01 was about twenty-three lakhs.

The salaries of the Director of Ordnance Factories and his office and the Central Accounts Office for current year amount to 2·54 lakhs and the remaining expenditure to 38·9 lakhs.

The pension charge on pensionable salaries for 1910-11 was Rs 2,13,893.

It is not known in the Controller's office on what basis pension charges are fixed. 9459.

The increase in the cost of establishments since 1901 is due to the fact that there are factories now which did not exist in 1901. 9465.

The increased expenditure on establishments at Cossipore, Dum Dum and Kirkee is due to reorganization entailing, *inter alia*, manufacture of more expensive equipment which takes far more labour than the other articles. 9467, 9471.

Satisfied that this large increase in expenditure on establishments represents value for money. 9473, 9475.

The average value of the yearly outturn of the various factories calculated at 118·75 lakhs represents the average outturn for the last 3 years 1907-8—1909-10 as furnished by Military Accounts Department. The value of each article appraised by calculating cost of material expended *plus* the amount on account of general charges, which are arrived at by calculating the percentages which the total value of the direct labour expended in the factory bears to the total general charges of the factory. 9477.

General charges are far more than 3½ per cent. on capital would be. 9479.

Suffered in India for last ten years owing to lack of inspection staff, we have now got it, and things should be better. 9487.

If on inspection it is found that a factory is turning out bad stuff, the value of that stuff is spread over the serviceable outturn of the factory. 9489.

If bad stuff is turned out, the Superintendent of the factory will be held responsible. 9491.

The factories in India, though they could give all that was required in time as regards a gun rearmament but not as regards rifles, could not do so in a period which would be acceptable. 9495.

It is not possible both for supply reasons, utilizing the combined powers of production of England and India, and on financial grounds, that a complete rearmament, whether as regards guns or rifles, could be effected in less than 3 years. 9495.

Desirable that India should be able to produce a certain amount of her war stores. 9499.

In comparing the cost of the rifle manufactured in India with that of the rifle obtained from Home the items taken into consideration are: material employed, cost of labour employed, and percentages due to general charges on labour; interest on capital will also be shewn. 9513, 9529.

Does not think the annual accounts of Ordnance factories were worth the paper they were written on. 9536.

Basis on which the prices of articles supplied to other departments are made out. 9562.

Our rate for cordite is more expensive than at Home owing to our limited output. 9579.

Our small arm ammunition is more expensive at present owing to the price of cordite and heavy indirect charges. 9579.

The policy of local production by the Ordnance factories has, from the financial point of view, been on the whole advantageous, while in the case of local manufacture of stores which are at present more expensive than if imported there is good reason to expect similar results in the future 9579. 9611.

In each arsenal there is a workshop for the repair of arms. 9644.

The rearmament of the troops in India has been carried out without any definite policy, the matter has been allowed to spread itself over years and we have consequently about 7 different patterns of arms now. 9666.

The rifle question in India has been starved. 9668, 9670.

All rifles in the hands of troops are examined by an expert annually. Premature to say whether these arrangements are adequate; they certainly were not so before and do not now err in the direction of leading to needless condemnation. 9704.

When a new rifle is introduced and its manufacture is started in India, we shall be handicapped to a certain extent, but it is not quite the same thing as starting a rifle factory for the first time. 9752, 9754.

Strikes and disturbances are practically unknown in the Ordnance factories and there is no reason at present to suppose they are likely to arise. 9762.

In order to have a hold over its more efficient workmen, would suggest the introduction of a system of pensions or bonuses. 9762, 9776.

India can only draw a portion of her requirements for rearmament from the Indian factories. 9793.

No political danger in training a large number of natives of India in the production of war material on the lines at present followed. 9815.

If rifle factory were abolished, heavy repairs would then, as formerly, have to be done in arsenals, a most undesirable and inefficient procedure. 9827, 9835.

Does not think that the situation in the country is such that it is advisable to send rifles out of the country for repairs. 9839.

Considers that the Ordnance factories are adequately guarded. 9853.

Precautions taken against theft or mishap in transporting rifles and ammunition to and from factories, arsenals and troops. 9855.

Question of transport of arms and ammunition about to form the subject of an enquiry by a committee. 9855.

The actual losses of arms and ammunition on the railway are very small. 9857.

Does not consider that consignments of arms and ammunition should be accompanied by a military guard. 9867.

Agrees that it is essential to develop private enterprise as much as possible. 9897.

At present providing the British troops with web equipment, but it will take about 5 years to complete. 9899.

In regard to the Supply and Transport Corps discontinuing getting transport vehicles, harness, etc., from the Ordnance in 1906, this was due to the Supply and Transport Corps having overstocked themselves with transport gear about that period. 9909.



Other departments could be supplied with steel bar and rod and steel and iron castings from Cossipore, and any articles made of leather of similar type to those manufactured for Government at Cawnpore. 9909.

Jubbulpore could also supply a proportion of the requirements of the Military Works Services as regards doors and windows and their frames, and barrack and hospital furniture generally. 9909.

All Government departments should obtain from the Ordnance Department such stores as the latter are in a position to supply. 9909.

The establishment buildings and plant of a factory being fixed for the outturn of warlike stores, the work of that factory should be augmented for orders for other articles although the full production cost thereof be greater than the purchase price elsewhere. Otherwise the establishment is not employed to the full extent and machines are standing idle. 9909.

The Ordnance Department supply the Burma Military Police with their rifles and ammunition. 9918.

Ordnance Department could supply all leather articles to the Supply and Transport Corps at a smaller price than they now pay to contractors. 9922.

Arsenal workshops should be repair shops for the carrying out of repairs of equipment which do not require the facilities of a factory. At present they manufacture numerous stores, a small percentage of which should be made in the factories and a larger percentage of which should be obtained, if possible, from the trade. 9924.

Does not think that economy or administrative convenience would result by the adoption of a contract procedure with units for any articles of Ordnance supply. 9924.

Existing regulations in regard to supplies to units are sufficient to prevent undue waste and no economy would result from the proposed contract system which in practice would be impossible to work. 9928.

Quite sure the State gets no benefit from the contract system now in existence. 9934.

Considers the present accounting and audit arrangements in respect of Ordnance factories as efficient and as furnishing an adequate check on undue expenditure. 9938.

Even in peace time the discharge of the duties of the Department are seriously hampered by the dispersion of the Directors and views with apprehension what the results would be in war. 9940.

Very advantageous to have the Directors of Ordnance Factories and Ordnance Inspection and the Accounts Controller together at Calcutta. 9940, 9950.

It would be advantageous if the office of the Director of Ordnance Stores were removed to Simla. 9940, 9946.

To localize the Audit Department completely would be fatal, and it would also be a most expensive system. 9978.

The cost including clerical establishment of the three Directors is Rs. 4,39,770. 9984.

Supervising staff of Department inadequate. 9984.

To control the establishments in Ordnance factories it is much better to employ military agency in every factory, and would not be prepared to recommend civilians.

For superintendence work in the gun and shell factory, the gun carriage factory, and the cordite factory, military officers essential.

For ammunition factories the military officer has decided advantages. 9990.

For the rifle factory a civilian might be found, but this was tried at Home and it proved a failure.

For the harness and saddlery factory a qualified civilian might answer, but does not recommend it.

Proposes eventually to replace warrant officers in the Department by men who have originally been serjeants in British regiments and have become civilians, this will result in economy. 9990.

Does not consider the proportion of honorary commissioned and warrant officers in the Department excessive. At present proposed to find the entire European personnel of the Indian arsenals from the Army Ordnance Department. 10002, 10010.

Considers the system of getting Ordnance men from Home is the cheaper system. 10020.

Quite impossible to place the Budget for Ordnance stores on a contract basis. 10048.

We want more check of stores than we have at present. 10050.

The .45 maxim guns in India might be converted to .303 calibre and there would then be no wastage on account of ammunition for these guns which at present is about Rs 30,000 annually. 10066.

The Ordnance Department should have a financial adviser. 10075.

The provision of an expert financial branch in the office of the Director General of Ordnance would effect an immense diminution in the correspondence and delay which at present occur in arriving at decisions at a cost that would be more than compensated for by the advantages to be obtained. 10075.

It is essential to efficiency and economy that, once commenced, a rearmament should be carried through and completed within 3 years. 10095.

The reserve of ammunition that would remain in the country for internal defence troops is reasonably adequate if it can be maintained. 10091.

In the event of a prolonged campaign we should rely on our manufacturing capacity to keep up reserves. 10097.

Calculate on being able to turn out in a year of emergency and working under pressure about 75,000,000 rounds. 10103.

War stores sent to South Africa during the South African war. 10125, 10127.

Present outturn of small arms ammunition quite sufficient for Indian peace requirements. 10141.

War reserve of small arms ammunition is complete. 10143.

Apart from the supply of acetone which is imported, the Ordnance Department turn out all cordite they require. 10153.

Agrees with the views of General Mahon in regard to the manufacture of warlike stores in India. 10163.

The manufacturing capacity of the factories in India enables a large number of items of warlike stores to be brought up to latest pattern at a far smaller cost than that of replacing them with new stores. War Office designs not only of gun carriages, but also of many other artillery vehicles have not been found strong enough for Indian conditions of service. War Office designs of wheels for mobile artillery are found to be too weak for India and Indian pattern designs of these articles are now only used. 10163.

If it could be arranged, it would be desirable for equipment to be tried in India before introduction by the War Office. 10163, 10165.

*Colonel Mead.*—The arrangements for the supply of stores and ammunition by the Ordnance Department are dilatory and great injury results to training in consequence. The system is cumbrous and includes a mass of clerical labour which might with advantage be reduced. 12587.

## DEPARTMENTS.

## ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT—GUN AND SHELL FACTORY, COSSIPORE.

*General Dickie.*—Military Works Services obtain sections of iron and steel from Cossipore, as they find it cheaper to obtain these from Cossipore as far north as Lahore than to import them from Home. 1902, 1910, 1912.

*General Stuart.*—The initial cost of establishing the gun and shell factory at Cossipore is not available. 9417.

The increased expenditure on establishments at Cossipore is due to reorganization entailing, *inter alia*, manufacture of more expensive equipment which takes far more labour than the other articles. 9467, 9471.

Could produce steel bar cheaper than private manufacturers if we could work to full extent. 9567, 9569.

As regards guns and gun components our rates compare favourably with the Home costs. 9579.

Our rates for projectiles are much the same as at Home. 9579.

In all cases we obtain the benefit of capabilities for repairs, alterations and conversions, by possessing the plant and training the labour for manufacture. 9579.

The manufacture at Cossipore has been a complete success both in respect to the gun itself and also from the point of view of economy. 9785.

For superintendence work on the gun and shell factory military officers essential. 9990.

## DEPARTMENTS.

## ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT—GUN CARRIAGE FACTORY, JUBBULPORE.

*Sir M. Grover.*—Gun carriage factory at Jubbulpore has been a success. 715.

*General Stuart.*—Initial cost of starting the gun carriage factory was Rs. 41,41,206 ; outturn from factory started in 1906-07. 9417.

Work of the gun carriage factory difficult to compare. 9579.

In all cases we obtain the benefit of capabilities for repairs, alterations, and conversions, by possessing the plant and training the labour for manufacture. 9579.

Financially the gun carriage factory at Jubbulpore has been a success ; the maintenance of a properly equipped factory in India for heavy repairs is absolutely necessary. 9869.

For superintendence work in the gun carriage factory, military officers essential. 9990.

War Office designs of wheels for mobile artillery are found to be too weak for India and Indian pattern designs of these articles are now only used. 10163.

War Office designs not only of gun carriages but also of many other artillery vehicles have not been found strong enough for Indian conditions of service. 10163.

## DEPARTMENTS.

## ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT—HARNESS AND SADDLERY FACTORY, CAWNPORE.

*Sir M. Grover.*—Does not think the saddlery factory at Cawnpore could be handed over to civilian agency. 715.

*Mr. Brunyate.*—Thinks the leather work for the army could eventually be placed to a large extent in private hands. 6038, 6351.

As regards the harness and saddlery factory at Cawnpore the proper course would be to increase leather orders to civilian agencies but not to close the factory until leather manufacture is more developed in India. 6351.

*General Stuart.*—To hand the harness and saddlery factory at Cawnpore, to a private firm, whatever Government supervision of books and tanning operations was instituted, the effect would be a general rise in the cost of equipment. 9885.

The Cawnpore harness and saddlery factory is the one from which the largest savings to the Government accrue from the point of view of the relative cost of imported stores. 9885.

In the absence of competition in this country, does not think it is feasible to give the whole work to private firms. 9897.

Ordnance Department could supply all leather articles to the Supply and Transport Corps at a less price than they now pay to contractors. 9922.

For the harness and saddlery factory a qualified civilian might answer, but does not recommend it. 9990.

## DEPARTMENTS.

## ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT—RIFLE FACTORY, ISHAPORE.

*Sir M. Grover.*—Ishapore rifle factory expected to turn out about 25,000 rifles, annually, and amply suffices for supplying peace replacements. 709.

*Mr. Brunyate.*—A strong *prima facie* case might be made out for the discontinuance of the rifle factory. 6038, 6309.

The rifle factory at Ishapore has not justified its existence financially. 6309.

It is not the present policy to maintain the factory on such a scale as to make India self-supporting in the matter of rifles. 6309.

If you postulate sufficient time for the local manufacture of a new type of rifle to be got into full swing, the cost of turning out rifles in India is likely in time to be favourable compared with the Home price. 6315, 6317, 6319, 6321.

You must compare the cost of the rifle produced in India, less interest on capital to date, with the amount you pay for the Home article. 6323.

As the rifle factory can never turn out anything like the number of rifles we want and as it cannot turn them out more cheaply it is best to look to England for the supply. 6327.

If the maintenance of the rifle factory were discontinued, supposes the arsenals would carry out such petty repairs as were within their ordinary capacity. 6329.

We should also have to maintain a proper reserve of rifles to replace such as could not be repaired in India. 6329.

*General Stuart.*—Initial cost of starting rifle factory was Rs. 46,95,581. Outturn from factory started in 1908-09. 9417.

Our rifles and their components are a good deal more expensive owing to their being new work. 9579.

In all cases we obtain the benefit of capabilities for repairs, alterations and conversions, by possessing the plant and training the labour for manufacture. 9579.

The original estimate of yearly production at the rifle factory was 25,000 rifles. 9607.

Statement shewing the number of rifles turned out from the factory annually and the number obtained from Home. 9607.

Statement shewing the number of long rifles converted into charger-loading rifles at the factory. 9607.

Number of rifles repaired at the factory not available. 9607.

Manufacture of modern rifles in this country is a most difficult process. 9621.

The estimates of output put forward when the Ishapore rifle factory was sanctioned have been absolutely falsified. 9630.

Minor repairs done at arsenals, important things like the sighting of rifles have to be done at the rifle factory. 9638.

In each arsenal there is a workshop for the repair of arms. 9644.

The non-fulfilment of expectations on the part of the rifle factory has been due in a measure to labour difficulties and to the set-back the production received owing to the complaints of troops in regard to the rifle. 9650.

The latter was due to the delay in sanctioning the inspection staff. 9650.

The complaints of troops in regard to the Ishapore rifle were after full investigation found to be exaggerated, but there were undoubtedly grounds for criticism. 9650.

The rifle question in India has been starved. 9668, 9670.

The cost of converting a long rifle to charger-loading has been greater than it would have been had the rifles been repaired at Home. 9686, 9688.

Hear of no complaints now from troops in regard to rifles manufactured at the Ishapore rifle factory. 9716.

The cost of Ishapore rifles in 1910-11 is probably inflated by charges which should more properly have gone to conversions and to inspection. 9726.

The manufacturing and other difficulties inseparable from starting a rifle factory in India with inexperienced labour have to a great extent been surmounted and considerable reductions in the future cost of production are assured. 9726.

Latest estimate for converting a long rifle into a charger-loading rifle at Ishapore is Rs. 15. 9726.

Within four years Ishapore will manufacture rifles approximately at the Home cost. 9736, 9738.

When a new rifle is introduced and its manufacture is started in India, we shall be handicapped to a certain extent, but it is not quite the same thing as starting a rifle factory for the first time. 9752, 9754.

If a war lasted a long time, machinery to increase the turn out of rifles could be got together by degrees, but it would be slow work. 9760.

Under the present condition of manufacture and inspection, the Ishapore rifle is in all respects equal to Home production. 9780.

It was never contemplated or previously suggested that the minimum output of the Ishapore rifle factory would, except to a minor extent, permit of the rearmament of the army in India with a new pattern rifle being effected through its agency. 9785.

Believes that the rifle factory at Ishapore has now most of its difficulties behind it. 9785.

The rifle factory ought to have begun in a small way. 9807, 9809.

Does not agree with statement that when an entirely new pattern of rifle is introduced local manufacture of rifles had better cease. 9811, 9813.

Once an enormous supply of machinery has been obtained it cannot be got rid of without incurring heavy loss. 9813.

In the event of its being decided to discontinue the local manufacture of rifles, the small arm ammunition factory might be moved from Dum Dum to the rifle factory site or the Cossipore works moved to this site, but the expense of shifting would be enormous and the loss in getting rid of the rifle machinery would be so great as to place the realization of this proposal out of the question. Further, heavy repairs would then, as formerly, have to be done in arsenals, a most undesirable and inefficient procedure. 9827.

Does not think that the situation in India is such that it is advisable to send rifles out of the country for repairs. 9839.

There would be no chance of selling the rifle machinery to one of the Colonies. 9851.

For the rifle factory a civilian might be found, but this was tried at Home and it proved a failure. 9990.

*General Hamilton Gordon.*—The circumstances which caused the large deficiency in rifles were not entirely due to the factory nor even mainly so. 13616, 13621.

It is better to get the rifles from Home than to count on local supplies that are not forthcoming; at the same time would prefer that the rifles should be forthcoming locally. 13618.

## DEPARTMENTS.

## SUPPLY AND TRANSPORT CORPS--PERSONNEL.

*Sir M. Grover.*—Considers suggestion to employ officers taken from the ranks as commandants of transport units feasible. 729.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—Opposed to proposal to make the Supply and Transport Corps largely civilian in character as we do not usually make war in civilized countries. 4594.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—Should only be civil in a very limited degree. 5677.

*Mr. Brunyate.*—Cannot see that a special officer is required for contracts in each division. 6038.

Transport registration staff could be largely reduced. 6038.

The appointment of the Director of Supply and Transport might be converted into an inspecting appointment. 6060.

Considers there is no question of civilianizing the transport portion of the Supply and Transport Corps. 6280.

As regards supply, does not think the superior establishments could be made civil. 6280.

Subordinate establishments of the Supply and Transport Corps are already largely civil. 6280.

Does not see much scope for introducing more of the civilian element into the Corps. 6280.

In the Quartermaster-General's Branch if you have a Director of Supplies and Transport with two senior officers as Deputies, cannot see the necessity for two Assistant Deputies. 6464.

*General Aylmer.*—The majority of the supply and transport requirements in officers will probably have to be obtained from internal defence units. 8624.

*General Birdwood.*—Badly off for personnel in the Supply and Transport Corps. 7089.

Recommends an increase of officers to the cadre of the Corps. 7093.

In paragraph 11, Appendix X, of the General Staff Memorandum of 1911, the estimate of officers required for the Supply and Transport Corps is too low, and the methods by which it is proposed to accumulate the reserve are of doubtful practical value. The reserve required should be at least 400, excluding wastage, and not 150.

The suggestion that officers of Supply and Transport Corps be allowed to go to the reserve on the same conditions as officers of the Indian army going to the general reserve does not contain any promise of utility. Officers of the Supply and Transport Corps who are fit and efficient do not want to go between eighteen and twenty-two years' service, as they are then just arriving on the threshold of the better paid appointments of the Corps, and this is probably the period of an officer's service in which it is most important for him to stay and draw all the pay he can. Officers with private means do not enter the Supply and Transport Corps. Any officer, therefore, retiring at such an early age would most probably be physically or professionally unfit, and therefore useless for the reserve.

As regards utilizing warrant officers for a reserve of officers, it would best pay those who are fit for commissioned rank to stay on in the service for the sake of the extra pay and the increased pension. Those who are fit for commissioned rank would get the rank by staying on, those who are not fit and would not be promoted in the ordinary course would also be unfit for the rank in the reserve. A proposal to substitute promoted warrant officers for lieutenants of the Indian army in supervising posts is not one which can be recommended.



It is possible that a certain number of recruits for a reserve for the Supply and Transport Corps might be obtained from business firms, but it is not easy to see how this reserve of officers is to be trained in supply and transport matters. It is to be presumed that the firms which employ them will require their whole time. 14855.

The increase of officers proposed for the Supply and Transport Corps would go some way to provide us in war not only with officers but well trained officers whose employment makes all the difference between efficiency and chaos. The more supervision we can get, the more economically we can 'run the show.' 14855, 14857, 14859, 14871, 14873, 14875.

Candidates for the Supply and Transport Corps are sufficient in number and their suitability is tested at the Supply and Transport School, and subsequently during their three years probationary period with the Corps. No difficulty is now experienced in getting good men and the Corps has some of the best officers in the Indian army amongst its numbers. 14877.

The Supply and Transport Corps is about the best paid branch of the Indian army, but considers that it is accepted that they must be better paid. 14879, 14881, 14883, 14885.

The proposal to employ officers promoted from the non-commissioned ranks of British units as Commandants of transport units is a revolutionary one, and such a proposition could not be considered seriously even for a moment. 14889, 14901.

The officering of transport units with officers of the Indian army, drawn mainly from cavalry units, has been tried, and was superseded by the present system. If the regimental cavalry officer was not found to make such an efficient transport officer as the trained officer of the Supply and Transport Corps, it is not to be expected that an untrained regimental non-commissioned officer would be an efficient substitute.

The responsibility which falls upon the commandant of a transport unit is heavy, and his duties are such as can only be satisfactorily performed by a highly trained officer of energy and good education. Apart from the discipline of the unit and the well-being of the men and animals in his charge, the commandant is responsible for the interior economy of his command. 14889; 14929, 14895, 14897.

Comparison of the number of officers in a transport unit with those in a non-silladar cavalry regiment, an Indian mountain battery, and in Army Service Corps units. 14889.

Not essential that the commandant of a transport unit should have an assistant in the shape of an officer in time of peace, but it would increase efficiency and there would be full employment for him. 14913, 14915, 14925, 14927.

When a commandant of a transport unit goes on leave, if there is more than one unit in the station the officer of the other unit would command, but if the unit is by itself, would take a native cavalry officer if the leave was for a short period, but in cases of long leave, would apply for the services of one of the leave reserve officers. 14917, 14919, 14923.

If there were an assistant commandant in each transport unit we could always rely on having a man in war. 14937.

Transport officers are trained in supply duties and go backwards and forwards from one duty to the other. Undesirable to divorce transport from supply—the transport is servant of the supply and both are servants of the army. 14943, 14945.

Although the expenditure on personnel since 1898 has increased by nearly twenty-eight lakhs, the cost of supplies to the army has decreased by nearly thirty lakhs in spite of the fact that the cost of living and articles of food has increased enormously. 14947, 15023, 15025, 15029.

The increase in officers since 1898, although it has increased the cost of administration, has resulted in efficiency and in the reduction in peculation in the Supply and Transport Corps. 14947.

To make the Supply and Transport Corps more civilian in character would be a retrograde movement—a return to the system in force in the Peninsula and the Crimea. The system has been tried (with notoriously calamitous results in the Crimean War), and deliberately abandoned in favour of permanent organizations manned by officers and men drawn from the army. 15045.

The commissariat in India has always been starved and kept at the lowest possible strength to carry out with difficulty its ordinary peace duties of supplying the British troops only. On field service it supplies also all Indian troops, and on general mobilization it has to be expanded to a strength many times its peace establishment; to do this it has to depend on entirely untrained material, and it is doubtful whether even this can be obtained to anything like the required extent.

Any reduction of strength of the personnel of the Supply and Transport Corps is to be deprecated, and in fact the sound policy is to increase the personnel up to such a strength as can be fully and economically employed in peace time, which even then would be considerably less in proportion to what is now maintained by the Army Service Corps.

The allotment of a special contract officer to each division was a measure of decentralization following upon the abolition of the Commands. Previously all the more important contracts were referred by divisions to Command Headquarters and were sanctioned there. Effect of this arrangement was to lessen responsibility and consequently the acquired knowledge of the subject by the officers on the spot who were frequently little more than uninterested receivers of tenders which they submitted to superior authority for orders. This procedure did not encourage that local knowledge of resources and prices which is the foundation of economical administration in a vast country like India.

The reform has produced very satisfactory results, and the appointment of a special contract officer in each division has had the effect of concentrating the work within a convenient area and of promoting specialization. Concentration means economy in establishments, and specialization economy in arrangements for supplies. In the latter respect it is considered that the contract officer has justified himself. 15045.

Divisional contract officer is sufficiently occupied and if he does his work he must save the Government money. 15225.

Short of warrant and non-commissioned officers in the Supply and Transport Corps. 15057.

The proposed reorganization of transport units will result in a reduction of 13 officers, thus placing the Supply and Transport Corps in a still more unfavourable position as regards officers required on mobilization for all supply and transport purposes. 15330.

It would be impossible for Indian officers to command silladar camel corps. These corps are largely used for moves to the hills, etc., in peace time. 15377.

In the event of general mobilization there would be no transport officers for internal defence troops as all the transport officers would go to the front. 15569, 15571.

Statement showing in detail the number of supply and transport officers required for a field army of 7 divisions and 5 cavalry brigades and for the troops left in India for internal defence, *viz.*, 473 (including one year's wastage) for the former, and 120 for the latter. 15760.

Lord Kitchener in arriving at his estimate of 300 supply and transport officers for the field army counted on having the railways to Dakka and Parachinar. 15770.

A complement of 212 officers is essential for the present but a greater number could with advantage be employed. 15800, 15802, 15806.

*Colonel Williams.*—The four Grantee camel corps have one British officer for the whole four corps, and one native officer for each corps. On mobilization officers for these corps would have to be found from the general 'pool' of officers; they could not be found by the Supply and Transport Corps. 15415, 15417.

## DEPARTMENTS.

## SUPPLY AND TRANSPORT CORPS—SUPPLIES.

*Mr. Brunyate.*—The question of the Supply and Transport Corps arrangements with regard to contracts and food supplies wants looking into. 6088.

*General Birdwood.*—The mobilization reserves of imported articles of food supplies are considered sufficient for the first requirements of nine divisions and eight cavalry brigades.

As regards locally procurable articles of food supplies and grain for animals, small quantities are maintained to meet the concentration period requirements of five divisions and four cavalry brigades.

Sufficient fodder to meet the concentration requirements for (eleven days on the northern and central lines and eight days on the southern) of nine divisions and eight cavalry brigades. 7007.

Satisfied with the existing reserves of food supplies maintained for the Field Army. 7128.

Although the expenditure on personnel since 1898 has increased by nearly twenty-eight lakhs, the cost of supplies to the army has decreased by nearly thirty lakhs in spite of the fact that the cost of living and articles of food has increased enormously. 14947, 15023, 15025, 15029.

The system of concentration of contracts in divisional offices enables Army Headquarters to allocate to the most convenient and suitable division such contracts for the requirements of two or more divisions as can be most economically supplied from any one source selected. This system both lessens labour and promotes economy. A few contracts only are arranged at Army Headquarters such as those for tinned meat and British soldiers' boots. 15045, 15075, 15081.

Note on the contract systems of the Supply and Transport Corps. 15045.

The Divisional contract officer arranges bread and meat contracts, which are two of the biggest items, also gram, vegetables, groceries, hospital supplies, etc. 15223.

It would be possible, if the prices for grain, etc., for native troops were rising high, and thus increasing the compensation charges, for the Supply and Transport Corps to intervene and supply the rice, etc., at a certain price, but it is a difficult question. It is almost on the same lines as the question of providing free rations for native troops, and if we begin tampering with the sepoy's feeding, there will be difficulties, but we have the power to intervene and would do so if necessary. As it is, we keep our eye on local *nerrick* rates all over the country, and at once make enquiries if rates are unduly high. 15303, 15305, 15307.

In regard to stores and equipment issued by the Supply and Transport Corps to units free, there is at present no inducement for units to practice economy in regard to the use of such articles as the policy of the Government in the matter is usually to secure for itself the entire benefit of any economy which units may effect.

It would be possible to substitute a money allowance for some items of issue; units would draw their actual requirements of articles as required from the departments of supply, any money balance credit at the end of the year being shared between the Government and the unit. This system could be applied to most consumable items of issue for which fixed scales are laid down, *e.g.*, rations, oil, petty barrack supplies, compensation in lieu of short drawals being given on a lower scale than their cost to the Government. 15573.

Under present arrangements firewood issues to Indian troops must be made in kind, notwithstanding the fact that in many cases men would welcome a money allowance of less amount than the cost of the firewood ration which they do not always want in full. 15573, 15578.

Would propose giving units a lump allowance for some items of issue, the actual requirements being drawn from the department of supply, and in the case of a saving the money to be divided between the State and units. Under existing arrangements, in the case of miscellaneous articles a unit would, rather than let the money lapse to the Government, draw articles to the full value whether they are required or not. 15586.

The question of compensation for dearness of food to native soldiers has been exhaustively examined for years past, and many committees have been assembled with a view to arriving at a satisfactory solution but none so far has been found. 15594.

The present arrangements are not entirely satisfactory and economical, because the rates on which compensation are based, which are quoted by the civil authorities, are not very reliable, but the Assistant Director of Supplies of each division checks all the prices of items of the standard rations at all stations in his division whilst the prices at all the principal stations in India are closely watched at Army Headquarters and suspicious rates are at once queried.

States that Mr. Brunyate expressed his belief that food supply charges (of which compensation is an important item) have not risen to the extent which might have been anticipated in view of the rise in prices since 1898. 15594.

The Secretary of State has definitely refused to consider the system of supplying articles of food to native soldiers in India. 15600.

At present the British soldier gets fed (including the cost of fuel) at something under fourpence per diem. 15641.

The supply of fuel at many stations in India is becoming one of increasing difficulty. 15641.

Strongly recommends that a cash allowance be given to native units in lieu of wood and thinks it would lead to economy in the long run and the immediate elimination of the middleman who now makes out of Government. Would even give the men the option of taking 3lbs. in kind or the price of 2½ lbs. 15641.

*Surgeon-General Sloggett.*—Local purchase instead of keeping up a reserve of alcohol would result in economy. 10466.

There might be economy in bedding and clothing. The waste at present is enormous, due to bad laundry arrangements, cheap and shoddy material, and slipshod tailoring. 10466.

## DEPARTMENTS.

## SUPPLY AND TRANSPORT CORPS.—TRANSPORT AND REGISTRATION.

*Colonel Bingley.*—Time taken to mobilize a force depends on the time required to provide the force with second-line transport. Registered camel corps expedite collection of animals for transport. 167.

*Sir M. Grover.*—If transport registration scheme does not work out to full numbers it will at any rate work up to something better than we have ever had before. 460.

*General Aylmer.*—The collection of camels could be accomplished now with greater rapidity than was the case formerly. 2393, 2395.

Camel corps are on a fairly sound basis now. 2397.

Various possibilities that the 18 Ghilzai camel corps in the transport scheme would not come up on mobilization. 2415.

In order to feed large masses of troops at the front, motor transport must be introduced. On line of communication camels will occupy too much road space and will be impossible to feed. 2437, 2439.

Would be most difficult with present transport to feed the 4 divisions of the Field Army proposed for Kabul. 2549.

*Sir H. McMahon.*—On the whole thinks we could always rely upon Ghilzai camels for our use. 3421, 3545.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—A large force could be collected at places of concentration much quicker than the transport could be supplied. 3798.

Transport is a thing you can expand. If we cannot maintain enough transport in peace, would like to have cadres for expansion on mobilization for whatever force India relies on. 3804.

Even if fully concentrated as under the Kitchener scheme, troops would not be able to move without their second-line transport, and it would be months before even seven divisions could be provided with the same. 3869.

Some of the divisions have not even 'first line' transport. It would be months before even seven divisions could be provided with second-line transport. 3869.

Understands the 1st and 4th Divisions have a sufficient number of mules and camels. 3883.

In the event of a war with Afghanistan it would not be safe to rely on the Ghilzai Camel Corps. 3899, 3901.

The mobilization scheme absorbs all the available transport for the Field Army. 3903.

Not necessary to have highly organized pack transport for internal defence. 3905.

Doubts if without railway we can feed the four divisions necessary for Kabul in a war with Afghanistan. 4008.

*Sir G. Roos-Keppel.*—Does not think we could use light lorries for transport in Afghanistan as they would cut the roads to pieces in a very short time. 4746.

In a war with Afghanistan would not be safe to count on the Ghilzais, but if war breaks out in winter these camels will be down in districts of the Derajat and we could seize them and utilize them. Would not use the Ghilzai camel drivers in Afghanistan. 5026, 5028, 5040.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—Does not think the transport would be immediately available for a large portion of the Field Army. 5283, 5285.

The Ghilzais would turn up in ordinary times but in the case of a war with Afghanistan it would be doubtful if they would put in an appearance. 5287.

Transport is available in the country for internal defence troops and we should, of course, not ask for it but take it. 5295.

The roads from Dakka to Kabul and from Kabul in various directions are good surface roads but would never stand heavy wheeled traffic. 5343.

You could collect your transport in less than a month now for operations. 5747.

We now have the Grantee camel corps and other improvements which facilitate the transport question. 5749.

Each of the frontier brigades has mobile transport for a moveable column. 5757.

*Mr. Brunyate.*—Transport registration staff could be largely reduced 6038, 6291.

Civilians could be employed for the registration of animals. 6291.

*General Birdwood.*—All transport is sent to the base. 6972.

Transport and ammunition provided at the base with the exception of pouch ammunition which every unit maintains in peace. 6986.

We have got sufficient transport for equipment purposes, but not enough for the lines of communication. 6978.

It is all divisional transport except in the case of the frontier brigades. 6980.

The transport is so organized as to allow of its being split up. 6982.

The advantage of the divisional transport is that it is under the divisional General who uses it in the best way possible. 6984.

Immediate requirements in transport mules can be met, and approximately half a year's wastage is available.

As regards camel transport, it is estimated that requirements and wastage can be met.

As regards bullock transport, it is estimated that the number of bullocks required can be obtained in the country, but that considerable difficulty will be experienced in getting the personnel. 7007.

We calculate on obtaining the mules required to expand cadres within 21 days. 7019.

In addition to the 31,000 mules always maintained, 27,000 would be required to cover requirements on mobilization and a year's wastage. 7023.

The scheme for transport for the Field Army does not rely on bullocks from Madras. 7035.

Not safe to count absolutely on the Ghilzai camel corps. 7037.

We could use the Ghilzai drivers, and we would probably get the camels if mobilization took place in the winter when they were grazing within our borders. 7039.

By the time the troops could be got clear out of Jamrud and Quetta we could make up any deficiency in mules by importation. 7043.

The employment of mechanical transport would improve the situation to an enormous extent. 7106.

The maintenance in time of peace of motor lorries for transport for the Field Army is being considered. 7113.

The introduction of motor transport would result in a great saving in men and money on mobilization. 7112.

Under the proposed reorganization of transport units, in lieu of the present 21 corps and 18 cadres, the whole of the mule transport (except that at Malakand and Chitral) is divided into 142 companies. Each company will consist of 168 mules with 42 carts, will be commanded by a British warrant or non-commissioned officer and will be a self-contained unit. For administrative purposes companies will be grouped into corps of four or six companies under a British officer, the larger units (*i.e.*, those of six companies) being given a departmental officer with honorary rank as assistant commandant and quartermaster. In all there will be thirty corps. The companies will be conveniently placed both for work in peace and for mobilization, and it will be possible to detach individual companies under the warrant or non-commissioned officer in charge, for service or other duties, more easily than can be done at present. 15339, 15343.

The saving consequent on the reorganization is almost entirely due to the reduction of thirteen officers, and this places the Supply and Transport Corps in a still more unfavourable position as regards officers required on mobilization for all supply and transport purposes. 15330.

At present a mule corps costs roughly Rs. 1,82,000 per annum and a mule cadre Rs. 83,000 per annum. 15339.

The proposal to have only five main transport units, the reduction of the officers to six, and the reduction of the drivers by 1,000 is not practicable. 15375.

It would be impossible for Indian officers to command silladar camel corps. 15377.

The proposed reorganization of ammunition columns, requiring an additional 5,753 mules for the ammunition columns of 9 divisions, 8 cavalry brigades, and army troops, if given effect to, will put us in a worse position in obtaining our numbers on mobilization, and would swell the large deficiency we have to face to replace wastage in the field. It is possible, however, that we could meet requirements if we could get our organized cadres expanded, but as things are at present some of the leading divisions of the Field Army would probably have to go short of a certain amount of organized transport. 15419, 15437, 15462.

Statement shewing transport ordinarily available at Peshawar and at the headquarters of the frontier brigades for use on emergency. 15504.

Transport is allotted to a regiment on concentration as a general arrangement; each regiment has its transport given it at the front. The frontier brigades keep their transport in peace time which is then to a certain extent regimental. In Kohat, Bannu and the Derajat there is a certain amount of local transport given to regiments to keep as was done under the old Punjab Frontier Force system. 15508.

The present system of registration is fairly satisfactory—as satisfactory as can be hoped for in this country without the expenditure of a large sum of money to which we are adverse, more especially as we cannot absolutely rely on obtaining all the animals we register on mobilization. 15516, 15528.

Decided to abolish actual registration of all animals in the Punjab and North-West Frontier Province. It has been found that the registration of nomadic animals is of little practical benefit since they are constantly moving from area to area in search of employment, but we can gauge with fair accuracy the numbers available from any given district and there is no practical benefit to be gained by registering them.

The system now recommended is analogous to that in the United Provinces and Bombay. As regards bullocks, each district should have a fixed number of animals allotted to it—the quota which it may be called on to produce for war purposes. As regards mules and camels, the most that can be done is to have a transport officer constantly touring in his area whose business it will be to keep in touch with owners and who should be able to say what numbers of camels or mules can be found in his particular area at any given time.

General impressment of these animals (nomadic) wherever they may happen to be will have to be resorted to on mobilization.

As regards the advantages of employing military officers for registration work, the first point to be remembered is that the civil authorities accept no responsibility for these matters. Their duties lie in the collection of the animals which have been located and selected during peace by military officers. The civil department lends its assistance during peace but is not responsible for numbers or quality.

Statement of duties of enumeration or transport registration officers.

As regards the possibility of registration being carried out by the civil authorities, not only is a whole-time officer necessary, but he must also possess certain qualifications in the matter, knowledge of animals, etc. The transport officer, on the result of his investigations, furnishes the Collector of the district with the numbers of animals available, and on this as a basis the quota is fixed. The *zaildar* maintains a register of the selected animals. On mobilization these quotas have to be collected by civil agency, after which the responsibility of the civil administration ends. 15516.

From motives of economy, proposed to reduce the number of registration officers. They seem hardly worth the expense involved. 15518, 15524.

For actual first mobilization, hopes to be able to get the whole of the 37,981 mules required to equip the Field Army by the time the mobilization of the whole 9 divisions and 8 cavalry brigades is completed. The shortage of 8,517 shewn in the statement previously supplied to the Committee is arrived at by deducting the total number available from requirements, including one year's wastage. 15542.

Ghilzai camels are made available for use in war under provisional contracts which are effective only when mobilization takes place. The camels are usually in India from October to March only. The above contracts have held good since 1903 and are applicable to twenty-nine corps or 32,451 camels. There is in peace time no liability on either side, but it is possible that, in the absence of some form of recognition from the Government, the tribal *sardars* and syndicates who guarantee the raising of these units may not continue to ratify their agreements year after year, and it is thought that if seats in the Provincial Darbar were granted to certain selected *sardars* it would be a suitable form of reward. 15544.

We spend no money on the Ghilzai camel corps, we register them only, but as there is always the uncertainty as to whether we will obtain these people in the event of hostilities, it points to the necessity of retaining our silladar camel corps. 15546.

The census figures in the Punjab shew an increase from 2,02,646 camels in 1894 to 2,70,522 in 1909. The price of camels however has gone up from Rs. 80 when the present silladar camel corps were raised, to Rs. 130 and over at the present time, without any appreciable increase in quality. 15048.

The scheme for general mobilization, so far as the Quartermaster-General's Branch is concerned, is worked out at present on the assumption that no form of mechanical traction or light railway will be used. 15552.

It is proposed to use mechanical traction as much as possible to relieve the strain on the animal transport, more especially on the northern line. Enquiries are being made from all divisions which should shew to what extent this form of traction now exists in India, and it may be possible in time to introduce some form of subvention of lorries similar to that adopted in England. These enquiries should also shew the possibility of using this form of traction in time of peace, with the various Government departments, railways, and so on, and it is hoped it may be found feasible to keep up a small nucleus in India which can be used economically and at the same time serve as a means of training in this country. It is calculated that some 60,000 bullocks with their personnel could be replaced with advantage in this way in the event of operations in Afghanistan. 15552.



Could not replace camels by mechanical transport. 15554, 15557.

As regards the impressment of transport animals, a Bill is already drafted and approved and will be passed in Council on emergency requiring it to be brought into operation. 15661.

The carriage required for internal defence troops on the departure of the Field Army would be hired in the ordinary way locally, but would if necessary be impressed. The requirements of each division in transport together with the resources available are shewn in the area defence schemes. The resources are arrived at by the General Officer Commanding in communication with the civil authorities and are over and above the demand from the area on mobilization. 15565.

Organized mule transport in India is maintained in the form of 'corps' and 'cadres.' Corps consist of fully organized and complete units for work with divisions and cavalry brigades. Cadres are units in skeleton form in peace and are expanded into full corps on mobilization by :

- (a) mules registered during peace ;
- (b) silladar cavalry mules utilized on mobilization ;
- (c) certain mules which have not so far been formed into corps or cadres.

We have in all, 17 pack mule corps, 15 pack mule cadres, 4 cavalry brigade corps and 3 cavalry brigade cadres.

Statement shewing the details of the allotment of transport to the field army. 15657.

If the proposal for the reorganization of the ammunition columns is accepted would require about 7 additional mule corps. 15661.

Under the reorganization if we get all our registered animals we shall have sufficient mules to complete the enhanced number required for the proposed ammunition columns but this would reduce the large number required almost from the start to replace wastage.

For the new ammunition columns will require 1,921 carts more than are at present arranged for, which will be met from the existing surplus of 10,459 carts left over after supplying the 9 divisions and 8 cavalry brigades, the deficiency for supply purposes on the lines of communication being met by a corresponding increase in the number purchased in the country.

Statement shewing the total number of mules and carts required under the existing and the proposed ammunition columns for 9 divisions and 8 cavalry brigades. 15663.

Pony cart trains have been abolished. They are considered inferior to mule transport. 15671.

Annual requirements to replace wastage have, so far, been calculated as follows :—

- (a) On the actual castings which have taken place in the first six months of the official year.
- (b) On the average percentage of castings during the previous three years for the second six months of the year.

This system has not been a success for the reason that once Budget provision has been made the number of mules cast in divisions has to be regulated by the number that can be bought for the money provided.

Transport mules are brought up for casting by the officer commanding the mule unit. The animals are then inspected and approved by the Assistant Director of Transport of the division and final sanction to their disposal is given by the General Officer Commanding.

Statement shewing variations in the complement of army transport mules since 1895-96, giving causes of increase. 15673.

For the next few years we ought to replace mules at the rate of 12 per cent. of the total number; that would put the situation right in regard to the excessive number of old mules now in units. 15693.

Mules on purchase by the Army Remount Department in India are taken over by the Supply and Transport Corps and sent to a central point, such as Rawalpindi or Lahore in the Punjab, from which they are distributed to divisions. Imported mules are taken over at the port of disembarkation and dealt with in the same way. 15673.

At times, have to take on rolls numbers of mules far beyond the age of remounts, e.g., in 1908, 1,300 mules were transferred from battery baggage class to transport, many of which were old animals. The result of this has been that at present we have on the rolls mules from 18 to 20 years of age of which 1,103 are classified as fit and 717 unfit, and mules over 20 years of age of which 1,004 are classified as fit and 518 unfit. Essential to get rid of the 1,235 unfit mules at once and have accordingly asked for an additional allotment to enable us to buy 1100 more mules during the current year. It is however equally necessary to eliminate gradually the 2,104 animals shewn as fit at present. 15673, 15695.

*Colonel Williams.*—In favour of the proposed scheme for the reorganization of transport units. 15337.

The proposal to have only five main transport units, initiated by the Military Finance Branch, is unworkable. 15374.

In the silladar camel corps, those in receipt of full pay are fully employed in peace time; cannot say they earn their full pay, but they earn a considerable portion of their upkeep. They are paid Rs. 3 per mensem as a retaining fee when unemployed, and Rs. 9 when employed. 15379, 15399.

The present establishment of the silladar camel corps (9,000 camels) is necessary. They are used as second-line transport for the infantry. In addition to the present 9,000, many thousands of camels would have to be employed on the lines of communication. 15401.

As regards Grantee camel corps in the canal colonies, the men are given grants of land on the understanding they produce so many camels and come out for 15 days' training every year at 15 days' notice, and provide the animals with serviceable gear and a driver for every three camels. The men are not allowed to change the animals under three years. We could obtain 4,000 camels from this source. The civil authorities say they cannot continue the system because the spread of the canals has interfered with the grazing and the land is waterlogged. Considering silladar camel corps in their place. 15405, 15407, 15413.

*General Hamilton Gordon.*—Until mechanical transport becomes commonly used in India it is unlikely the Government will maintain a sufficient amount of it to meet our requirements in the event of a war with Afghanistan. 13687.

In the opinion of competent authorities who have been consulted, it is probable that even in the case of war with Afghanistan the Ghilzai camel corps or a large portion of them would be available. They cannot be reckoned upon with absolute certainty, but this appears to be no reason why their registration for what it is worth should not be carried on. It should be remembered that the Ghilzais are hostile to the present Barakzai dynasty. In our most recent schemes there are alternative plans, those in which the Ghilzais are to be depended on, and others from which they have been eliminated. 13899.

*Major Annesley.*—Transport animals are registered only in the Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province. In the United Provinces, Bengal, and Bombay, they are merely enumerated. 15853.

Registration consists in the name and description of the owner and a full description of the animal being recorded in a register. This is intended to be carried out by the registration assistant. A copy of this assistant's register is maintained by the *tahsildar* concerned and by the transport registration officer

and the latter's duty is to inspect periodically the animals borne on the register. The Collector fixes the number and class of animals to be registered. Animal are produced at given times for inspection. 15835, 15843, 15909, 15911.

As regards enumeration, the local Government sanctions a certain quota of animals to be provided from each district in case of mobilization. No registers are maintained. The district officer, in consultation with the transport registration officer, sub-divides his allotment into *tahsil* allotments and fixes the collecting centres for each *tahsil*. The transport registration officer periodically visits each district, inspects the animals of each *tahsil*, and advises redistribution of allotments as may be found necessary. 15835, 15843.

The Simla Committee of 1910 condemned individual registration as carried out in the Punjab, and recommended the universal adoption of the United Provinces system of enumeration for non-nomadic animals. The *zaildar* to maintain a list showing the allotment of each village in his *zail*. As regards nomads, the Committee were of opinion that all that could be done was for the transport registration officer to ascertain by constant touring the normal numbers that would be present in each district at any given time of the year and the directions in which the animals generally traded. 15835, 16020.

Considers that the system of registration or enumeration will be of material assistance in the acquisition of animals when required for war, and considers that the system recommended by the Simla Committee will prove as satisfactory as can be hoped for without undertaking heavy expenditure on registration or retaining fees. 15835.

Considers that on mobilization we would be as likely to obtain animals under the enumeration system as under the registration system. Only fit animals are taken account of under both systems. 15839, 15841, 15843, 15845.

The collecting power lies with the civil authorities; considers that the *zaildars* should have enough power to see that the right animals are collected. 15849.

For the Chitral expedition, the civil authorities collected bullocks and ponies. Only about 10 per cent. of those of the former were fit, but the ponies were better. Mules were brought in by mule dealers just as they would be in ordinary times, and only about the average prices were charged. 15357, 15859, 15861, 15863.

The confusion in the transport arrangements of the Chitral expedition was due to lack of organization. Men were seized from the bazars, put in charge of bullocks and so on; they were put into the train with a British officer straight from a British regiment and off they went to the front—a mob. 15867.

The same confusion should not take place now, because we know the number of units we want to raise in case of a big mobilization. Commandants are already told off; we have a certain amount of supervising personnel in the way of native officers, havildars, naiks, etc., who come from regiments (*i.e.*, regiments not on the mobilization roster). These go through transport courses in time of peace, and officers who have been through transport courses are generally chosen for command. There will be trouble as regards transport drivers, except bullock drivers; in the case of camel drivers, the difficulty will be accentuated—we want the proper *sarwans*. 15869, 15871, 15873, 15875, 15877, 15879, 15881, 15883, 16054.

Personnel for hired camel corps would have to be obtained from outside the corps. 15893.

A certain number of bullocks are kept up, but a very small proportion—practically nothing to what we should want. 15895.

From what he has read understands the transport arrangements for the Tirah expedition were very unsatisfactory. The animals were miserable and the drivers were an undisciplined mob. 15899, 15901.

Considers that two officers are necessary for enumeration in the United Provinces. 15928.

Under the enumeration system, does not trouble about ownership. 15940.

Gets through area allotted to him for enumeration about once every two years. 15942.

The number of animals collected at the officer's inspection which are classed as unfit depends a good deal on the *halqadar* (or *kanungo* in the United Provinces), but there is an Urdu pamphlet given to these native subordinates, which states exactly the stamp of animal required. 15944, 15946.

Enumeration is really a rough census of the number of fit available animals in the province. 15948.

The system of enumeration has not been extended to Madras. 15950.

Information is available as to the number of transport animals in Native States in the Punjab. 15956.

As regards bullock drivers, the Oudh Talukdars have promised to supply us with various numbers from their estates in case of mobilization. In the Province of Agra the Collectors have given us the names of big landowners who have agreed to supply a certain number. 15962.

Have roughly about five thousand bullock drivers in the United Provinces. 15968, 16129.

In peace time each transport pack mule corps has carts lent to it. It would go on service without these carts and they would be used as bullock carts; by those means we should supply a good many. 15972.

Does not know why the ordinary country carts would tumble to pieces in the dry climate of Afghanistan any more than in the Punjab. They would be used on the lines of communication. 15976.

In big towns we register ponies which take the place of mule cart trains. In time of war would have to organize them in regular new corps. 15980, 15984.

The enumeration officer has to make enquiries about, and inspect the personnel landowners have promised and the native officers of the reserve, and has also to find twenty-eight artificers for each corps to be raised in his area. 15986, 15988.

Each transport corps formed on mobilization would have two native officers from the Indian army and two from the reserve. 15990.

Could not rely on the efforts of the civil people for the enumeration of animals; in the first place does not consider they would have time to go into the question properly; an expert must decide as to the class of animal that is to be enumerated. 15992.

Tours in his area for about seven months in the year. 16008.

It is the custom among native owners to hide their best animals as soon as they suspect that the Government intend to collect them for field service, but under the *zail* and village system sufficient control should be capable of being exercised over owners to repress this custom. 16016, 16018.

Most camels and mules are of the nomadic class, especially camels. 16026.

Acts similar to the Punjab Transport Animals Impressment Act do not exist in other provinces in India, except in the North-West Frontier Province. In time of war a system of general or partial impressment would have to be adopted according to the size of the war. 16030, 16032.

Under the Punjab Military Transport Animals Act, registers are to be revised annually under arrangements to be made by the Collector and the transport registration officer in consultation. In the United Provinces where enumeration is carried out each district has so far been inspected by the transport registration officer once every three years. The Simla Committee propose that a general muster should take place through each district annually. 16034, 16042.

Taking into account that many of the mules required for the expansion of cadres will at the time of mobilization be working across the border, of opinion that all the mule cadres could not be expanded to full war strength even at their equipping stations, and much less at the bases of operations, in twenty-one days. From experience acquired from working in the Rawalpindi transport office, considers it would take from thirty to sixty days. Some cadres, however, are expanded with silladar grass mules and their expansion would be fairly rapid. 16046.

The collection of camels would be still slower as they work further afield. 16048.

In his own area could get the bullocks within twenty-one days. 16050.

Has registered over 10,000 bullocks in his area. 16052.

Transport drivers, when called up on mobilization, should be given free rations from the day of enlistment and the advance of pay should be Rs. 20. At present transport drivers feed themselves until they get beyond the base. 16054, 16068.

Impressment will have to be resorted to for transport drivers. 16054, 16060, 16066.

Considers the silladar camel corps to be most efficient. The advantages that corps organized on the silladar system have over hired camel corps are (a) preparedness for war, (b) disciplined units, (c) efficient drivers, (d) first class animals. 16070, 16072.

It would be dangerous to reduce the number of camels on full pay. We have only eight corps as it is, and the animals might be wanted suddenly. 16076.

The camels of the silladar camel corps are well fitted for service across the frontier. 16086.

Anticipates that from twenty to twenty-five per cent. of the enumerated bullocks and ponies would be rejected on account of unfitness on mobilization. 16099, 16105, 16107, 16109.

In 1904 a bullock train was raised in the Benares division of the United Provinces; they had great difficulty in raising drivers, but when it got to the front it was all right. 16111, 16113, 16115.

A Supply and Transport Corps Officer is kept on transport registration duty for from two to three years, and gets the same staff pay as he would on other work. 16149, 16153.

#### WRITTEN EVIDENCE.

*Colonel Parkin.*—So far, the supply of mules from China has not been stopped but we are faced with the fact that the Chinese may at any time stop mules coming to Burma. 272.

## FIELD ARMY.

## EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES.

*Colonel Bingley.*—Seven divisions now fully equipped for the Field Army. 174.

*Sir M. Grover.*—Had the money spent on redistribution been utilized in improving the armaments of units of the Field Army, we would still be in much the same position as we are now, as armaments are always changing, and units are at times in the Field Army and at times detailed for internal defence. 472, 476, 478.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—Sceptical as regards the possibility of feeding four divisions at Kabul. 4008.

Doubts if without railway we can feed the four divisions necessary for Kabul in a war with Afghanistan. 4008.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—The army is absolutely without ambulance transport, would rather do without a brigade than without ambulance transport. 5289.

You could not feed four divisions and two cavalry brigades in Kabul from local supplies for long, but sees no difficulty in doing so once our lines of communication are open and we have light railways to assist us in our task. 5368.

*General Birdwood.*—Units of the Field Army are provided in peace with the greater part of the equipment they require, the balance on mobilization provided for by a system of checked indents on the base or equipping station. 6966.

Transport and ammunition provided at the base with the exception of pouch ammunition which every unit maintains in peace. 6966.

The mobilization reserves of imported articles of food supplies are considered sufficient for the first requirements of nine divisions and eight cavalry brigades.

As regards locally procurable articles of food supplies and grain for animals small quantities are maintained to meet the concentration period requirements of five divisions and four cavalry brigades.

Sufficient fodder to meet the concentration requirements (for eleven days on the northern and central lines and eight days on the southern) of nine divisions and eight cavalry brigades.

With a few exceptions, the reserves of clothing maintained by the Army Clothing Department are adequate to meet requirements.

The imported articles of mobilization equipment maintained by the Supply and Transport Corps are sufficient to meet the first requirements of nine divisions and eight cavalry brigades. 7007.

Satisfied with the existing reserves of food supplies maintained for the Field Army. 7128.

Except fuel and forage we could supply four divisions in Kabul by utilizing the northern and central lines. 7305, 7316.

In the case of British troops a stock of boots and shoes aggregating 132,500 pairs is to be maintained at the Army Boot Depot, Cawnpore. This stock is turned over in the process of meeting peace requirements. In addition, regiments keep in regimental charge a stock equivalent to three months' average requirements or about 16,000 pairs, and thus 132,500 pairs of boots may be considered as available for supply in the event of war. A separate stock of 1570 pairs of boots for British troops maintained in mobilization reserve by the Supply and Transport Corps for issue to departmental military subordinates. 15703, 15717.

A first supply of boots to British troops on mobilization is not needed as the two pairs in possession of each soldier would be taken to the field and any unserviceable pairs would be replaced from the regimental stock which is equal to three months' requirements. In the event of a campaign which employed the whole British force in India the available stock of boots would suffice for from six to eight months, and in the event of a prolonged campaign we should probably, in the present state of the trade in India, have to seek supplementary sources of supply outside India. We could, therefore, safely increase our stock to 210,000 pairs. No loss from deterioration need be anticipated if we keep up a stock which can be turned over in four years. 15703.

No reserve stock of boots for Indian troops is maintained by the Government in peace. Some reserve is maintained by Cooper, Allen & Co. for the regiments with which they individually deal, but this is, as a rule, merely a stock sufficient to enable the firm to meet peace demands with promptitude.

A small stock of 2500 pairs of boots is maintained by the Supply and Transport Corps for issue on mobilization to native superior class subordinates.

The Indian soldier maintains two pairs of boots in peace and takes them with him on service. He does not therefore require any immediate issue at the beginning of a campaign but merely renewals during the course of operations, and to meet the latter it is probable that we should have to resort to supplementary sources of supply outside India.

Indian troops should be required to get their boots from the Army Clothing Department and we should maintain, for mobilization purposes, as large a stock as we can turn over without loss in time of peace.

A reserve stock of 65,000 shoes is maintained by the Supply and Transport Corps for native followers. Many small dealers throughout India manufacture shoes such as followers are accustomed to wear, and we have in this case a much larger market to draw upon than in the case of the better made boots supplied to British and Indian troops. 15705.

No reserve of clothing is maintained for native units. 15730.

Mobilization reserves of grain amounting to 144,000 *maunds*, are distributed as follows:—

Peshawar 23,000 ; Rawalpindi 37,000 ; Sialkot 20,000 ; Lahore 23,000 ;  
and Quetta 38,000 *maunds*. There is no reserve maintained in  
forts.

At present this reserve has to be turned over annually and the turnover entails some loss. It has in the past been stored in bags, improvised pits, and towers. The question of adopting a better method of storing has been engaging attention for some years; experiments for storing it in *gholas* charged with carbonic acid gas and in silos are being carried out and it is hoped that a satisfactory method of storing this article without recurring loss will soon be introduced. 15808.

Mobilization reserves of fodder amounting to 653,652 *maunds* are distributed as follows:—

Peshawar 251,214 ; Rawalpindi 138,879 ; Bannu 5,200 ; Kohat 70,800 ;  
and Quetta 187,559 *maunds*. Half of this reserve is turned  
over every year.

Mobilization reserves of fuel, amounting to 72,789 *maunds* are distributed as follows:—

Peshawar Division 16,000 ; Rawalpindi Division 6,789 ; and Quetta  
Division 5,000 *maunds*. In addition a reserve for 13,020 *maunds*  
is maintained in forts. 15808.

These arrangements for reserves of fodder grain and fuel are as economical as is possible under the circumstances. 15824.

*Colonel Williams*.—Have no reserve of wheat, but have a reserve of food for the men. 15812, 15816.

*General Aylmer.*—An addition of 32 pack horses for carriage of maxims and reserve ammunition should be made to Indian cavalry regiments. 8456.

*General Stuart.*—British units, whether allotted to the Field Army or to internal defence, should always be in actual possession of 300 rounds per rifle. 10091.

Absolutely necessary that the British troops that go to the hills should take ammunition with them. 10093.

*Colonel Hoghton.*—Has a standing order in his regiment with Cooper, Allen and Co. for 300 pairs of boots, and this firm has told him they can meet his requirements on mobilization. 10984, 10994, 10998.

Thinks Cooper, Allen and Co. should have enough boots for the whole army. 10996.

Doubts if in the event of war he could get a mobilization supply of clothing and a service supply afterwards for his regiment. 11052.

An inquiry into the whole question of clothing for the native army would be an excellent thing. 11054.

*Major Hill.*—Decentralization in the custody of mobilization stores would facilitate mobilization. 11374.

*Colonel Dunsterville.*—Would be able to keep up supply of shoes in the field. 11826.

Anticipates no difficulty in obtaining fresh clothing supplies for his battalion on service. 11840.

*Colonel Creagh.*—Satisfied that he can meet requirements as regards clothing for his battalion on mobilization. 12199.

*Colonel Mead.*—Gets the boots for his regiment from Cooper, Allen and Co., who keep 700 pairs for him on mobilization—tried Pocock for a year or two but the fitting was not good. 12591, 12593, 12597.

Trying the Army Clothing Factory for khaki with the object of getting supplies from them for field service. 12609.

*General Hamilton Gordon.*—It is not the function of the General Staff to see that the Field Army is properly equipped but it is their duty to keep themselves informed on the subject. 13382.

General Staff drew attention of the Commander-in-Chief to the state of affairs regarding rifles as soon as ever they learned from the Ordnance Branch that the estimates upon which manufacture and the orders for the supply of the new rifles had been based had been found to have been seriously miscalculated. 13593.



## FIELD ARMY.

## MOBILIZATION AND CONCENTRATION.

*Colonel Bingley.*—Had Lord Kitchener's scheme been carried to completion it would have conferred considerable advantages for mobilization purposes. 161.

Adds enormously to smoothness of mobilization if complete organization is thought out beforehand. 163.

Time taken to mobilize a force depends on time required to provide the force with second-line transport. 167.

Troops can as a rule be collected long before the transport can. 169.

*Sir M. Grover.*—It often happens that Army Headquarters must necessarily intervene in mobilization arrangements, even in minor expeditions. 398.

Army Headquarters prepare tables of railway movements on concentration. 408.

If the full number of transport animals registered is provided, 5 divisions could be equipped in two months, 2 more divisions in another month, the remaining division not being required till after the 3rd month. 448.

Possible, but undesirable, to move up troops to the front before the second-line transport required is collected or available. 454.

*General Aylmer.*—Arrangements prior to the Redistribution Scheme were chaotic from a mobilization and concentration point of view. 2359, 2361, 2363.

No time after mobilization to train units required for the Field Army to act together. It is therefore preferable to have ready for the Field Army units of the strength of a brigade or division, and to scramble for the troops required for the larger internal defence columns, than *vice versa*. 2622.

Would have 750 reservists for each infantry battalion to meet deficiencies on mobilization and wastage for a year. 8203, 8355, 8372.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—A large force could be collected at places of concentration much quicker than the transport could be supplied. 3798.

Before we talk about mobilizing nine divisions we ought to complete the requirements of the troops we have actually available. 3802.

Even if fully concentrated, as under the Kitchener scheme, troops would not be able to move without their second-line transport, and it would be months before even seven divisions could be provided with the same. 3869.

For concentration of troops General Staff prepare a scheme which is issued to divisions, and from it divisions know which regiments have to move. 3889.

The mobilization scheme absorbs all the available transport for the Field Army. 3903.

Does not concur in the opinion that the mobilization arrangements in Lord Roberts' time were chaotic. 3909.

Hesitates to accept the view that we can advance to Kabul and Kandahar with the rapidity that is assumed. 3990.

In a war with Russia, we would have six months to get to Kabul and Kandahar instead of the few weeks that Army Headquarters contemplate or assume. 3992.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—Had the Loi-Shilman and Parachinar railways been completed, the saving of expense and time on mobilization would have been great and the saving in transport animals still greater. 5283.

Does not think the transport would be immediately available for a large portion of the Field Army. 5283, 5285.

Against making up of numbers on mobilization by having larger reserves. 5581.

You could collect your transport in less than a month now for operations. 5747.

The mobilization of troops is entirely done by divisional commanders. 5761.

The nearest division should furnish the troops for a minor expedition. 5767.

*General Birdwood.*—Peace strength of units in India being in excess of war strength, it is only necessary to select the men to be left behind. 6966.

Army Headquarters issues orders to mobilize and concentrate and arrange for the supply of deficiencies in British officers. 6966.

Concentration is carried out in accordance with 'Plans of Movement' prepared at Army Headquarters unless only one division is involved, in which case the divisional commander arranges for the concentration. 6966.

When a division has to draw units from another divisional area the movement is carried out in direct communication between the General Officers Commanding concerned, but Army Headquarters issues the orders first. 6966, 6968, 7184.

The General Staff Branch obtains the orders of Government to mobilize and concentrate, the Adjutant-General then issues orders to mobilize and the Quartermaster-General to concentrate, all transport is sent to the base. 6972.

Subsidiary plans for mobilizing the nine divisions have been completed, but have not been issued. 6990.

The Railway Board now accepts entire responsibility for carrying out the prepared plans, and Army Headquarters merely indicate the troops, etc., to be moved, the distribution of these in the various blocks and the order in which they should arrive at the base. 6992.

The railway portion of the concentration scheme is made out entirely by one railway official, and then criticized by a second, the latter being the officer who would be in charge of the concentration in war. 6992.

Although the railway authorities want 21 days' notice for concentration, it is believed that in practice this period would be shortened. 7001, 7003, 7005.

To horse the artillery of the Field Army on mobilization it would be necessary even after utilizing the reserve to withdraw 803 horses from internal defence units. 7007.

British cavalry and Indian silladar cavalry can mobilize out of their peace establishment. 7007.

We calculate on obtaining the mules required to expand cadres within 21 days. 7019.

In addition to the 31,000 mules always maintained, 27,000 would be required to cover requirements on mobilization and a year's wastage. 7023.

The scheme for transport for the Field Army does not rely on bullocks from Madras. 7035.

By the time the troops could be got clear out of Jamrud and Quetta, we could make up any deficiency in mules by importation. 7043.

The introduction of motor transport would result in a great saving in men and money on mobilization. 7112.

During the 21 days' grace allowed to the railway all the technical troops allotted to each line of advance would be moved up. 7134.

'Plans of Movement,' are at present under revision, and under the proposed revised system the flow of units to the base can be regulated according to the situation at the front without in any way dislocating the general plan of concentration. 7138.

The Field Army brigades trained under their own Generals should go on service. 7164.

The advantages of the decentralized system introduced by Lord Kitchener are most striking. 7184.

Would lay down as a guide that troops should be taken from the nearest division both for frontier and overseas expeditions. 7184.

The interruption of Lord Kitchener's scheme will materially handicap the mobilization and concentration arrangements. 7203.

The completion of the Loi-Shilman and Parashinar railways would tend to remove the handicap on mobilization. 7207, 7281.

In the time of the last Afghan war concentration would probably have taken three times as long as it would now. 7322.

Artillery units cannot mobilize with their own horses, and 1,310 additional horses would be required on mobilization to enable batteries to go into the field fully horsed. 15261.

Silladar cavalry regiments are able to mobilize with their own horses. 15281.

*Sir T. Wynne.*—The 21 days' notice required by the railway before it could start running the full concentration complement of trains could be diminished. 8813, 8815.

A large increase of rolling stock on the North-Western Railway is being made, and in a year or so the period of notice required as regards the northern and central lines may be reduced to ten days. 8815.

In the event of a general mobilization, the drivers along the railways in the vicinity of the frontier would be entirely Europeans or Eurasians. 8850.

*Captain Watson.*—The 21 days' notice required by the North-Western Railway before starting the full concentration complement of trains is needed to distribute the engines and stock, and to obtain engines and staff from foreign lines. 8814.

In a year or two, however, the North-Western Railway will be able to do without any help from foreign railways as regards the northern and central lines of advance. 8814.

As regards the southern line, it takes a considerable time to get engines up that side in any case. 8814.

In the revised scheme it is provided that the technical troops would be brought up to their bases early. 8819.

The conveyance of transport animals and vehicles is the trouble, as they take up more room. 8825, 8827.

The 1st Division could be moved in four days on the northern line, the first troops on the central and southern lines in about eight days, and the head of the 9th Division could be got to the base on about the 10th, and the remainder on about the 18th day. 8833, 8835.

The concentration scheme on hand is for seven divisions and five cavalry brigades. 8840.

Going into Peshawar, we shall eventually have twelve trains a day running. 8845.

The three lines of advance are quite separate and a derailment on one would not affect the others. 8847.

*Colonel Hoghton.*—Would like to see the establishment of Indian ranks for purposes of mobilization increased so that each company could start out 100 strong. 10520.

The changes introduced by Lord Kitchener in connexion with the training, preparation and mobilization of units of the native army for field service have generally proved satisfactory. 10972.

*Major Hill.*—Does not anticipate any difficulty in British territory if reservists are required to join at short notice on emergency, but the Native States might present difficulty as the postal arrangements there are so bad. 11205.

Mobilization has greatly benefited from Lord Kitchener's scheme, but not to the extent it might have done. 11374.

*Colonel Dunsterville.*—Approves of the changes introduced by Lord Kitchener in connexion with the training, the preparation, and the mobilization of units of the Indian army for field service, and would not suggest modifying or amending any of the changes made. 11794.

*General Hamilton Gordon.*—Some of the functions of the Mobilization Committee have been passed on to the General Staff. 13362.

Mobilization is solely the work of the Adjutant-General now. 13369, 13639.

The concentration of five divisions and four cavalry brigades was worked out in accordance with an approved scheme of deployment and the reason why further concentration arrangements were not formally laid down was that subsequent action would depend mainly upon events which might have happened and upon information which might have been received in the meantime. Alternative plans of concentration for two more divisions were, to a considerable extent, worked out in the Quartermaster-General's Branch, but it was not considered desirable to issue them outside Army Headquarters. 13487, 13503 13505.

At the present moment arrangements are being worked out for the concentration of seven divisions and four cavalry brigades with a view to a possible campaign against Afghanistan, and the position of the remainder of the Field Army will be settled in accordance with what circumstances outside India or the demands of internal security may require. 13487.

It would take months to get the whole of the Field Army into position. 13545.

Although no steps have recently been taken to complete a plan of operations against Russia, the strategical study is kept up to date and carefully revised and on it a complete plan of operations could be very quickly prepared, more especially as the concentration tables for the preliminary moves would be much the same as those for a war with Afghanistan. 13572.

The only preparations for operations against Russia and Afghanistan prior to 1906 that can be traced appear to have taken the form of mobilization orders and time-tables for the concentration of troops on general mobilization. 13533.

*General Headlam.*—Low peace establishments, depending on a reserve for mobilization, are unsuitable for the Indian army. 14101, 14141.

Under the revised system for the training and calling up of reservists it is proposed to avoid the move of depôts, with all the baggage of the battalion, for which accommodation has to be found, and to amalgamate the reservists with the depôt on which will devolve the duty of furnishing drafts, thus avoiding the necessity for forming reserve battalions. 14212.

Field Service Manual, 1907, makes no mention of taking men from linked battalions of native units to complete battalions of the Field Army. Mobilization Regulations direct that deficiencies will be met by the divisional commander from units in the divisional area detailed for internal defence. There is no reference to linked battalions except in paragraph 32 which legislates for drawing from linked battalions when they are not detailed for the Field Army; and it is further legislated for that battalions may have to take the field short of full field service strength. 14216.

In detailing native units for the Field Army, no provision is made for leaving one battalion of a link behind. 14233, 14239.

*Colonel Hamilton.*—Not contemplated according to present orders that any reservists be absorbed into the battalions on mobilization. 14693.

A battalion which cannot work up to its field service strength of 752 will be filled up with its own reservists, but if they are not called up, then from one of the links. 14730.

On mobilization, reservists are called up by order of the Government of India. They are summoned as in peace, except in the case of Gurkhas whose calling up notices are sent to the Resident in Nepal in bulk by regiments. In the case of trans-frontier reservists the aid of the political agent will be asked to deliver calling out notices. Reservists are inspected, armed and equipped at the regimental centres as during peace. 'Foreign' reservists after being equipped at their peace training stations are sent to their regimental centres. It is proposed to abolish the term 'regimental centre' and to substitute 'reserve centre.' On mobilization the reservists will assemble, be armed and equipped at their reserve centres and then proceed to join the depôts of their battalion which will remain at the last peace station of the battalion instead of moving to the reserve centre as hitherto. 14685.

Cavalry reservists always join their own regiments. 14687.

## FIELD ARMY.

## ORGANIZATION.

*Colonel Bingley.*—Lord Kitchener's scheme was based on the assumption that in the event of a serious war, India might have to hold her own for one year. In the event of our having to cross the frontier now we should probably have to reconsider how many divisions we should send forward. 321.

*Sir M. Grover.*—Brigadiers of Field Army brigades would not be taken away from their brigades for internal defence. The 4th and 5th Cavalry Brigades and the 3rd, 15th and 26th Infantry Brigades have no commanders in time of peace. The limited tenure of commands and the reliefs of units necessitate troops being at times led into the field by Generals who have commanded them for only a short period. 462.

*General Aylmer.*—Would prefer to see the present proportion of British to Indian troops in the Field Army higher. 2431, 2435.

Seems essential that the Kohat Brigade should cease to exist as an independent unit when the advance by the central line is made. 2605.

Amount of artillery in Field Army at present very small and cannot recommend any reduction. 2783, 2785.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—Necessary to have organized bearer corps for the Field Army. 3818, 3822.

Understands the 1st and 4th Divisions have a sufficient number of mules and camels. 3883.

The mobilization scheme absorbs all the available transport for the Field Army. 3903.

Present system of organization produces advantages which compensate any disadvantage that disappeared on the abolition of the old system. 3919.

Kandahar line is the only one which would allow of any extensive use being made of cavalry across the frontier. 4046.

The existing arrangements may be capable of improvement, but without an increase in the number of units it is impossible to provide for both the Field Army and internal defence from divisional areas. 4162.

The addition of seven horses to the strength of each field artillery brigade desirable. The best way to get out of the present difficulty in regard to horse and field artillery drivers on mobilization, the establishment of drivers in each higher establishment battery should be increased by four. 4350.

Does not think the number of artillery units assigned to the Field Army is excessive, but is sufficient for Asiatic warfare. 4362.

More mountain batteries would be of more use than heavy batteries across the frontier. 4368.

A great mistake having British cavalry in the 1st and 4th Cavalry Brigades. Would prefer to see three regiments of native cavalry unhampered by horse artillery, because they will be with the leading échelons, and you want units who can live on the country. 4726.

*Sir G. Roos-Keppel.*—Considers that our line of communication to Kabul should be very strong as it would bear the brunt of the fighting, while a much smaller force than that suggested could deal with Kabul. 5012.

The general advantages of utilizing in an Afghan war the organized brigades now garrisoned on the frontier should outweigh local and selfish considerations. 5235, 5243, 5245.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—Would prefer to keep the Field Army as it stands and let internal defence take the risks. 5281, 5429.

The army is absolutely without ambulance transport, would rather do without a brigade than without ambulance transport. 5289.

Would prefer the present organization instead of letting each brigade have a certain proportion of each arm. 5331.

Our Field Army is already very low in artillery power, and it should not be depleted for any cause. 5565, 5567, 5569, 5571.

If reductions are going to be made the number of heavy batteries with the Field Army might be reduced. 5573.

We might want a few heavy guns if we were going to besiege a big place but very few would be enough. 5575.

*General Birdwood.*—To horse the artillery of the Field Army on mobilization it would be necessary, even after utilizing the reserve, to withdraw 803 horses from internal defence units. 7007.

A reserve of at least 1,800 artillery horses should be maintained. 7068.

Owing to the difficulty of finding horses on mobilization advisable to have only two of the three non-silladar cavalry regiments allotted to the Field Army. 7070.

The maintenance in time of peace of motor lorries for transport for the Field Army is being considered. 7112.

The Field Army brigades trained under their own Generals should go on service. 7164.

Personally would prefer to command a mixed to a homogeneous brigade. 7168.

*Surgeon General Sloggett.*—If the emergency occurs we cannot nearly supply the Field Army with medical personnel. There is a total deficiency of 381 medical officers, 158 assistant surgeons, 22 sub-assistant surgeons, 467 ward orderlies, 632 ward servants and 18,750 bearers. 10175.

Have sufficient medical personnel for four divisions together with internal defence requirements, except as regards Army Bearer Corps men of whom only 91 would be available for the Field Army after meeting internal security requirements. 10179.

The deficiency in medical officers will have to be met from England; and if there is peace in Europe, and sea passage is open, we might obtain 381 civil surgeons from England in six months. We should have to enlist and train men in order to make up the deficiency in ward orderlies and ward servants and to impress men from the bazar to make up the deficiency in bearers. 10191, 10335.

Assuming that there is no fighting elsewhere, we could make up the deficiency in medical personnel in India. 10199.

Able to meet the requirements of an army in the field for six weeks as regards medical officers. 10214.

Except as regards Army Bearer Corps men six divisions and four cavalry brigades could be adequately equipped with medical personnel and appliances within three months. 10216.

*General Hamilton Gordon.*—The organization of the Field Army in brigade and divisional formations is the most suitable we can obtain for operations in Afghanistan or on the tribal frontier and is superior to the organization previously in force. 13357, 13659, 13661.

Speaking generally, it will be possible to send units into the field under the Generals who commanded them in time of peace. There will, of course, be one or two exceptions, but the rule should, as far as possible, be maintained for the sake of the whole of the army, as the knowledge that it is adhered to has the greatest possible effect on the *moral* of the officers and men. 13663, 13671, 13673.

## FIELD ARMY.

## STRENGTH.

*General Aylmer.*—Would be most difficult with present transport to feed the four divisions of the Field Army proposed for Kabul. 2549.

In a war between ourselves and the Afghans, the frontier tribes are bound to go against us. Assuming the strict neutrality of tribes, six divisions would be sufficient for a war with Afghanistan. In event of war with Afghanistan and the frontier tribes combined, we shall want every man we have in India in an efficient state of organization. 2549.

Estimate of six-and-a-third divisions *plus* several separate units of infantry, cavalry, and pioneers, not excessive for war with the tribes. We must always take into account unofficial Afghan assistance to the tribes. 2563.

The policy of withdrawal from tribal territory has always proved a failure and will do so in the future. In case of a war with, or in, Afghanistan we might easily have to keep three divisions watching the tribes. 2575.

Cannot discriminate in India between Field Army troops and troops for internal defence—all should be thoroughly efficient for active duties. The force in India at the present time, even if made thoroughly efficient is not a man too many. Considering local and Imperial responsibilities, army in India weak, even leaving Russia out of account. 2585, 2587.

*Sir H. McMahon.*—We could not occupy Persia with our present army. 3225.

A larger force than has been used before would now be necessary, in the event of war with Afghanistan, though does not think it would amount to six divisions. 3419.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—Eight divisions is the minimum required to meet a very possible Pan-Islamic conflagration. 3763.

We could not make up nine divisions by scraping up troops from various places without danger. 3781.

Irrespective of transport we have not the troops to mobilize more than twenty-three infantry brigades and seven cavalry brigades. 3802.

The same Field Army could have been provided without the complete recasting of previous arrangements. 3838.

In war with Afghanistan strategically unsound to advance by three lines, as it involves three lines of communication—

(a) If we occupy the Kandahar Province including Seistan and act defensively elsewhere, we want six divisions and four cavalry brigades.

(b) If we occupy the Kandahar and Jalalabad Districts and act defensively elsewhere we want six divisions and five cavalry brigades.

(c) If we advance on Kabul and occupy Kandahar as well, we want seven divisions and six cavalry brigades.

Would adopt course (a) under present conditions.

Doubts whether without railway we can feed the four divisions necessary for Kabul in a war with Afghanistan. 4008.

In a war with the tribes, if we act offensively in one quarter at a time and defensively elsewhere, we might manage with five divisions *plus* the three Independent Brigades. It would be absurd to take the offensive simultaneously against all unless we were compelled to do so. Does not consider that concerted action on the part of the tribes is possible. 4026, 4034.



Seven divisions would be sufficient for a war with Afghanistan *plus* the tribes. 4040.

Assuming that friendly relations with Russia continue, a Field Army of nine divisions is by no means excessive, but eight might suffice if our resources do not admit of more. 4068.

We must either reduce the Field Army or increase the army as a whole. 4162

The existing arrangements may be capable of improvement, but without an increase in the number of units it is impossible to provide for both the Field Army and internal defence from divisional areas. 4162.

Agrees that the strength of the army in India is not in excess of existing requirements. 4671.

*Sir G. Roos-Keppel*.—The General Staff's estimate of six-and-a-third divisions with other details is ample if not excessive for a general war with the tribes. 4928.

*Sir J. Willcocks*.—Could not feed four divisions and two cavalry brigades in Kabul from local supplies for long, but sees no difficulty in doing so once our lines of communication are open and we have light railways to assist us in our task.

Provided that we are prepared to accept the fact that Russia must have her share, does not consider  $8\frac{1}{2}$  divisions necessary. 5363.

If Government takes prompt measures at the outset of a war with the tribes on our North-West Frontier, can see no possibility of so large a force as six-and-a-third divisions being necessary. Delay and diplomatic dealing may cause a general rising, but the suspension of political rule and a free hand to the commander of the troops will be the best and the only way to prevent a prolonged campaign and to nip a general rising in the bud. The immediate advance of, say, one division will do more than the concentration of a large force at a later period. 5373.

Does not consider that an army of 120,000 would be required to fight Afghanistan and the tribes combined. 5375.

Does not consider it possible that our relations with Russia can continue on so friendly a footing as to make it safe for us to base the strength of the Field Army in India on this fact alone. 5403.

To reduce the army with the certainty that sooner or later we must be prepared to resist a Russian occupation of Afghanistan, not to say later on an advance towards India, would be the worst possible policy. 5403.

If the Field Army were reduced to 7 or 8 divisions, it would be necessary to redistribute the divisional areas so as to render it easier to have each divisional area self-contained. 5451.

If reductions are going to be made the number of heavy batteries with the Field Army might be reduced. 5573.

*General Birdwood*.—Better to increase the Field Army; internal safety depends on success across the frontier. 7102.

Even if the Field Army is reduced to 7 or 8 divisions, it would not be in any way advisable to reduce the number of existing divisional areas. 7361.

*General Hamilton Gordon*.—On the assumption that the Field Army could not be put into the field fully equipped in all respects and on the further assumption that the Army Budget must remain on its present footing, it might be arguable that a fully efficient small army is preferable to an inefficient large one. 13711.

Method by which the estimate of  $8\frac{1}{2}$  divisions for a war with Afghanistan is arrived at. 13747.

The aggregate of all the schemes worked out for a war with Afghanistan and the tribes comes to a much larger figure than is available and therefore

we have had to contemplate a scheme in which we have considered which of the tribes we could in the earlier stages afford to deal with defensively only, so as to economize troops for the more important ones. 13841.

With the improvement of the roads in Afghanistan, the maintenance of the force proposed for Kabul was thought possible, more particularly as in all probability motor transport could be made available to a considerable extent. 13853.

The Commander-in-Chief expressed the opinion that seven divisions and four cavalry brigades would be sufficient for operations against Afghanistan and the tribes under the specified condition that the Government of India desired the possibility of a war with Russia to be entirely omitted from the calculations and that the financial conditions of the moment precluded the completion of the whole nine divisions. Seven divisions were to cross the frontier in the event of war with Afghanistan alone and one division was to be maintained as a reserve. 13857.

The estimate of six-and-a-third divisions with some additional units required for dealing with the tribes is based upon a careful study of the experience and reports of previous campaigns against some of the tribes in question. 13909.

## IMPERIAL LIABILITIES.

*General Staff Appreciation. Appendix I.*—Imperial liability of army in India undefined. Demands on the military forces of India are likely to be larger in the future than they have been in the past. 8, 37.

External conditions less onerous now than was the case a few years ago. But the external dangers that still threaten are relatively considerable with a distinct tendency to further growth. Advance of civilization and its requirements cause the natural barriers between States to be broken down. 139.

*Sir H. McMahon.*—The Russians appear to be taking measures which, if continued, will look as if they desire to force upon us the partition of Persia although the Russian Government maintain that this is not the case. 3219.

We could not occupy Persia with our present army. 3225.

Places on the Gulf do not lend themselves to defence from the land side, and the fleet might not always be available. 3227.

Understands that the Potsdam Agreement favours Germany's commercial interests in the neutral zone in Persia. 3267.

Under her present military system, it would be most difficult for Germany to maintain garrisons of German troops in Persia. 3275.

Permanent military occupation of Persia by Germany is a matter that need not be very much apprehended. 3277.

Our obligations in respect of Afghanistan should be carried out to the letter. 3393.

Assuming eventual partition of Afghanistan and Persia, describes most desirable line of division. 3415.

Very serious objections to allowing Russia to obtain a port on the Persian Gulf. 3447.

We are making every effort to keep the Gulf to ourselves. 3449.

We are getting so many treaties with people along the Gulf littoral that we are closing it to other people. 3451.

Would fight to keep other European Powers out of the Gulf. 3453.

Occupation of Chinese Turkistan by Russian troops removes another buffer and gives Kashmir a Russian frontier. 3754, 3756.

## INTERNAL SECURITY.

ADEN.

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*General Staff Appreciation. Appendix I.*—Population, 40,000, entirely Muhammadan.

Defence of Aden. 128.

Aden commands entrance to the Red Sea and is coaling station on one of the great trade routes to the East. 128.

Aden Protectorate could muster about 50,000 fighting men of whom probably half would be armed with modern weapons. 129.

Aden Muhammadans would only be dangerous in the case of a general Muhammadan movement throughout the East.

Aden Protectorate Arabs would probably join Yemen Arabs if quarrel with British was inspired by religious fanaticism. 129.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—Aden requires another battalion of Indian infantry. 4708.

Not necessary to have the British battalion at Aden completed to full strength. 4710.

## INTERNAL SECURITY.

## BIHAR AND ORISSA AND BENGAL.

*General Staff Appreciation. Appendix I.*—Population—50 million, Hindus, and 25 million Muhamadans. 89.

Bihar tainted with the spirit of disaffection, but it is chiefly confined to educated classes and not therefore so dangerous. 90.

Bitterness of religious animosities between Hindus and Muhammadans reduces likelihood of a general anti-British combination in Bengal. 91.

Seditious propaganda in Bengal developed to an extent that was never foreseen. National movement in Bengal—'India for the Indians.' Sedition in Bengal now less aggressive than it was. 92, 93.

Unlikely that a revolt could be organized in Bengal. 93.

Defence of Calcutta. 94, 138.

Strategical importance of Calcutta owing to its dockyard, railway termini, etc. 94, 138.

Asansol an important place owing to its railway works and its proximity to the Bengal coalfields. 96.

Garrison to be provided for Patna for the defence of Bihar. 97.

Military police ordinarily sufficient to maintain order in Assam. 99.

Rebellion, as the fruit of seditious agitation, appears most probable in northern India, less likely in the Deccan and least likely in Bengal. 134.

*Major Jackson.*—In the annulment of the partition of Bengal Muhammadans imagined that their interests had been sacrificed to appease Hindu agitation. 350.

*Sir C. Cleveland.*—There is less obvious sedition now in Bengal, but the Press in Parts of the Province is very unpleasantly anti-British. 1161, 1163.

Biharis are very busy quarrelling among themselves. 1173.

*Mr. Wheeler.*—There has always been a somewhat turbulent element in Patna, and it has always been considered that the city requires watching. 2307.

Bihar Light Horse would be useful in putting down trouble. 2313, 2315.

*General Birdwood.*—Troops certainly seem to be needed to suppress a rising in Bihar, but there is a moveable column at Allahabad and there is the Bihar Light Horse. 7209.

*Mr. Hughes-Buller.*—The amount of support which the civil police in Bengal could give to the minimum garrisons would be very small indeed, and may be treated as a negligible quantity. 7733.

As regards military police, would be better to have the men concentrated at Dacca with a flying column. 7763.

List of the most dangerous extremist politicians. Influence of these over the younger generation. 7829.

Tilak has still immense influence in Bengal. 7832.

All young Bengal would follow Arabindo Ghose tomorrow. 7836.

Mr. Gokhale does not exercise much influence in Bengal. 7838.

There is co-operation between the extremist political leaders in Bengal and those in Poona, the Punjab, and elsewhere. 7882.

The circulation of seditious literature has decreased very much recently but it has not stopped. 7898-A.

Statement of boycott movement in Bengal. 7903.

The 'nationalist volunteer' movement has died down since strong measures were taken, such as the Press Act, etc. 7905.

Chandernagore and Pondicherry give rise to danger and inconvenience in matters of agitation and sedition. 7917, 7919.

The Morley Reform Scheme exercised an enormous influence in organizing Muhammadans, but the Bengalis are not contented with it now. 7927.

As compared with 1904, the same causes of unrest are still operating, but compared with 1907-08 when the agitation reached its zenith the surface situation has improved. His Majesty's visit and the recent alteration of the partition have had a tranquilizing affect on the disaffected part of the population, but it will wear off. 7927.

The arrest and deportation of people in 1908 had excellent effect. 7932, 7934.

Muhammadans consider the Government has yielded to persistent Hindu agitation at the sacrifice of Muhammadan interests and are aggrieved at the apparent victory of anarchism over loyalty. Muhammadan question getting more acute as Hindus are doing all in their power to fan their discontent and are trying to instil in them the spirit of disloyalty. If the claims of the Muhammadan community are overlooked by the Government, there can be no doubt that the Young Muhammadans will join the Congress and preach the principle "no agitation, no concession." 7930.

The re partition has dissatisfied the majority of the people of Eastern Bengal. 7980.

Most Muhammadans are keenly interested in the Turco-Italian War, especially in Calcutta, and these resent the passive attitude of England. Moroccan affairs do not interest the Muhammadans of Bengal but they take a great deal of interest in Persia. 7997.

Every Hindu considers the revised partition a triumph. 7992, 7994.

The Native Press in Bengal at present is gagged. 8006.

As regards the Press Act, the great difficulty is that we have not sufficient power, when we know of a seditious distribution, to intercept the offending publication. 8019.

In 1907-08, sedition was preached in Bengal in the guise of extremely inflammatory plays. 8037, 8041.

The effect in Bengal of the various trials for sedition which have taken place of recent years, have had on the whole an excellent preventative effect. 8044.

The exact object of the present political agitation in Bengal is to get control of the civil administration, and to oust the European element, but Bengalis fully understand that the military protection of the English is essential. 8051.

The potentialities of the Samitis for mischief is very great. 8058.

Outwardly the Bengalis have no widespread organization, but there is information that certain members of the Samitis that have been suppressed are still active. 8058.

The aim of the dacoities was to impress upon the people the unfitness of the British to govern India, on the ground that the people could not be protected by the Government. 8058.

From a general standpoint the Arms Act assists very materially in securing the peace of the country. A census of arms was taken in both Bengal and Eastern Bengal. 8058.

The working of the Arms Act is not entirely satisfactory as the system of exemptions has lead to leakage. 8058.

Agitation will increase in violence as occasion offers.

Should the British arms at any time suffer a reverse, or should the army in India be mobilized, the opportunity will be taken by the ill-disposed to stir up the people against the British. 8087.

Should imagine internal defence arrangements proposed for the Province allow of a bare margin of safety in ordinary circumstances. 8109.

There would be considerable difficulty in Calcutta in maintaining order with the small force allotted. 8123.

Outside Calcutta and the railways, it is doubtful if much assistance will be obtained from the Volunteers. 8138.

It would not be surprising if the industrial population in Calcutta got out of hand in times of political unrest, as there are both a Hindu and a Muhammadan element in the mills. 8167.

*Sir F. Halliday.*—In the event of general religious or racial riots in Calcutta likely to last for some days and spread throughout the city, the police would not be sufficient and military assistance, especially European, would have to be called for. 7737.

List of most dangerous extremist politicians. Influence of these over the younger generation. 7830.

Local autonomy as advocated by the Congress a most serious and dangerous aspiration. 7830.

Undoubtedly effective co-operation and concerted action between extremist political leaders throughout India. 7883.

The existence of foreign territory at Chandernagore has been a source of danger and inconvenience in dealing with agitation and sedition. 7920.

The present state of Bengal is better than in 1904 or 1907, except that the people have become used to violent political agitation, are better able to organize such agitation effectively, and recognize more fully the power of sustained agitation. 7928.

The Morley Reform Scheme exercised the very greatest influence. 7928.

The King's visit has had a very tranquilizing effect for the time being. 7928, 7940, 7944.

The attitude of the Muhammadan community in Calcutta is quiescent and they have practically no leaders of any weight. The revised partition has been accepted with equanimity by the Muhammadans in Calcutta. 7995.

Does not think there is any possibility of a combination for political purposes between the Young Muhammadan party and the Hindu agitators; they would never agree for long. 7997.

The state of the native Press so far as Calcutta is concerned is on the whole quieter and better in tone than it has been for many years past. 8009.

Under Calcutta Police Act has power to seize at once anything which is considered likely to cause a disturbance. 8022.

If magistrates had the same power in this respect it would be an improvement. 8025.

It is necessary to be able to take action against all future issues of seditious papers for power to be effective. 8031.

The effect in Bengal of the various trials for sedition of recent years has been to break up a number of harmful organizations and to prevent many organizations from forming. 8045.

The exact object of all political agitation in Bengal is complete political independence for India. 8052.

The working of the Arms Act is satisfactory in Calcutta, but suggests certain improvements. A census of arms was taken in Calcutta in 1911-12. 8059.

Any industrial unrest will always be utilized by political agitators as a means of shaking confidence in the administration. 8163.

Against the proposal that nobody should possess firearms without license. 8068.

Agitation in Bengal is quiescent at present but it is probable that the professional agitators will find some way of raising contentious issues. 8088.

Does not think the garrison proposed for Calcutta would be sufficient were the disturbances of a general and serious nature and were they to continue for any length of time. 8124, 8128.

Thinks another British infantry battalion and the remainder of a field battery would be required to meet all contingencies. 8132, 8136.

In Calcutta we could count on material assistance from the Volunteers, but with the exception of the Railway Volunteers, they would not be readily available much beyond the vicinity of the places in which they live. 8139.

Classes constituting disorderly element in Calcutta. 8149.

List of strikes on railways and at Calcutta. 8161.

*Governor in Council Bengal.*—Government of Bengal consider that two squadrons of Indian cavalry should be stationed at Calcutta in time of peace. 8124. (Annexure VIII, paragraph 6; and Annexures IX and X.)

*General Hamilton Gordon.*—Provided the battalion of native infantry allotted to the internal defence of Bihar is carefully selected as regards its composition, etc., there is no reason we know of, pending the receipt of the views of the Bihar Government, to suppose that the provision made will be inadequate. 14055, 14059.

Under consideration whether a battalion of British infantry might be allotted to the Bengal and Bihar areas—half a battalion to each, and the present proposed garrison reduced by two Indian infantry battalions. 14055.

Patna should have an obligatory garrison. 14060, 14066, 14068.

#### WRITTEN EVIDENCE.

*Lieutenant-Governor in Council, Bihar and Orissa.*—The police force in Patna is decidedly insufficient to deal with widespread disturbances in the city, and in such an emergency it would be necessary to seek military assistance from the outset. 319.

The present state of feeling in Bihar now is not better than it was in 1904 or 1907. It is stated that Government has lost prestige with the Biharis in consequence of the lengths to which the Bengalis have been allowed to go in their political agitation. 335.

Urges that the proposals for the internal security of Bihar and Orissa may be modified to the extent of leaving at Dinapore at least two companies of British infantry in addition to the battalion of Indian infantry of which half might be stationed at Dinapore and half in the Jheria coalfield. If it is intended to keep two squadrons of Indian cavalry at Asansol, it might be possible to do without the half battalion of Indian infantry which would otherwise be needed in the coalfields. 345.

Without the British troops, a regiment of Indian infantry would be liable to revolt, and its presence in the Province would be a source of danger and anxiety rather than of strength. 345.

Unless the emergency was so great as to render it necessary to sacrifice the civil administration of a number of districts and to concentrate the Europeans at a few main centres, very few of the Volunteers would be able to leave their districts for service elsewhere. 345, 347.



At present there are probably no special danger centres, but in case of internal disturbance, Patna city and the Shahabad district would have to be very carefully watched. It is extremely probable that if trouble were impending it would begin by anti-planter riots in the Tirhut division. 349.

It may safely be said that in the event of general unrest or disturbance, attempts would be made to excite further trouble at Jamalpur with a view to embarrass railway communications and the movements of troops. The population of the coal mining districts could only be influenced through local grievances which they could understand or through the greed of plunder. 351.

## INTERNAL SECURITY.

## BOMBAY PRESIDENCY.

*General Staff Appreciation. Appendix I*—Population of the Poona area 15 million, mostly Hindus, Marathas being the dominating class. Population of Sind, 3 million, chiefly Muhammadans. 112.

Anti-British propaganda of Chitpavan Brahmans meets with considerable sympathy in the Deccan. 109, 113.

The people of Sind loyal and well-behaved. 114.

Defence of Karachi. 118, 138.

Defence of Bombay. 115, 138.

Arsenal and ammunition factory at Kirkee. Deolali, Ahmadnagar, Satara and Belgaum to be held. 116, 117.

Rebellion, as the result of seditious agitation, appears less likely in Deccan than in northern India. 134.

*Governor in Council, Bombay.*—Absolute necessity for strengthening the forces in Gujarat by stationing a body of British troops at Ahmadabad. 6652 (Annexure II, paragraph 15).

Although it might be arguable that the troops detailed for the internal security of the Bombay Presidency would suffice for the ultimate suppression of popular risings, cannot but apprehend that the forces provided are inadequate for the prevention of possible temporary chaos in large tracts of the country, the political effects of which in other parts of India would be lamentable, and would react in largely enhanced difficulties in connexion with the maintenance of order in other provinces. 6650 (Annexure II, paragraph 14).

The garrison allotted for the internal defence of Bombay city is the bare minimum of force required. 6652 (Annexure II, paragraph 15).

Compelled to advert to what he regards as the grave inadequacy of the forces available for the defence of Bombay and Poona areas. 6652 (Annexure II, paragraph 16).

Two companies of British infantry based on Belgaum and available as proposed independently of the moveable column might be most valuable in the Southern Maratha country. 6683 (Annexure II, paragraph 17).

*Mr. Curtis.*—Would invite attention to the necessity for allowing more troops to Ahmadabad and the country round. 6652.

Could hold on to the Kirkee post with the minimum number of troops allowed, but more maxim guns are wanted badly. 6654.

On the whole, satisfied that the internal defence arrangements are adequate with the exception of those for safeguarding certain important railways. 6675.

Considers the fort at Satara should be held by a military force. 6678.

As a general rule, arrangements to meet emergencies analogous to those made by the military authorities are not made by the civil administration, but as regards Poona the civil population know they have to go to the Kirkee post. 6699.

Does not think there are reserves of arms for arming Europeans in case of emergency apart from those provided for the Volunteers. 6702.

The principal danger in Bombay is from the homogeneous mill population who are nearly all Marathas, but there is also danger at Poona, Nasik, and Satara. The mill populations of industrial centres are a cause of anxiety to the authorities. 6704, 6706.

The Press Act has had an excellent effect in the Bombay Presidency. 6863.

The present state of feeling in the Bombay Presidency is quieter than it was in 1904 or 1907. 6873, 6875.

The Muhammadan community are absolutely loyal right through and there is nothing to fear from them. There is no likelihood of their combining with the Hindu agitators. 6904, 6906, 6912, 6930.

The country both north and south of the State of Baroda is at this moment administered by natives of India, and if there was a mutiny throughout India to-morrow this area as at present administered would be the scene of the first trouble. 6954.

*Mr. Kennedy.*—In time of trouble should probably have to strengthen our guards over treasuries, etc. 6556.

The number of police outposts have been decreased and the number of stations increased. 6603.

On the whole, satisfied that the internal defence arrangements with the exception of those for safeguarding certain important railways are adequate. 6676.

The up-country infantry garrisoning the fort at Satara should be for preference composed of Muhammadans. 6681.

The Ramosis have quieted down considerably now, and the Bhils, etc. are less martial than they used to be. 6690.

The rebellion in Goa has raised no echoes in the Bombay Presidency and even if the Goa Government had to make terms with the rebels does not consider that it would react unfavourably on European prestige in Bombay. 6694, 6697.

The breach between the young Muhammadans and the Hindu agitators is getting wider. 6913.

## INTERNAL SECURITY.

## BURMA.

*General Staff Appreciation. Appendix I.*—Population—about 10 millions, majority of whom are Buddhists. People, generally speaking, law-abiding and easily controlled. 125.

Defence of Rangoon and Mandalay. 126.

Mandalay at junction of railways from Rangoon, Lashio and Myitkyina and is near bridges over Irrawaddy. 12.

Preservation of internal security facilitated by the presence of a large and efficient force of military police. Mutiny in the force is an unlikely contingency as it is quartered in the midst of an alien population. 127.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—Disagrees with the proposed reduction of the Burma garrison. 4104, 4142, 4669.

*General Hamilton Gordon.*—May safely reduce the Burma peace garrison by one battalion of British infantry, three battalions of Indian infantry and one mountain battery. 14011.

## WRITTEN EVIDENCE.

*Mr. B. S. Carey.*—The military and civil police can be counted on to ensure internal order under normal circumstances. Serious disorders taking the form of dacoity and guerilla warfare will only reappear in the event of open disturbances breaking out and continuing in India. If disorders break out in Burma the military police could not restore order without considerable assistance from the Indian army. 225.

In the event of dacoity reviving, no appreciable bodies of military police could be formed into columns to proceed to any particular sphere of operations. Every district would be more or less involved and would require its full force to protect police posts, public property, and peaceful people and to send out small parties after local dacoits. 225

Absolutely necessary to keep British garrisons at Rangoon, Mandalay and Shwebo. 225.

Impossible to use Burmese police in concentrated bodies. Ten or fifteen per cent (largely composed of non-commissioned officers) could be employed under the leadership of British officers or with a preponderating proportion of Indian troops or police. 225.

If British troops are withdrawn from Mandalay and Shwebo, the whole population of Upper Burma will believe that we are unable to hold the country and the administration will be reduced to something bordering on lawlessness if not actual anarchy. 265, 291.

There has been no unrest calculated to give anxiety to Government since Upper Burma was pacified, but unrest will most certainly increase in the event of a war whether on the Chinese border or elsewhere. 274.

As regards pretenders, the danger points are first Shwebo, and after that Mandalay, but as regards lawlessness there is not a district in the Province which could not get into this state. 291.

*Mr. Leveson.*—The present military police force with the existing military garrison can ensure internal order in the country during the next few years. 226.

In the event of internal disorder should not count on any assistance from concentrated bodies of civil police. Such as could be spared locally could best be employed in small parties for intelligence and patrol work. 226.

There is little or no need for co-operation between the civil and military authorities in regard to collecting and exchanging information on the subject of sedition and unrest in the Province, but no reason to suppose there would be any lack of it should occasion require. 261.

Should not apprehend any immediate danger if an additional battalion of Indian infantry were withdrawn temporarily from Burma, but should consider a permanent reduction of the peace garrison of the Province as a dangerous step. 266.

Knows of no symptoms of recent years of general unrest calculated to cause serious anxiety to the Government of Burma. The danger of such unrest occurring in future cannot be gauged but would presumably increase in the event of war on the Chinese border or elsewhere. 275.

Not aware of any communications of an anti-British character between persons in Burma and in other parts of India. 282.

Considers Rangoon, Sagaing, Shwebo, and possibly Pyapon, the portions of Burma in which internal trouble might most easily arise. 292.

Internal trouble less likely to arise in the Shan States, but if it did occur it would be more difficult to control owing to the distances involved and comparative lack of communications. 292.

*Colonel Parkin.*—In times of internal disturbance, military police would do much to maintain internal order, but troops would be required at Bhamo, Meiktila, Shwebo, Mandalay and Rangoon. A network of military police posts throughout districts would become necessary and another 5,000 military police would probably be required. 227.

Correspondence regarding the collection and exchange of information and intelligence on the subject of sedition and unrest in the Province is carried on between the military authorities and the local Government. 262.

It would not be safe to denude the present peace garrison of Burma as regards regular troops by more than one mountain battery and one Indian infantry battalion. 267.

The people are easily led by anyone who sets to work to get up a local rising and in the event of a war on the Chinese frontier or elsewhere, unrest would be likely to show itself in Burma. 276.

Not aware of any communications of an anti-British character between persons in Burma and in other parts of India. 283.

Internal trouble might most easily arise in Upper Burma and particularly in the Shwebo, Sagaing, Pakokku, Mandalay, Myingyan, Meiktila and Yamethin districts. 293.

*Mr. Law.*—Does not think the military police could ensure internal order in the country to any extent except in the immediate vicinity of any large body of that force and, except in exceptional cases, no assistance could be counted on from concentrated bodies of civil police. 228.

Due co-operation between the civil and military authorities in the matter of collecting and exchanging information and intelligence on the subject of sedition and unrest in the Province. 260.

There has been very little necessity for co-operation between civil and military authorities in the matter of collecting and exchanging information and intelligence on the subject of sedition and unrest in the Province. 263.

It would not be safe to denude the present peace garrisons of Burma as regards regular troops by more than one mountain battery and one Indian infantry battalion. 268.

Unrest in Burma would to a certainty increase and would be general throughout the Province in the event of war either on the Chinese border or elsewhere. 277.

The Chinese population in Burma has increased to 122. 834.

There are a good many secret Chinese societies but does not think they would be likely to give any trouble unless we were at war with China or Japan, in which case they probably would. 279.

Not aware of any communications of an anti-British character between persons in Burma and in other parts of India. 284.

Internal trouble might most easily arise round Mandalay, but internal trouble might daily arise anywhere or at any time in Burma. 294.

*Local Government : Burma.*—The Provisions of the Indian Press Act, 1910 have not been enforced at all in Burma. No necessity to enforce them has yet arisen. The only exception is that certain objectionable documents, known to be circulating in India, have from time to time been notified in Burma as a precautionary measure under Section 12 of the Act to be forfeited to His Majesty. 301.

## INTERNAL SECURITY.

## GENERAL.

*General Staff Appreciation. Appendix I.*—First requirement is to provide for maintenance of the authority of the Government and the enforcement of its commands. Arsenal and seaports upon which the troops depend for munitions of war, other supplies, and reinforcements, should be properly defended. Railways and other communications should be safeguarded from interruption. Importance of information regarding the elements which make for sedition, rebellion, or unrest. 38.

Necessity of controlling dangerous internal movements in their early stages 38, 139.

Protection from external aggression and internal security interdependent problems. 41.

Lord Kitchener's Reorganization and Redistribution Schemes attempted to provide for both external aggression and internal security. 42.

Assistance might be derived from possibility of employing Muhammadans to suppress revolt among Sikhs or Hindus and *vice versa*. 69.

A revolt of the martial population of northern India, which might easily spread to the troops, would tax the military resources of the Government to the uttermost. 131.

Military arrangements would in themselves be inadequate and incomplete without the co-operation of the civil departments of the Government of India. 139.

*Colonel Bingley.*—Some divisions have to obtain certain of their internal defence troops from other divisional areas. 159.

Circumstances have changed so much during the last few years that Lord Kitchener's scheme for internal defence requires revising in some details. 317.

Lord Kitchener's idea was that an organization which would be suitable for an advance across the frontier would be equally useful for internal defence. 319.

In the event of our having to cross the frontier now it is possible that we might have to keep more troops back for the internal security of India than was contemplated under Lord Kitchener's scheme. 321.

*Sir M. Grover.*—Internal situation very much the same as it was stated to be by Lord Kitchener in 1903. 406, 408.

Reverberations from the Muhammadan world outside are probably more serious now than they were in 1897. 412.

Danger in policy of reducing the recruitment of the army from inferior classes and adding to the strength of the martial races. 418.

If it became necessary to withdraw troops from internal defence garrisons to meet external aggression, the British portion withdrawn should be replaced by troops from Home. 540.

Internal defence arrangements of 1903 were weaker than was desirable. 546.

Not much change in the situation since 1907. 548.

Does not see any danger in having a large number of unarmed reservists in the general peace population. 584.

*Sir C. Cleveland*—Civil authorities are in close touch with the military authorities 1225.

Would not deplete India of troops to the extent Lord Kitchener proposed 1237, 1249.

Does not consider, if Government keeps its head, that it is possible that a rising similar to that of 1857-58 will take place in India, within the next 10 years. 1276.

Evil effects are likely to result from stationing a native regiment within its recruiting area. 1292.

Of opinion that the schemes for internal defence seem to inculcate too great a tendency to act on the defensive and not enough on the offensive. 1302.

Would keep the military hand on matters of internal defence and would not attach too much importance to opinions of local Governments, as they do not go into these questions fully. 1304, 1306.

*General Aylmer.*—Circumstances have developed since the Redistribution Scheme was brought forward; it does not now sufficiently provide for internal security and defence. 2359.

Better generally to stiffen internal defence rather than the Field Army with British troops. 2435.

Cannot discriminate in India between a Field Army and troops for internal defence—all should be thoroughly efficient for active duties. Considering local and Imperial responsibilities, army in India weak, even leaving Russia out of account. 2585, 2587.

The internal situation in India worse now than it was in 1904 and no improvement on what it was in 1907. 2603.

Concurs generally in the proposals for increasing the internal defence forces as suggested by the Government of India to local Governments in February—March 1912. 2605.

Commanders of internal defence troops might be given a freer hand than the General Staff scheme contemplates. 2605, 2607.

Advisable to imbue officers of internal defence units with the necessity of mobility and offensive action. 2613.

Corps of Indian yeomanry could be formed from loyal Indian gentry, who would provide their own men to assist in maintaining internal order. 2674.

After general mobilization British guards over arsenals etc. may be very weak, but more cannot be allotted without taking a dangerous number of men from moveable columns. 2716.

Risk in policy of recruiting the Indian army mainly from a few sources. 2731.

Would make schemes for internal defence more elastic. 8703.

Would be far better and more economical to have fewer and intact units for internal defence. 8803.

The victory of Japan over Russia has had a great effect in India generally, and the idea has arisen that the Asiatic can beat the European if affairs are properly managed. 2773.

*Mr. Lovett.*—Does not think that United Provinces Muhammadans as a community could be drawn towards the North-West Frontier tribes whom they regard as uncivilized, nor is it likely that they should ever desire Afghan domination. 2983.

Muhammadans would be more seriously excited if we were at war with Turkey than they would be if we were at war with Afghanistan. 2985.

Communications from the Military to the Civil in regard to unrest, etc., are not always adequate. 3045 (annexure).

*Sir E. Barrow.*—Lord Kitchener's scheme did not adequately provide for internal security and defence, but modified and improved to date is adequate for all but exceptional circumstances, such as revolt of native army. 3838.



When the 19 British battalions were considered necessary for internal defence reinforcements from Home were contemplated, and it was not thought that active unrest would manifest itself in India. 3848.

The situation in India has changed for the worse. 3855.

Our calculations do not allow for commanders for internal defence troops in time of war. 3923.

Does not approve of proposal to have a General attached to a division for administrative purposes in time of peace who would command internal defence troops on mobilization. 3925.

A certain proportion of Generals now in India should be retained for internal defence and administrative purposes, and deficiency now existing in the Field Army made up by selected colonels and lieutenant-colonels. 3929.

In a war with Russia the Indian population would be in a state of alarm and expectation, but the ferment would not be against us. 4000, 4093.

The internal situation is better now than it was in 1907, but decidedly worse than in 1904. 4080.

The events of the Russo-Japanese War inspired the idea that it was quite feasible for an oriental race to stand up to Europeans. 4086.

In the event of a Pan-Islamic war, the Hindu agitators might possibly seize the opportunity of co-operating with the Muhammadan agitators. 4100.

It is essential to have troops ready at hand to quench local conflagrations. We cannot depend on railways 4104.

Arrangements might be made a little more elastic, but it is essential to have schemes prepared as guides to the officers concerned. 4106.

We want guns more than any other arm for dealing with internal disturbance. 4152.

The existing arrangements may be capable of improvement, but without an increase in the number of units it is impossible to provide for both the Field Army and internal defence from divisional areas. 4162.

Due precautions are taken to guard arsenals and military factories with British troops, but increased vigilance may be necessary in times of disturbance or unrest. 4268.

Scattered reserves without arms and without cohesion must obviously be less of a danger than armed sepoys in regiments. 4380.

Does not think the raising of yeomanry by native gentlemen to quell internal disturbance would work. 4422.

Internal defence can best be provided for by :—

(i) the registration of all able-bodied Europeans and Eurasians in a territorial reserve.

(ii) An enactment enabling the Government to enforce service if necessary.

(iii) The allotment in advance of such territorials to specific duties.

(iv) By the maintenance of reserves of arms and ammunition at suitable British centres for such organizations. 4671.

Would prefer to see British cavalry employed in internal defence. 4726.

*Sir G. Roos-Keppel.*—There is no combination of Hindus and Muhammadans that could not be broken with the greatest ease. 5203.

In regard to the raising of several yeomanry corps by native gentry, thinks it would be a mistake in the North-West Frontier Province to form them into corps and would prefer to give each Khan a section of the border to guard. 5225.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—Lord Kitchener's Scheme provided for the necessities of internal defence as they existed at the time. Things have changed a good deal since then. Sufficient obligatory garrisons were not detailed in the Kitchener scheme. 5277.

Whatever may be laid down in peace in India, internal defence will have to be met according to circumstances, but so long as the Field Army is efficient and victorious, so long will internal defence be comparatively easy; if the Field Army fails in its task then internal defence comes to the fore. 5277, 5279, 5427, 5429.

Does not believe risks in India itself could be so great as to demolish us before reinforcements arrived. 5281.

The internal situation in India today is, from a military point of view, better than it was in 1904 and 1907 because we all realize that sedition and unrest exist and will remain, and knowledge is power. 5409.

Agrees with the arrangements for increasing the internal defence garrison. 5427.

Contends that the requirements of internal defence should take a back seat in comparison with those of the Field Army. 5429.

Present arrangements to guard arsenals and military factories are sufficient as a rule but the obligatory garrisons are inadequate and would have to be increased as soon as trouble began. 5513.

We could do with a much smaller proportion of artillery in putting down rebellion than we could in the field. 5565.

Improvised batteries with 2 guns would be strong enough as units in proportion to the enemy we should meet in internal defence. 5569.

Very large reserves, especially of cavalry, are a danger. 5623.

In times of internal trouble, possibility of getting corps of yeomanry raised by loyal gentlemen. 5637.

Does not concur in the proposal to give each divisional commander a Brigadier-General for administrative work, who would command the internal defence troops on mobilization of Field Army. 5858.

*Mr. Kennedy.*—Copies of information of a political nature forwarded to the Chief of the General Staff, Simla, by the Bombay Government, and copies of the Weekly Secret Abstract which contains confidential information of a political nature are sent to the General Officer Commanding, Southern Army, General Officer Commanding, Poona Division, General Officer Commanding, Belgaum Brigade, Resident, Aden, and to the General Staff at Army Headquarters. The Bombay Government, however, do not often get any information of this, nature from the military. 6630, 6632, 6634, 6636.

*General Birdwood.*—The internal defence scheme drawn up by Lord Kitchener was right for the time, but times have changed. Political unrest has, since 1904, made the necessity for providing for internal safety more urgent. 7209.

The troops laid down by Lord Kitchener in his scheme were accepted by local Governments. 7211.

As regards commanders for internal defence troops, the only way to get over the difficulty is by incurring extra expense on new appointments. Lord Kitchener did not think them necessary. 7277.

"External security means internal peace" was Lord Kitchener's motto. 7279.

Believes it is the intention of the General Staff to allow an entirely free hand to the internal defence troops commanders. 7347.

*Mr. Hughes-Buller.*—Should the British arms at any time suffer a reverse, or should the army in India be mobilized, the opportunity will be taken by the ill-disposed to stir up the people against the British. 8087.

*Sir T. Wynne.*—Generally satisfied with the arrangements for the defence of railways. 9005.

*General Lean.*—Until disturbance is of so serious a nature that all railway traffic is stopped, railway Volunteers will not be available as they will be required for their ordinary railway duties. 9358.

*General Stuart.*—The reserve of ammunition that would remain in the country for internal defence troops is reasonably adequate if it can be maintained. 10091.

*Surgeon-General Sloggett.*—Medical personnel for internal defence units reduced to a minimum on the supposition that it would eventually be supplemented by non-official practitioners. 10181.

*General Hamilton Gordon.*—Under existing arrangements, the senior officer in the area concerned would command the internal defence troops allotted to the area in the event of a general mobilization of the Field Army. 13677, 13697, 13699.

An officer is actually detailed to command in case of serious disturbance, and informed accordingly; he has access to all the schemes for internal defence. 13689, 13691, 13695.

All divisional commanders are consulted as regards internal defence schemes, in fact they prepare these schemes themselves. 13761.

Divisional Generals were not consulted in regard to the proposed mobile brigades and the proposed additions to internal defence troops, because the new proposals were modifications of the old proposals based on conditions which applied to the whole of India and it would have been impossible to ask each divisional General to consider conditions which applied to other areas. 13777, 13796, 14029.

Statement of method by which the conditions governing internal security and internal defence arrangements are studied by the General Staff Branch. 14013, 14029.

The only detailed arrangements made at Headquarters are the assignment of obligatory garrisons to certain places regarded as of great importance. In all other respects the arrangements referred to are those of the General in command of the area concerned. 14037.

It is thought desirable to have on record in each defended place or area a definite scheme for its defence, to which a new arrival can refer for advice and guidance until he has had time to make himself acquainted with the governing conditions. 14037.

All contingencies cannot be foreseen, and we do not want definitely to have a cut and dried scheme to which an internal defence commander must adhere. When the occasion arises, perfectly certain that the Commander-in-Chief would wish that the internal defence commander should have a free hand. 14043.

No doubt much to be said for concentration, and the General Staff have consistently urged this view on the local authorities, but there is this to be said that the smaller the numbers of the formed bodies of troops the more widely they can be distributed and the more readily can they be made available to stamp out seditious movements the moment they appear and before they have had time to gather head. 14047.

The General Staff have consistently impressed on officers commanding the desirability of their being prepared to take the offensive whenever possible, and never, when it is avoidable, to stand on the defensive. 14047.

*General Headlam.*—An increase in the number of reservists would constitute a political danger, as a mob with soldiers in it would be a difficult thing to deal with. 14109, 14111, 14121.

Should like to see a special officer appointed in peace to command the internal defence troops on the mobilization of the Field Army. 14473.

## WRITTEN EVIDENCE.

*Sir B. Robertson.*—Information on the subject of sedition is communicated to the military authorities whenever it appears that the information is likely to be of use to them. 16.

*Sir H. Stuart.*—Orders were issued by Madras Government 1907, directing district officers to communicate to local brigade and station commanders any information about seditious agitation which appears to be likely to affect the troops. 129.

## INTERNAL SECURITY.

## MADRAS AND EAST COAST.

*General Staff Appreciation. Appendix I.*—Population—2 million Christians, 4 million Muhammadans, and 57 million Hindus or Animists. The only troublesome people are the Moplahs of Malabar. Muhammadanism and Christianity in southern India act as checks on Hindu national aspirations. 121.

Volunteers numerous and able to give considerable assistance in the Madras area. 122.

Defence of Madras. 122, 138.

Madras has a fort, and is a seaport and railway centre. 122, 138.

Defence of Bangalore. A railway centre, dominates Mysore, and is to be the Indian station in the chain of radio-telegraphic communication linking up the whole Empire. 123.

Defence of Coonoor. 123, 138.

No troops between Trichinopoly and Cape Comorin. 124.

Wellington, Ootacamund, Cannanore, Calicut, Cochin, Trichinopoly, Bezwada, Waltair, Yercaud and Trimulgherry also require to be held. 123, 124.

*Sir H. Barrow.*—Agram entrenchment scheme for defence of Bangalore both absurd and unnecessary. 4118.

The Europeans and Eurasians of Bangalore quite capable of defending themselves. 4124.

So long as there are troops available at Bangalore and Madras for reinforcements, one battalion at Trichinopoly is sufficient for the needs of southern India. Observes that Governor thinks that in war time we should have half a battalion in Malabar and another half battalion on east coast at, say, Vizianagaram, but he himself does not agree with these views. 4130.

In times of disturbance or unrest it might be necessary to quarter the obligatory garrison of two companies of British infantry in the cordite factory instead of at Wellington. 4268.

## WRITTEN EVIDENCE.

*Sir H. Stuart.*—Does not consider that the arrangements made for the defence of the Madras area on general mobilization are satisfactory.

Does not believe there is any necessity to have the bulk of the Madras area troops at Bangalore to dominate Madras and Coorg, and recommends that the headquarters of the troops left in the Madras area on mobilization be Fort St. George. 135.

Would remove the whole of the regular troops proposed to be retained at Bangalore to Madras, with the exception of one of the Indian infantry battalions which he would send to Trichinopoly.

Madura and Tinnevely will be the places where we are most likely to have a disturbance.

Would like to see a detachment of British infantry at Malappuram even after mobilization.

If troops are disposed as suggested, not necessary to make special arrangements in advance for an organized column.

If no troops at Trichinopoly and Malappuram, should have a moveable column so organized that it could start at an hour's notice. 135.

Would like to see some troops stationed in the Godavari or Kistna district. 137.

Rajahmundry would be a more useful military station than Bellary. 137.

Not necessary to retain the detachments of British infantry at Calicut and Cannanore. 137.

There is no danger of the cordite factory at Aruvankadu being rushed by armed rioters. 139.

The civil administration have selected rallying posts in every district, and some rather hazy plans for their defence have been proposed. 139, 156.

The principal danger points in the Madras Presidency are:—The Malabar Tinnevely, Madura, Kistna, Godavari and Guntur Districts, and in the hill tracts above the Eastern Ghats. 160.

There is direct communication between anti-British leaders in the Madras Presidency proper, and those in other parts of India. 186.

In time of trouble we should have attempts made in numerous places to excite feeling against British rule. 186.

A good deal of seditious literature is smuggled into Madras from Pondicherry, but there is no evidence of much coming direct from Europe or other parts of British India. 189.

*Mr. Francis.*—There are no extremist politicians of note in his district but there are plenty of smaller fry. 181.

The Pondicherry extremists keep in touch with those in the north and in Bengal. 187.

A great deal of seditious literature finds its way out of Pondicherry, both of local manufacture and transmitted from abroad. 190.

The present state of feeling in the Madras Presidency is much better than it was in either 1904 or 1907. 196.

The Muhammadan community counts for very little in the Madras Presidency. Not noticed any inclination on the part of the Young Muhammadans to combine with the Hindus in agitation. 206.

In the Tinnevely District the Muhammadan community does not count for anything either way. There have been no symptoms of combination between Musalman and Hindu politicians in the Tinnevely District. 208.

The Press Act has had an excellent effect on the tone of the vernacular Press in Madras.

The Arms Act works satisfactorily in Madras. 210.

*Mr. Horne.*—The tone of the vernacular Press has improved and the improvement is partly due to the Press Act. 193.

The state of feeling in the Madras Presidency very greatly improved since 1904 and 1907. 197.

The Muhammadan community does not count for much in Madras. Has not noticed any inclination on the part of the young Muhammadans to combine with the Hindus in agitation. 207.

## INTERNAL SECURITY.

## MOVEABLE COLUMNS.

*General Staff Appreciation. Appendix I.*—Moveable columns necessary at Peshawar, Mardan and the Malakand. 50.

Moveable column, based on Hangu, required for the defence of the Kohat area. 51.

Moveable column based on Bannu required as a support to the posts in Northern Waziristan. 52.

Moveable column based on Dera Ismail Khan, necessary to act as a support to the posts in Southern Waziristan and the Gumal. 53.

Moveable columns, based on Rawalpindi, Abbottabad, Jhelum, and Sialkot, required for maintenance of order in Rawalpindi area. 58.

Moveable columns, based on Lahore and Multan, necessary for the maintenance of order in Lahore area. 67.

Moveable columns, based on Delhi, Agra, Meerut, and Barcilly, required for the maintenance of order in the Meerut area. 77.

Moveable column, based on Lucknow, required for the internal defence of Oudh. 83.

Moveable columns, based on Allahabad and Cawnpore, required for the internal defence of the Allahabad area. 87.

Small moveable columns of Volunteers and military police necessary to ensure the maintenance of order in Assam. 102.

Small moveable column necessary for the maintenance of order in Nasirabad area. 105.

Moveable columns, based on Mhow, Jhansi, and Baroda, required for security of Central India. 108.

Jhansi moveable column, in conjunction with the one at Agra, to watch Sindhia's forces at Gwalior. 108.

Mhow column to overawe Holker's troops at Indore and, if necessary, those of the Gaikwar at Baroda. 108.

Moveable columns, based on Nagpur and Jubbulpore, required for internal defence of Jubbulpore area. 110.

Moveable columns, based on Poona, Santa Cruz, and Belgaum, necessary for internal defence of Poona area. 117.

Maintenance of order in Sind by a small moveable column based on Karachi. 119.

Moveable column, based on Bangalore, required for the maintenance of order in southern India. 123.

Moveable column for the maintenance of order in the Hyderabad area. 124.

Hyderabad area moveable column could be utilized for suppressing disturbances in the Maratha country or in the Central Provinces in conjunction with the forces of the Poona and Jubbulpore areas. 124.

Internal defence moveable columns should be very mobile and should not be stinted either in cavalry or transport. 139.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—Numerous and relatively weak moveable columns not desirable but unavoidable. 4104.

Mistake to break up British units too much, would like to see moveable columns composed more largely of British troops. 4114.

Better to have two small moveable columns based on Madras and Bangalore respectively. 4126.

At present we depend upon Bangalore, but Madras is also a place where a moveable column is wanted. 4128.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—The strength of some of the columns is very small indeed, the strength may be laid down as a guide, but local conditions will surely render them all liable to change on the mobilization of the Field Army. 5427.

Each of the frontier brigades has mobile transport for a moveable column. 5757.

*Mr. Curtis.*—A moveable column with two companies of British infantry, based on Belgaum, would be extremely useful. 6683.

*Mr. Kennedy.*—A moveable column would be very necessary at Belgaum 6684.

*General Birdwood.*—Would prefer to see larger columns concentrated without any hard and fast rules being laid down. Preferable to have fewer columns of a stronger character. 7209, 7347.

*Mr. Hughes-Buller.*—As regards the military police, would be better to have the men concentrated at Dacca with a flying column. 7763.

*General Aylmer.*—As regards the North-West Frontier, in no case should the number of men required for the minimum strength of the moveable columns be allowed to be reduced by men going on furlough or leave. 8573.

*General Lean.*—Mounted Volunteers in planting districts might be available for moveable columns, but the average Volunteer is not likely to be available for such work. 9362.

#### WRITTEN EVIDENCE.

*Sir H. Stuart.*—If troops are disposed as suggested, not necessary to make special arrangements in advance for an organized column. If we have no troops at Trichinopoly and Mallapuram, we should certainly have a moveable column so organized that it could start at an hour's notice. 135.



## INTERNAL SECURITY.

## NATIVE STATES.

*General Staff Appreciation. Appendix I.*—Patiala, Nabha and Jind States have become tainted with the prevailing spirit of unrest. 61.

Patiala, Nabha and Jind States, astride main lines of communication between Calcutta and Peshawar, and dominate Lahore, Amritsar, and Ferozepore. 61.

The loyalty of the chiefs of the Rajput States can, with considerable certainty, be relied on. 105.

Reliance cannot be placed on the loyalty of the Maratha States or on the fidelity of the State troops to their Rulers. 106.

Strategical importance of Gwalior State owing to railway from Bombay to Delhi passing through it. 107, 137.

Gwalior, Indore and Baroda in Central India, command the principal lines of communication between Bombay and Delhi. 132.

*Sir M. Grover.*—Local troops of Native States more formidable now than they were in 1904. 422.

It would be impossible to reverse the policy of allowing Native States to maintain Imperial Service Troops now. 426.

Would not recommend encouragement being given to Native States to arm their local troops with modern weapons. 442.

*Sir C. Cleveland.*—The present ruler of Nabha has a distinctly seditious record, but he has not shewn his hand very clearly since his accession. 1013.

Sindhia is influenced by the Maratha Brahmans. 1057.

The Gaikwar has always favoured the Maratha Brahman extremists. 1069.

The Maratha States will go with the strongest. 1141.

Lord Minto's policy of relaxing the control over Native States has brought them increased power. 1143.

The States have nobody they would follow as a leader; they are grouped. 1147.

*Major Molyneux.*—Does not know of any local troops which would be of much use except for police purposes. 1339 (Annexure).

Speaking generally, does not consider that the local forces of Native States would be any danger. 1500.

*Mr. Fenton.*—Very undesirable that Patiala should become the leader of the Sikhs, and our efforts should be directed against such an idea. 1750.

If Patiala were to start a claim to the leadership of the Punjab, sentiment would be largely in his favour. 1754.

No indication to shew that Patiala, Jind, Kapurthala, and the Faridkot States are otherwise than well disposed towards the Government. 1756.

*Mr. Bosanquet.*—Military forces of Baroda. 1986.

The Gaikwar takes no interest whatever in his army. 1994.

Contributions of Baroda towards Imperial defence. 2016.

Does not consider the Gaikwar disaffected nor his State a source of danger. 2038.

No Arms Act in Baroda State. 2046.

Believes Gaikwar to be loyal. 2062.

Sindhia disclaims any friendship with the Gaikwar. 2066.

Indore local forces. 2068.

In all cases the Government of India has the power to prevent Native States from increasing their troops without sanction. 2070.

In Baroda there are 2549 police who are armed with muskets. 2085.

Holkar of Indore and his ministers loyal. 2093, 2095.

The Gaikwar has Europeans in charge of practically every department in the State. 2105.

*General Aylmer*.—State troops should be regarded as a positive nuisance and should be discouraged in every way. 2638.

Local troops of Native States would give us a great deal of trouble in the event of sedition in India coming to anything. 2642.

*Mr. Lovett*.—If there were a war with Afghanistan or the tribes and a simultaneous war between Great Britain and one of the great Powers the attitude of Gwalior might be doubtful. 2824.

The Talukdars of Oudh are perfectly loyal to the Government. 2836, 2842.

Talukdars have been taught that their own interests lie in supporting Government. 2848.

Maharaja of Benares very strongly disposed towards the Government. 2858.

The Talukdars will always be loyal so long as they feel that the Government is strong and gives them a clear lead. 2860.

In time of trouble the Nawab of Rampur would have some difficulty in maintaining order should the Imperial Service Troops be withdrawn. 2894.

*Mr. Waterfield*.—In all States the feeling is absolutely favourable towards the Government. 3081.

Indore the most dangerous State in the event of trouble. 3105.

In Gwalior, Indore, and Bhopal the Chiefs and Darbars are both loyal. 3123.

Rewa does not like us, but he is much too shrewd to take any action against the ruling Power. 3123, 3133 (Agent to the Governor-General considers Rewa loyal. (Annexure).

Rewa has introduced a form of conscription. 3125.

In Rewa and Gwalior officers in civil appointments have to serve as officers in the army. 3131.

Gwalior State makes its own cartridges. 3151.

Indore Darbar have shut up their arsenal. 3151.

Transport services of Indore and Gwalior both serviceable. 3153.

Some horse or field artillery guns are wanted at Mhow to keep Indore city quiet. 3169.

We should want a whole company of British infantry at Indore alone. 3169.

*Sir H. McMahon*.—Local forces of Native States fallen off by about 150,000 men during last 20 years. 3631, 3676.

Majority of local forces of Native States badly paid, badly clothed, badly equipped, badly trained and badly led rabbles. 3631.

Irregular forces armed with antiquated weapons. 3666.

Our policy is to allow the irregular forces to dwindle away. 3631, 3666.

Better weapons for Sindhia's irregular troops constantly refused. 3668.

Rewa has compulsory service, but his men are rotten material, and their hearts are not in the work. 3670.

Baroda's army good at ceremonial drill, but useless in the field. 3676.

A small party in Phulkian States who need careful watching. 3700.

Would call Patiala whole-heartedly loyal. 3702.

Though Nabha is a misguided egotist, would not call him disloyal. 3702, 3704.

With doubtful exception of Baroda, all Maratha Chiefs thoroughly loyal and would stand by us to the very last moment as they cannot stand without us. 3706, 3708.

Impossible to acquit Gaikwar of charge of disloyalty, but it would be unfair to call him actively seditious. 3706.

Maratha States permeated with the influence of the pestilential Deccani Brahman. 3706.

Gwalior has influence among many States as he is looked upon as a very clever and shrewd administrator. 3712.

Attitude of Gaikwar put down to 'swollen head.' 3714.

Would not be in favour of removing the regiment from Baroda. 3722.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—In Rajputana we must depend on the loyalty of the Chiefs. 4104.

Does not see why we should have any troops at Indore. 4112.

Local armies of Hyderabad, Mysore, Baroda, Indore and Gwalior, all lacking in the essentials of good troops, namely, officers, training, and equipment. 4185.

The artillery of these States is not any good. 4191.

Very little sympathy between the Maratha Chiefs of Gwalior, Indore, and Baroda and their troops. 4193.

Maratha Chiefs would be loyal if only from motives of self-interest. 4193.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—The local armies of all Native States are very inferior. 5469.

*Mr. Curtis.*—The ruling Chiefs in the Southern Maratha country are to this day all Chitpavans, except Kolhapur and Jath. 6800.

The most influential Maratha leader is Kolhapur. He is absolutely loyal and on that account has a great deal of trouble with the Brahmans in Kolhapur. 6857.

*Mr. Hughes-Buller.*—Darbhanga and Burdwan might support us, Mymensingh during the latter part of the agitation was unfavourable, but the Nawab of Dacca was all right. 7965.

*Major Hill.*—Thinks there is more sympathy with the British in Native States than there is in actual British territory. 11260.

#### WRITTEN EVIDENCE.

*Lieutenant-Colonel Stratton.*—The Darbars in Rajputana may be relied on to be loyal to Government.

Many of the Jagirdars in Rajputana are at variance with their Darbar and it is open to question whether they would side with them or go against them and us. 64.

The local forces of the States in Rajputana, taken as a whole, are of no military value, the men are badly disciplined and trained, and their fighting qualities are poor. 68, 94.

Though Tonk and Dholpur and the minor Sisodia States of Banswara, Partabgarh, and Dungarpur, are loyal themselves, it is equally certain that the Chiefs are not always able, unassisted, to control their own subjects. 70.

In Rajputana, the Native States are generally less powerful, compared with the Paramount Power, than they used to be.

Does not think there is any marked tendency for States to come together, though Chiefs do so more than before.

There is no group of States or Chiefs who have come together in a political sense. 92.

The guns in possession of the Rajput States are mostly obsolete and are only used for firing salutes—the gunners do not carry out any range practice and their fighting qualities are poor.

Not aware of any stock of ammunition being maintained for these guns beyond saluting powder. 96.

Three cases have occurred during the last 10 or 12 years in which it was found necessary by the Native States to obtain outside aid. 100.

## INTERNAL SECURITY.

## NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE AND BALUCHISTAN.

*General Staff Appreciation. Appendix I.*—Inhabitants of the North-West Frontier Province susceptible to the same influences as the independent frontier tribes, especially in religious matters. 47.

Population of Baluchistan more easy to control than that of the North-West Frontier Province. 48, 54.

Local forces under civil authorities, stationed in small fortified posts, are maintained for normal defence on main lines of communication on North-West Frontier. These forces would prove inadequate should extensive and organized tribal revolt supervene. 49.

Defence of Peshawar. 50.

Peshawar, base of northern line of advance into Afghanistan. 50.

Defence of Kohat. 51.

Kohat railhead of broad gauge railway, and base of central line of advance into Afghanistan. 51.

Defence of Bannu. 52.

Bannu covers entrance to Tochi valley. 52.

Defence of Dera Ismail Khan. 53.

Defence of Quetta. 54, 138.

Quetta, base of southern line of advance into Afghanistan. 54.

*General Aylmer.*—Present system for defence of frontier complicated, inefficient, and totally opposed to the first principles of defence. 2650.

*Sir H. McMahon.*—The present system of maintaining order on the North-West Frontier compares very favourably with the previous one. 3469.

Dangers in Baluchistan very much less than those in other portions of the frontier. 3742.

Zhob Levy post on Afghan frontier should not be withdrawn. 3750.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—North-West Frontier absolutely dissimilar to frontier between France and Germany. 3783.

Absolutely opposed to proposed reduction of Kohat garrison. 4104.

*Sir G. Roos-Keppel.*—Present system of maintaining order along the frontier compares favourably with that in force in 1895. 4756.

Internal situation in North-West Frontier Province materially better and morally worse than it was ten years ago. 5113.

During the last two years the Arms Act has been more strictly enforced in the Frontier Province. 5125.

On the whole, the prestige of the Government on the frontier has increased in the last 20 years. 5131.

The improvement of railway communication is more important for the defence of the North-West Frontier Province than any increase of garrisons. 5163.

In regard to the raising of several yeomanry corps by native gentry, thinks it would be a mistake with the North-West Frontier Province to form them into corps and would prefer to give each Khan a section of the border to guard. 5225.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—Muhammadans and Hindus on the North-West Frontier generally hate one another. Even if they hate us in places, their hatred of one another is greater. A combination of Hindu and Muhammadan is but a temporary make-shift which we can nip in the bud by judicious handling. 5553.

## INTERNAL SECURITY.

## PUNJAB.

*General Staff Appreciation. Appendix I.*—Population—12 million Muhammadans, 10 million Hindus, and 2 million Sikhs. People hardy and warlike. 56.

Muhammadans of Rawalpindi area the most turbulent people in the Punjab. 57.

Defence of Rawalpindi. 58, 138.

Rawalpindi of strategical importance on account of its fortified position and arsenal. 58, 138.

First move in revolt among Sikhs would probably be an attack on Ferozepore arsenal. 61.

Tat Khalsa and Arya Samaj potential sources of mischief when appreciating the factors affecting the internal security of the Punjab. 65.

Rawalpindi, Murree, Campbellpore, Attock, Abbottabad, Jhelum, and Sialkot have to be held. 58.

The Punjab must be regarded as an area in which special precautions are necessary for the maintenance of internal security. Our first strategic objective in the defence of the Province is to secure our positions at Rawalpindi, Lahore, Amritsar, and Ferozepore, and to keep open the lines to Bombay and Karachi. 67, 69, 138.

Delhi of paramount political and strategical importance. 73, 131, 138.

To hold Delhi is to dominate northern India, and to dominate northern India is to ensure the submission and tranquility of the less warlike portions of the country.

The security of Delhi, and of the railways which link it to Calcutta and Bombay, may be regarded as the basis of India's peace strategy. 131.

Rebellion, as the fruit of seditious agitation, appears most probable in northern India, less likely in the Deccan and least likely in Bengal. 134.

*Sir O. Cleveland.*—Does not consider that the number of troops allotted to the internal defence of the Punjab is adequate. 1294.

*Mr. Fenton.*—The rural classes throughout the Punjab are well-disposed towards the Government, except where they have been got at by agitators. 1712.

Punjab Muhammadans would be more concerned if we went to war with Turkey than if we were at war with the Amir. 1780.

Proposed arrangements for internal defence of the Punjab accepted as satisfactory, and an improvement on previous arrangements. 1802.

In the event of disaffection in the native army it might be unsafe to have no British troops at Jhelum. 1808.

*Mr. Wheeler.*—Feeling between Muhammadans and Hindus in the Punjab is very bitter. 2205.

*General Aylmer.*—Not safe to have a Sikh battalion at Amritsar and does not think the Sikh troops like it. 2818.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—A weak detachment of British troops at Jhelum would be a mistake in the presence of a very strong brigade of Indian troops and does not think it would be advisable to have one there even on account of the bridge. 4257.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—Does not think the full mobile brigade is as necessary at Delhi as at the front. 5443.

A place like Jhelum should never be without a British regiment. 5511.

The two companies of British infantry detailed as the obligatory garrison of Ferozepore are totally inadequate. 5513.

Muhammadans and Hindus in the Punjab generally hate one another. Even if they hate us in places, their hatred of one another is greater. A combination of Hindu and Muhammadan is but a temporary make-shift which we can nip in the bud by judicious handling. 5553.

## INTERNAL SECURITY.

## RAILWAYS AND OTHER COMMUNICATIONS.

*General Staff Appreciation. Appendix I.*—The following are the more important lines of railway which will require special measures for their protection on mobilization or during a time of internal disturbance :—

Attock—Jamrud. 50. Thall—Khusalgarh. 51. Sukkur—Quetta—Bostan—Chaman. 54, 137. Wazirabad—Jhelum—Attock and Khusalgarh bridges. 58. Lahore—Peshawar and Kohat. 58, 68. Delhi—Ambala—Lahore; Raewind—Delhi; Lahore—Samasata—Karachi; Samasata—Kundian, Samasata—Jhand, Beas, Sutlej, Ravi and Chenab bridges. 68, 76, 119, 137. Calcutta—Delhi; Bombay—Delhi. 73. Lucknow—Saharanpur. 76, 87, 98, 117, 131, 137. Itarsi—Allahabad; Bhusawal—Nagpur. 110. Kotri and Sukkur bridges. 119. Madras—Bombay and branches to Bangalore and Coonoor. 123, 124 and 137. Wadi—Secunderabad. 124.

Bannu shortly to be connected with the North-Western Railway by a narrow gauge line crossing the Indus at Kalabagh. 52.

Brahmaputra is a safe and indestructable line of communication in Assam. 101.

Construction of Trans-Persian Railway will increase responsibilities of Sind as regards railway protection. 119.

Strikes among telegraph and railway subordinates are likely to be brought about with political objects. 135.

Irrawaddy a safe line of communication from Rangoon to the north of Burma. 126.

*Sir M. Grover.*—An important railway bridge to be defended on one of our main strategical railways at Jhelum. 526.

*Sir C. Cleveland.*—Chitpavans employed by railways, telegraphs, etc. to a dangerous extent. 1109.

The big strike of signallers on the railway in 1899 was engineered by Maratha Brahmans. 1119.

The power of the Chitpavan Brahmans to impede or stop the working of the railways constitutes a danger. 1125.

*Mr. Waterfield.*—Understands railway Volunteers and the military will be responsible for the defence of the railways. 3157.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—Danger in number of Chitpavans employed on railways, telegraphs, etc. 4308.

*Sir G. Roos-Keppel.*—It might be desirable to make roads through some parts of independent territory and to keep them open by posts, without annexing or taking over the administration of the country. 4966, 4980.

The opening up of communication is the best means for keeping a tribe in check. 4974.

The improvement of railway communication is more important for the defence of the North-West Frontier Province than any increase of garrisons. 5163.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—Railway bridge at Jhelum should be secured against destruction. 5511.

*Governor in Council, Bombay.*—Desires to draw attention of military authorities to the many miles of bridging on the Bombay, Baroda and Central India Railway between Bombay and Surat, the efficient guarding of which by the available Volunteer forces would be impossible. 6650 (Annexure II, paragraph 16).

The reliable forces, other than regular troops, available for the protection of the Indian railway systems are so exiguous that the utmost they could be relied upon to accomplish would be the defence of certain sections which it would be vital to hold. 6652 (Annexure II, paragraph 18).

Nearly all the clerical employés of the Great Indian Peninsula Railway, and practically all the telegraph operatives within the central area of the Bombay Presidency are Brahmans, and this is certainly a factor which discounts the improvement in the security of the country as a consequence of the increased facilities of communication. 6780 (Annexure II, paragraph 19).

*Mr. Curtis.*—Considers the arrangements for guarding the railways in the Surat-Belgaum area inadequate. 6650, 6652.

Considers the civil authorities could help to a certain extent in guarding the railways. 6656.

An undue proportion of Chitpavans employed in the traffic departments of the railways. 6780.

*Mr. Kennedy.*—In guarding the railways, the armed and the unarmed police, the latter armed with swords, could give effective assistance, but would not put much trust in village *chaukidars*. 6657, 6662, 6668.

*Mr. Hughes-Buller.*—The whole of the communications in Bengal are very much in the hands of the Chitpavan Brahmans, and though this is undoubtedly a danger it is difficult to find a remedy. 8194.

*Sir T. Wynne.*—For the defence of railways, the military authorities enquire, or the railway authorities report, what important tunnels, etc. the railway consider should be guarded, and the military then make provision to guard the most essential points. 8993, 8997.

Railway junctions and workshops are to be largely handed over to the Volunteers to look after.

There are certain points which the railway Volunteers undertake to protect and others where the local police and the military must come in. 8999.

Generally satisfied with the arrangements for the defence of railways. 9005.

Does not think there is any political danger in the number of Chitpavan Brahmans employed on railways. Every railway has been doing its best to mix up the various castes on its staff. 9049.

#### WRITTEN EVIDENCE.

*Sir B. Robertson.*—The civil authorities in the Central Provinces could take effective measures to assist the military in guarding the railway lines running through the Provinces. 22.

*Sir H. Stuart.*—In the Madras Presidency the civil authorities could give very little assistance to the military in guarding the railway lines in time of disturbance. 152.

*Mr. Horne.*—Owing to the extreme smallness of the force at their disposal, the civil authorities could only give very little assistance to the military in guarding the railway lines in the Madras Presidency in times of disturbance. 153.

*Mr. Francis.*—In time of disturbance, there would be very few police available to guard the railways in the Madras Presidency in the way they would need guarding. 154.

No immediate likelihood of serious difficulties with the Chinese on the Yunnan border, but if at any future time the Chinese became a powerful nation they may then give trouble in that region. 270.

*Local Government, Burma.*—Burma Government has repeatedly pressed the project of a railway from Bhamo to Tengyueh and Talifu, and the opposition of the Chinese Government has been the only obstacle. 303.



## INTERNAL SECURITY.

## RAJPUTANA, CENTRAL INDIA AND THE CENTRAL PROVINCES.

*General Staff Appreciation. Appendix I.*—Population, 2 million Muhammadans and 18 million Hindus. 104.

Ajmere requires to be held as it has a railway junction with workshops of importance. 105.

Mhow, Jhansi, and Baroda have to be held. 108.

Anti-British propaganda of Chitpavan Brahmins meets with considerable sympathy at Nagpur. 109, 113.

Nagpur and Jubbulpore require to be held. 110.

*Mr. Waterfield.*—Muhammadans and Hindus intermingle a good deal in the Native States of Central India. 3117.

Some horse or field artillery guns are wanted at Mhow to keep Indore city quiet. We should want a whole company of British infantry at Indore alone. 3169.

Bhils and Bhilalas, are communities who might give trouble. 3191.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—In Rajputana we must depend on the loyalty of the Chiefs. 4104.

Does not see why we should have any troops at Indore. 4112.

## WRITTEN EVIDENCE.

*Sir B. Robertson.*—The internal defence arrangements proposed for the Central Provinces are considered generally satisfactory. 20.

There are local as well as military arrangements for internal defence. 24.

Though local outbreaks might undoubtedly be looked for in the south and west, the rest of the Provinces would remain fairly secure for some time, and by then, an improvement in the general situation might reasonably be looked for. 26.

There is no doubt that the political agitators of the Central Provinces were in communication with the Bengal agitators, and with those of Poona and Nasik. 34.

The prosecution and conviction of Tilak had a somewhat exasperating effect on local extremists. 36.

Under the administration of Sir Reginald Craddock, seditionists were promptly dealt with in the Central Provinces, and the effect of the strong action displayed is still felt. 40.

All administrative officers in the Central Provinces are directed to secure a due admixture of races and castes as far as possible in their offices. 42.

Believes the state of public feeling is now very good. 50.

As a community, the Muhammadans in the Central Provinces are loyal and for the present, hold quite aloof from the Hindus politically, but a possible fusion of Muhammadans and Hindus is obviously a consideration that will always have to be reckoned with. 54, 60.

The Muslim League branches are the only signs of stirring among the Muhammadan community of the Central Provinces, but their influence has as yet been slight. The Muhammadans in the Central Provinces may be regarded as a fairly homogeneous body.

It would largely depend on the attitude of Muslim League whether the local community showed much interest in matters such as a war with Afghanistan, etc. 56, 58.

There can be no two opinions as to the beneficial effect of the Press Act, but there is not now much necessity for applying the Act in the Central Provinces.

The Turco-Italian war and the events in Morocco and Persia have been noticed in the Central Provinces. 56.

The working of the Arms Act is satisfactory from a political point of view so far as the Central Provinces are concerned. 62.

All administrative officers in the Central Provinces are directed to secure a due admixture of races and castes as far as possible in their offices. 42.

Believes the state of public feeling is now very good. 50.

*Lieutenant-Colonel Stratton.*—Not aware of any party in Rajputana which desires to shake off British rule. 76.

All large towns in Rajputana would be *foci* for trouble in the event of acute political unrest. 78.

The statement that the Muhammadans of India have no real community of interest is borne out to some extent so far as Rajputana is concerned. In Rajputana, Muhammadans are everywhere greatly out-numbered by the Hindu element, and are generally in a state of semi-dependence on the Hindu rulers. 80.

Would be wise to add at least two companies of British infantry to the garrison proposed for the Nasirabad area. 82.

## INTERNAL SECURITY.

## UNITED PROVINCES.

*General Staff Appreciation. Appendix I.*—Population—41 million Hindus, 7 million Muhammadans. 71.

Security of Delhi must be made absolutely certain. 73.

Defence of Agra important as it has a fort, is the centre of telegraph system, and has a railway junction commanding two bridges over the Jumna. 74, 138.

Defence of Lucknow important being place of first strategic importance in Oudh. 78, 138.

Defence of Allahabad important as it has a fortress containing an arsenal and has a radio-telegraph installation. 84.

Allahabad covers three railway bridges across the Ganges and Jumna. Would be the base of any force operating in Oudh from the east. 84.

Defence of Cawnpore important on account of its mills and factories. 85.

Lucknow, Gorakhpore, Allahabad, Cawnpore, and Benares have to be held. 83, 87.

Muhammadan population in certain towns in the United Provinces turbulent and fanatical and liable to be influenced by a *jihad* on the frontier. 83.

Anti-cow-killing movement might be made the pretext for a dangerous political agitation in the United Provinces. 81.

*Sir C. Cleveland.*—Oudh has come out of the sedition movement extremely well. 1175.

*Mr. Wheeler.*—Feeling between Muhammadans and Hindus in United Provinces is very bitter. 2205.

*Mr. Lovett.*—If there were a war with Afghanistan or the tribes, and a simultaneous war between Great Britain and one of the great Powers, the British strength and especially the mounted strength of obligatory garrisons for the Meerut and Lucknow divisional areas should be increased. 2824, 2826, 2828, 2832.

The United Provinces were the cock-pit of the Mutiny and are "the heart of India." 2824, 2860.

Allahabad is one of the places where he would like more British troops, 2832.

The Talukdars of Oudh are perfectly loyal to the Government. 2836, 2860.

Orthodox Brahman feeling in the United Provinces is distinctly on our side. 2852 (Annexure), 2854.

During the past year the anti-cow-killing agitation has enjoyed some sort of organization and coherence, but the feeling aroused by the movement is chiefly superficial. 2864 (Annexure).

Possibility of a temporary rapprochement between Hindus and Muhammadans, but does not believe in a permanent alliance between them. 2866 (Annexure).

Although the *Shiahs* and *Sunnis* in Lucknow quarrel a great deal they can combine on occasion, and on the whole the Muhammadans of the United Provinces are a homogeneous body. 2880, 2882, 2983, 3007, 3009.

An idea for both a Muhammadan and a Hindu University at Benares. Both institutions should be kept strictly under Government control or they will give a great deal of trouble. 2892.

The general feeling in the United Provinces is favourable to the Government. In the Meerut, Agra, and Rohilkhand Divisions there is a lawless turbulent element which requires vigilant and firm handling. It can hardly be expected that serious depletion of the garrison to which Provinces have so long been accustomed, would be unattended by loss of prestige to the Government. 2929.

The aspirations of the Hindus are Hindu predominance in an India protected by Great Britain. 2935.

In the event of political unrest, trouble might be anticipated at the following main centres :—Benares, Allahabad, Lucknow, Agra, Bareilly, Cawnpore, Aligarh, Jhansi, Muttra, and Hardwar. 2959.

Volunteers could not possibly hold Agra fort in the event of trouble. 2961.

Muhammadan politicians in the United Provinces have been considerably interested in the Turco-Italian war and the course of events in Persia. They are attracted by the Pan-Islamic movement and many of them are striving hard to imbue their co-religionists generally with their own sentiments. 2977, 3007.

JAPAN.

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*General Staff Appreciation. Appendix I.*—British Government's right to call for the assistance of Japan, which would probably be confined to military action in Manchuria. 14.

In assisting Japan in a war with Russia the attitude of Afghanistan would largely influence the action to be taken by India. 15.

*Sir H. McMahon.*—In the event of our being at war with Russia in Afghanistan, we could count, under the treaty with Japan, on Japanese assistance. 3291.

It might be preferable for Japan to operate against Russia in the northern part of Manchuria or at other places. 3293.

## WRITTEN EVIDENCE.

*Mr. Law.*—There are a good many secret Chinese societies in Burma, but does not think they would be likely to give any trouble unless we were at war with China or Japan, in which case they probably would. 279.

## KASHMIR AND THE GILGIT AGENCY.

*General Staff Appreciation. Appendix I.*—Chinese Turkistan separated from Kashmir by enormous mountain ranges. Few tracks across these mountains are passable by even smallest bodies of troops, and no Chinese troops of any value maintained in Chinese Turkistan, no danger need be apprehended from China in this quarter. Possibility of an attack from Russia across Pamirs. Owing to difficulty of communications Kashmir Imperial Service Troops could probably dispose of Russians in this quarter. 27.

*Sir H. McMahon.*—Occupation of Chinese Turkistan by Russian troops removes another buffer and gives Kashmir a Russian frontier. 3754, 3756.

*Sir G. Roos-Keppel.*—Chitralis are hostile to Pathan tribes surrounding them, and would be unlikely to join them. 4776.

Thinks if we are going to keep an isolated garrison in Chitral it must be increased to two battalions. 5143.

The tribal militia system for the garrisoning of Chitral would not be a very satisfactory arrangement. 5149.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—Sees no danger in holding Chitral as at present. Tribal levies would not be suitable for garrisoning Chitral. 5826, 5830.

Does not consider 2 battalions necessary for Chitral. 5826.

*General Aylmer.*—Present garrison for Chitral is sufficient, and another battalion would certainly be excessive. 8687.

## NORTH-EAST FRONTIER AND NEPAL.

*General Staff Appreciation. Appendix I.*—Nepal factor of first importance in this part of India. Has a fairly efficient army of 35,000 men.

Nepal does not acknowledge suzerainty of either Great Britain or China but Nepalese are more disposed now than formerly to listen to our advice, and are likely to prove important allies in any contingency that may arise. 28.

Tibetans not warlike and never been aggressive neighbours.

Tibet does not call for any serious military preparations on our part for some years to come.

In case of trouble with Tibet, Chumbi valley is a weak point which invites our attack.

Military operations in Tibet inordinately expensive and difficult and should be avoided. 29.

Population of Bhutan neither warlike nor well armed.

Would not be easy to protect Bhutan from China acting through Tibet.

Northern frontier of Bhutan remains undefined and this may become a source of trouble.

Considerable forces could not with advantage be employed in Bhutan. 30.

China not hitherto a strong military Power. 32.

Movement of large bodies of troops along any route in the mountains between China and Burma-Assam border not possible. In the absence of railways across the frontier we have little to fear from China but should railway from Bhamo northwards be extended through Yunnan, it may demand additional forces on Burma frontier though it may, at the same time, have pacific effect on frontier. Pressure will always be more effectively brought on China by oversea operations. 32.

Potential military strength of China has to be borne in mind. 33.

Independent tribes along North-East Frontier numerous but unimportant. They must however be brought under our influence and afforded protection against external aggression. 34.

*Sir H. McMahon.*—Nepal has never openly acknowledged the suzerainty of Great Britain, and no such suzerainty is indicated in any treaty or by the recognition of our right to control her foreign relations. Present position in regard to Nepal is one of *de facto* though not *de jure* suzerainty tacitly acknowledged by Nepal but denied by China. 3579.

Undesirable to press the Nepal Darbar in regard to allowing us to have more Gurkha reservists. 3585, 3589, 3593.

Strength of Nepal army 35,333 men and 257 guns. 3597.

Nepal troops well-organized, well-trained, smart looking men. 3601.

Prime Minister of Nepal assured His Majesty the King-Emperor that the whole of the army of Nepal would be at his disposal whenever required. 3605.

Of all the people with whom we have to deal there are none more consistently loyal and obliging than the Nepalese Darbar. 3609.

In a war with Russia Nepalese would stick to us until we were absolutely cleared out. 3615.

If China re-establishes herself in Tibet, trouble will sooner or later arise between her and the Government of India over her claim to the States of Nepal and Bhutan. 3621.

China claims Tibet and Mongolia as regular provinces of China. 3627.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—Chinese troops need not at present be considered as formidable from a military point of view, but led by Europeans or Japanese,

Chinese troops might become so as the Chinaman is no coward and shews an extraordinary aptitude for drill. 4667.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—Nepal may one day go against us, but in India we must take such risks. 5525.

*General Hamilton Gordon.*—There is no probability in the near future that the situation at present existing on the North-East Frontier is likely to require the presence of additional troops near that frontier in time of peace, but it is impossible to say what direction the present unrest in the frontier provinces of China may take, and additional troops on our Assamese and Burmese frontiers may possibly prove necessary. The future policy of China may also affect the question. 14006.

Of opinion that we shall have trouble on the North-East Frontier later on. 14082.

*General Birdwood.*—On the North East Frontier, so far as can be seen at present, any railway extension would be on the metre gauge. 15552.

#### WRITTEN EVIDENCE.

*Mr. Law.*—There are a good many secret Chinese societies in Burma, but does not think they would be likely to give any trouble unless we were at war with China or Japan, in which case they probably would. 279.

Burma Government has repeatedly pressed the project of a railway from Bhamo to Tengyueh and Talifu, and the opposition of the Chinese Government has been the only obstacle. 303.

*Local Government, Burma.*—No immediate likelihood of serious difficulties with the Chinese on the Yunnan border, but if at any future time the Chinese became a powerful nation they may then give trouble in that region. 270.



## NORTH-WEST FRONTIER TRIBES.

*General Staff Appreciation. Appendix I.*—Amir is encouraging the armament of the frontier tribes, who are now much better armed and their fighting strength greater than in 1897-98.

In the event of collision with these tribes we must be prepared to attack them in their mountain fastnesses. They are becoming a great and increasing danger of which it is necessary to take cognizance. 26.

*Notes on the Military resources of Afghanistan. Appendix II.*

Nasrulla Khan constantly makes presents of arms and ammunition to prominent men among the frontier tribes. 22.

The tribesmen of the North-West Frontier and Afghanistan buy rifles in the open market at Kabul, Kandahar and Herat, from Ghilzai and other arms dealers. 22.

*Colonel Bingley.*—Amir believed to have been selling some obsolete rifles such as Sniders to the frontier tribes. Caravans laden with rifles go up from the Mekran coast to Kabul and Amir must be aware that these arms are there sold to the tribesmen. 129, 131.

In event of advance beyond Jalalabad, tribes would be placed in an awkward position, as in an advance to Kabul we would secure advantage of controlling tribes by getting in behind them. 235.

In a war with Afghanistan, in the event of the Amir preaching a *jihad*, the tribes would probably follow him as their spiritual leader. 237.

*Sir M. Grover.*—The armament of the frontier tribes has improved. 491, 493.

Does not think frontier tribes would ever combine. 501.

The fighting strength of tribes estimated at 300,000 fighting men, with over 62,000 breech and 40,000 muzzle-loading rifles, is considered probably correct. 505.

*General Aylmer.*—In a war between ourselves and the Afghans, the frontier tribes are bound to go against us. Assuming the strict neutrality of tribes, six divisions would be sufficient for a war with Afghanistan. In event of war with Afghanistan and the frontier tribes combined, we shall want every man we have in India in an efficient state of organization. 2549.

Does not think General Duff's estimate of 120,000 men required to fight Afghanistan and the tribes far wrong. 2559.

Estimate of six-and-a-third divisions *plus* several separate units of infantry, cavalry and Pioneers not excessive for war with tribes. We must always take into account unofficial Afghan assistance to the tribes. 2563.

Does not think the Sultan's influence on the tribesmen is greater than that of the Amir. 2565.

Tribes have no leader, but one might arise. 2567.

For some of the more modern weapons tribes would have very little ammunition. 2573.

The policy of withdrawal from tribal territory has always proved a failure and will do so in the future. In case of a war with, or in, Afghanistan we might easily have to keep three divisions watching the tribes. Permanent garrisons and strict disarmament once we occupied frontier tribal country would be far more economical than policy of withdrawal. 2575.

The annexation of a single tribal area might bring us trouble, but it would be better to have it out. 2577.

The Afridis are one of the most formidable tribes and they would take advantage of any favourable opportunity. 2579, 2581.

The Mahsuds are the most likely tribe to give us trouble in the early future, but we may have trouble with any of the tribes. Other tribes have not much sympathy with the Mahsuds. 2579, 2583.

*Sir H. McMahon.*—Amir has indirectly encouraged the armament of the North-West Frontier tribes. 3377.

Increased intercourse and recent peaceful relations with tribes has tended to mitigate anti-foreign feeling, and make it less than it was 30 years ago. 3425.

The time has long since passed when any sudden or general attempt at "peaceful penetration" on Sandemen lines would have any prospect of success. Our relations with the tribes on the North-West Frontier are as a whole more satisfactory than they have been in the past. There would appear to be a general desire on the part of the tribes to maintain peaceful relations with us. Each tribe views its neighbour with jealousy and mistrust. 3467.

The blockade in the Gulf has already begun to affect the supply of arms to frontier tribes. 3501.

The quantity and quality of rifles made in the Kohat Pass is steadily increasing, but want of ammunition will minimize the evil of this, and the courage of tribes will diminish with their ammunition. 3511.

The possibility of a large and general combination of frontier tribes against us is a contingency that must always be recognized. At the same time, any large combination of tribes involving combined action outside the territorial limits of each is out of the question owing to the impossibility of their feeding themselves. A *jihad* fostered by the Amir would stir up not only the border tribes but disturb the Muhammadans of the whole of India. 3515.

Amir's brother is working to make the tribes a more efficient buffer between us and Afghanistan. 3517.

The Mahsuds are the tribe with which we are likely to have hostilities first. 3525.

Afridis becoming subject to peaceful influences, does not think they want any trouble with us. 3527.

Of opinion that an expedition against any tribe should be followed by the occupation of the tribal area with a simple system of administration by means of irregular local forces and a small backing of local troops. 3535.

First example made with this new policy would be thoroughly appreciated by rest of frontier, and would minimize trouble with tribes in the future. 3539.

The frontier tribes will be the first to come under the influence of the fanatical feeling which a war with Afghanistan will arouse. 3545.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—In a war with the tribes, if we act offensively in one quarter at a time and defensively elsewhere, we might manage with 5 divisions *plus* the 3 independent brigades. It would be absurd to take the offensive simultaneously against all, unless we were compelled to do so. Does not consider that concerted action on the part of the tribes is possible. 4026. 4034.

Considers 7 divisions sufficient for dealing with Afghanistan and tribes. 4040.

Does not consider the estimate of men and arms of tribes reliable, but somewhat exaggerated. Ammunition of tribes would run out in a very short time. 4052, 4054.

After isolated campaigns against tribes withdrawal is advisable, but in event of general war, is for going right up to Durand line, making roads and freely enlisting tribesmen. 4056.

The tribesmen if enlisted by us would make good soldiers. 4058.

The Afridis are the most likely to be dangerous to us in the future. 4064.

A war with the Mahsuds is likely. 4066.

In the event of a Muhammadan rising in India the tribesmen would join in and the Afghans also. 4300.

*Sir G. Roos-Keppel.*—Shinwaris could be made use of in time of war to guard the Khyber road within their limits. They feel that their interests are ours and they could be entirely depended upon.

Afridis the most important and best armed tribe upon the frontier and no rising could be general without them. They are singularly free from fanaticism and look solely to their own interests. Nothing short of a real grievance would induce them to rise independently of others.

Orakzai and Zaimusht would follow the Afridis, but they are not such good fighters nor so well armed as the latter.

In a frontier rising the Turis of the Kurram could be entirely depended upon.

Wazirs and Mahsuds are hostile to us, well-armed and steadily increasing their armament and they are much under influence of Kabul.

Our relations with all except the most remote tribes have steadily improved since 1895.

The people of the Black Mountain and Buner are poorly armed and it is doubtful whether they ever would give serious trouble unless their independence was threatened.

Swatis are intensely fanatical and priest-ridden, not to be trusted and might rise at any time without cause and without warning.

The people of Dir and Bajaur are less fanatical than the Swatis but would probably join the latter in any big rising.

Chitralis are hostile to Pathan tribes surrounding them, and would be unlikely to join them.

The Mohmands have fanatical tendencies and would probably give trouble, but they are not a serious menace.

Mullagoris are very friendly to us, on bad terms with Mohmands and Afridis, and can be depended upon to assist us to guard Mullagori country.

Bhittanis, Mianis, Shiranis are negligible.

The relations of tribes with each other have been drawn closer, and a war against one tribe would arouse the sympathy of the others. 4776, 4802, 4930.

In 1897 there was no lateral communication between the tribes now there is a chain linking them up. 4778, 4918.

The Amir keeps up regular pro-Afghan agencies amongst the tribes and subsidizes them. Anybody who is notoriously anti-British receives an allowance from Kabul. Our allowances to the tribes are allotted by tribes and each section receives its share. 4782, 4790.

Does not think we could possibly do without this system of subsidies. 4794.

All the tribes on the frontier are more or less hostile at heart. 4800.

There is no instance of fighting tribes having settled in India. 4806.

Does not think tribes want to change masters in the least. 4812.

An enormous trade among tribes has grown up. 4816.

With increased prosperity, will be less value as fighting men and will become less inclined to fight because they will have more to lose. 4818.

In a war with Russia, with Afghans as our allies, if the tribes thought we were going to win they would fight for us, but some would nevertheless raid our convoys. 4824.

Statistics showing armament of the tribes can be relied upon as a minimum. 4832.

Return of arms in possession of tribes shows only arms of European manufacture. Every tribesman has a weapon of some sort. 4834.

In calculating the fighting strength of the tribes, every able-bodied man is included. 4838.

Taken as an average, tribes possess 20 to 40 rounds of ammunition per rifle. Tribes have always obtained ammunition from Kabul and they also buy it from Afghan troops on the frontiers of tribal areas. 4848, 4854.

No rifle has very great value on the frontier which does not take Government ammunition. All rifles made in tribal areas are made to take Government ammunition. 4862, 4864.

Rifles made in tribal country shoot well up to 800 yards or so. 4868.

If we stopped the manufacture of rifles in the Kohat Pass it would only drive the trade further inland. 4874.

The effect of our operations in the Persian Gulf has been to reduce largely the supply of arms and ammunition. 4878.

Tribesmen visit Kabul and Jalalabad in considerable numbers each year, and bring back a few rifles and large quantities of ammunition. 4884.

No present likelihood of any large or general tribal combination against us, and cannot conceive of same unless we were at war with Afghanistan. No *jihad* preached from Kabul would induce the tribes to rise unless the Afghans showed the way. Should tribes have serious grievances, and their discontent tempt them to rise their inclinations would doubtless be intensified by preaching and promises of support from Kabul. 4908, 4926.

The stoppage of the arms traffic would not in the least have the effect of bringing some of the tribes on us. 4912.

No comparison is possible between the frontier tribes and the tribes in Baluchistan. 4916.

Nasrulla Khan begs tribes always to keep in communication with each other. 4918.

Afridis consider themselves the premier tribe and have a certain amount of dislike and contempt for the others, but common interest and a common fighting religion count for something. 4924.

The national feeling is too strong to permit us to entertain the idea of getting any of the clans on our side if we tried to take a portion of tribal country. 4926.

The General Staff estimate of six-and-a-third divisions with other details is ample if not excessive for a general war with the tribes. 4928.

The three important tribes to be considered are the Swatis, Afridis, and the Wazirs (including the Mahsuds) as the smaller tribes would follow their example. Mahsuds are the most obviously hostile tribe at present. Looks upon the Swatis as the gravest danger. 4928, 4930.

The armament of the tribes is very much better than it was in 1897. 4932.

We are now in a better position to hit at the tribes than we were. 4933, 4938.

Mahsuds could be ruined by entering their country in the spring and destroying their harvest then and in the following autumn. A war with Afghanistan would unsettle the tribes, but it would not necessarily make them rise in sympathy. In such a war the Afridis are the most important tribe as they command Khyber throughout its length and road from Landi Kotal to Jalalabad. An early and decisive victory at Jalalabad or Gandamak would probably bring Afridis to our side. The other tribes from their situation could take little part in the war, but were it prolonged, they would probably become much excited and go in for extensive raiding. In a tribal war the Afghan Government would disclaim any sympathy with the rebels, but would give covert assistance in the shape of food and ammunition and would wink at large numbers of Afghan subjects joining the tribesmen. 4942, 4944.

If we had a revolt on the part of Sikhs and Hindus, and we wanted the frontier tribes, they would come in thousands, bring their own arms, and pay their own expenses. 4960.

The tribes regard the Sultan as the head of Islam; they do not regard the Amir as a great religious leader, but a *jihad* declared by him is lawful. 4964.

Anything in the nature of annexing the territory up to the Durand line would be a mistake, but we should take advantage of future expeditions for necessary rectifications of our frontier with the tribes. 4966.

It might be desirable to make roads through some parts of independent territory, and to keep them open by posts without annexing or taking over the administration of the country. 4966, 4980.

The opening up of communications is the best means for keeping a tribe in check. 4974.

Afridis get on better with us than any other of the tribes—they have a great natural taste for soldiering. 4984.

In his opinion, peaceful penetration on the “Sandeman system” is not possible in frontier tribal territory. 4996.

Not safe to base calculations regarding number of troops required for an Afghan war upon assumption that frontier tribes would give little trouble. 5042.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—Considers that in a war with Afghanistan we must reckon on the frontier tribesmen rising. 5363.

If Government takes prompt measures at the outset of a war with the tribes on our North-West Frontier, can see no possibility of so large a force as six-and-a-third divisions being necessary. Delay and diplomatic dealing may cause a general rising, but the suspension of political rule and a free hand to the commander of the troops will be the best and the only way to prevent a prolonged campaign and to nip a general rising in the bud. The immediate advance of, say, one division will do more than the concentration of a large force at a later period. 5373.

Does not consider that an army of 120,000 would be required to fight Afghanistan and the tribes combined. 5375.

Considers that the numbers in the General Staff Memorandum showing the fighting strength of the frontier tribes, and the breech-loading rifles or carbines in their possession are exaggerated. 5387.

The more the tribes pursue our system the less formidable they will become. 5391.

Withdrawal after punitive expeditions cannot be laid down as a general principle. 5393.

Considers that taking advantage of future expeditions for rectifications of our frontier with the tribes and the making of roads etc., is a very sound plan. 5395.

The Mahsud Wazirs are the only tribe with which we are likely to have trouble in the immediate future and they must get a beating. 5401.

Believes Afridis would not move in the event of a fanatical outbreak unless there were other circumstances as well. 5551.

*General Birdwood.*—Can hardly imagine a war with Afghanistan without the frontier tribes giving us a great deal of trouble. 7305.

The Afridi is not fanatical and has a dislike to imperilling a well paid job near his home. He has no great love for the Afghans. 7379.

*General Hamilton Gordon.*—There can be no question that the Amir's policy of arming his people and the tribesmen and maintaining a large reserve of arms and ammunition has made both of them far more formidable enemies than they were before. 13887.

Not aware that it has ever been regarded as impossible or even very improbable that practically simultaneous action against all the tribes on the frontier may have to be reckoned with. Admitted that it is unlikely that the tribes would on their own initiative be capable of arranging for such a combination as would make simultaneous action possible. The Foreign Office concurs on these points. 13909.

It is not quite certain that a more or less consecutive series of outbreaks such as occurred in 1897 may not result in more serious inconvenience than a simultaneous rising of the tribes. 13909.

In a war with the tribes, should act on the defensive against the Mahsuds because they could not do us much harm, but the action taken must necessarily depend on the circumstances of the moment. 13917, 13919.

The arming of the tribes since 1897 has increased their fighting power very largely, both in respect of the great increase in the number of rifles possessed by them and in their nature. At the present time the number of magazine and breech-loading rifles has largely increased. 13921.

Foreign Office on being consulted stated that the estimates of the number of fighting men and the weapons amongst the tribes might be relied upon as being correct to within ten per cent. 13921.

The tribes about whose armament we know least are those most remote from our frontier and therefore of less immediate importance. 13921.

The increased armament of the tribes has undoubtedly been materially affected by our operations in the Persian Gulf; the check on importation is most satisfactory. 13929.

## PERSIA.

*General Staff Appreciation. Appendix I.*—Anarchy in Persia, which might bring about its partition, might cause difficulties with Russia. 9.

Internal condition so unsatisfactory that it may become impossible to adhere to the Anglo-Russian Convention as regards Persia. 17.

India interested in Seistan owing to its proximity to Afghan and Indian frontiers and its grain-producing possibilities. It is desirable to maintain *status quo* in Seistan. 18.

Possibility of hostile naval base being established at head of Gulf owing to advent of Baghdad Railway to shores of Gulf. 19.

Trans-Persian Railway must modify strategical position of India to our disadvantage. It should be so located as to be controlled by our sea power through a large portion of its length. 20.

Britain to resist the establishment of a rival naval base or fortified coaling station in the Gulf. 21.

*Sir H. McMahon.*—The Russians appear to be taking measures which, if continued, will look as if they desired to force upon us the partition of Persia, although the Russian Government maintain that this is not the case. 3219.

We could not occupy Persia with our present army. 3225.

Places on the Gulf do not lend themselves to defence from the land side, and the fleet might not always be available. 3227.

The situation in Persia does not look promising. 3253.

The whole question regarding Persia will be focused and decided by the Trans-Persian Railway. 3257.

There seems every likelihood of the continuance of anarchy until the Trans-Persian Railway materializes. 3261.

Understands that the Potsdam Agreement favours Germany's commercial interests in the neutral zone in Persia. 3267.

Our trade interests with Persia are small in value, but preponderating as compared with that of other countries. 3273.

Under her present military system, it would be most difficult for Germany to maintain garrison troops in Persia. 3275.

Permanent military occupation of Persia by Germany is a matter that need not be very much apprehended. 3277.

Assuming eventual partition of Afghanistan and Persia, states the most desirable line of division. 3415.

With improved administration, the potential grain-producing possibilities of Seistan are enormous. 3427.

Would fight to keep the Russians out of Seistan. 3433.

Very serious objections to allowing Russia to obtain a port on the Persian Gulf. 3447.

We are making every effort to keep the Gulf to ourselves. 3449.

We are getting so many treaties with people along the Gulf Littoral that we are closing to it other people. 3451.

Would fight to keep other European Powers out of the Persian Gulf. 3453.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—In the event of a war with Afghanistan would not bring Persia in if it could be avoided. 4014.

*Sir G. Roos-Keppel.*—Operations against the arms traffic in the Gulf should be continued until the trade is exterminated. 4890.

*General Hamilton Gordon.*—The construction of the Trans-Persian line will have a permanent effect on India lasting at any rate far beyond the time covered by existing alliances and conventions. The state of affairs would be similar to what would exist if we had a conterminous frontier with Russia. The construction of this railway, even if not completed, will add a third line of approach, and one which, from its outflanking character, would be a greater source of anxiety than the other two. 13798.

It is a good thing for the line to strike the Persian Gulf at a point at which we should have complete naval command and as far away from India as possible. 13816, 13818.

The Trans-Persian Railway will be very disadvantageous to us in case of war. 13833, 13835.



## POLICE.

*General Staff Appreciation. Appendix I.*—In event of widespread unrest culminating in serious outbreak, reliability of bulk of police doubtful unless strongly supported by regular troops. Policy of the Government is therefore to restrict any increase or improvement in the armament of the police. 45.

*Colonel Bingley.*—During last three or four years police have been put to extreme tests and have emerged from ordeal very creditably. 278.

The only dangerous element in the police would be those who happened to be armed at the time of the outbreak. 280.

Sir Louis Dane, Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, suggested that to place reliance on the police for maintaining internal security would be to place reliance on a broken reed. 282.

*Sir M. Grover.*—As a rule objection is made to giving the police better arms than they have got. 436.

*Sir C. Cleveland.*—The police have had the fighting of sedition and they have done it *con amore*. The anti-British party have all along adopted an extremely bitter tone against them. 1231.

In favour of arming the better portion of the police for internal defence. 1235.

Not likely that the whole of the Field Army will be out of India at once, therefore the police will never be exposed to quite the strain Lord Kitchener contemplated. 1237.

During the last few years the numbers and organization of the police have been considerably improved and increased. 1245.

The native police are becoming a little softer; they are getting more educated men and the prestige of the force is not quite what it was. 1247.

Policemen are less ready than formerly to take the legal risks of strong action. 1249.

The seditionists have gone too far to win over the police to their side now. 1266.

*Mr. Fenton.*—Police just as loyal as the native army, possibly a shade more so, because there is less chance of the seditionists influencing them. Distinct hostility between the advanced party of the seditionists and the police. Large number of Muhammadans in the Punjab Police, and Muhammadans are supposed to be in no way affected by sedition. 1680.

If there was deep-seated disaffection in the native army no doubt the police would feel the influence of it. 1688.

In times of disaffection, provided the army remained loyal, the police could generally be trusted to do so also. 1690.

*Mr. Wheeler.*—Police of Bengal and Assam have stood trial very well. 2123.

Spontaneous or organized movement against the Government by the police in the first instance most unlikely. 2139.

Ordinarily, political agitators leave the police alone, in fact, regard them as their enemies. 2141.

Estimated that about 28,764 armed police would be available in an emergency. 2143.

No material change in the quality of the help that could be expected from the police now and in Lord Kitchener's time. 2159.

Position of the police would be difficult if the military force were reduced to a minimum. 2161.

A great deal to be said in favour of giving better weapons to a certain proportion of the police. 2177.

*General Aylmer.*—No reason to suspect the loyalty of the police more than that of the native troops. The present armament of the police is suitable. In time of trouble the classes who were above suspicion might be given a better rifle. 2800.

*Mr. Lovett.*—Strength of armed police in United Provinces 6784. In the United Provinces the armed police are trained to arms regularly whilst the civil police are given some comparatively simple instruction for a year after joining the force and a short annual training. 2898, 2904 (annexure).

A strong feeling among the police against agitators. 2910.

It would be asking too much to expect the police to remain loyal if there were deep-rooted disloyalty in the native army. 2914 (and annexure).

Unlikely that the police would be less trustworthy than the army, and if the army remained loyal, police could generally be depended on. 2921.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—Does not think we can rely entirely on the loyalty and steadfastness of the police in the maintenance of order. Would not supply police with better weapons. 4374.

*Sir G. Roos-Keppel.*—Police would not be of any great material assistance in maintaining order, but they would be of use in collecting information and in repressing minor disorders.

If provided with Martini-Henri rifles and trained to use them, police would be of great value if concentrated at important points in time of serious disturbance. 5103.

Would train the police to use rifles, but would not issue the rifles till required. 5109.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—Armed police generally fitted for police duty; but against giving them any better weapons if those they have at present are fit for use at short ranges. 5577.

*Governor in Council, Bombay.*—Of the utmost importance that there should never be any weakening of the British element in the command of the police of each district. 6954 (Annexure II paragraph 9).

*Mr. Curtis.*—In Poona the police are Marathas and lower class Muhammadans. 6520.

The withdrawal of the police from outlying *thanas*, with a view to concentrating them in large bodies to assist in the maintenance of internal order on the departure of the Field Army would result in a conflagration at once. Does not think the Bombay police could do anything at all to assist the military. 6534.

In the event of disaffection in the native army, the police of the Bombay Presidency could be depended upon and does not think that trouble in the army would re-act on the police. 6581, 6591.

His belief in the continued efficiency and loyalty of the police is contingent on the higher posts remaining in the hands of Europeans as they are at present. If the higher posts in the force are to be given to natives of India, the concession will diminish so materially the value of the force that the whole question of the extent of assistance which it would be relied on to give in time of trouble would have to be reconsidered. 6954.

*Mr. Kennedy.*—The entire strength of police in the Bombay Presidency, including Sind but excluding Kathiawar, is 27,623. 6491, 6496.

The agency police are maintained for service in the territories of the non-jurisdictional Talukdars. There are something like 800 mounted and 600 foot police. 6493.

Proposals for increasing the police of the Bombay Presidency proper have been approved by the Government of India and are now under submission to the Secretary of State. 6496, 6500, 6502.

The armed police in the Presidency proper number 6789; the unarmed police are trained to hit a target six times or more out of ten, but they have no regular practice and do not drill with arms. 6507, 6511, 6513.

In the Bombay Presidency there are 6789 arms for the police with a reserve of 1586; of these, 536 are Martini-Henri rifles and the rest bored-out Martinis. 6509, 6606.

Muhammadans, Marathas, Brahmans, Rajputs, Kollis, Bhils, a few Sikhs, some Parsis, Jews, and Native Christians and several other minor castes are enlisted in the Bombay Presidency police; they all serve in the districts in which they are enlisted. 6515, 6517, 6526.

Have to take a few Brahmans in the police for investigation and scriptory purposes. 6524.

In regard to the concentration of police on the departure of the Field Army to assist in maintaining internal order, considers that the withdrawal of the police from outlying *thanas* would be considered as a sign of weakness by the people of the districts, and no arrangements have been made to carry out this scheme as it is considered a dangerous policy. 6528, 6530.

In Bombay Presidency, have no actual reserve for our present strength of police, but have a small force, 536 in number, armed with rifles. These rifle squads are distributed in the districts and comprise constables and head-constables. There are no reserves at all at headquarters, simply the men required for ordinary guard duties. When an emergency arises, guards are left standing and any men that can be spared sent to where they are required. 6539, 6541.

Although the number of armed police in the Bombay Presidency is large it is not more than is required to guard treasuries, lock-ups, etc. In the proposed reorganization, it is proposed to provide for a reserve of sick and leave vacancies as there is no such reserve at present. 6549.

In Lord Kitchener's scheme the assistance which it was contemplated the police could render to the troops in the maintenance of internal order was over-estimated. 6558.

The only addition to the police of the Bombay Presidency proper since 1903 was about 1000 men, mostly unarmed. 6560, 6562, 6564, 6566.

The police in the Bombay Presidency have dealt very successfully with all disturbances. Has no specific instances of sedition-mongers trying to seduce the force from its loyalty, but the Press has brought pressure to bear on it and twitted it with remaining true to its salt. 6568, 6576.

The seditionists try to discredit the police with the Government. 6570.

In the event of disaffection in the native army the police in the Bombay Presidency could be depended upon, even if there were a mutiny among the troops, and does not consider that trouble in the army would react on the police. 6580, 6584, 6586, 6590.

Difficulty experienced in the Bombay Presidency in getting educated men of suitable physique for the police, but the difficulty is due to industrial expansion and the shortage of the labour market in Bombay due to plague. There is no discontent in the force. Bombay Government are not adhering strictly to the letter of the recommendations of the Police Commission. 6593, 6595, 6597, 6599.

Does not wish to give the police force better arms than they now possess. 6608.

In arriving at the general attitude of the people towards the police in the Bombay Presidency, it is necessary to take the ignorant and the educated classes separately and again to sub-divide the educated into the loyal and the disloyal. Those who are disaffected are certainly very hostile to the police and are always trying to discredit them in every way possible. The whole of the population is apathetic when it comes to the question of working with the police, but in other respects as far as the law-abiding educated loyal classes are concerned, they are friendly to the police. 6614, 6616.

In the Bombay Presidency the people are not likely to combine with the police. The people think the police are loyal to Government and they are suspicious and distrustful of them when it comes to the question of working for Government. 6618.

Of the utmost importance that there should never be any weakening of the British element in the police. 6955.

*Mr. Hughes-Buller.*—Police force (outside Calcutta) of Bengal 18,610, of which 2,944 are armed. 7595.

All the police are trained to the use of firearms, but the musketry course is a very indifferent one. 7602.

Recruiting areas and class composition of the Bengal police. 7612.

We prefer the Muhammadan to the Hindu, but we cannot get him. 7623.

Not satisfied with the class of men got for the police. 7627.

Does not think that on the whole the curtailment of the avenues of promotion open to constables has affected the contentment of the force. Difficulty is experienced in getting the right class of men, but this is chiefly due to inadequate pay and to the Bengali's dislike to discipline. 7629.

Instances where attempts have been made to seduce the police from their loyalty. On the whole, throughout the last 7 years the police have remained unexpectedly staunch. 7648.

The police are intensely disliked by the extremists, but it would be a wide statement to say that the breach could not be healed. 7657.

No indications that there is any likelihood of an organized rising on the part of the police of Bengal in response to the call of seditionists. 7661.

Civil police would be tainted long before the army. In the event of disaffection amongst the native troops, the civil, but not the military police in Bengal, would most certainly join them. 7676, 7679.

In the event of racial or religious riots, reliance on the police in such emergencies is sometimes doubtful. 7689.

About 1,500 civil police and 500 military police could be made available for police battalions in case of emergency. 7710, 7719.

Strength of reserve maintained at district headquarters is 2446. 7710.

The amount of support which the civil police in Bengal could give to the minimum garrisons would be very small indeed, and may be treated as a negligible quantity.

Three hundred and eighty smooth-bore breech-loading muskets sanctioned for police in neighbourhood of Calcutta.

European sergeants and inspectors are in charge of the police force in neighbourhood of Calcutta.

Arrangements for dealing with strikes among the mill hands in Calcutta.

In the Bengal Presidency, opinions differ as to whether the armed police should be armed with a more effective weapon. 7736.

There is a complete lack of sympathy between the people and the police. 7765.

*Sir F. Halliday.*—Calcutta police number 4293, of whom 213 are armed. 7596, 7737.

Only the men actually armed are trained to shoot in the Calcutta police. 7603.

Recruiting areas and class composition of the Calcutta police. 7613.

The curtailment of the avenues of promotion has caused discontent among the literate head-constables of the Calcutta police. There is no difficulty in a normal year in obtaining the usual type of recruit so far as physical qualifications are concerned. 7630.

Does not know of any organized attempt to seduce the Calcutta police from their allegiance, though isolated instances have occurred in which agitators advocated in speeches a boycott of the police service. 7649.

There is no likelihood of an organized rising on the part of the police in Calcutta in the immediate future. The more the police are educated, the more dangerous they become to us. 7662, 7664.

Provided the army remained loyal, the police could be trusted to do so also, at any rate in the immediate future. If the causes of disaffection in the native army affected the interests of the police the latter would easily become disaffected. 7677.

In the event of religious or racial riots, the civil police cannot be fully trusted. Provided the European element is present, police could be trusted to some extent to sink racial feelings and stand by their officers. 7690.

The actual reserve at Calcutta is 148 men. 7711.

There are 156 Europeans in the Calcutta police.

Arms in possession of Calcutta police are 133 muskets and 75 revolvers. In the event of general religious or racial riots in Calcutta, likely to last for some days and spread throughout the city, the police would not be sufficient and military assistance, especially European, would have to be called for. Desirable to arm such bodies of the civil police as are permanently armed with more effective weapons than they now possess. 7737.

In Calcutta there is a very general and strong aversion to the lower ranks of the police. 7766.

#### WRITTEN EVIDENCE.

*Sir B. Robertson.*—The civil police of the Central Provinces number 11 800, and all are trained in the use of firearms. The arms available for police in the Central Provinces are 270 rifles, 97 carbines, and 3,565 smooth-bore muskets. 2.

The special armed reserve consists of 400 men and 32 head-constables thoroughly drilled and trained in musketry and available for use in case of disturbance. 4.

No reason to suppose that estimate of 2,000 police in Central Provinces capable of being concentrated and made available for the purpose of maintaining internal order is an over-estimate except in the event of widespread disturbance. 6.

There is no evidence to show that there has been any attempt to seduce the police of the Central Provinces from their loyalty. 8.

So far as the Central Provinces are concerned, it is probable that even if the Indian army seceded, the larger portion of the police would still remain loyal. 10, 14.

It would be a good thing if the pay of head-constables were raised to Rs. 30 per mensem. 12.

The special armed reserve require an increase in the number of their rifles. The Martini-Henry is a sufficiently good weapon. 14.

On the whole, the attitude of the people in the Central Provinces towards the police, though occasionally critical, may be said to be friendly. 18.

*Lieutenant-Colonel Stratton.*—There are 286 armed civil and 713 military police in Rajputana.

The civil police in Rajputana are maintained for fixed guards, escorts of prisoners and treasure, and for semi-military duties on emergency.

About half the number of the civil police are located in formed bodies, remainder are scattered between Ajmer-Merwara.

*Sir H. Stuart.*—There are 1782 officers and 29,388 police in the Madras Presidency, all trained to the use of arms.

The following arms are in possession of the police in the Madras Presidency:—rifles, 996, smooth-bores, 8528, revolvers, 531, swords, 6896, bayonets, 9524. 104.

All classes are enlisted in the Madras Presidency police.

In most districts between 80 and 90 per cent. of the men are natives of the district. 104.

In the Madras Presidency, there is at the headquarters of each district an 'emergency force' always present and ready at short notice to proceed to any place in the district or outside it. Emergency force consists of 123 head-constables and 1476 constables. 106.

Statement showing distribution of armed reserves throughout the Madras Presidency. 106.

Does not think it would be a wise plan to concentrate the armed police and use them in comparatively large bodies at a time of general mobilization. If there was anything of the nature of general uprising, the police could not be trusted, and would be of little, if any, value for purposes of suppression. The police would be of great use in dealing with local outbreaks. 108.

The Madras armed police have behaved satisfactorily in dealing with disturbances in recent years, but there have been instances of the rural police showing the white feather in the presence of heavy odds against them. Never heard of any real attempts being made to seduce the police from their allegiance. 110.

If disaffection were of a military character, it would not be likely to spread to the police. If the military disaffection were merely symptomatic of the general disaffection, then would certainly expect to find it among the police also. No love lost between police and sepoys. 114.

Quite possible that the police in the Presidency might become disaffected while the army remained loyal, and that they might be less trustworthy than the army. 118.

No discontent in the police owing to the alleged restriction of promotion from the ranks. 122.

Undesirable to give the civil police more effective firearms than they now possess. There would be appreciable danger in supplying the police with rifles to any greater extent than is now done. 125.

There has been a distinct improvement in the attitude of the people towards the police. 132.

*Mr. Horne.*—The Madras police in dealing with disturbances of late years have behaved better than many people expected. Knows of no cases in which sedition-mongers have attempted to seduce the police from their loyalty. 111.

Concurs in the opinion that in the event of serious disaffection in the native army, the police generally could not be relied on for use in quelling disturbance. 115.

Provided the army remained loyal, the police could generally be trusted to do so also. It is not likely that the police would be less trustworthy than the army. 119.

Does not think it would be desirable to give the police more effective firearms than they now possess. 126.

*Mr. Francis.*—Knows of no cases in which sedition-mongers have tried to seduce the police from their loyalty. 112.

If there was disaffection in the native army, the police could not be relied on to quell serious disturbances. 116.

Provided the army remained loyal, the police could generally be trusted to do so also. 120.

There is no discontent in the political sense of the word among the lower ranks of the police, now that promotion is barred to them. 123.

Undesirable to give the police more effective firearms than they now possess. 127.

The attitude of the people towards the police depends upon the police, and where everything is straight forward the relations are friendly enough. 133.

*Mr. Carey.*—Impossible to use Burmese civil police in concentrated bodies. Some 10 or 15 per cent. (largely composed of non-commissioned officers) could be employed under the leadership of British officers or with a preponderating proportion of Indian troops or police. 225.

As a body, the civil police in Burma must be considered to be inferior in physique to the ordinary cultivator. 225.

Believes sedition-mongers have made no systematic attempt to seduce the Burma police from their loyalty, and unless the regulars in India could be won over it would be futile to try and seduce the regulars and police in Burma. 230.

If the Indian police in Burma mutinied there ought to be no serious trouble in exterminating the mutineers in the hills and forests on their way back to India. Provided the army remains loyal, the police in Burma can also be trusted to do so. 230, 235.

The civil police should most certainly not be armed with a better weapon. 250.

*Mr. Leveson.*—In the event of internal disorder in Burma, should not count on any assistance from concentrated bodies of civil police. Such as could be spared locally could best be employed in small parties for intelligence and patrol work. 226.

No evidence that sedition-mongers have tried to seduce police from their loyalty. 231.

The Indian portion of the civil police in Burma, provided the army remained loyal, could generally be trusted to do so also, but the loyalty and trustworthiness of the Burmese civil police would depend on the nature of the disaffection. 236.

Only difficulty in recruiting for the Burmese civil police is the question of pay. 241.

Would not be desirable to give the civil police more effective firearms than they now possess. 251.

Generally speaking, the people in Burma look upon the police as an unavoidable evil. 256.

*Colonel Parkin.*—198 inspectors, 1123 sub-inspectors, 18 European serjeants, 1735 head-constables and 12,449 constables in the Burma civil police. 213.

Inspectors, sub-inspectors and European serjeants armed with revolvers. Head-constables and constables are trained to arms and the number of firearms provided for them is 3604, of which nearly all are smooth-bore Martini-Henri carbines. Force consists mainly of Burmans but it includes men of other indigenous races and Indians. The Burmans and other indigenous men are usually recruited locally in the districts in which they are serving. Rangoon town police is a separate force consisting of 1053 men, of whom the greater part are Indians; this force has 87 smooth-bore carbines. 213.

Armed police could be most usefully employed at posts with the military police, but it would probably be undesirable to employ civil police in concentrated bodies by themselves. 227.

No evidence that sedition-mongers have tried to seduce the military or civil police from their loyalty. 232.

The police could generally be trusted if the army remained loyal. 237.

Recruits are generally obtainable, but the quality is not so good as could be desired. As regards Sikh recruits, quality and quantity are in defect. 242.

The bored-out Martini-Henry carbine is sufficient for the civil police. 252.

The general attitude of the people in Burma towards the police is satisfactory. 257.

*Mr. Law.*—In Burma, no assistance except in exceptional circumstances could be counted on from concentrated bodies of civil police. 228.

No reliable evidence to show that sedition-mongers have tried to seduce the police in Burma from their loyalty. 233.

Does not think the police would prove themselves less trustworthy than the army. 238.

No very great difficulty in recruiting for the Burma portion of the Indian civil police. 243.

Averse to giving the civil police more effective firearms than they now possess. 253.

The attitude of the people towards the police is one of passive resistance. 258.

*Lieutenant-Governor in Council, Bihar and Orissa.*—Civil police in Bihar and Orissa consist of 155 inspectors, 972 sub-inspectors, 1399 head-constables, 10041 constables, 203 town *chaukidars*, 5 mounted constables, 10 European serjeants and are in possession of 9325 Martini-Henri smooth-bore carbines. 305.

Of the civil police, 21 inspectors, 8 serjeants, 60 head-constables, and 750 constables constitute the armed reserve. 305.

Proposals for reorganization of armed resources of the police under consideration. 305.

Places from which the Bihar and Orissa police are recruited. 307.

The proportion of Muhammadans to Hindus in the police of Bihar and Orissa generally, and especially in the armed reserve, exceeds that in the general population. 307.

No evidence of any attempts having been made to seduce the police of Bihar and Orissa from their loyalty, but attempts have been made in Eastern Bengal during the past five or six years and they were to a considerable extent successful in the case of police units recruited partially if not entirely from Bihar and Orissa. 309.

A very general consensus of opinion that, provided the army remains loyal, the police in Bihar and Orissa can be trusted to do so also, but if disaffection fomented by political agitators were to spread amongst the rank and file of the native troops, the police could not be relied upon to remain loyal. 311.

In the event of religious or racial riots, the police in Bihar and Orissa in existing circumstances can be trusted to act against their co-religionists or kinsfolk, but it is doubtful whether it would be safe to rely upon their loyalty in the event of general religious excitement especially should such excitement be preceded by an organized attempt to tamper with the police. 313.

Statement of reserves of police in Bihar and Orissa that would be available at district headquarters for quelling local disturbances. 315.

The armed reserve of police in Bihar and Orissa is maintained in a high state of efficiency, but the other units would be useless for armed work without at least a month's steady training. 315.

A scheme for mobilization of police in each district in Bihar and Orissa. 315.



Statement of police available at each divisional centre. 315.

The assistance which the police could render the troops in the maintenance of internal order was certainly over-estimated in Lord Kitchener's scheme if reliance was placed on police battalions. 317.

The assistance which the police could render the troops in the maintenance of internal order would depend more on the extent to which signs of disturbance could be quelled by prompt handling on their first appearance than upon the numbers of the police force subsequently available. 317.

Five inspectors, 20 sub-inspectors, 1 European serjeant, 58 head-constables and 550 constables in Patna. This force is decidedly insufficient to deal with widespread disturbances in the city, and in such an emergency it would be necessary to seek military assistance from the outset. 319.

The supply to the police of a more effective weapon would be inexpedient. 319.

On the whole there has been an improvement in the general attitude of the people towards the police. 321.

## POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS.

*General Staff Appreciation. Appendix I.—ARYA SAMAJ.*—Sikhs influenced by anti-British propaganda and liberal ideas of—. 59.

Sikhs hostile to modern Hinduism as represented by—. 59.

Favours national independence. 60.

Striving to unite Hindus of every sect in a common religion and nationality. 60.

Anti-Islamic, anti-Sikh, anti-Christian and strongly anti-European. Aims at creating a national spirit by inculcating a hatred of alien rule.

Its object is ultimate overthrow of British rule. 62.

Educated Hindus in Punjab nearly all supporters of the Samaj which is admirably directed and organized. 63.

Tried to seduce soldiers from their allegiance.

Has taken a strong hold among Jats and is gaining ground among Dogras and Rajputs.

Attracts many Hindus by its religious tenets rather than by its political doctrines.

Some members of it have led the seditious agitation of the last few years. 65.

TAT KHALSA.—Designed to unite all Sikhs in resisting the attempts of the Arya Samaj to proselytize them.

Aspires to a revival of Sikhism as it existed in the days of Ranjit Singh. 60.

Tat Khalsa and Arya Samaj potential sources of mischief when appreciating the factors affecting internal security. 65.

CHITPAVAN BRAHMANS.—National aspirations and anti-British propaganda fostered by the Chitpavan Brahmans. Remarkable for their implacable hostility to the Government and their open advocacy of political assassination. Their power increased by fact that through their ability and administrative capacity they pervade every branch of the local administration. 109, 113.

NATIONAL MOVEMENT IN BENGAL.—Seditious propaganda of—.

ALL-INDIA MOSLEM LEAGUE.—Headquarters at Lucknow. Object of—is to safeguard Muhammadan interests. 82.

*Colonel Bingley.*—ARYA SAMAJ :—For last two years lectures have been delivered to officers in every division on aims and objects of the Arya Samaj and other organizations, and Commanding Officers have been warned as to what they should be careful about. 284.

If branch is opened at any place Commanding Officers of units quartered in that locality are informed, and are thus enabled to anticipate mischief. 290.

Nature of its activities exemplified by its propaganda among the Jats, to whom it appeals as agriculturists and asks them to join the anti-cow-killing movement.

Is not so successful in the Deccan.

Absolutely convinced that it is a seditious society. 368.

POONA BRAHMANS.—Would join issue with Arya Samaj on the point of nationalism or anti-cow-killing. 368.

*Major Jackson.*—ANTI-KINE-KILLING propaganda has a political object. 325.

Abundant evidence to shew that the ARYA SAMAJ, TAT KHALSA, THE CHITPAVAN BRAHMANS and other agencies have made attempts to tamper with the loyalty of the troops. 365.

*Sir M. Grover.*—Seditious agencies such as CHITPAVANS, ARYA SAMAJISTS, TAT KHALSAISTS, etc., largely hostile to each other. 410.

*Sir C. Cleveland.*—ARYA SAMAJ:—In 1907, the influence of the Arya Samaj on the political unrest prevailing at the time was very clearly traced in the Punjab. 806.

The political aims of some prominent members of the Arya Samaj were clearly disclosed in 1908-09. Since then Arya Samajists have found it necessary to keep the political side of their teachings rather more in the background. 812.

Arya Samaj was originally antagonistic to the Christian and all other religions. 816.

The weakness of the Arya Samaj is that its members are constantly embroiled with other people. 818.

Influential members of the Arya Samaj have been amongst the leading seditious agitators while others have associated themselves with anarchists in Europe and America. 820.

A great many people join the Arya Samaj from religious motives and are not initiated in the true inwardness of the association until afterwards. 825, 827.

The distribution of Arya Samaj branches follows the distribution of the army in a curious way. 839.

The North-West Frontier Province is affiliated to the Punjab in the Arya Samaj organization. 846.

All provincial bodies of the Arya Samaj concern themselves with politics. 858, 860.

The *gurukul* at Kangri has inculcated a good deal of anti-British feeling. 874.

The deportation of Lajpat Rai, etc., in 1907 stimulated Arya Samajists in one way and frightened them in another. 894.

Lajpat Rai's correspondence with Bhai Parmanand spoke of desirability of supplying revolutionary books to students. 896.

Members of Arya Samaj stirred up unrest in the 10th Jats. 898, 900.

Arya Samaj have always preached against Government service. 902.

Members of the Arya Samaj have made persistent efforts to seduce soldiers from their allegiance. 904.

ALL-INDIA MOSLEM LEAGUE.—Was in favour of British rule in India up to 1911; since then their affairs have been through a somewhat critical stage. 925.

Young Muhammadans state solid acquiescence in *hukum* of the Government is not the way to get reforms, and that Muhammadans must follow the Hindus a little more, and perhaps co-operate with them. 927.

Young Muhammadans go on the principle that agitation leads to concessions. 929.

TAT KHALSA.—Has for its ostensible object the promotion of Sikh orthodoxy, and there is some likelihood of a combination being brought about between the Tat Khalsa and the Arya Samaj because a new spirit is permeating the former. 973.

Has developed a political 'kink' since it originated. 975.

Not so much a religion as a movement within a religion. 987.

Political tendency is nationalization of the Sikhs, while some would go so far as to claim the Punjab for the Sikhs. 991, 995.

Seems to contain the germs of strong development on the political side, and to deserve very careful study and observation. 1001.

GAURAKSHANI SABHA.—Attacks cattle-killing generally and every now and then takes on a political taint. 1019.

RAM KRISHNA MISSION.—Connected with Vedantism in America and has attracted Americans a good deal. 1019, 1021.

**BRAHMO SAMAJ.**—Very little notice taken of the Brahmo Samaj as a political body. 1025.

**CHITPAVAN BRAHMANS.**—The Ganpati movement among the Chitpavans has an anti-Government tendency. 1025.

The combination between the Bengalis and Marathas is nothing like what it was in 1906. 1029.

Chitpavans preaching sedition in the guise of plays in the Maratha country. 1049, 1051, 1053.

More avowedly anti-British than other disloyal sections. Ninety per cent. of the Chitpavans are sentimentally disloyal. They are more avowedly anti-British than other disloyal sections. Tilak's papers have been very outspoken all along, and have made no pretence at loyalty. 1041, 1075.

Chitpavans employed by railways, telegraphs, etc., to a dangerous extent. 1109.

The big strike of signallers on the railway in 1899 was engineered by the Maratha Brahmans. 1119.

The power of the Chitpavan Brahmans to impede or stop the working of the railways constitutes a danger. 1125.

The power of the Chitpavans extends to engendering excitement and dissatisfaction. 1129.

**POLITICAL SOCIETIES IN BENGAL.**—Thinks Bengal has a very elaborate organization, but that it can apparently disintegrate at will. 1157.

**SERVANTS OF INDIA SOCIETY.**—Was founded by Mr. Gokhale. It has changed its original prospectus and now expresses very moderate views which represent the change in Gokhale's ideas and plans. A very violent article about the native army, published in a Bombay newspaper, is on record against the Servants of India Society. 1207.

Real interest of the Servants of India Society is that it reflects the attitude of Gokhale. It is an organization which will materially assist him in his plans whatever they may be. 1217.

**NATIONAL CONGRESS.**—Composed of moderates and extremists. Its sting has however been taken out of it now. The Congress had a great many constitutional agitators but there was a very dangerous proportion working for revolution. 1219, 1221.

*Mr. Fenton.*—**ARYA SAMAJ** :—Arya Samaj contains a large portion of political agitators who desire to create what they call an 'Indian Nationality.' 1782.

Where there is a disloyalist there is an Arya Samajist. 1784.

There could be no combination between the Arya Samaj and the Tat Khalsa. 1788.

**TAT KHALSA.**—The individual leaders of the Tat Khalsa need to be watched by the Government. 1730.

Tendencies of Tat Khalsaists and neo-Sikhs are political and not religious. 1744.

**NATIONAL CONGRESS.**—Portion of educated Muhammadans prepared to join hands with the Congress. 1766.

**PAN-ISLAMIC MOVEMENT.**—Only the educated portion and those whom the educated portion are able to influence have been affected by the Pan-Islamic Movement. 1774.

*Mr. Wheeler.*—**CHITPAVANS** :—Chitpavans constitute a very large element in Government service. 2249.

**NATIONAL CONGRESS.**—Influence of National Congress has considerably waned owing to split between moderates and extremists. 2261.

The Congress should be watched carefully as it represents the opinion of an influential section. 2267.

Such assassinations as have taken place have been the outcome of the teachings of the Congress. 2275.

*Mr. Lovett.*—ANTI-COW-KILLING MOVEMENT.—During the past year the anti-cow-killing agitation has enjoyed some sort of organization and coherence in the United Provinces but the feeling aroused by the movement is chiefly superficial. 2864 (annexure).

ARYA SAMAJ.—There are a few preachers in the United Provinces who are believed to hold fanatical and revolutionary views. 2935.

The numerous Arya Samaj societies in the United Provinces have had practically no outward political effect on the people of the Provinces. 2947.

There is a genuine risk that the Arya Samaj in the United Provinces will become more political. 2947 (annexure), 2949.

Political character and aims of the Arya Samaj are anti-Muhammadan, anti-Christian and anti-foreign. 2989.

Arya Samajism in Benares encounters strong opposition. 2989.

The operations of the Arya Samaj should be carefully watched. 2989.

Regular system of correspondence between Arya Samajists of the United Provinces and those from other places. 2995.

It would be just as well if there were not so many Arya Samajists in Government offices. 2999.

NATIONAL CONGRESS afraid to say as much as they used to. 2941, 2943.

*Mr. Waterfield.*—CHITPAVANS.—Indore cut number of Chitpavans employed by the State down to 30 per cent. 3095.

Number of Chitpavans intimately acquainted with seditionists. 3103.

Deccani Brahmans correspond with agitators in Bombay and Bengal. 3109.

ANTI-COW-KILLING.—The movement is the peg on which the Hindus of Central India hang everything. 3111.

Every time there has been sedition the cow-killing question has come up. 3113.

*Sir H. McMahon.*—PAN-ISLAMIC MOVEMENT.—This is welding Muhammadans of India into a body more capable of combination and co-operation in their mutual interests than ever was the case before. 3688.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—ARYA SAMAJ.—We may have trouble from Sikhs or Jats, as it is their areas in which the agitator has been most busy and where he is most powerful. 4280.

CHITPAVANS.—Danger in number of—employed on railways, telegraphs, etc. 4308.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—ARYA SAMAJ.—Saw seditious effects of Arya Samaj once or twice when divisional Commander. 5563.

*Mr. Curtis.*—SERVANTS OF INDIA SOCIETY.—The most important Society in the Bombay Presidency is the Servants of India Society and it is the one which requires the closest watching. The Society is chiefly composed of Chitpavans. 6751, 6755, 6757, 6761.

ANTI-COW-KILLING MOVEMENT.—The anti-cow-killing society is practically dead in the Bombay Presidency. 6759.

ARYA SAMAJ.—The Arya Samaj is not active in the Bombay Presidency. It has a small membership, and is mostly composed of law-abiding members of society. 6763, 6765.

There was no co-operation between the Arya Samajists in the Punjab and societies in Poona; they are too distrustful of each other. The only co-operation is between the Brahmans of the Bombay Presidency and those of Berar. 6853, 6855.

**GANPATI MOVEMENT.**—The Ganpati movement has a certain amount of influence in the Bombay Presidency, but the Government has been employing restrictions which have tended to weaken it, and not much trouble with it is anticipated in the future. This remark does not apply to the Sivaji cult which is an off-shoot of the Ganpati movement. 6775, 6777.

**CHITPAVANS.**—A large number of Chitpavans in Government service and they are most certainly anti-British. Undesirable proportion of them in telegraph offices and an undue proportion of them in the postal service and in the traffic departments of the railways. 6780, 6782, 6784, 6790, 6792, 6796, 6800.

Not quite sure that steps have been taken to reduce the number of Chitpavans in the traffic departments of the railways, as they give little pay and have to take what they can get. 6786, 6794.

In the Bombay Presidency, as the Chitpavans predominate in every branch of the administration their opposition paralyzes our action and there is great risk of their combining in the Presidency. 6804, 6806.

The bulk of the Chitpavans may be classed as extremists. 6830.

**NATIONAL CONGRESS.**—The importance of the National Congress has declined considerably since the reorganization of the Councils. Ever since the promulgation of the Morley Scheme the Congress has suffered from lack of interest. There is a large proportion of the Desh-Brahmans and some Chitpavans now on the moderate side. 6826, 6828.

Complete local autonomy as advocated by the Congress is a serious aspiration. It is being preached very largely by Gokhale. 6832.

There are a number of *sadhus* in the Bombay Presidency, but they are not influential, and does not consider they are connected with any political propaganda. 6898.

**Mr. Kennedy.**—**ARYA SAMAJ.**—The Arya Samaj has a strong hold in Gujarat and Sind, but the membership is extremely small, and there is nothing to fear from it at all in Bombay as this Presidency is very caste-ridden. 6767.

**GANPATI MOVEMENT.**—Poona is the centre of the Ganpati movement but Government has imposed very strict prohibitions there which may eventually kill it. 6778.

**Mr. Hughes-Buller.**—**GANPATI MOVEMENT.**—List of political and quasi-political societies at work in Bengal. 7777.

**ANUSILAN SAMITI.**—Societies like this one at Dacca undertake propaganda, organize political dacoities and go in for physical training. 7780.

**ARYA SAMAJ.**—This is as a body shewing no activity at present in Bengal. 7812.

**NATIONAL CONGRESS.**—The Congress has dwindled in importance since the creation of the enlarged Legislative Councils and the split at the Surat Congress. 7821.

The breach between moderates and extremists of the Congress has not been so definite in Bengal as elsewhere. 7824.

Local autonomy advocated by the Congress is certainly a serious and dangerous aspiration. 7829.

**SIVAJI CULT.**—This has at present no influence in Bengal. 7922.

**PAN-ISLAMIC MOVEMENT.**—This has had no material effect in Bengal. 7997.

**SAMITIS.**—Outwardly the Bengalis have no widespread secret organization, but there is information that certain members of the Samitis that have been suppressed are still active. 8058.

The potentialities of these for mischief are very great. 8058.

*Sir F. Halliday.*—List of political and quasi-political societies at work in Calcutta. 7778.

At present no society in Calcutta which might be regarded as actively dangerous—they are all however a possible source of danger. 7810.

**ARYA SAMAJ.**—This has a good deal of influence in Calcutta. 7813.

The Bengalis as a class, do not willingly accept the teachings of the Samaj. 7813.

Among the Marwari community the Arya Samaj has great influence, and command considerable financial support. 7813.

The disaffection in the 10th Jats was entirely due to local prompting, the sepoys being first approached through Arya Samaj ideas. 8093.

The Arya Samaj acted as an innocent cat's paw in the 10th Jats incident. (His Excellency the Governor in Council disagrees with this view, and considers that there is sufficient evidence against the Arya Samajists to show that they attempted to seduce the men from their allegiance.) 8099 (and annexure VIII, paragraph 4).

**NATIONAL CONGRESS.**—The political influence of the Congress has fallen off in the past five years but is likely to increase in the near future. 7822.

Local autonomy as advocated by the Congress a most serious and dangerous aspiration. 7830.

**SIVAJI CULT.**—At present there are no signs of activity in Calcutta and the cult has obtained no lasting hold there. 7923.

**PAN-ISLAMIC MOVEMENT.**—This has taken very little hold in Calcutta. 8000.

So far as is known, the Bengalis have at present no organization for political purposes in Calcutta. 8059.

**SAMITIS.**—These are potentially dangerous organizations for the dissemination of seditious literature, thoughts and aspirations. 8059.

*Colonel Hoghton.*—**ARYA SAMAJ**—This is frequently alluded to by the Sikhs who are fully alive to its advances, and are hostile to its members as a rule. 10890, 10894.

*Major Hill.*—**TAT KHALSA AND ARYA SAMAJ.**—Some of the better educated Indian officers interest themselves and talk about them but has never heard any of his Sikh officers refer to anything regarding Muhammadans. 11296.

It may be said that the Tat Khalsaist is a seditious man. 11298.

*Colonel Creagh.*—**ARYA SAMAJ.**—Lobana Sikhs and Marathas look on the Arya Samaj people as people of quite a different religion. Muhammadan native officers, especially those from Rajputana, look on the Arya Samaj as a really bad society that ought to be suppressed. Would like to be allowed definitely to prohibit the Arya Samaj and to inflict exemplary punishment on anyone who might be caught attending meetings. 12185.

*Colonel Cole.*—**TAT KHALSA.**—Looks upon the Tat Khalsa as absolutely legitimate, at any rate the original movement was so. 13189, 13191.

#### WRITTEN EVIDENCE.

*Sir B. Robertson.*—**ARYA SAMAJ.**—The Arya Samaj has branches in the Central Provinces, but is not particularly strong, and does not possess much influence. 80.

In the Central Provinces, the Arya Samaj movement is chiefly confined to the religious side.

**ALL INDIA MUSLIM LEAGUE.**—The Muslim League is purely political. Muhammadans are not very numerous in the Central Provinces, but there are branches of the league in the Provinces though it is not strong nor does it possess much influence.

**GAURAKSHANI SABHAS.**—These are in every part of the Central Provinces, but it is believed they are not connected with any central body but are purely local institutions. 30.

**CHITPAVANS.**—All dangerous agitators in the Central Provinces are Maratha Brahmans. 32.

**ANTI-COW-KILLING MOVEMENT.**—The anti-cow-killing movement has not had much influence in the Central Provinces.

**GANPATI MOVEMENT.**—The Ganpati celebrations are still alive and are kept up wholly for political reasons.

**SIVAJI CULT.**—Sivaji celebrations are also political only. 38.

**NATIONAL CONGRESS.**—Not disposed to attach much weight to the influence of the National Congress in the Central Provinces. Since the succession of the extremist party in the Congress, there has been a general disposition even amongst men of the moderate school to give politics a bit of a rest. 44.

In the Congress the cleavage between the moderates and extremists is complete in the Central Provinces. 46.

**PAN-ISLAMIC MOVEMENT.**—The Pan-Islamic movement has not had any vogue worth mentioning among the Muhammadans of the Central Provinces. 56.

*Lieutenant-Colonel Stratton.*—**ARYA SAMAJ.**—The activity of the Arya Samaj in Rajputana for the past 4 or 5 years has much abated, and the Sanatan Dharm has superseded it and commands more favour and allegiance. 84, 86.

It is believed that a good number of the camp followers and some of the native troops at Nasirabad belong to the Arya Samaj. 86.

**SANATAN DHARM.**—The Sanatan Dharm is, if anything, more bitter and adverse to British rule than the Arya Samaj. 84.

**CHITPAVANS.**—At the time of Lajpat Rai's deportation and Tilak's imprisonment, there was great discontent and unrest among Aryas of Rajputana. 88.

No Chitpavan Brahmans employed by the Telegraph Department in Rajputana, but there are a considerable number employed on the Rajputana-Malwa Railway.

Brahmans are not now employed without a reference to the police as to their character and antecedents. 102.

**GANPATI MOVEMENT.**—The Ganpati movement is not in evidence in Rajputana.

**ANTI-COW-KILLING MOVEMENT.**—There is a very strong feeling against kine-killing.

*Mr. Horne.*—**CHITPAVANS.**—Does not think that the predominance of Brahmans in Government appointments affords grounds for apprehension. In any case predominance of Brahmans unavoidable. 173.

**NATIONAL CONGRESS.**—At present the attitude of the National Congress may be regarded as "correct." 176.

*Mr. Francis.*—**CHITPAVANS.**—There is danger to be apprehended from the predominance of Brahmans in Government appointments.

**NATIONAL CONGRESS.**—The attitude and importance of the Congress have never really changed, but it sees that the present is not a favourable moment for demonstrations. 178.



**SERVANTS OF INDIA SOCIETY.**—No political results to be apprehended from the actions of the Servants of India Society and other Hindu agencies in connexion with “depressed classes.” 184.

*Sir H. Stuart.*—**SERVANTS OF INDIA SOCIETY.**—The Servants of India Society is the only political association of continuous activity in the Madras Presidency. 166.

No political results to be apprehended from the actions of the Servants of India Society, and other Hindu agencies in connexion with the ‘depressed classes.’ 183.

**ANTI-COW-KILLING MOVEMENT.**—The anti-cow-killing movement has hitherto made no impression in the Madras Presidency and we need not apprehend any serious trouble from it. 169.

**CHITPAVANS.**—The predominance of Brahmans in Government service does not afford grounds for apprehension as it is considered we may rely on their enlightened self-interest. 172.

**NATIONAL CONGRESS.**—The political importance of the National Congress is not so great now as it was 10 or 15 years ago, and at present its attitude, taken as a whole, is one of loyalty to the British connexion. 176.

*Mr. Carey.*—**NATIONAL CONGRESS.**—The National Congress does not exercise any influence in Upper Burma. Knows of no dangerous society in Burma. 286.

*The Hon. Mr. Leveson.*—**NATIONAL CONGRESS.**—So far as his personal knowledge goes, National Congress exercises no serious influence in Burma. Knows of no other political society in Burma whose doings Government may have to take into consideration but there are several small local social societies the development of which may be expected gradually to acquire a political colour. 287.

*Colonel Parkin.*—**NATIONAL CONGRESS.**—Does not think the National Congress exercises any serious influence in Burma. Knows of no society in Burma whose doings Government might have to take into consideration. 288.

*Mr. Law.*—**NATIONAL CONGRESS.**—The National Congress exercises no influence in Burma. Thinks, however, that particular members of the native community would have to be considered rather than any particular society, as also possibly one or two Europeans who openly express sympathy with the down-trodden and oppressed Asiatics and do incalculable mischief by inciting them to stand up for their rights. 289.

*Lieutenant-Governor in Council, Bihar and Orissa.*—**NATIONAL CONGRESS.**—The National Congress has hitherto had very little influence in Bihar and Orissa, but there may be a change after the next session. 323, 327.

Evidence that the Bihar Students’ Association has been captured by politicians and that its branches are being influenced to support the Congress movement. 323.

The importance of the complete local autonomy advocated by the Congress lies in the fact that the idea has taken hold of the educated classes and will gather weight as these increase in number. 329.

**ALL-INDIA-MUSLIM LEAGUE**—The Muslim League is loyal in Bihar and Orissa but is of very little political importance. 323.

**ARYA SAMAJ**—Arya Samaj not of much importance in Bihar and Orissa. 325.

No evidence of co-operation between the leaders in Bihar and those in other provinces. 333.

## RUSSIA.

*General Staff Appreciation. Appendix I.*—Relations with Russia have a very important bearing on military strength of India.

The anarchy in Persia, which might bring about its partition, the discharge of our obligations to the Amir of Afghanistan, or the fulfilment of our undertakings in our Agreement with Japan might involve India in difficulties with Russia. 9.

So long as Anglo-Russian Convention is observed, chance of war with Russia is not great. 10.

Addition of 174 battalions and 54 batteries to the Russian army and the improvement and expansion of Russian railways in Central Asia. 11.

*Colonel Bingley.*—Russians have increased the number of their army corps to six. These additional corps are so located that they can be moved to any quarter, but these changes need not be considered as being specially directed against India. 375.

*Sir H. McMahon.*—If we removed Afghanistan as a buffer State the Russians would not hear of any other arrangement except partition. 3201.

The Russians appear to be taking measures which, if continued, will look as if they desire to force upon us the partition of Persia although the Russian Government maintain that this is not the case. 3219.

In a war with Russia in Afghanistan we could count under the treaty with Japan on Japanese assistance. 3291.

But it might be preferable for Japan to operate against Russia in the northern parts of Manchuria or in other places. 3293.

People of Afghan-Turkistan are very friendly towards the Russians largely owing to their trade dealings with them. 3303.

We could not keep the Russians out of Afghan-Turkistan if they wanted to take it. 3305.

If the Russians occupied Afghan-Turkistan they would come in for the richest portion of Afghanistan and be so much nearer the portions which are considered of vital importance to ourselves. 3307.

Russians would think very deeply before they attempted to dismember Afghanistan. 3309.

Would fight to keep the Russians out of Seistan. 3433.

In a war with Russia, Nepalese would stick to us until we were absolutely cleared out. 3615.

Occupation of Chinese Turkistan by Russian troops removes another buffer and gives Kashmir a Russian frontier. 3754, 3756.

*Sir H. Barrow.*—In a war with Russia, Russians would content themselves in the first instance with the occupation of Badakshan, Turkistan, and the Herat Province unless they were invited to Kabul as allies by the Afghans. 3984.

In a war with Russia, we would have six months to get to Kabul and Kandahar instead of the few weeks that Army Headquarters contemplate or assume. 3992.

We can count on the support of the people of India in the event of a war with Russia, as they would suffer more than anybody else. 3996, 4002.

In a war with Russia would confine advance to Kandahar-Jalalabad plan but if the people in Afghanistan were friendly and were afraid of Russia, it would be safe for us to go to Kabul, but not otherwise. 4004.

Natives of India fear the Russians much more than a few of them dislike us. 3996, 4002.

In a war with Russia would risk alliance with Afghanistan if we had a united people clamouring for our support. 4006.

Would preserve as far as possible the buffer State between Russian and British territory. 4010.

In the event of partition of Afghanistan would not go beyond Kandahar and Jalalabad Provinces if it could be avoided. 4018.

*Sir G. Roos-Keppel.*—To most of the North-West Frontier tribes Russia is merely a name. 4824.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—Whether Russia has Afghanistan with her or not we must occupy Kabul as soon as possible. To leave Kabul alone whilst the Russians consolidated their position in Afghan-Turkistan and made preparations for crossing the Hindu Kush would mean that the Afghans might or might not go over to Russia, but would in any case go dead against us. 5343.

Cannot conceive of any situation under which we could not be in Kabul before the Russians. 5345, 5349.

In the event of war with Russia would not delay the advance on Kabul until we were asked to go there by the Afghans. 5351, 5353.

If Russia did Afghanistan a really bad turn, and the Afghans remained friendly to us, would send some troops to assist Afghans on Hindu Kush, and also occupy Kabul-Ghazni-Kandahar line. 5361.

The period that must elapse between an outbreak of war with Russia and her actual occupation of anything more than Afghan-Turkistan would afford time for the arrival of re-inforcements from England, provided we had command of the sea. 5361.

In a war with Russia, supposing Afghanistan more or less friendly, would trust Afghans but be on guard. 5361.

If we are at war with Afghanistan the friendship or neutrality of Russia can only be gained by giving her a big share in the spoils. Russia, whether she be friendly or unfriendly to us, will take Afghan-Turkistan in any circumstances. 5363.

Hindu Khush is absolutely bound to be the boundary between India and Russia in future years, does not look upon it with apprehension because knows it is coming. 5377.

As regards Afghan Turkistan, questioned the use of saying we could defend a place to which we cannot get our troops. 5379.

Does not consider it possible that our relations with Russia can continue on so friendly a footing as to make it safe for us to base the strength of the Field Army on this fact alone. 5403.

*General Birdwood.*—In a war with Russia we must occupy Kabul with least possible delay as it is the key of Afghanistan, the great strategic point of the country, the centre of its power and all its communications. 7281.

*General Hamilton Gordon.*—Early last year (1911) instructions were received that the general probability of war with Russia was not to be taken into account. 13521, 13523, 13525, 13533, 13547.

Have not troubled recently so far as complete plans of operations against Russia are concerned, but the strategical study is kept up to date and carefully revised, and on it a complete plan of operations could be very quickly prepared, more especially as the concentration tables for the preliminary moves would be much the same as for a war with Afghanistan. 13564, 13566, 13568, 13570, 13572.

On the construction of the Trans-Persian Railway, the state of affairs would be similar to what would exist if we had a conterminous frontier with Russia. 13798.

The only preparations for operations against Russia prior to 1906, that can be traced, appear to have taken the form of mobilization orders and time-tables for the concentration of troops on general mobilization. 13983.

## RUSSIAN RAILWAYS IN ASIA.

*General Staff Appreciation. Appendix I.*—Central Asian and Orenburg-Tashkent lines have had carrying capacity increased by addition of crossing stations and sidings.

Collection of materials for extension from Kaghan to Termez now proceeding.

Extension from Omsk through Vyerni to Aris will link the Siberian and Central Asian systems. 11.

*Sir H. McMahon.*—Trans-Persian Railway must add to the military and other difficult problems in India. We benefit ourselves more by joining in the present proposal for a Trans-Persian railway on our own terms than by having hereafter to link up with some other Persian railway system on less favourable terms. 3435.

Most important conditions in regard to railway would be alignment, control, break of gauge, and the conditions regarding any branch lines within our own sphere which we should insist on constructing ourselves. 3437.

Line should run along the coast for a considerable distance. 3439, 3443.

Extension of railway to Termez under consideration for a considerable time. Railway survey completed from Kaghan to Termez. 3726.

## SOUTH-EASTERN FRONTIER.

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*General Staff Appreciation. Appendix I.*—Communications between Burma and Annam difficult and unfitted for the deployment of even moderate forces. Length of communications and smallness of forces in Indo-China prevent any serious offensive by France on this frontier. 35.

Siamese army consists of 10 mixed brigades, organized, equipped and trained on modern lines. Siam capable of putting into the field some 45,000 men and 120 guns.

Siam usually friendly, and we need fear but little danger from this quarter. 36.

## WRITTEN EVIDENCE.

*Local Government : Burma.*—Burma Government has not very strongly supported any scheme for railway communication with Siam, but the Lieutenant-Governor recently welcomed the undertaking of surveys in order to obtain further information regarding the practicability of railway construction and the relative advantages of alternative routes. 303.

## STRATEGICAL RAILWAYS ON AND BEYOND FRONTIER.

*General Staff Appreciation. Appendix I.*—Work suspended on railway extensions to Parachinar and Smatzai. 12.

Trans-Persian Railway renders Bombay-Karachi standard line connexion an urgent requirement. 20.

*Colonel Bingley.*—Railheads of frontier lines have now been pushed on to Kohat, Jamrud and Chaman. 148.

Line along Indus from Attock to Darya Khan will give lateral communication. 150.

*Sir Malcolm Grover.*—Considers it desirable to proceed with the Loi-Shilman and Parachinar railways, the former taking precedence of the latter. Considers alignment advocated by the Foreign Department for the Loi-Shilman line preferable to that proposed by Lord Kitchener. The rails, sleepers, and bridge-girders on the Loi-Shilman railway have been removed as far as it had been laid. 495.

*General Dickie.*—For the Peshawar-Kabul railway prefers the route advocated by the Foreign Department to that proposed by Lord Kitchener. 1924.

On the northern line it would be absolutely impossible to push on the railway at the rate of a mile a day. 1932.

*General Aylmer.*—Considers it will be necessary to proceed with both the Loi-Shilman and Parachinar railways eventually; would take up Parachinar line first as it gives us a point nearer Kabul than the other does. For the Peshawar Kabul railway would prefer the route advocated by the Foreign Department. 2597.

Considers the establishment of direct railway communication between Bombay and Karachi as being of the greatest strategical importance, and of more importance than the Loi-Shilman and Parachinar railways. 2599.

*Sir H. McMahon.*—The whole question regarding Persia will be focussed and decided by the Trans-Persian Railway. 3257.

There seems every likelihood of the continuance of anarchy in Persia until the Trans-Persian Railway materializes. 3261.

Trans-Persian Railway must add to the military and other difficult problems in India. We benefit ourselves more by joining in the present proposal for a Trans-Persian railway on our own terms than by having hereafter to link up with some other Persian railway system on less favourable terms. 3435.

Most important conditions in regard to railway would be alignment, control, break of gauge, and the conditions regarding any branch lines within our own sphere which we should insist on constructing ourselves. 3437.

Line should run along the coast for a considerable distance. 3439, 3443.

In present circumstances considers Parachinar line should take precedence of the Loi-Shilman line. With regard to the latter, personally prefers Loi-Shilman to the river route. 3738.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—Would take up the Parachinar railway in preference to the Loi-Shilman railway. With regard to the latter prefers line advocated by Foreign Department which could be made quite safe with blockhouses suitably located and garrisoned by Mohmand levies. 4070.

From a military point of view would consider the Bombay-Sind railway connexion as money wasted. 4078.

*Sir G. Roos-Keppel.*—For a war in Afghanistan Loi-Shilman railway would almost double our strength, while the Parachinar line would be of great assistance. Would advocate the construction on the broad gauge of Kurram

railway as far as Thal if not to Parachinar itself. For the Loi-Shilman railway prefers the route advocated by Lord Kitchener. 5002.

The improvement of railway communication is more important for the defence of the North-West Frontier Province than any increase of garrisons. 5163.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—The completion of the 1st Division area communications up the Kurram and Khyber should in any case be carried out. 5257.

Had the Loi-Shilman and Parachinar railways been completed, the saving of expense and time on mobilization would have been great and the saving in transport animals still greater. 5283.

The development of railway communication has placed us in a much better position for dealing with Afghanistan than was the case in 1878-80, and the further extension of our railways would make our task far lighter. 5363.

The Loi-Shilman and Parachinar lines are absolutely necessary. Would certainly advance the Kohat-Thal line to Parachinar. Ordinarily speaking, would have taken the Loi-Shilman line first for which he prefers the river route to that decided on by Lord Kitchener. 5405.

Does not consider that under present circumstances the large expenditure that would be involved in opening up direct railway communication between Bombay and Karachi is justifiable. 5407.

*General Birdwood.*—The completion of the Loi-Shilman and Parachinar railways would tend to remove the handicap on mobilization. 7207, 7281.

Essential for us to extend our frontier railways to the foot of the Peiwar Kotal, and to our frontier in the direction of Dakka. 7207, 7281.

The development of railway communication in India has put us in a much better position for dealing with Afghanistan than we were in during 1878-80. 7305.

Most desirable to proceed with the Khyber and Parachinar railways. For the Loi-Shilman railway prefers the route advocated by the Foreign Department to that chosen by Lord Kitchener. 7324.

Order to dismantle the Loi-Shilman railway came after Lord Kitchener's time. 7332.

Advisable to establish direct railway communication between Bombay and Karachi. Quite possible that it might turn out a success financially. 7336.

In the event of operations beyond the North-West Frontier it is proposed :—

- (a) On the northern line to use a light railway from near Dakka to Jalalabad or possibly Nimla. There are certain difficulties connected with the haulage of railway material through the Khyber, and some of the heavier pieces will have to be sent by river from Warsak to Dakka, but it is hoped these difficulties will be overcome.
- (b) On the central line it is proposed to lay a light railway from Thal to Parachinar or possibly Peiwar village.
- (c) On the southern line any railway extension that may be ordered will be done on the broad gauge.

Plans of railway operations in detail for both (a) and (b) are being worked out on the assumption that sufficient railway material will be at hand at Landi Khana for (a) so that there will be no delay or confusion in getting to work on these two lines on the outbreak of war.

There are no proposals at present to use mono-railways, and believes that experiments made with these have not proved a success.

On the North-East Frontier, so far as can be seen at present, any railway extension would be on the metre gauge. 15552.

*Captain Birney.*—By paying the local tribesmen, the Kabul river railway could be kept secure in time of war. 8870, 8876.

At present working on a scheme to take a certain amount of railway material up the road to Landi Kotal and, if we want any further railway extension, we would take rolling stock over and put it down from Dakka to Jalalabad. 8958.

Could get locomotives over the Khyber. 8962.

Reserves of rails and plant maintained for use in war:—20 tank engines, 240 general service trucks, 22 brake vans, 139-90 miles of rails and fastenings, and sleepers for 138-161 miles. 8974.

*Sir T. Wynne.*—To complete the Kabul river railway up to mile 300 (29 miles from Kacha Garhi) would take about  $7\frac{1}{2}$  months. 8862.

If we extended the line and took the river route, it would take about 3 years to bring the railway to Smatzai. To be of any use for war purposes on this alignment it must be carried there, as there is no place between Warsak and Smatzai where a railway terminal base could be formed. 8864, 8884.

For the Kabul railway the best alignment is along the Kabul river. If at mile 300 the alignment up to Shilman Gakke was adopted by the Loi-Shilman nullah, it would take about two years to complete a 2' 6" line, and from Shilman Gakke, about another year and a half. 8884, 8886.

From Dakka to Kabul it would be impossible to advance the railway at the rate of a mile a day. 8896.

If we used a 2' 6" line through, it would reduce the cost very largely, and at the same time give sufficient carrying capacity. 8902, 8904, 8906.

Could always borrow stock for 2' 6" line. 8914.

It would take three or four months, or about a third of a mile a day to construct a line from Dakka to Jalalabad, the trouble is not in laying the rails but in making the formation. 8926.

If a cart road is now constructed from Thal to Parachinar with grades, curves, and bridging suitable to take a 2' 6" gauge railway, the rails can be laid on this road and the line opened up for traffic in one month's time. If road is not made, a 2' 6" line can be laid partly along the river bed under favourable conditions in 3 or 4 months but it would be liable to interruptions of traffic in time of floods, in which case the line might be washed away. 8928.

For the Parachinar railway would prefer a 2' 6" gauge. 8933.

A road to Dakka might be made to take rails when required. 8935.

Rails could be laid down for the Chaman to Kandahar line in about 3 months. 8966.

For this railway would continue the present broad gauge line; the material is already stored at Chaman. 8970.

For the Bombay-Karachi connexion, if the alignment were taken through Cutch, expenditure would be much reduced. Otherwise Bombay and Karachi could not be connected without involving large unproductive expenditure. The Cutch alignment was abandoned for political reasons. 8976.

The responsibility for constructing new railways beyond the frontier in war time rests with the Railway Board, and various schemes for this purpose have been drawn out. It is better to entrust the construction of such railways to the railway authorities. 9021.

A rope-way would help us in getting supplies over the Khyber: would probably have to work it with electricity. 9047.



## TREATIES, CONVENTIONS—AGREEMENTS, ETC.

*General Staff Appreciation. Appendix I.*—Anglo-Japanese Agreement 3.  
Agreement with the Amir of Afghanistan. 4.

Protection of Kashmir against external aggression guaranteed. 5, 27.

Indian Government pledged to defend special rights and privileges of Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim States in Tibet. 5.

Anglo-Russian Convention equal in importance to agreement with Japan ; as regards Afghanistan, the Convention has not yet received the assent of Amir.

Desire to uphold Anglo-Russian Convention not universal in either England or Russia.

Anglo-Russian Convention being acted upon by the two contracting parties. 10, 13, 22.

Treaty with the Nizam of Hyderabad *re* troops for safety of his person and suppression of disorder in his dominions. 124.

Ancient treaty for the protection of the Gaikwar of Baroda. 108.

*General Aylmer.*—In regard to the Agreement with Afghanistan cannot regard any agreement between a civilized and a barbarous Power as satisfactory. 2533.

Considers that alliance with Afghanistan will prove disastrous to us. 2547.

*Sir H. McMahon.*—The policy of His Majesty's Government is to endeavour to maintain and strengthen the present *entente* with Russia on the basis of our Convention. 3197.

We are only called upon to give the Amir assistance if he follows our advice. 3207, 3227.

The Amir has never consented to the Afghan clauses of the Anglo-Russian Convention and will never probably do so. 3213, 3230, 3241.

Anglo-Japanese Alliance in conjunction with Anglo-Russian Convention is a strong factor for peace. 3231, 3237.

Validity of Anglo-Russian Convention not at present affected by the Amir not having subscribed to it, but it is doubtless open to Russia in the future to question its validity on this ground. 3239.

A party of Grand Dukes, etc. in Russia who would like to see the Convention set aside. 3243.

It will be to the increasing interest of Russia for many years to come to maintain a friendly understanding with us. 3279.

In the Treaty with Japan, the phrase "Eastern Asia and India" includes Afghanistan. 3289.

For the purposes of the present enquiry, the Anglo-Japanese Agreement and the Anglo-Russian Convention are likely to prove of equal permanence. 3295.

The Agreement with the Amir has the very highest value. He is never likely to break the Agreement as long as we ourselves adhere to it. 3297.

Our obligations in respect of Afghanistan should be carried out to the letter. 3393.

*Sir E. Borrow.*—In a war with Russia would risk alliance with Afghanistan if we had a united people clamouring for our support. 4006.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—In regard to Afghanistan, a nation so treacherous and barbarous keeps no agreements and only acknowledges superior force. 5361.

## UNREST AND SEDITION.

*General Staff Appreciation. Appendix I.*—Growth of sedition. Effect of the victory of Japan over Russia awakened long-slumbering national aspirations and a hatred of European domination.

Sedition in India encouraged by attitude of certain politicians at Home.

Agitation for political independence in India varies from (i) the same degree of autonomy as the self-governing Dominions, to (ii) complete revolution and independence.

No political propaganda can rouse the people from their apathy unless it is associated with religion. Promoters of sedition therefore careful to find religious motives for their activities.

Leaders of extremist movement have made a study of anarchical methods, and extremists work on the fears of the timorous by assassination, bomb-throwing, and political dacoities.

Considerable supply of revolvers has been distributed throughout the country. Cargoes of rifles could probably be landed at some of the smaller ports, more especially at places like Goa and Pondicherry. 43.

Sikhs have to some extent succumbed to influence of political agitators, and can no longer be implicitly relied on. 59.

Sikhs have taken up questions of education and social reform and joined in general outcry for greater local autonomy. Propaganda of sedition inculcated by native Press done much to undermine Sikh loyalty. 60.

*Colonel Bingley.*—Agitators who 'get at' agricultural population indirectly 'get at' the troops. 249.

Whole idea of agitators is "India for the Indians" but the more moderate of the agitators hope India will enjoy the same degree of independence as our self-governing dominions possess. 261.

Writings and speeches of political agitators disclose fact that they have studied methods of Italian and French revolutionists. Political agitators incite people to anarchy and violence and compare the British to the Moghuls. 263.

Underlying idea is, Punjab for the Sikhs, Bengal for the Bengalis, etc., 265.

Reformers are swept off their feet and become extremists. 267.

Co-operation of the civil and military authorities in obtaining information regarding the spread of sedition in India generally and in the army. 284.

Overwhelming evidence to shew that in the Deccan, the Punjab and Bengal there is a distinct nationalist movement directed against British rule. 305.

Seditionists are adopting new methods. Spread of education increasing the aspirations of the people. 309.

Danger of combination against British rule largely counteracted by the rivalries and religious differences of the various classes. But although classes are divided they are always ready to unite whenever it is a case of European *versus* Indian. 333, 337.

Muhammadans may be swayed by a series of circumstances outside India about which we may be powerless, and are therefore more dangerous than the Hindus. 345.

Does not consider that Muhammadans would go against us in the event of a general rising; Muhammadan sentiment against Sikhs and Hindus. 348.

*Major Jackson.*—Agitators now cloak their methods under the guise of social progress, and use all sorts of societies as stalking horses to try to get at the troops. These methods just as efficacious as more direct methods and add to difficulty of getting hold of agitators and convicting them. 325.

The people are now prejudiced and suspicious. 327.

Common ground upon which Hindus and Muhammadans might unite. In the annulment of the partition of Bengal Muhammadans imagined that their interests had been sacrificed to appease Hindu agitation. 350.

*Sir M. Grover.*—The fact that the Japanese beat the Russians has had an influence on the country generally. 416.

*Sir C. Cleveland.*—Muhammadan population is inflammable, and he would not be surprised if Young Muhammadan movement drove it to take action. 953.

Considers we are going to get a rather dangerous class of Young Muhammadans who have not yet settled what their policy is to be. Cannot imagine combination between Muhammadans and Hindus, but that does not necessarily mean that there may not be a Muhammadan danger. 959.

Exhibition of weakness on the part of Government might have the effect of combining them. 963.

In the event of a Sikh outbreak it would be bad statesmanship if we could not get Muhammadans to rally to us. 967.

So long as we are not hopelessly involved in Europe, nothing but weak government would tempt the Indian people to combine. 969.

The Press Act has had a tremendous effect; men who wish to write open sedition cannot stay in India in safety. 1083.

Agitators using temperance and other apparently innocent movements as a cloak for anti-British work. 1113, 1115.

The year 1904 saw the beginning of a movement, we are now at the end of it. 1179.

It was due to the deportations of Lajpat Rai and Ajit Singh that readiness to act openly declined after 1907. 1185.

The deportations of 1908 shewed that the Government meant business, but their effect was a little spoilt by the knowledge that they did not command the sympathy of the people at Home. 1187.

The agitators in 1907 expected the army to get excited and to take sides with them, or at any rate to refuse to act against them. 1197, 1199.

In India there are very few real fanatics who would move from sheer hatred of the Government. 1201.

If we were at war on the Indian frontier and met with some disaster, we should have a number of other people to deal with. 1203.

Does not think the great bulk of the population has been seriously affected by sedition. 1274.

There are a good many instances of political preachers being sent out in the guise of *sadhus*, but there is no reason for thinking that the genuine *fakirs*, *yogis*, etc., have taken wholesale to political or anti-British preaching as part of their religion or professional stock-in-trade. 1308.

*Mr. Fenton.*—The measures taken by the Government, the Press Act, Seditious Meetings Act, etc., have entirely suppressed any possibility of serious agitation; but there will, of course, always be secret intrigue. 1670.

In the event of disaffection, the stronger the policy the better, nothing is gained by letting disloyal people believe they are considered to be loyal. 1740.

Sikhs would like to be supreme in the Punjab, whereas Hindus would like to wield a general influence over the whole of India. 1764.

Present object of the Muhammadans is only to secure larger recognition without actually supplanting British supremacy. 1766.

Muhammadans dwell considerably on the Turco-Italian war. 1774.

There would have to be some very binding cause to unite all communities together to move against us; at present knows of none. 1798.

All that is required is that the Government should take strong action against disaffection. 1810.

*Mr. Wheeler.*—Muhammadans resent any imputation that the interests of any members of their religion are not the interests of all. 2113, 2115.

Turco-Italian War has had a somewhat disturbing effect on Muhammadans in the United Provinces. 2217.

Young Muhammadans inclined to advocate in Muhammadan interests action similar to that of Hindus. 2223.

*General Aylmer.*—The general unrest among the educated classes is likely to go on increasing till something forcible happens which will give it a check. 2603.

A Muhammadan rising would be more dangerous than a Hindu rising. 2767.

*Mr. Lovett.*—Possibility of a temporary rapprochement between Hindus and Muhammadans, but does not believe in a permanent alliance between them. 2866 (annexure), 3007.

Does not think the Young Muhammadans will ever get all the power they want. 2886.

Young Muhammadans might like to, but would not think seriously of getting rid of British rule. 2890.

Nothing has influenced the people of India as to their political future more than the victory of Japan over Russia. 2937 (Annexure).

*Sir H. McMahon.*—Any attempt to impair or destroy the integrity of Afghanistan will be bitterly resented by Muhammadans throughout the world and more especially by those of India. 3197.

The advent of the Baghdad Railway to the shores of the Persian Gulf is likely to have but small effect on Indian Muhammadans. A *jihad* started by the Amir would stir up not only the border tribes but disturb the Muhammadans of the whole of India. 3515.

The tendency to look to the Sultan is declining and the Muhammadans of India and Afghanistan are gradually coming to consider the Amir as the Head of Islam. 3553, 3557, 3559.

Turco-Italian War has had a great effect on Indian Muhammadans. 3682, 3686.

Hindus more dangerous than Muhammadans. 3696, 3698.

*Sir E. Barrow.*—Since 1904 seditionists have worked in collaboration and produced the present unfavourable situation. 4084.

We could suppress sedition, given firmness on the part of the Government and a wise policy. 4096.

Muhammadans undoubtedly look more to Constantinople than to the Amir. 4290.

The Hindu agitator will take advantage of any Muhammadan unrest or discontent. 4294.

The further apart we keep Hindus and Muhammadans the better. 4294.

Muhammadan danger greater than the Hindu. 4296.

*Sir G. Roos-Keppel.*—If we had a revolt on the part of the Sikhs and Hindus, and we wanted the frontier tribes they would come in thousands, bring their own arms, and pay their own expenses. 4960.

*Sir J. Willcocks.*—The internal situation in India today is, from a military point of view, better than it was in 1904 and 1907 because we all realize that sedition and unrest exist and will remain, and knowledge is power. 5409.

Only the highly educated Muhammadans look much to the Sultan of Turkey. 5557.

*Governor in Council, Bombay.*—The schools and colleges annually turn out a large number of youths into whose minds hostility has been instilled and who have been led to believe that they could and ought to assume the government of the country, and further, the great spread of primary education which is taking place will in no long time render a far greater proportion of the population accessible to seditious propaganda than at present. 6845 (Annexure II, paragraph 22).

The necessity for retaining the present powers of controlling the Press are manifest. 6863 (Annexure II, paragraph 22).

Sedition in India may be said to have three objects :—

- (1) Assassination of Government officials with the idea of coercing Government to make political concessions. Conspiracies with this object may be either local or may have ramifications all over India.
- (2) A propaganda of disloyalty in the native army.
- (3) Attempts to stir up the civil population to revolt, which if not promptly quelled, might spread to serious dimensions.

(2) and (3) have mainly to be considered and (3) could not be serious in ordinary times if (2) proved unsuccessful. Complications in Europe are the main hope of the seditious party in India, and even if the situation at Home was not really critical, wild exaggerations brought to bear upon an ignorant population which had been previously prepared might produce dangerous unrest. 6888 (Annexure II, paragraph 21).

While isolated and disjointed political unrest and disturbance will usually be the work of Hindu malcontents, organized and widespread disaffection may, in favourable conditions, result from Musalman influence. 6915 (Annexure II, paragraph 7).

Although at the present moment there is an apparent cessation of the revolutionary movements of the last few years, it must not be supposed that activities of this nature have been permanently abandoned. On the contrary, there are signs that seditious organizations are only in abeyance and that, if at any time political agitation is revived, anarchist outrages will follow in its train. In the meantime, it must be assumed that the attempt to bring local centres of sedition into touch still proceeds. 6721 (Annexure II, paragraph 20).

History has plainly shown that the Muhammadan religion is capable of overriding differences of race and hereditary traditions of hostility and of combining its heterogeneous followers in a common movement to an extent that is possible to no other religion. Sectarian differences, however numerous, and racial prejudices, which in India are profound, may be sunk in a combined movement under Muhammadan leadership, but it is almost impossible to imagine a combination of circumstances which would render joint action under Hindu leadership and organization remotely conceivable. If a lead is ever to be taken in India in a united national movement, that lead must almost inevitably proceed from—or at least be dependent upon—the support of Islam. 6915 (Annexure II, paragraph 7).

The possibilities of Muhammadan unrest depend largely on circumstances external to India, and the Bombay Government believe that it is difficult at this moment to exaggerate the great and growing importance in their effect upon Musalman opinion and feeling in certain parts of India of current events in Europe and in Persia. The growth of a homogeneous sentiment among Muhammadans is a factor which will become increasingly difficult as time goes on and it is one which cannot specially be ignored in any reasonable forecast of the measures necessary for securing internal peace in the various provinces of India whenever either external menace is present or local troubles occur. 6920 (Annexure II, paragraph 8).

Of the utmost importance that there should never be any weakening of the British element in the personnel of the Imperial Civil Services. 6954 (Annexure II, paragraph 9).

*Mr. Curtis.*—The method of some agitators in using the temperance movement as a cloak for spreading disaffection is helped by the utterances of some missionaries and other Europeans who think that the Government has been slack in encouraging temperance. 6648.

Tilak's removal had great effect; he is a born leader, and trouble is anticipated in the Bombay Presidency when he is released. Regards Tilak as most dangerous to British interests. 6771, 6773.

Does not think Mr. Gokhale has that intense and absolute hatred for the white man that Tilak has. Gokhale is willing to work with the white man but Tilak is so bitter that one cannot parley with him. 6810.

Tilak's influence is unimpaired, and when he is released he will be received with the greatest possible enthusiasm. 6822, 6824.

Hopes to see a careful watch kept in order to see that extremist views are not preached to students by the educational staff. 6842.

Have had a great deal of trouble with plays because the actors 'gag' continually. The censorship of printed or manuscript copies of the plays is thus rendered useless on account of this 'gagging.' Some time ago these plays exercised much influence, but they are now censored as much as possible. 6869, 6871.

The movement in favour of political assassination has been abandoned, but can never tell when it will come up again. The police have been able to stop assassinations which would otherwise have taken place thus leading to the abandonment of the policy, and the police have now a thorough grip of the situation. 6885, 6889.

Does not think that the Turco-Italian War, events in Morocco and the state of affairs in Persia had much influence on Bombay Presidency Muhammadans. 6915.

The working of the Arms Act is satisfactory in Bombay. It might be desirable to make everybody take out licenses for arms. There should be no exceptions. Should not of course prevent the possession of guns by those legitimately entitled to have them, but there should be no leakage in the application of the Arms Act. The registration of arms should be either free or a small fee charged to cover its working. 6932, 6934, 6936.

The idea of having an inspector in every district belonging to the Criminal Investigation Department to enquire into the character and teaching of the schoolmasters is worth consideration. 6845.

*Mr. Kennedy.*—The last political assassination was engineered from India House, London. 6888.

The educated minority of Muhammadans in the Bombay Presidency discuss the Turco-Italian War because they are interested in it. Would add in regard to Morocco, Persia, and the Tripolitan War, that educated Muhammadans are asking why Great Britain cannot intervene to protect Muhammadans now as in years gone by when Turkey was threatened. 6916.

The Muhammadans of India have no real community of interest and are not a homogeneous body. They are, of course, one in religion, but not in habits. They hold the Amir in great respect. 6920, 6924.

Of the utmost importance that there should never be any weakening of the British element in the personnel of the Imperial Civil Services from which the British staffs are manned, more particularly in those of the Indian Civil Service and the police. 6955.

*Mr. Hughes-Buller.*—Hindus distrust Muhammadans too much to take them into the Samitis. 7800.

Local autonomy advocated by the Congress is certainly a serious and dangerous aspiration. 7829.

*Major Hill.*—There is still a feeling of unrest, and there always must be, and the better educated the people become, the greater will become the unrest. 11360.

*Colonel Cole.*—The events of 1907, the sedition-monger, the length of the war in South Africa, the Japanese War, education and religious activity in India, have all tended to awaken thoughts which did not exist before, and cannot be smothered. Thoughts that the native soldier is equal to or better than the British soldier and that the educated native is equal to the white man, are spreading through the country. 13235.

#### WRITTEN EVIDENCE.

*Lieutenant-Governor in Council, Bihar and Orissa.*—Indications are not wanting that an under-current of anti-European feeling is growing in the Northern part of Bihar and Orissa. 323.

The tendency of certain newspapers in Bihar and Orissa, as well as of a large and important section of the Calcutta Press, is to lower the prestige of European officials. 323, 331.

Though there was a certain degree of sympathy with Turkey in the war with Italy, and though a certain number of Muhammadans were disposed to consider that more active exertions might have been made to prevent the spoliation of Turkey, there was no indication of any general unrest or of any feeling of hostility to Government on that account. 337, 339.

As a body, the Muhammadans of Bihar and Orissa are backward and they take little interest in general politics or in matters which do not directly concern themselves. Some of the younger members of the educated section of the community, especially those who have been in England, have always shown a more or less active sympathy with the National Congress but there is no outward sign yet of any general tendency to support it, or to take common action with the Hindus in political matters. 337.

With few exceptions, the Native Press in Bihar and Orissa is of little importance. The *Biharee* has been publishing a series of articles tending to excite a bitter feeling against the indigo planters, and it is also prone to attack the public actions of Government servants. It has not been necessary to utilize the Press Act in Bihar and Orissa. 341.

On the whole, the Arms Act works satisfactorily in Bihar and Orissa but it has certain defects which have been brought to the notice of Government. More stringent restrictions are needed in the case of revolvers, automatic pistols and repeating rifles. 343.

## WASTAGE IN WAR.

## ANIMALS.

*General Aylmer.*—General Staff estimates of war wastages for officers and men of the Field Army too high, and those for horses of the Field Army and for internal defence troops too low. 2810.

*General Birdwood.*—In addition to the 31,300 mules always maintained 27,000 would be required to cover requirements on mobilization and a year's wastage. 7023.

The annual wastage in horseflesh is estimated as follows:—

British cavalry	...	...	...	50 per cent.
Artillery	...	...	...	25 " "
Native cavalry	...	...	...	30 " "

but inclined to think that these figures are pitched too low and would suggest that the basis of calculation should be:—

Artillery	...	...	...	30 per cent.
Cavalry	...	...	...	60 " "

15235, 15253, 15257, 15261, 15281.

Statement shewing approximate wastage in horseflesh in various wars. 15253, 15259.

*General Hamilton Gordon.*—In preparing the figures for war wastage, those laid down in Field Service Regulations, which are prepared by the Imperial General Staff, are accepted. 13907.

*Major Annesley.*—A bullock corps would have to be replaced in a year. 16092.

The wastage in camels would be about the same as that of bullocks. 16094.



## WASTAGE IN WAR.

## MEN.

*General Aylmer.*—General Staff estimates of war wastages for officers and men of the Field Army too high, and those for horses of the Field Army and for internal defence troops too low. 2810.

Would have 750 reservists for each infantry battalion to meet deficiencies on mobilization and wastage for a year. 8203, 8355, 8371.

If you add the reservists to the present peace establishment there are not enough men to cover wastages in war. 8353.

*Sir F. Barrow.*—Does not agree with the General Staff estimate of casualties among British officers during the first year of a war. 4470.

*General Birdwood.*—The wastage of British officers with native regiments is under-estimated, as such officers from their colour alone must always be conspicuous. 7421, 7427.

*Surgeon General Sloggett.*—Able to meet the requirements of an army in the field for six weeks as regards medical officers. 10214.

Estimates wastage in one year amongst fighting troops at 50 per cent. 10365.

Considers the General Staff estimates of 80 per cent. wastage among officers as rather excessive. 10369.

*Major Hill.*—In a war with Afghanistan or the tribes, the casualties amongst British officers would be heavier than they were in previous campaigns, as the Afghans and tribesmen are better armed than they were. 11094.

*Colonel Dunsterville.*—In case of war, casualties among British officers would be very heavy and it would therefore be dangerous to reduce the peace strength, and further it would be more necessary than ever to have a reserve of officers to fall back upon. 11418.

*General Hamilton Gordon.*—In preparing the figures for war wastage, those laid down in Field Service Regulations, which are prepared by the Imperial General Staff, are accepted. 13957.

Wastage is calculated on the troops concentrated for the commencement of a campaign and on reinforcements from the dates on which they are estimated to have joined the Field Army. 13957.

Due allowances are understood to have been made in the figures of the Imperial General Staff for the recovery of a certain proportion of the wounded and sick. 13957.

The calculations in the Field Service Regulations were based on all the big European campaigns for which there are figures, including the Napoleonic campaigns. 13953.

It is more or less easy to find figures giving the numbers of killed and wounded and sometimes of sick and those who recovered from wounds or sickness, but the numbers of those who were missing or deserted, or disappeared for various other reasons do not appear to have been kept in accessible form. 13988.

For purposes of our calculations it must be assumed that officers, British and native, will come into the same percentage of casualties. 13992.

*Colonel Hamilton.*—Reservists would be moved up in drafts to keep the battalion which was on field service up to its normal strength. 14691.





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